The Barrani Clarification: Utah Supreme Court Affirms Public-Duty Shield for Municipal Inaction on Homeless Encampments

Introduction

Barrani v. Salt Lake City, 2025 UT 25, confronts the collision of two increasingly visible social realities: (i) the growth of unsheltered encampments on city property and (ii) the frustration of nearby residents and business owners who experience crime, disorder, and economic loss. Nine Salt Lake City residents and business owners (“Residents”) sued the City alleging that its failure to remove encampments constituted both public and private nuisance. They demanded an injunction or, alternatively, a writ of mandamus compelling the City to act. The Third District Court dismissed the complaint, invoking the common-law public duty doctrine. On direct appeal, the Utah Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, holding that:

The public duty doctrine, now codified at Utah Code § 63G-7-202(5), bars nuisance claims predicated on governmental omissions that affect the public at large.
Salt Lake City’s role as a landowner does not strip it of the doctrine’s protection; any abatement would rely on sovereign enforcement powers, not purely proprietary capacities.
No special relationship existed between the City and the Residents sufficient to lift the public-duty bar.

Summary of the Judgment

Chief Justice Durrant, writing for a unanimous Court, delivered four principal holdings:

Continued Vitality & Codification. The 2014 amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act (GIA) affirmed—not abrogated—the common-law public duty doctrine.
Scope of the Doctrine. The doctrine shields governmental entities from tort liability for inactive omissions in executing public duties (e.g., policing, code enforcement). It does not protect affirmative misconduct.
Application to Barrani. Residents’ claims rest on the City’s failure to exercise enforcement power to disperse encampments—an omission grounded in duties owed to the public at large. Therefore, the doctrine precludes the nuisance suit.
No Special Relationship. Mere ownership or occupation of property adjoining city land does not create a special relationship; the harms cited (trespass, drug use, threats) can befall any member of the public.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Obray v. Malmberg (1971) – Utah’s first articulation of the public duty doctrine; sheriffs owed duties to the public, not individual crime victims.
Webb v. University of Utah (2005) – Clarified two meanings of special relationship and limited doctrine to omissions.
Cope v. Utah Valley State College (2014) – Reaffirmed the doctrine, distinguished omissions from affirmative acts, and recognized statutory codification.
Lamarr v. UDOT (1992, Ct. App.) – Held that a city owes no duty to control homeless persons under an overpass; relied upon here as factually analogous.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821C – Defines public vs. special injuries in nuisance context; cited to show Residents did not suffer injuries different in kind.

These authorities collectively reinforced the Court’s view that government is not a universal insurer and that individualized tort liability must arise only where the governmental actor has singled out or undertaken specific obligations toward the plaintiff.

2. Legal Reasoning

Statutory Endorsement. Quoting floor debates and committee testimony, the Court deemed § 63G-7-202(5) a legislative endorsement that preserved, not replaced, common-law doctrine.
Identification of Duty. The Court framed the asserted duty as enforcement of laws and abatement of encampments for the benefit of all residents—undeniably public.
Omission vs. Commission. Residents alleged non-enforcement. Because this is passive inaction, the doctrine applies; had the City bulldozed property unlawfully (an affirmative act), liability could attach.
Landowner Argument Rejected. To abate encampments, the City would necessarily invoke sovereign powers (orders, police, citations). Therefore, the claim cannot be re-characterised as purely proprietary land-management.
No Special Relationship. Special relationships arise from governmental affirmative conduct that induces reliance (e.g., promises of protection, custody). Physical adjacency is fluid and gives Residents no qualitative distinction from other city dwellers.

3. Potential Impact

The decision has wide ramifications:

Homelessness Litigation. Property owners in Utah will face a steep hurdle if they attempt to compel municipalities to clear encampments through tort theories. Political, not judicial, remedies will dominate.
Government-Private Distinction. Clarifies that public entities do not automatically assume private-landowner duties for nuisances on public land; plaintiffs must show affirmative misconduct or statutory waiver.
Expansion of Immunity Doctrine. By fusing the doctrine with GIA immunity, the Court solidifies an additional shield even outside classic negligence (e.g., in nuisance, trespass, or other torts rooted in omissions).
Policy Considerations. Municipalities may feel emboldened to prioritize resources without fear of nuisance suits but could face political backlash; conversely, residents may lobby legislatures for statutory exceptions or funding mandates.
Guidance for Counsel. Plaintiffs contemplating suit must now (i) allege an affirmative governmental act, or (ii) plead a clearly delineated special relationship—mere proximity will not suffice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Public Duty Doctrine: A rule that a government entity is not liable in tort for failing to carry out duties owed to everyone (e.g., policing), unless a special relationship exists.
Special Relationship: When the government, by its own affirmative act, creates a unique, individualized duty to a person (e.g., taking someone into custody, issuing a specific promise of protection).
Nuisance (Public vs. Private): Public Nuisance: An unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.
Private Nuisance: A substantial and unreasonable interference with the private use or enjoyment of land.
Governmental Immunity Act (GIA): Utah statute waiving and limiting governmental liability; § 63G-7-202(5) codifies the public duty doctrine.
Affirmative Act vs. Omission: Liability attaches more readily to active misconduct (bulldozing a house) than to failure to act (not patrolling a street).

Conclusion

Barrani v. Salt Lake City cements a bright-line principle in Utah jurisprudence: Governmental inaction—even when it creates or perpetuates serious quality-of-life harms—remains immune from tort liability absent a special relationship or statutory waiver. The Court clarified that a municipality’s ownership of public land does not convert public enforcement duties into private landowner obligations. Residents adversely affected by homeless encampments must therefore pursue legislative, administrative, or political avenues rather than nuisance litigation. In the broader legal landscape, Barrani strengthens the protective canopy of the public duty doctrine and offers a textbook roadmap for future courts confronting similar claims across varied public-service contexts.