The Appellant’s Burden to Supply an Adequate Record and Demonstrate Prejudice in Civil Appeals:
Commentary on Sedore v. Landfair (6th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

The unpublished Sixth Circuit decision in Scott Sedore v. Sirena Landfair, et al., No. 25‑1384 (Dec. 11, 2025), arises from a prisoner civil-rights and disability-discrimination trial that ended in a defense verdict. On appeal, the plaintiff–prisoner, Scott Sedore, did not challenge the jury’s fact-finding directly. Instead, he attacked two discretionary trial-management rulings:

The district court’s allocation and enforcement of strict time limits at trial; and
The court’s decision to quash a subpoena directed to the prison warden (Kim Cargor), whom Sedore wished to question on ADA‑related policies and practices.

Critically, Sedore did not order a full transcript of the four-day trial. He supplied only a 51‑page partial transcript covering the subpoena discussion, the mid-trial request for more time, related motions, and closing arguments—but no witness testimony and no exhibits. That strategic (or financial) choice became dispositive.

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Nalbandian affirmed, not because the court found the trial rulings indisputably correct, but because Sedore could not demonstrate prejudice without providing an adequate record. Even assuming error, the Sixth Circuit held, an appellant cannot obtain a new trial in a civil case unless he shows that the error likely affected the outcome—and that analysis requires a sufficiently complete transcript. With only isolated snippets of the proceedings before it, the court lacked the tools to conduct the required harmless‑error inquiry.

Thus, the practical lesson—and the central doctrinal point—of Sedore is this: an appellant who challenges trial management decisions but fails to supply a record adequate to assess prejudice cannot prevail, even where abuse of discretion might otherwise be arguable. The panel’s treatment of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(3)(A) and its emphasis on the “fair assurance” standard of prejudice further clarify the Sixth Circuit’s expectations for appellate practice.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1. Parties and Claims

At the time relevant to the suit, Scott Sedore was a Michigan state prisoner confined at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility (CCF). He used a wheelchair. He sued:

The Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC);
Two MDOC nurses; and
Dr. Victoria Hallett, a non‑MDOC physician providing medical care at CCF.

His claims were twofold:

First Amendment retaliation (against the two nurses and Dr. Hallett):
Sedore alleged that these individual defendants placed him in segregated housing under the pretext of self‑harm risk, when the actual motive was retaliation for his filing grievances and pursuing litigation concerning his medical care.
Disability discrimination under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act (against MDOC):
He asserted that:
- While in segregation, he was housed in a cell too small to accommodate his wheelchair; and
- MDOC failed to provide reasonable accommodations for his disability, amounting to discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act.

As is common in prison litigation, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act theories were framed in terms of deficient accessibility and alleged deliberate indifference to his disability‑related needs.

2.2. Pre‑Trial Subpoena for the Warden

On March 15, 2025—three days before the scheduled trial—Sedore issued a subpoena commanding the attendance of CCF warden Kim Cargor. He wanted Cargor to testify about:

MDOC practices and policies regarding disability accommodations; and
Presumably, how those practices applied to segregation housing for wheelchair users.

Two days later, the warden moved to quash the subpoena. Sedore opposed the motion and offered to have the warden testify remotely, an attempt to reduce any claimed burden of in‑person testimony.

2.3. Trial Time Limits

The day before trial, the district court clerk emailed the parties with the court’s allocation of trial time:

5 hours for Sedore;
5 hours for MDOC and the two nurses (collectively, the “MDOC Defendants”); and
5 hours for Dr. Hallett.

Within an hour, Sedore responded with a brief “[t]hank you.” He did not object to the time limits at that point.

Once trial was under way:

On the second day, the district court granted Warden Cargor’s motion to quash the subpoena.
Later, Sedore filed an “emergency” motion asking the court to revisit its time allocations and grant him additional time to present his case.
The court denied that motion the next day, and shortly after that denial, Sedore rested.

2.4. Posture at the Close of Evidence and Verdict

After Sedore rested:

Both the MDOC Defendants and Dr. Hallett moved for judgment as a matter of law.
The district court granted Hallett’s motion, removing her from the case entirely.
The claims against the MDOC Defendants went to the jury.
On March 21, 2025, the jury returned a verdict for the MDOC Defendants, and judgment was entered against Sedore.

2.5. The Appeal and the Partial Transcript

Sedore filed a timely notice of appeal. On the same day, he applied to proceed without paying the appellate filing fee, and on the first page of that application he stated that he intended to challenge:

The trial time limits, and
The order quashing the subpoena for Warden Cargor.

A few days later, he ordered a partial trial transcript. The docket entry shows that he requested only:

The portion addressing the warden’s motion to quash (March 19);
The portion addressing his request for reconsideration of the trial time limits (March 20); and
“Other motions and closing argument” from March 21.

The resulting transcript was 51 pages, taken from a four‑day trial. It contained:

Arguments and rulings on the subpoena and on the time limits;
Defense motions for judgment as a matter of law; and
Sedore’s closing and rebuttal arguments.

It did not include:

Any witness testimony;
Any detailed description of the exhibits; or
Any of the substantive evidentiary record presented to the jury.

These omissions framed the central appellate issue: whether the Sixth Circuit could meaningfully review alleged trial‑management errors without knowing what the jury actually heard.

3. Summary of the Opinion

3.1. Issues on Appeal

Sedore sought reversal and remand for a new trial, advancing two primary arguments:

Time limits: The district court allegedly abused its discretion by:
- Imposing unfairly restrictive trial time limits, and
- Denying his mid‑trial request for additional time.
Subpoena for the warden: The court allegedly abused its discretion by granting Warden Cargor’s motion to quash, preventing what he characterized as crucial testimony related to his ADA theory (particularly the “deliberate indifference” aspect).

Additionally, the appellees asserted that the appeal should be dismissed altogether because Sedore, having ordered only a partial transcript, failed to file a formal “statement of issues” under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(3)(A).

3.2. Procedural Ruling on Rule 10(b)(3)(A)

Rule 10(b)(3)(A) requires that when an appellant orders a partial transcript, he must file a statement of the issues within 14 days of the notice of appeal. The appellees argued non‑compliance and sought dismissal.

The panel:

Observed that Sedore did not file a separate, formal “statement of the issues” document;
Noted, however, that:
- His fee‑waiver application expressly identified the two issues he intended to raise;
- The transcript order itself described that he was requesting only the portions related to those issues; and
- The Sixth Circuit has recognized that “functional equivalent” compliance with procedural rules can suffice (Coleman v. Shoney’s, Inc., citing Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.);
Indicated that even if Sedore had not strictly complied, dismissal would be a harsh sanction, and dismissal is not mandated in every case of non‑compliance (Fitts v. Sicker; Island Creek Coal Co. v. Local Union 1827).

The court declined to decide definitively whether there was full compliance, reasoning that the appeal failed on independent grounds related to the transcript’s inadequacy.

3.3. Core Holding: Failure to Demonstrate Prejudice Without an Adequate Record

Turning to the merits, the court:

Applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to:
- The district court’s allocation of trial time; and
- The decision to quash the subpoena.
Emphasized that, in a civil case, even if an error is found, the appellant must show prejudice—that is, that the error likely affected the outcome (Shinseki v. Sanders; 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Homeward Residential).
Explained that prejudice is assessed under the “fair assurance” standard: the reviewing court asks whether it has “fair assurance” that the error did not affect the outcome; if such assurance is lacking, the error is prejudicial (Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. U.S. Nursing Corp., following Kotteakos v. United States and Beck v. Haik).

The problem: With only 51 pages of a four‑day trial before it—and no testimony or exhibits—the panel could not “examine the proceedings in their entirety,” as required for a proper prejudice analysis. It could not gauge:

How strong or weak Sedore’s overall evidentiary case was;
What other evidence he had (or lacked) to support his ADA and retaliation theories;
Whether the absence of Warden Cargor’s testimony might reasonably have made a difference; or
Whether additional trial time might have altered the evidentiary balance in a meaningful way.

Accordingly, the court held that Sedore could not carry his burden to show prejudice. Citing Ramage v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government, the panel reiterated that “it is the appellant’s duty to order the trial transcript when it is necessary to a review of the issues.” Here, such a transcript was plainly necessary to review alleged prejudicial management decisions at trial.

The court explicitly acknowledged that ordering every page of a trial transcript is not required in every case, but concluded that in this particular case—given the nature of the alleged errors—the record provided was too incomplete to permit meaningful review.

3.4. Footnote on Preservation of the Time‑Limit Issue

A brief but important footnote notes that Sedore did not object when the district court initially announced its time limits. The only preserved objection related to his mid‑trial request for more time. Thus, the panel treated his appeal as challenging only the denial of additional time mid‑trial, not the original time‑limit order itself.

3.5. Disposition

Because Sedore failed to establish reversible prejudice, the Court of Appeals:

Declined to disturb the district court’s decisions; and
Affirmed the judgment in favor of the MDOC Defendants and Dr. Hallett.

4. Analysis

4.1. The Procedural Dispute: Rule 10(b)(3)(A) and “Functional Equivalent” Compliance

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b) governs the appellant’s obligation to order the transcript. Subsection (3)(A) provides that when an appellant orders less than the full transcript, he must file a “statement of the issues” he intends to raise. This allows:

The appellees to determine whether additional portions of the transcript are needed; and
The court to understand what parts of the record are relevant.

Here, Sedore:

Did not file a separate, labeled “statement of issues” document within 14 days; but
Did file other documents that clearly described his intended issues:
- His fee‑waiver application expressly identified the two issues he would raise;
- His transcript order expressly limited the requested transcript to portions related to those issues.

The court relied on Coleman v. Shoney’s, Inc., which, drawing from the Supreme Court’s decision in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., recognizes that strict formalism is not always required in procedural compliance: an act may be the “functional equivalent” of what the rule demands.

In addition, Fitts v. Sicker and Island Creek Coal Co. v. Local Union No. 1827 stand for the proposition that dismissal is not mandatory for every technical violation of the rules. The court has discretion to evaluate:

Whether the non‑compliance was prejudicial;
Whether the opposing party was unfairly surprised or disadvantaged; and
Whether some lesser response is adequate.

In Sedore, the panel signaled that:

Sedore likely did enough, in functional terms, to satisfy Rule 10(b)(3)(A); and
Even if not, dismissal would be unduly harsh under the circumstances.

But the court ultimately avoided binding precedent on that procedural question by resting its decision on the more fundamental failure: the inadequate record.

4.2. Appellate Duty to Provide an Adequate Record

The decision’s central doctrinal contribution lies in its reaffirmation and concrete application of the longstanding rule: the appellant bears the burden to provide a record sufficient to review the claimed errors.

The panel cites Ramage v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov’t, which held that ordering the relevant trial transcript is the appellant’s duty “when it is necessary to a review of the issues.” Other Sixth Circuit case law is aligned with this principle, including Bivens v. Zep, Inc., where the court declined to review the denial of a motion to compel because the plaintiff had failed to order the transcript of the status conference at which the motion was argued.

In Sedore, the alleged errors pertained to:

The amount of time Sedore had to present evidence; and
Whether the absence of a particular witness (the warden) undermined his case.

Both challenges inherently require a contextual, record‑based assessment:

For the time‑limit issue, the court would need to know:
- How efficiently Sedore used his 5 hours;
- Which witnesses he called, how long they testified, and what evidence was still to be presented;
- Whether the alleged need for more time was due to unforeseeable developments or to cumulative, marginally relevant evidence; and
- How any additional time might realistically have changed the evidentiary picture.
For the subpoena issue, the court would need to know:
- What other evidence of MDOC disability policies and practices was presented;
- Whether anyone else testified on similar topics (e.g., ADA coordinators, custodial staff, medical staff);
- What exactly Sedore expected Warden Cargor to say, in light of the existing record; and
- Whether the case hinged on a missing piece of information only she could supply.

Without testimony or exhibits, the appellate court could not fairly assess any of this. As the panel put it, to evaluate prejudice it must “examine the proceedings in their entirety” (quoting Beck v. Haik, itself quoting Kotteakos). The partial transcript simply did not permit that holistic view.

4.3. Harmless Error, Prejudice, and the “Fair Assurance” Standard

Substantively, the court’s reasoning is grounded in the federal harmless‑error doctrine as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2111 and elaborated by the Supreme Court in Shinseki v. Sanders. In a civil case:

The party seeking reversal (here, the plaintiff–appellant) bears the burden to show that an error was harmful, not harmless.
A harmful error is one for which the reviewing court cannot say with “fair assurance” that the result would have been the same absent the error.

The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly applied the “fair assurance” standard, with Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. U.S. Nursing Corp. and Beck v. Haik as recent examples. In Beck, the court found that five distinct errors cumulatively undermined confidence in the verdict; the record there was fully available, allowing that analysis.

In contrast, in Sedore the panel did not say that the alleged errors were harmless. Instead, it said: we cannot tell, because we do not have enough of the record. Since the burden to show prejudice rests on the appellant, that inability to tell works against him:

If the record is silent or opaque on the impact of an alleged error, the presumption is that the appellant has not carried his burden.
The court will not assume prejudice or speculate about hypothetical effects on the jury.

Thus, Sedore illustrates a critical nuance: harmless‑error review is not merely a legal abstraction; it is a record‑dependent exercise. Without a record, no prejudice can be found.

4.4. Standards of Review: Abuse of Discretion for Trial Time Limits and Subpoena Rulings

The panel cites both Ross v. Parrot’s Landing, Inc. (relying on Sutkiewicz v. Monroe County Sheriff) and Hill v. Homeward Residential, Inc. to confirm that:

Allocation of trial time; and
Rulings on subpoenas (such as orders granting motions to quash)

are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Abuse of discretion is a deferential standard. A district court abuses its discretion only if its decision:

Is based on an erroneous view of the law;
Is based on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence; or
Is outside the range of reasonable choices given the circumstances.

Given that high bar, the appellant’s burden is already substantial. When coupled with the further requirement to demonstrate prejudice, the adequacy of the record becomes even more crucial. The court will not reverse a discretionary ruling based on conjecture, especially where the appellant has chosen not to provide the full evidentiary landscape.

Additionally, the panel’s footnote on preservation underscores that:

An appellant who fails to object promptly to trial‑management decisions may forfeit broader challenges; and
Later objections may narrow the scope of appellate review (here, to the mid‑trial denial of additional time).

4.5. Application to the Subpoena of Warden Cargor

Sedore argued that quashing Warden Cargor’s subpoena was prejudicial because her testimony was “critical” to his ADA “deliberate indifference” theory. The court, however, could not assess:

What, if any, evidence about MDOC disability policies was already before the jury; or
How uniquely important Cargor’s testimony would have been.

The panel gave a concrete illustration:

“To take just one of Sedore’s claims, he contends that the district court’s decision to grant Cargor’s motion to quash was prejudicial because Cargor’s testimony was critical to its ‘deliberate indifference’ theory of MDOC’s alleged ADA violation. But was there an evidentiary flaw in Sedore’s case at trial that would assure us that the outcome would’ve been the same even in the absence of Cargor’s proposed testimony? We don’t know. So Sedore can’t carry his burden of showing prejudice.”

In other words, without knowing the full evidentiary context, the court could not decide whether the subpoena ruling meaningfully altered the trial’s trajectory.

4.6. Application to the Time‑Limit Issue

Similarly, any assessment of whether the time limits were unfairly restrictive—and whether denying more time mid‑trial was prejudicial—would depend on:

How Sedore allocated his time among witnesses and topics;
Whether his case was truncated in a way that omitted key witnesses or evidence; and
Whether the omitted evidence was likely to affect the jury’s verdict.

With no testimony in the record, the Sixth Circuit could not:

Determine which witnesses he could not call due to time constraints;
Identify which lines of questioning were cut short; or
Evaluate whether any omitted testimony would have been cumulative, marginal, or central.

Without that information, the court could not meaningfully carry out a prejudice analysis under § 2111 and Shinseki.

4.7. Limited Substantive Impact on Prisoner Civil Rights and ADA Doctrine

Notably, the panel did not reach the substantive merits of:

Prisoner First Amendment retaliation doctrine; or
The contours of ADA and Rehabilitation Act liability in the prison segregation context.

The opinion’s holding is procedural and evidentiary, not substantive. It does not alter:

The elements of retaliation claims;
The standard for “deliberate indifference” in disability‑discrimination claims; or
The substantive accommodation obligations prisons owe to wheelchair users.

However, practically, the decision can have a real impact on similar litigation: it underscores that even meritorious civil‑rights claims can fail on appeal if the record is not properly preserved and transmitted. For incarcerated litigants—who often have limited resources and may struggle to obtain transcripts—this is a cautionary example of how procedural requirements can become outcome‑determinative.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.1. Coleman v. Shoney’s, Inc. and Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.

Coleman, drawing on the Supreme Court’s decision in Torres, supports the idea that a filing can count as the “functional equivalent” of a required document if it provides the same substantive information, even if it is not formally labeled or structured as the rule contemplates.

In Sedore, this principle undergirds the panel’s willingness to treat:

The fee‑waiver application and
The transcript order

as collectively serving the function of a Rule 10(b)(3)(A) “statement of issues.”

5.2. Fitts v. Sicker and Island Creek Coal Co. v. Local Union No. 1827

These cases emphasize that not every procedural defect justifies the drastic remedy of dismissal. Courts retain discretion to consider:

The gravity of the violation;
Whether the opposing party was prejudiced; and
Alternative measures to address non‑compliance.

The panel uses these cases to justify not dismissing Sedore’s appeal solely on the alleged Rule 10(b)(3)(A) violation.

5.3. Ross v. Parrot’s Landing, Inc., Sutkiewicz v. Monroe County Sheriff, and Hill v. Homeward Residential, Inc.

These cases confirm that:

Trial‑time allocations (Ross, relying on Sutkiewicz); and
Subpoena rulings, including granting motions to quash (Hill)

are reviewed for abuse of discretion. This aligns with the broader principle that trial management lies largely within the trial court’s sound discretion.

5.4. Shinseki v. Sanders and 28 U.S.C. § 2111

Shinseki v. Sanders is a Supreme Court decision that clarifies the harmless‑error standard in civil cases: the party seeking reversal bears the burden of showing that an error was harmful, not harmless. Section 2111 codifies that appellate courts should disregard errors that do not affect “substantial rights.”

The panel relies on Shinseki to reinforce that a mere showing of error is insufficient; the appellant must establish prejudice. The core of Sedore lies in applying that burden to a situation where the record is incomplete.

5.5. Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. U.S. Nursing Corp., Beck v. Haik, and Kotteakos v. United States

These cases develop and apply the “fair assurance” standard for assessing prejudice:

Kotteakos originated the “fair assurance” test in the criminal context;
Beck applied the test in a civil context and considered cumulative error;
Appalachian Regional reaffirmed and applied “fair assurance” in modern civil practice.

In Sedore, these cases collectively underscore that assessing whether a trial error affected the outcome is a holistic, record‑dependent inquiry.

5.6. Ramage v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government and Bivens v. Zep, Inc.

Ramage holds that it is the appellant’s duty to order the transcript when it is necessary to review the issues raised on appeal. Bivens reflects the practical application of that rule: the Sixth Circuit declined to review a discovery ruling because the key hearing transcript was missing.

In Sedore, these authorities directly support the panel’s refusal to entertain Sedore’s arguments on the merits without fuller trial transcripts.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1. “Abuse of Discretion”

A court “abuses its discretion” when:

It applies the wrong legal standard;
It bases its decision on a clearly mistaken understanding of the facts; or
Its decision is outside the range of reasonable choices available to it.

Abuse of discretion does not mean the appellate court would have decided the issue differently. It means the trial court’s decision was not reasonably justifiable under the applicable law and facts.

6.2. “Prejudice” and Harmless Error in Civil Appeals

In civil appeals, “prejudice” means that the alleged error likely affected the outcome of the case. If the court believes the outcome would probably have been the same even without the error, the error is considered “harmless” and does not justify reversal.

The “fair assurance” test asks:

Are we fairly confident that the error did not change the result?
If we lack that confidence, then the error is prejudicial.

The party asking for a new trial must provide enough of the record to allow the court to perform this analysis.

6.3. “Functional Equivalent” Compliance

Sometimes a rule requires a particular kind of filing (for example, a “statement of issues”). If a party files another document that clearly provides the same information (for example, a motion or application that lists the appellate issues), the court may treat that as the “functional equivalent” of the required filing, rather than insisting on rigid formality.

6.4. “Deliberate Indifference” in ADA/Rehabilitation Act Claims

In the ADA and Rehabilitation Act prison context, “deliberate indifference” often refers to prison officials:

Knowing about a prisoner’s disability and related needs; and
Consciously disregarding a substantial risk of serious harm or failing to provide reasonable accommodation.

Prisoner‑plaintiffs often try to show deliberate indifference by pointing to:

Policy-level failures;
Systemic disregard for accessibility; or
Repeated refusals to accommodate obvious disability‑related needs.

In Sedore, the appellant argued that the warden’s testimony was crucial to establishing such policy‑level deliberate indifference, but the lack of a full record prevented the appellate court from evaluating whether that was truly the case.

6.5. “Segregated Housing”

“Segregated housing” generally refers to confinement in a more restrictive environment within a prison (often called “segregation,” “the hole,” or “administrative/disciplinary segregation”). These units often differ significantly from general population in terms of:

Cell size;
Out‑of‑cell time;
Access to programs and services; and
Physical accommodations for disabilities.

Sedore’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims focused specifically on his segregation cell’s inability, in his view, to accommodate his wheelchair.

7. Impact and Practical Implications

7.1. For Appellate Practitioners

Sedore sends a clear message to appellate lawyers and litigants in the Sixth Circuit:

Critical errors require a complete record. If your appellate issues turn on what happened at trial—particularly the strength of the evidence, the sequence of proof, or the impact of missing witnesses—you must order the transcript of the relevant proceedings, not just closing arguments or motion colloquies.
Partial transcripts are risky. While a complete transcript is not mandatory in every case (for example, purely legal issues may be resolved on pleadings or orders), challenging trial‑management decisions usually demands a broad view of the record.
Procedural rules are enforced, but not mechanically. The court will consider “functional equivalent” compliance with Rule 10(b)(3)(A) and may avoid draconian sanctions like dismissal for technical missteps—but will not relieve appellants of the substantive burden to demonstrate prejudice.

7.2. For Trial Judges

For district judges, Sedore provides:

Implicit validation of reasonable time‑management measures at trial, including time limits—so long as parties have notice and an opportunity to object or adjust their presentation;
Reassurance that subpoenas may be quashed in appropriate circumstances, subject to abuse‑of‑discretion review; and
Confirmation that, in many cases, any alleged trial‑management error will be reviewed under a deferential standard and subject to a robust harmless‑error inquiry.

7.3. For Prisoner and Civil Rights Litigation

Substantively, Sedore does not change the law of ADA, Rehabilitation Act, or prisoner First Amendment retaliation claims. However, it has practical consequences:

Resource constraints and transcripts. Prisoner litigants often lack resources to purchase full trial transcripts. Sedore illustrates that economizing on transcripts can be fatal to an appeal, especially when the claimed errors relate to trial evidence and case presentation.
Strategic ordering of transcripts. Even if a full transcript is unaffordable, appellants should prioritize obtaining:
- All testimony related to the allegedly mishandled issue (e.g., ADA accommodations, retaliation evidence); and
- Excerpts showing what evidence was not presented due to time limits or quashed subpoenas.

7.4. Persuasive, Not Binding, Authority

The opinion is marked “NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION.” Under Sixth Circuit rules, such decisions are typically not binding precedent, though they may be cited as persuasive authority. Nonetheless, Sedore aligns with established Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit doctrine and is likely to be persuasive in future cases involving:

Inadequate appellate records;
Challenges to trial time limits or quashed subpoenas; and
Questions about the interaction between procedural rule compliance and dismissal as a sanction.

8. Conclusion

Sedore v. Landfair is not a sweeping substantive civil-rights or ADA decision; instead, it is a focused procedural opinion with significant practical consequences. The key takeaways are:

An appellant who alleges trial‑management errors in a civil case must provide a record that allows the appellate court to assess both whether there was an abuse of discretion and, crucially, whether any such error was prejudicial.
Without adequate transcripts—especially of witness testimony and exhibits—the court cannot conduct the required “fair assurance” analysis under § 2111 and Shinseki v. Sanders, and the appellant’s claim will fail.
Rule 10(b)(3)(A)’s requirement of a “statement of issues” may be satisfied by filings that serve as its functional equivalent, and dismissal for technical non‑compliance is not automatic. But this leniency does not extend to the substantive burden of showing prejudice.

In short, Sedore reinforces a critical but sometimes underappreciated aspect of appellate practice: procedural rigor and a complete, well‑constructed record are indispensable, particularly when an appellant seeks to overturn discretionary trial rulings. Without them, even potentially serious errors may remain beyond meaningful appellate review, and the verdict will stand.

The Appellant’s Burden to Supply an Adequate Record and Demonstrate Prejudice in Civil Appeals: Commentary on Sedore v. Landfair (6th Cir. 2025)