Textual Primacy & the Narrow Reach of the Scrivener’s-Error Doctrine: Commentary on Professional Home Health Care v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Cabinet for Health & Family Services, Supreme Court of Kentucky (2025)

1. Introduction

In August 2025 the Supreme Court of Kentucky issued an opinion that clarifies how Kentucky courts will approach the interpretation of administrative regulations when the text appears to diverge from agency practice or drafters’ intent. At stake was more than one million dollars in Medicaid reimbursements that the Department for Medicaid Services (“DMS”) sought to recoup from Professional Home Health Care (“PHHC”), a small non-profit provider serving rural counties under the Home and Community Based (HCB) waiver. PHHC contended that a word accidentally omitted from a 2009 regulation entitled it to retain the higher (“enhanced”) safety-net reimbursement rate for “case management” services. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that:

When the regulatory text is plain, courts may not “write in” missing words merely to advance perceived regulatory purpose.
The “scrivener’s-error” doctrine applies only to obvious, purely clerical mistakes where the true meaning is “absolutely clear.”
Equitable estoppel and laches rarely bar governmental recoupment actions absent “exceptional and extraordinary equities.”

Because the decision rigorously privileges text over intent and sharply limits relief against the State, it sets a consequential precedent for administrative, Medicaid, and broader public-law litigation in Kentucky.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court (Justice Keller writing) affirmed the Court of Appeals and every level below it:

Plain-text reading of 907 KAR 1:170. “Case management” is not listed among “revenue code services” eligible for enhanced reimbursement; the omission is not an obvious clerical error; therefore DMS lacked authority to pay PHHC the higher rate and may recoup overpayments.
No equitable estoppel. PHHC failed to show “exceptional and extraordinary equities.” Reliance on agency employees’ emails or past reimbursements cannot override unambiguous regulations.
No laches. Delay by DMS in discovering its mistake does not bar recoupment because public funds and interests are involved and no compelling prejudice was shown.
Audit challenge rejected. PHHC offered no legal basis to invalidate DMS’s audit or five-year look-back methodology.

Accordingly the Department may collect roughly $1.06 million previously paid for the three fiscal years 2011-2013 and offset amounts owed for 2014.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Wonderfoil, Inc. v. Russell (2021) & Comprehensive Home Health Servs. (2013) – confirm that statutory-interpretation rules govern regulation interpretation.
Shawnee Telecom Res. v. Brown (2011) – reiterates that unambiguous language ends inquiry.
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong (2018) – provides modern formulation of textualist hierarchy, quoted for the “plain meaning first” approach.
Neutzel v. Ryans (1919) – early Kentucky case recognising courts may supply or omit words if necessary to effectuate legislative intent; invoked by PHHC but distinguished because the error here was not “obvious.”
Niz-Chavez v. Garland (U.S. 2021) & United States v. X-Citement Video (1994) – U.S. Supreme Court statements that scrivener’s-error doctrine should be used sparingly; relied on to cabin judicial rewriting.
Sebastian-Voor Props. v. LFUCG (2008), St. Luke Hospitals (2005) – establish reluctance to apply estoppel against government.
City of Paducah v. Gillispie (1938) & Moore v. Commonwealth (2011) – underscore that laches seldom runs against the State.

“The sine qua non of any scrivener’s-error doctrine is that the meaning genuinely intended but inadequately expressed must be absolutely clear.” – Majority opinion quoting X-Citement Video.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

a. Textual Framework

The Court treated administrative regulations as the functional equivalent of statutes.
If text is clear, courts will not examine drafting history, internal emails, or subsequent agency practice.
907 KAR 1:170 § 1(19) clearly lists the services; “case management” is missing. End of inquiry.

b. Narrow Scrivener’s-Error Doctrine

Doctrine is available only where the error is facially obvious (e.g., wrong number, mis-placed “not”).
Here omission may be “curious” but not self-evidently mistaken; alternative explanations (cost, policy) conceivable.
Therefore courts must resist temptation to rescue the drafter from its silence.

c. Rejection of Equitable Estoppel

Requires “false representation” + “extraordinary equities.”
Email assurances and eight years of payments do not outweigh public interest in correct expenditure of Medicaid funds.
Court emphasises that erroneous acts of officials cannot freeze an incorrect interpretation indefinitely.

d. Rejection of Laches

Public-rights doctrine: time does not run against the State in enforcing public rights unless extraordinary harm is shown.
No statutory limitation period directly governs DMS recoupment; ambiguity may exist, but laches is still disfavoured.

e. Audit Objections

PHHC argued the recoupment was cloaked as an “audit” to evade limits, but supplied no rule dictating audit form.
Court: argument waived / unsupported; therefore no relief.

3.3 Likely Impact

Regulatory Drafting. Kentucky agencies now have a clear warning: omissions cannot be rescued by later practice; textual precision is vital.
Provider Reliance. Medicaid and other program providers cannot safely rely on informal guidance, emails, or historical reimbursements when the regulation reads otherwise.
Scrivener’s-Error Litigation. Litigants seeking to correct drafting problems face a higher evidentiary bar; “absolutely clear” standard adopted.
Government Defences. Equitable estoppel and laches remain difficult to assert against Kentucky agencies; future plaintiffs must marshal truly “exceptional” equities.
Administrative Law Scholarship. The decision aligns Kentucky with a growing nationwide textualist trend (seen in Kisor, Niz-Chavez) limiting purposive correction of regulatory text.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 “Scrivener’s Error”

A scrivener’s error is a clerical mistake (typo, wrong number, missing “not”) so blatant that everyone knows what was meant. Courts sometimes fix such typos to avoid absurd results, but only when the intended meaning is “absolutely clear.” Here, dropping “case management” might have been intentional policy; therefore not a scrivener’s error the Court will correct.

4.2 Equitable Estoppel (against Government)

Ordinary estoppel prevents someone from back-tracking on a promise when others reasonably relied on it. Against a government agency the bar is higher: only “exceptional and extraordinary equities” – e.g., gross misconduct, irreversible harm – justify blocking the State, because public money and statutory mandates are involved.

4.3 Laches

Laches is an equitable defence: “You waited too long, and it would be unfair to let you sue now.” When the State enforces public rights, Kentucky (like many jurisdictions) generally refuses to apply laches unless the delay is extreme and the prejudice compelling.

4.4 Medicaid Recoupment

Under 907 KAR 1:671 the Department may claw back (“recoup”) amounts it deems overpaid. Providers agree to that risk when they sign up for Medicaid. Recoupment can occur years later, depending on cost-settlement audits and any applicable statutes of limitation.

5. Conclusion

Professional Home Health Care v. Commonwealth firmly entrenches a rule of textual primacy in Kentucky administrative law, tightly cabins the scrivener’s-error doctrine, and reiterates the State’s strong immunity from equitable defences when recouping public funds. Providers and other regulated entities must now:

Read the black-letter regulation rather than rely on agency custom or assurances.
Document any extraordinary harm if they hope to estop or bar the State through laches.
Advocate with agencies to amend erroneous text promptly, because post-hoc judicial correction is unlikely.

For legislators and regulators the decision is an unmistakable caution: clarity on the page is king, and silence cannot later be filled in by benevolent courts. In the broader landscape, the case contributes to a national movement favouring textual fidelity over purposive reconstruction, signalling that in Kentucky—at least for now—the words truly matter most.

Textual Primacy & Limited Scrivener’s-Error Doctrine in Kentucky Administrative Law – Commentary on Professional Home Health Care v. Commonwealth (Ky. 2025)