The Attachment of the Right to Counsel in Criminal Contempt Proceedings in the CNMI: A Commentary on Macaranas v. Macaranas, 2025 MP 13

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands’ decision in Macaranas v. Macaranas, 2025 MP 13 (Dec. 22, 2025). The case arises from post-separation family-law litigation between Nao O. Macaranas (“Nao”) and her then-husband, Guy R. Macaranas (“Guy”), and in particular from a contempt finding for alleged violations of an order of protection.

The decision is significant for several reasons:

It squarely holds that a person facing incarceration for criminal contempt is constitutionally entitled to counsel by the time the court first receives evidence against them at an adversarial hearing.
It clarifies that appeals from contempt findings associated with expired protective orders are not moot where those findings can have collateral consequences, especially in future custody and visitation disputes.
It tightens the standard for finding a willful failure to pay child support, emphasizing the need for evidence of ability to pay and a deliberate choice not to.

Although the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s factual determinations as to the violations of the protective order were generally supported by the record, it vacated the contempt judgment because Guy was unrepresented during a critical, adversarial evidentiary hearing that directly led to his incarceration. The case thus establishes an important procedural due process safeguard in contempt proceedings within the CNMI.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Background and Procedural History

Nao obtained an order of protection in June 2023, initially awarding physical custody of the children to Guy and granting Nao visitation, while severely restricting direct contact between the spouses. A November 2023 modification shifted physical custody to Nao, gave Guy visitation, and ordered him to pay monthly child support, maintaining a narrow scope of permissible telephone communications (only about the children’s welfare and visitation).

In February 2024, Nao accused Guy of violating the protective order by:

Sending text messages that contained derogatory language and demands beyond the agreed visitation terms; and
Failing to pay child support as ordered.

The trial court issued an order to show cause and set a contempt hearing for March 5, 2024. The order explicitly warned that the proceeding could lead to incarceration and advised Guy to consult an attorney, with a possibility of appointed counsel if indigent.

At the March 5 hearing, however, Guy appeared without counsel. The court received:

Copies of the disputed text messages, and
Guy’s own testimony, including regarding his work schedule and ability to pay support.

The hearing was then continued to March 13, at which point counsel was appointed. The parties temporarily resolved some issues, and the March hearing was taken off calendar after Guy made a payment and the order of protection was adjusted to allow relatives to conduct child exchanges. But after Guy again fell behind on support and failed timely to return the children, Nao successfully sought to re-calendar the contempt matter; a hearing was eventually held on May 20.

Combining evidence from both the March 5 and May 20 hearings, the trial court found Guy in criminal contempt, imposed a seven-day jail sentence, and suspended five days. Guy immediately served two days and then appealed, challenging:

The trial court’s factual findings and exercise of discretion in holding him in contempt; and
A purported violation of his constitutional right to counsel, because key evidence was received when he was unrepresented.

2.2 Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court addressed three central questions:

Mootness / Justiciability: Was the appeal moot given that the protective order had expired and the short jail term had already been served?
Preservation and Right to Counsel: Could Guy raise a constitutional right-to-counsel argument even though he did not object at the time, and did the trial court violate that right?
Abuse of Discretion in the Contempt Finding: Did the trial court clearly err in its factual findings and thus abuse its discretion in holding Guy in contempt?

2.3 Holdings

The key holdings were:

Appeal Not Moot: The contempt finding was not moot because it carries ongoing collateral consequences, particularly in future custody and visitation disputes. Vacating it would provide meaningful relief.
Right to Counsel Violated:
- The right to counsel attaches in CNMI criminal contempt proceedings when the proceedings become adversarial and incarceration is at stake.
- The March 5 hearing was such a “critical stage”: opposing counsel cross‑examined Guy, documentary evidence was introduced, and that evidence was later relied upon to convict him.
- Guy had no counsel at that hearing, and there was no valid on‑the‑record waiver. This was a plain error affecting substantial rights and a violation of due process.
- On this ground alone, the contempt judgment had to be vacated.
No Abuse of Discretion on Most Factual Issues (in the abstract):
- The trial court did not clearly err in finding that Guy:
  - Had been given “many chances” to comply,
  - Engaged in manipulative “mental games” with Nao, and
  - Sent text messages outside the scope of permissible communications under the protective order.
- The court did clearly err in finding that Guy willfully failed to pay child support, because there was insufficient evidence of ability to pay and of a deliberate choice to prioritize other expenses.
- However, that mistake was harmless because the other, independent grounds were sufficient—standing alone—to support a contempt finding.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court vacated the contempt order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, principally because of the right-to-counsel violation.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Justiciability and Mootness: Collateral Consequences of Contempt

3.1.1 General Mootness Principle

A case is moot when “a court’s decision can no longer affect the parties’ rights or provide effective relief.” This standard is drawn from Oriental Crystal Ltd. v. Lone Star Casino Corp., 1997 MP 25 ¶ 11. If no court order can change the parties’ legal position in any meaningful way, the appeal should be dismissed as moot.

Nao argued that:

The underlying protective order had expired;
Guy had already served the non-suspended portion of the jail sentence; and
The remaining suspended sentence could no longer be imposed.

On that view, there was nothing left for the appellate court to remedy.

3.1.2 The Collateral Consequences Doctrine

The Supreme Court rejected the mootness argument by emphasizing that a contempt finding in the domestic-relations context can have significant collateral consequences, particularly with respect to:

Future custody or visitation modifications, and
More generally, Guy’s record in ongoing or future family-law litigation.

The court drew on out-of-jurisdiction cases recognizing that even brief, fully‑served contempt sentences continue to matter:

State v. Mason, 486 P.3d 94 (Utah Ct. App. 2021): contempt for insulting the court during post-divorce proceedings was held not moot because the finding could affect future custody and related litigation.
Putman v. Kennedy, 900 A.2d 1256 (Conn. 2006): appeals of expired restraining orders were not moot due to possible collateral impacts, including in custody determinations.
Poland v. Poland, 518 S.W.3d 98 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017): findings of domestic abuse were not moot because of continuing collateral consequences, again including potential effects on custody.

The CNMI court applied this reasoning to Guy’s situation. Since the trial court had already taken judicial notice of the protective order during custody discussions in the divorce case, a contempt finding for violating that order could be invoked in future proceedings. Vacating that contempt order would “remove an adverse record” and thus provide meaningful relief.

Accordingly, the appeal was held to involve a live controversy and was not moot.

3.2 Preservation, Plain Error, and Unobjected Right-to-Counsel Claims

3.2.1 General Rule on Preservation

Ordinarily, an appellant cannot raise a procedural issue on appeal if the appellant failed to object, thereby implicitly accepting the procedure. The opinion cites the California case KC Multimedia v. Bank of America, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 247 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), for the general rule: failure to object may lead to forfeiture of a claim.

3.2.2 Exceptions Recognized by the CNMI Supreme Court

The CNMI court, however, previously recognized exceptions in Estate of Ogumoro v. Ko, 2011 MP 11 ¶ 58, and Salas v. Mafnas, 2010 MP 9 ¶ 47, and Commonwealth v. Santos, 4 NMI 348 (1996). It may consider unpreserved issues when:

The issue is a pure question of law that does not depend on factual development;
A new theory or issue has arisen because of a change in law while the appeal is pending; or
There is plain error and failure to review would result in injustice.

The Court held that the first and third exceptions apply here.

3.2.3 Pure Question of Law

The parties did not dispute the basic facts:

Guy appeared without counsel at the March 5 hearing;
He testified and was cross-examined; and
The court relied on evidence from that hearing when entering its contempt finding.

The only dispute was whether, under those undisputed facts, Guy was constitutionally entitled to counsel at that stage. Determining whether a particular stage of the proceedings is one at which the right to counsel has attached is a legal question, akin to questions addressed in Commonwealth Dev. Auth. v. Tenorio, 2004 MP 22 ¶ 21 (holding that whether a declaration complied with statutory requirements is a question of law).

Because the issue was purely legal and the appellate record was undisputed, there was no strict requirement of preservation.

3.2.4 Plain Error and Substantial Rights

The court then applied the plain error standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Shabgua Zhang, 2023 MP 9 ¶ 24, which requires:

An error occurred;
The error was plain (clear or obvious); and
The error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.

Here, the court found:

A clear error occurred when the court received incriminating evidence at an adversarial hearing where Guy faced possible incarceration but had no counsel and had not waived that right.
The error was “plain” in light of existing CNMI and federal case law on the right to counsel in proceedings carrying a risk of incarceration (discussed below).
The error affected substantial rights because Guy was actually incarcerated, and the evidence obtained without counsel directly contributed to the contempt finding.

Because all three criteria were satisfied, the Supreme Court reviewed the right-to-counsel issue notwithstanding the absence of any trial-level objection.

3.3 The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Criminal Contempt Proceedings

3.3.1 Nature of the Contempt Proceeding

Under 6 CMC § 3307, a court may hold a person in criminal contempt for “unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully” refusing to comply with a lawful court order or otherwise disturbing the peace of the court. The contempt here was:

Criminal rather than purely civil (it involved punishment—jail—not simply coercive measures to compel future compliance); and
Accompanied by actual incarceration (a seven‑day term, two days served immediately).

The court thus treated this as a criminal contempt matter with full due process implications, including the right to counsel.

3.3.2 Existing CNMI and Federal Law on Right to Counsel

The Supreme Court anchored its analysis in both federal and CNMI precedent:

Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002): Under the U.S. Constitution, a suspended sentence that may “end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty” may not be imposed unless the defendant had the assistance of counsel at the stage where guilt was adjudicated.
Pac. Fin. Corp. v. Muna, 2008 MP 21:
- Held that the risk of incarceration in civil proceedings (e.g., in debtor exams) heavily weighs in favor of a right to counsel.
- Stated that failing to provide counsel where incarceration is possible “guts the core protection due process provides.”
Bank of Guam v. Ruben, 2008 MP 22 ¶ 13 (overruled on other grounds): Recognized that contempt proceedings for indigent persons can proceed only after assignment of counsel or a valid waiver.

Together, these authorities make clear that, in the CNMI, when a litigant—regardless of the civil or criminal label of the case— faces a real risk of incarceration, the constitutional right to counsel is strongly triggered as a due process protection.

3.3.3 When the Right to Counsel Attaches: The “Critical Stage” Analogy

The more refined question in Macaranas was when the right attaches in a criminal contempt context.

Drawing on federal criminal procedure cases, the court adopted the “critical stage” concept:

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967): The right to counsel attaches at any “critical stage” of the criminal prosecution—i.e., a stage where, in the absence of counsel, the accused is likely to suffer significant prejudice or the fairness of the proceeding would be undermined.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975): In contrast, preliminary or purely non-adversarial stages that do not threaten substantial prejudice do not trigger the right.

The CNMI Supreme Court analogized this doctrine to criminal contempt proceedings: the right to counsel in such proceedings attaches when the process becomes:

Adversarial (e.g., opposing counsel cross-examines, evidence is introduced), and
Critical to the outcome (i.e., where the evidence gathered may form the basis of eventual incarceration).

The court further justified this approach by citing other jurisdictions’ focus on preventing wrongful incarceration:

Rutherford v. Rutherford, 464 A.2d 228 (Md. 1983): Noted that, had contemnors been represented in civil contempt proceedings, imprisonment would likely have been avoided because counsel could have identified and raised existing precedents.
Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663 (N.J. 2006): Emphasized the defendant’s “interest in personal freedom” as triggering the right to counsel in child support enforcement actions.
In re Rivas-Luna, 528 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. App. 2017): Explained that under Texas Family Code § 157.163, the right to counsel arises early in the enforcement process, once incarceration is realistically possible.

Thus, the guiding principle is that the right to counsel should be provided at a sufficiently early stage to avert wrongful incarceration. Waiting until after the critical evidentiary steps would render the protection hollow.

3.3.4 Application to the March 5 Hearing

The Court deemed the March 5 hearing to be such a critical and adversarial stage because:

Opposing counsel cross-examined Guy;
The court received and admitted documentary evidence (text messages); and
The court later relied on that evidence in making its contempt finding and imposing jail time.

Moreover, the risk of incarceration was explicit: the order to show cause had warned that contempt could lead to imprisonment. Thus, the right to counsel had already attached by March 5.

The problem was twofold:

Guy had no attorney at that hearing; and
There was no valid waiver of counsel on the record.

On the second point, the court underscored that:

A waiver of counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, on the record, as held in Bank of Guam v. Ruben and consistent with out-of-jurisdiction cases such as:
- Carothers v. Carothers, 337 S.W.3d 21 (Mo. 2011); and
- Tinsley v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 668 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
Silence or mere participation in the hearing without counsel does not constitute waiver.
The record contained no advisement of the right to counsel and no inquiry sufficient to show a valid waiver.

Because the March 5 hearing occurred at a point when:

The right to counsel had attached,
Guy was unrepresented and had not waived counsel, and
Evidence from that hearing significantly contributed to a criminal contempt finding with actual jail time,

the Court concluded that due process was violated. The resulting harm was substantial enough that the violation itself required vacatur.

3.4 Factual Findings and Abuse-of-Discretion Review

3.4.1 Standard of Review

The Supreme Court reviews a contempt finding for abuse of discretion, as in In re Estate of Malite, 2010 MP 20 ¶ 59. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision rests on clearly erroneous factual findings. A finding is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing all the evidence, the appellate court is left with a “firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made”. See Pangelinan v. Pangelinan, 2024 MP 5 ¶ 58 (quoting Commonwealth v. Crisostomo, 2014 MP 18 ¶ 8).

3.4.2 “Many Chances” to Avoid Contempt

The trial court remarked that it had given Guy “many chances” and that it had twice appointed counsel in light of threatened sanctions.

The Supreme Court noted the record supported this:

An initial order to show cause issued in February 2024;
Hearings were held in March and later in May;
The trial court repeatedly warned Guy; and
At one point, the contempt matter was taken off calendar after Guy made a child support payment, indicating a willingness to give him opportunities to comply.

While there is no legal requirement to give a contemnor “many chances,” the finding is relevant to whether Guy’s conduct was knowing and willful. The Supreme Court held this characterization was not clearly erroneous.

3.4.3 “Mental Games” with Nao

The trial court also found that Guy played “mental games” with Nao. The Supreme Court linked this to:

Text messages in which Guy:
- Called Nao “lazy” and “brain dead,”
- Told her to “Get a life!”, and
- Imposed demands beyond the visitation schedule (e.g., changing pick-up/drop-off times).
Messages suggesting a pattern of manipulation—for example, thanking Nao and immediately leveraging that gratitude to secure new favors, and then insulting her (“really useless thanking you”) when she refused.
His similar rhetoric at hearing, framing demands as a “mutual agreement” while effectively pressuring Nao to exceed what the order required.

Taken together, the record reasonably supported the interpretation that Guy was using manipulative and belittling tactics—i.e., “mental games.” This was therefore not a clearly erroneous finding.

3.4.4 Scope of Communications Under the Protective Order

The protective order limited communications to telephone contact concerning the children’s welfare and visitation. In practice, Guy:

Did begin some texts by referencing visitation logistics, but then
Veered into personal insults and derogatory comments, and
Issued demands that went beyond the agreed visitation schedule (e.g., requiring Nao to adjust times unilaterally).

The Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s conclusion that such messages exceeded the permissible scope of “contact … concerning the children’s welfare and visitation” and thus violated the order of protection.

3.5 Willful Nonpayment of Child Support and Harmless Error

3.5.1 Willfulness Requirement

To hold a party in contempt for nonpayment of child support, courts generally require proof that:

The party had the ability to pay during the relevant period; and
Chose willfully not to do so, often evidenced by spending money on other, discretionary expenses.

The Supreme Court drew on out-of-jurisdiction cases to illustrate:

Smith v. Weedman, 892 N.E.2d 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008): Contemnor paid for cable TV, cell phone, music downloads, and wedding/honeymoon expenses instead of child support, demonstrating willful nonpayment.
State ex rel. Trisler v. Collins, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2012), quoting Buttrey v. Buttrey, 2008 WL 45545: having the means to meet other obligations is evidence of ability to pay support and can support a finding of willful contempt.

3.5.2 Lack of Evidence of Willful Nonpayment in this Case

In contrast, the record in Macaranas showed that when Guy fell behind on child support:

He did not continue car payments (he ceased paying for his vehicle); and
He stopped giving gifts to his adult children.

There was no showing that he chose to spend his money on discretionary expenses while willfully ignoring his support obligations. Guy’s single payment made under the pressure of looming contempt was insufficient to prove he had the consistent ability to pay earlier but opted not to.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the finding of willful failure to pay child support was clearly erroneous.

3.5.3 Harmless Error Doctrine

Despite this error, the court invoked the harmless error rule, codified in COM. R. CR. P. 52(a):

“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”

Because the contempt order rested on several independent grounds:

Violations of the limited contact provision, and
Conduct relating to visitation and manipulative behavior (“mental games”),

and because those grounds alone were sufficient to sustain a contempt finding under 6 CMC § 3307, the error regarding nonpayment of support did not affect the ultimate outcome and was therefore harmless.

It was the right-to-counsel violation, not this factual error, that required vacatur of the contempt judgment.

4. Precedents and Authorities in Context

4.1 CNMI Authorities

Matsunaga v. Matsunaga, 2001 MP 11:
- Confirmed Supreme Court jurisdiction over contempt orders imposing sanctions (cited in ¶ 7).
Oriental Crystal Ltd. v. Lone Star Casino Corp., 1997 MP 25:
- Articulated the basic mootness standard: an appeal is moot only if no effective relief is possible.
Pac. Fin. Corp. v. Muna, 2008 MP 21:
- Crucial for emphasizing that the risk of incarceration even in nominally “civil” proceedings demands near-absolute respect for the right to counsel.
Bank of Guam v. Ruben, 2008 MP 22:
- Stated that contempt proceedings for an indigent can proceed only after counsel is assigned or legally waived.
- Also used for the requirement that waiver of counsel be knowing, voluntary, intelligent, and on the record.
Estate of Ogumoro v. Ko, 2011 MP 11; Salas v. Mafnas, 2010 MP 9; Commonwealth v. Santos, 4 NMI 348 (1996):
- Recognized exceptions to the preservation requirement, including consideration of plain error and pure questions of law.
Commonwealth v. Shabgua Zhang, 2023 MP 9:
- Set the three-part test for plain error (error, plain, affects substantial rights), applied here to the right-to-counsel violation.
Pangelinan v. Pangelinan, 2024 MP 5; Commonwealth v. Crisostomo, 2014 MP 18:
- Reinforced the clear-error standard for factual review within an abuse-of-discretion framework.
In re Estate of Malite, 2010 MP 20:
- Confirmed that contempt orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth Dev. Auth. v. Tenorio, 2004 MP 22:
- Used to support the classification of the right-to-counsel question here as a pure question of law.

4.2 External Authorities on Right to Counsel and Civil Contempt

Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002):
- Provides the U.S. constitutional baseline that no suspended sentence leading to actual loss of liberty may be imposed absent counsel at the adjudication of guilt.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975):
- Offer the “critical stage” vs. “preliminary/non-adversarial stage” distinction adopted by the CNMI to determine when the right to counsel attaches.
Rutherford v. Rutherford (Md.), Pasqua v. Council (N.J.), In re Rivas-Luna (Tex.):
- Used to demonstrate the broader recognition that liberty interests in civil or family-law contempt settings require robust protection of the right to counsel.
Smith v. Weedman (Ind.), State ex rel. Trisler v. Collins (Tenn.), and Buttrey v. Buttrey:
- Inform the standard for “willful” nonpayment of child support—specifically, that courts look for evidence of the contemnor choosing to pay other, discretionary expenses instead of support.
State v. Mason (Utah), Putman v. Kennedy (Conn.), Poland v. Poland (Ark.):
- Ground the court’s understanding that contempt and domestic-violence-related orders carry continuing collateral consequences, defeating mootness arguments even after short sentences and expired orders.

5. Impact and Future Implications

5.1 Contempt Practice in the CNMI

Macaranas will substantially influence how trial courts handle contempt proceedings, especially in family-law contexts:

Courts must now treat any contempt matter with a realistic possibility of jail time as one in which the right to counsel attaches at the first adversarial evidentiary hearing.
Judges should:
- Clearly advise alleged contemnors of their right to counsel, including appointed counsel if indigent;
- Avoid taking substantive evidence (e.g., testimony, text messages, financial records) at any adversarial hearing unless the contemnor is represented or has executed a valid, on-the-record waiver; and
- Make a specific record of any waiver following a careful colloquy.

Failure to do so now exposes contempt orders to reversal or vacatur under the Macaranas precedent.

5.2 Family Law and Protective Orders

By recognizing collateral consequences to contempt findings related to protective orders, the decision:

Confirms that contempt determinations are part of the litigant’s long-term “family law record”, likely to influence future custody and visitation decisions.
Guides appellate courts to treat challenges to such findings as not moot even after service of short jail sentences and expiration of underlying orders.
Signals to parties and counsel that protective orders and contempt are not mere temporary skirmishes; they have lasting effects.

5.3 Right to Counsel in Quasi-Criminal Civil Proceedings

The decision further cements a trend in CNMI law: whenever personal liberty is realistically at stake, the right to counsel is robustly protected, regardless of whether the proceeding is formally labeled “civil” or “criminal.” This has implications for:

Child support enforcement actions involving possible incarceration,
Debtor examinations where coercive sanctions are being contemplated, and
Other civil proceedings that can culminate in jail time (e.g., failure to comply with certain orders, discovery violations with potential contempt sanctions).

5.4 Clarifying Willful Nonpayment Standards

Macaranas also refines what the trial record must show to support a willful failure to pay child support:

Court and counsel are put on notice that they must build a record concerning:
- Actual income and financial resources;
- Competing financial obligations; and
- The contemnor’s choices in allocating available funds.
Simply pointing to nonpayment, without evidence of discretionary or unnecessary spending during the same period, will be insufficient for a finding of willful contempt.

This requirement should lead to more careful fact-finding and more nuanced judgments about whether a failure is attributable to true inability or deliberate evasion.

6. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

6.1 Mootness and Collateral Consequences

Mootness: A case is moot when courts can no longer do anything meaningful for the parties. If a judgment or decision can still affect a person’s legal interests going forward, the case is usually not moot.
Collateral consequences: Future legal or practical effects of a judgment that persist even after any immediate punishment (like jail time) is over. In family cases, a contempt finding may affect how a judge views a parent’s fitness or reliability in future custody decisions.

6.2 Criminal vs. Civil Contempt

Criminal contempt: Punishes past disobedience of a court order. It is backward-looking and usually involves fines or jail. Its goal is punishment and upholding the court’s authority.
Civil contempt: Typically aims to compel future compliance. A contemnor may “hold the keys to the jail” (i.e., can be released by complying). It is coercive rather than punitive.

Here, the contempt was criminal because it punished past violations with a fixed jail sentence.

6.3 The Right to Counsel and “Critical Stage”

The right to counsel means that a person facing possible loss of liberty is entitled to an attorney at government expense if they cannot afford one.
A critical stage is any part of the case where what happens can significantly shape the outcome and where not having a lawyer risks unfairness—such as when:
- Evidence is introduced,
- Witnesses are examined or cross-examined, or
- Key factual or legal issues are decided.

In Macaranas, the first hearing where evidence was received and Guy was cross-examined (March 5) was such a critical stage.

6.4 Plain Error and Harmless Error

Plain error: A clear legal mistake that affects substantial rights, even though no one objected at the time. Appellate courts can correct such errors to prevent serious injustice.
Harmless error: An error that occurred but did not change the outcome of the case. Courts recognize it but choose not to disturb the judgment because it did not affect the party’s substantial rights.

Macaranas treats:

The lack of counsel at a critical hearing as plain error requiring vacatur; and
The mistaken finding about willful nonpayment as harmless error, because other evidence independently justified a contempt finding (in the abstract).

6.5 Willfulness in Failure to Pay Support

To show willfulness in failing to pay support, courts generally look for:

Evidence that the payer had some capacity to pay, and
Chose instead to pay for non-essential or discretionary items (for example, entertainment or luxury items) rather than the child support.

In Macaranas, the record lacked this type of evidence, so the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in finding willful nonpayment.

7. Conclusion

Macaranas v. Macaranas, 2025 MP 13, is a landmark CNMI decision on the constitutional right to counsel in criminal contempt proceedings and on the continuing significance of contempt findings in the family-law context.

Its principal contributions can be summarized as follows:

Right to Counsel Attachment: In the CNMI, when a person faces possible incarceration for criminal contempt, the right to counsel attaches no later than the first adversarial evidentiary hearing at which the court receives evidence against the alleged contemnor. Courts must either appoint counsel for indigent litigants or obtain a valid, on-the-record waiver before proceeding.
Non-Mootness of Contempt Appeals: Contempt findings arising from expired protective orders are not moot so long as they may have collateral consequences, particularly in custody and visitation decisions.
Refined Standard for Willful Nonpayment: A finding of willful failure to pay child support requires evidence that the obligor had the ability to pay and chose to pay for other, discretionary expenses instead; mere nonpayment is insufficient.

Although the Supreme Court ultimately found the trial court’s factual determinations (apart from child support willfulness) supported a contempt finding in principle, it vacated the contempt judgment because Guy was unrepresented during a critical hearing and had not waived counsel. The case thus underscores that procedural fairness—especially access to counsel—remains paramount whenever personal liberty is at stake, even in the ostensibly civil setting of family-law contempt.