The Barnes Rule: Recruiting and Directing a Single Accomplice Constitutes Supervisory Role under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) and Bars Safety-Valve Relief

1. Introduction

United States v. Zachary Barnes, decided by the Seventh Circuit on 26 June 2025, addresses a recurring sentencing quandary: when does a defendant’s authority over a single partner in crime rise to the level of a “manager or supervisor” under § 3B1.1(c) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and what follows for the statutory “safety-valve” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)?

The appeal arrived from the Northern District of Indiana, where Mr. Barnes pleaded guilty to a methamphetamine conspiracy. The district court added a two-level role enhancement for supervising one co-conspirator (Marquese Neal) and, as a direct consequence, found Barnes ineligible for the safety-valve that would otherwise have allowed a sentence below the ten-year mandatory minimum. Barnes challenged both determinations, asserting that he and Neal were equals and that the enhancement—and the loss of safety-valve relief—was unjustified.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. In doing so it crystallised a practical rule of sentencing law: if the defendant recruits, supplies, and directs even a single subordinate participant, and retains the fruits of the operation, a § 3B1.1(c) enhancement is proper; that finding, by statute, forecloses safety-valve relief. This commentary unpacks the judgment, its reasoning, its reliance on precedent, and its future ramifications.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Seventh Circuit affirmed both the two-level enhancement under § 3B1.1(c) and the resulting denial of safety-valve relief.
• The panel (per Judge Hamilton) held that the district court’s credibility determination in favour of co-conspirator Neal was not clearly erroneous.
• Barnes’s acts of recruiting Neal, organising logistics, supplying the drugs, directing deliveries, and collecting proceeds collectively established supervisory authority even though the conspiracy involved only two active participants.
• Because § 3553(f)(4) cross-references § 3B1.1, a defendant who qualifies for any leadership role enhancement is automatically disqualified from the safety-valve; thus Barnes was statutorily barred from obtaining a sentence below the ten-year minimum.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court wove an extensive tapestry of prior cases to support two pillars: (a) deference to credibility findings and (b) interpretation of “manager or supervisor.”

1. United States v. Flores-Olague (2013) – Reiterated de novo review of guideline application and clear-error review of facts.
2. United States v. Cruz-Rea (2010) – Explained that choosing between two permissible factual inferences cannot be clear error.
3. United States v. Etchin (2010); United States v. Ortiz (2005) – Emphasised extraordinary deference to a sentencing judge’s credibility assessment.
4. United States v. Weaver (2013); United States v. Martinez (2008); United States v. Sainz-Preciado (2009) – Clarified that § 3B1.1 does not require formal command; coordinating or orchestrating is enough.
5. United States v. House (2018); United States v. Craft (2024) – Provided the “common-sense hierarchy” lens for role assessments; Craft’s discussion of recruiting helpers featured prominently.
6. United States v. Grigsby (2012); United States v. Watts (2008) – Upheld enhancements where the defendant enlisted others into the scheme.
7. United States v. Fox (2008) – Factually close to Barnes; defendant arranged deals and sent an associate to deliver contraband.
8. United States v. Vargas (1994) – A counter-example in which the enhancement was reversed because the defendant lacked authority over others; the panel distinguished Barnes by noting his exclusive control of logistics and proceeds.
9. United States v. May (2014) – Demonstrated that receipt of a § 3B1.1 enhancement automatically disables safety-valve eligibility.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Credibility Findings
The district court believed Neal. Barnes attacked Neal’s inconsistencies (exact drug weights, car-loan anecdote, etc.), but appellate review of credibility is “virtually never” clear error unless the testimony is physically impossible or patently incredible. None of Neal’s missteps met that threshold, and key parts were corroborated by texts and surveillance footage.

b. Application of § 3B1.1(c)
To invoke the two-level enhancement the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted as an organiser, leader, manager, or supervisor of at least one other participant. The panel highlighted three decisive facts:

• Barnes recruited Neal and paid him in marijuana.
• Barnes exercised decision-making authority: he set prices, chose meeting spots, bundled pistol-drug deals, and fielded customer inquiries.
• Barnes delegated operational tasks—principally deliveries—to Neal but retained the proceeds.

That constellation of conduct mirrored the illustrative factors in Application Note 4 and the holdings of Fox, Grigsby, and Craft. The absence of a formal hierarchy or multiple underlings was immaterial; supervising one person is enough under subsection (c).

c. Safety-Valve Consequence
By statute, § 3553(f)(4) denies safety-valve relief to any defendant who “was an organiser, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offence, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.” Because the supervisory finding was affirmed, Barnes’s ineligibility for the safety-valve followed as a matter of law, making additional arguments (such as the firearm factor under § 3553(f)(2)) moot.

3.3 Anticipated Impact

• Lower threshold for supervisory status. The opinion cements that recruitment plus logistical control over a single subordinate suffices—courts need not find explicit command structures.
• Guidance for district judges. Sentencers can lean on a “common-sense hierarchy” test without checklist formalism. Written credibility explanations, as Chief Judge Brady supplied, will likely survive appellate scrutiny.
• Strategic implications for counsel. Prosecutors may emphasise even minor delegation acts to secure the enhancement and thereby defeat safety-valve arguments. Defence counsel will need to focus sharply on disputing factual hierarchies—particularly at the evidentiary-hearing stage—because appellate relief will be rare.
• Consistency among circuits. Other circuits (e.g., the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh) have adopted similar readings; Barnes adds Seventh Circuit bite, promoting nationwide uniformity.
• Sentencing disparity check. The decision indirectly warns small-scale dealers that using couriers—even friends paid in kind—can vault them over the safety-valve wall and expose them to mandatory minimums.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c)

A provision of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that adds two levels to the offence level when a defendant is found to have organised, led, managed, or supervised at least one other participant, but the overall criminal activity involved fewer than five participants and was not otherwise extensive.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) – “Safety-Valve”

A statutory escape hatch from mandatory minimum sentences for certain non-violent, low-level drug offenders who meet five criteria. Criterion (4) bars relief if the defendant had a leadership role, linking directly to § 3B1.1.

Standard of Review: “Clear Error”

On appeal, factual findings stand unless left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake occurred. Mere disagreement is insufficient; the error must be unmistakable.

Credibility Determination

The trial judge’s evaluation of whether a witness is believable. Appellate courts show extreme deference because the trial judge observes demeanor, tone, and other cues unavailable on paper.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Barnes fortifies a straightforward but potent principle: when a drug conspirator recruits and directs even one accomplice, he steps into supervisory shoes for Guideline purposes, and the statutory safety-valve door swings shut. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion achieves three effects: it underscores the near-immunity of trial-level credibility findings to appellate reversal; it clarifies that minimal yet genuine hierarchical control satisfies § 3B1.1(c); and it reminds practitioners that the safety-valve is structurally intertwined with the role enhancement. Going forward, defendants who dabble in delegation—no matter how informal—will risk mandatory minimum exposure, while prosecutors possess a clearer roadmap to invoke that consequence. The “Barnes Rule” will thus echo in plea negotiations, evidentiary hearings, and sentencing arguments across the circuit and beyond.