Texas Supreme Court Narrows TCPA “Legal Action”: Discovery Motions for Sanctions Are Outside the Statute

Texas Supreme Court Narrows TCPA “Legal Action”: Discovery Motions for Sanctions Are Outside the Statute

I. Introduction

In Sadok Ferchichi and Martina Coronado v. Whataburger Restaurants LLC and Crystal Krueger and Haven at Thorpe Lane, LLC v. Pate and Burke, the Supreme Court of Texas resolved an important interpretive question under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA): whether a motion to compel discovery and seek related monetary sanctions is a “legal action” subject to dismissal under the TCPA’s anti-SLAPP framework.

Two different courts of appeals (San Antonio and Austin) had held that such motions are “legal actions” when they request monetary sanctions, thereby triggering the TCPA’s burden-shifting mechanism and fee-shifting consequences. The Supreme Court rejected that approach and held that:

  • Motions to compel discovery and for discovery-related sanctions do not qualify as “legal actions” under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(6); and
  • Accordingly, such motions are not subject to TCPA dismissal, discovery stays, or interlocutory appeals tied to the TCPA.

The decision clarifies the TCPA’s reach, distinguishes substantive claims from ancillary litigation conduct, and curtails the use of the TCPA to escalate ordinary discovery disputes into anti-SLAPP battles with immediate appellate review.

II. Background of the Consolidated Cases

A. Ferchichi v. Whataburger

In Ferchichi, plaintiffs Sadok Ferchichi and Martina Coronado sued Whataburger and its employee, Crystal Krueger, for negligence after a motor vehicle collision. During discovery, Whataburger obtained surveillance video of the plaintiffs but did not produce it. At mediation, defense counsel wanted the mediator to show the video; plaintiffs refused a joint session, and Whataburger declined to show or produce the video.

That same day, plaintiffs’ counsel requested the video by email. When Whataburger refused, plaintiffs filed a “Motion to Compel Defendants’ Discovery Responses and for Sanctions”, alleging discovery abuse and seeking:

  • An order compelling production of the surveillance video; and
  • Monetary sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees incurred in bringing the motion.

Whataburger responded with a TCPA motion to dismiss, targeted only at the monetary sanctions portion of the motion. It argued that the sanctions request was a “legal action” based on Whataburger’s protected “right to petition” (communications in mediation and in a judicial proceeding).

The trial court denied the TCPA motion. On interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals:

  • Held that a motion for sanctions requesting monetary relief is a “legal action” under the TCPA;
  • Found that the motion was in response to Whataburger’s exercise of its right to petition; and
  • Concluded plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case for an essential “element” of their sanctions “claim” (no evidence of the amount of fees incurred), and therefore ordered dismissal and TCPA fees/sanctions in favor of Whataburger.

Plaintiffs sought review in the Supreme Court.

B. Haven at Thorpe Lane, LLC v. Pate

In Haven, a student-housing complex (Haven at Thorpe Lane) failed to open on schedule, leaving student-lessees without promised housing. Numerous students sued Haven and related parties for fraud and deceptive trade practices, alleging that Haven knowingly misrepresented the construction status and refused to release them from leases.

During discovery in that suit, Haven alleged that the plaintiffs had not fully complied with discovery and had spoliated relevant communications. To obtain missing information, Haven served subpoenas duces tecum on nonparty mothers of two plaintiffs—Jerretta Pate and April Burke (the “Mothers”)—who had:

  • Spoken to local media and government about Haven’s delays;
  • Complained on social media; and
  • Created a private Facebook group, “Haven at Thorpe Lane is a Joke!!!,” where families discussed their experiences.

The subpoenas required the Mothers to appear for depositions and produce documents and communications related to the lawsuit and the Facebook group, including communications with media, government, and the plaintiff-lessees.

The Mothers (through plaintiffs’ counsel) produced some materials but withheld others on an “associational; privacy” privilege claim. Haven responded with a motion to compel, asking the court to:

  • Overrule the privilege objections;
  • Order full production of responsive, unredacted materials; and
  • Require the Mothers to state bases for any redactions;
  • Plus award Haven its “reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses” incurred in obtaining this relief.

The Mothers filed a TCPA motion to dismiss, contending that Haven’s motion was an attempt to punish them for their protected speech (complaints to media, government, and on Facebook) and associational activities. The trial court denied the TCPA motion.

On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals (over a dissent):

  • Held that Haven’s motion to compel and for sanctions was a “legal action” because it added a “claim for relief”—monetary sanctions—against new parties (the Mothers);
  • Found the motion arose from the Mothers’ protected communications; and
  • Concluded Haven failed to establish a prima facie case for the motion (no evidence of valid service or noncompliance with the subpoenas), hence TCPA dismissal was required along with TCPA fees/sanctions in favor of the Mothers.

Haven petitioned the Supreme Court for review.

C. Consolidation and Core Question

The Supreme Court granted both petitions and consolidated the cases for oral argument. The Court limited its analysis to the threshold question common to both cases:

Whether a motion to compel discovery and for associated monetary sanctions is a “legal action” under the TCPA.

Having answered that question “no,” the Court did not reach whether the motions were “based on” or “in response to” protected speech or petitioning activity.

III. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Lehrmann, writing for a unanimous Court, held:

  1. Motions to compel discovery and for discovery-related sanctions do not qualify as “legal actions” under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(6).
    • The statutory definition of “legal action” covers lawsuits and pleading-like filings that assert substantive claims for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief.
    • Discovery motions and sanctions requests are ancillary to those substantive claims and do not themselves constitute “claims for relief” in the TCPA sense.
  2. The 2019 amendment excluding “procedural action[s]” or motions that “do not amend or add a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief” reinforces a narrower reading. (§ 27.001(6)(A))
  3. Requesting monetary sanctions within a discovery motion does not transform it into a “legal action.”
    • The fact that a motion seeks attorney’s fees or sanctions does not convert it into a new cause of action or substantive claim; the relief remains discretionary with the court and derivative of the underlying case.
  4. Applying the TCPA to discovery-sanctions motions would subvert the statute’s purpose.
    • TCPA motions automatically stay discovery and permit interlocutory appeals.
    • Using that machinery to litigate collateral discovery disputes would prolong and complicate litigation, contrary to the TCPA’s goal of balancing free speech protection with the right to pursue meritorious claims.
  5. The trial courts were correct in denying the TCPA motions, but for a different reason than the courts of appeals used.
    • Because the discovery motions were not “legal actions,” the TCPA simply did not apply; it was error for the courts of appeals to re-characterize them as legal actions and order TCPA dismissal and fee-shifting.

The Court reversed both appellate judgments and remanded each case to its trial court for further proceedings on the underlying motions to compel and for sanctions, expressly declining to opine on their merits.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. TCPA Framework and Where “Legal Action” Fits

The TCPA sets up a three-step process:

  1. Coverage: The movant must show that the challenged “legal action” is “based on or is in response to” the movant’s exercise of protected speech, petition, or association rights. (§ 27.003(a), § 27.005(b))
  2. Prima facie case: If coverage is shown, the nonmovant must produce “clear and specific evidence” establishing a prima facie case for each “essential element of the claim in question.” (§ 27.005(c))
  3. Defenses: If the nonmovant satisfies step two, the movant can still prevail by proving an affirmative defense or other legal ground entitling it to judgment as a matter of law. (§ 27.005(d))

If the TCPA motion succeeds, the court must award costs and attorney’s fees to the movant and may impose additional sanctions on the party who brought the “legal action.” (§ 27.009(a)) If the TCPA motion is frivolous or filed solely to delay, the court may award fees to the responding party. (§ 27.009(b)) A denial of a TCPA motion is immediately appealable, and all trial-court proceedings are stayed during that appeal. (§§ 27.008(b), 51.014(a)(12), 51.014(b))

Everything hinges on what counts as a “legal action”. If a filing is not a legal action, the TCPA is not triggered at all. This case squarely addresses that threshold.

B. Definition of “Legal Action” and the 2019 Amendment

Section 27.001(6) defines “legal action” as:

“a lawsuit, cause of action, petition, complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim or any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal, declaratory, or equitable relief.”

In 2019, the Legislature narrowed that definition by carving out:

“a procedural action taken or motion made in an action that does not amend or add a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief.”
(Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(6)(A))

Thus, post-2019, a filing must be both within the core definition and not within the exclusion to qualify as a “legal action.”

1. The Enumerated Filings

The Court identifies a common denominator among the enumerated terms—“lawsuit,” “cause of action,” “petition,” “complaint,” “cross-claim,” and “counterclaim”:

  • They commence or expand a judicial proceeding on substantive claims; and
  • They are formal pleadings that assert or respond to claims for relief (e.g., negligence, fraud, DTPA, etc.).

Drawing on prior decisions:

  • A lawsuit is “a judicial proceeding in which parties assert claims for relief.” (Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc.)
  • A petition (state court) or complaint (federal court) is the filing that commences a civil suit and specifies what relief the plaintiff seeks. (Tex. R. Civ. P. 22; Fed. R. Civ. P. 3)
  • A counterclaim or cross-claim is an affirmative claim for relief asserted against an opposing party or co-party. (Tex. R. Civ. P. 97)
  • A cause of action consists of the facts and corresponding legal elements entitling a party to relief and that must be alleged and proved. (Montelongo v. Abrea)

Together, these terms cover the substantive pleading architecture of a case: the primary lawsuit plus any additional claims that might redistribute liability or assert additional rights among the parties.

2. The Catch-All and Ejusdem Generis

The definition then adds a catch-all: “any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal, declaratory, or equitable relief.” The Court applies the canon of ejusdem generis:

When a statute lists specific items followed by a general phrase (“any other ...”), the general phrase is limited to things similar in nature to the specific items.

Thus, the “any other judicial pleading or filing” clause must be constrained to filings that resemble lawsuits, causes of action, petitions, complaints, cross-claims, or counterclaims—namely, filings that:

  • Assert a claim for relief in the sense of a substantive right to recovery or judgment; and
  • Function as part of the pleadings by which claims are initiated, expanded, or restructured (including third-party claims and interventions asserting affirmative relief).

By anchoring the catch-all to the enumerated filings, the Court rejects the view that any filing that asks a court to do something (e.g., to compel discovery, continue a hearing, or issue a scheduling order) automatically counts as a “legal action.”

3. The 2019 Exclusion Cementing the Focus on Claims

The 2019 amendment explicitly excludes from “legal action”:

“a procedural action taken or motion made in an action that does not amend or add a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief.”

This reinforces two points:

  1. The statute is centrally concerned with claims—that is, the assertion of substantive rights and entitlements to relief, as found in pleadings;
  2. Procedural motions and steps that merely manage or police litigation conduct, without altering or adding substantive claims, are not legal actions (and thus should not trigger the TCPA).

The Court aligns this with its earlier decision in Montelongo v. Abrea, where it held that, for TCPA purposes, a new “legal action” is asserted when an amended or supplemental pleading:

  • Adds new parties;
  • Alleges new essential facts supporting claims; or
  • Asserts new legal claims or theories with different elements.

That is, TCPA “legal action” tracks substantive claim-structure, not every motion or procedural skirmish.

C. Why Motions to Compel and for Sanctions Are Not “Legal Actions”

1. Ancillary to the Merits; Cannot Stand Alone

The Court emphasizes that motions to compel and for sanctions:

  • Are based on conduct ancillary to the substantive claims (i.e., discovery behavior); and
  • Cannot exist independently of an underlying lawsuit—they are derivative of, and parasitic on, already-pending substantive claims.

Citing with approval the Dallas Court of Appeals’ view in Misko v. Johns, the Court characterizes these motions as:

“based on conduct within litigation that is ancillary to the substantive claims in the case.”

Thus, they are fundamentally different from a petition, complaint, or counterclaim that initiates or expands the core controversy. They do not assert new legal rights or obligations; they ask the court to enforce compliance with procedural rules governing the litigation of existing rights.

2. Monetary Sanctions Do Not Turn Ancillary Motions into Substantive Claims

Both courts of appeals below had latched onto the request for monetary sanctions as the key to treating the motions as “legal actions.” The Supreme Court rejects that reasoning, drawing a parallel to its earlier decision in State ex rel. Best v. Harper.

In Best, the State sought removal of an elected official via a statutory removal petition. The defendant there argued that such a petition did not seek “legal or equitable relief” because it sought a political remedy (removal from office), not damages or an injunction. The Court rejected that narrow view:

The relief was “legal” because it was a statutory remedy created and defined by law.

Analogously, in these cases:

  • The relief sought—sanctions or fee awards under the discovery rules or sanctions statutes—is available only because Texas law authorizes courts to impose such remedies.
  • But that does not mean that every request for sanctions is itself a substantive claim for relief on par with negligence, fraud, or DTPA claims.

The Court’s key move is to separate:

  • The fact that sanctions are a form of “legal relief” in the abstract (they arise from law); from
  • The statutory concept of a “claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief” as used in the TCPA, which must be read in the context of pleadings asserting substantive rights, not every demand embedded in a procedural motion.

Accordingly, a motion’s request for attorney’s fees or sanctions does not, by itself, convert it into a TCPA “legal action.”

3. Rejection of an Overbroad “Claim” Concept and Distinguishing CTL/Thompson

The Austin Court of Appeals in Haven leaned heavily on the broad dictionary definition of “claim” (“a demand for or an assertion of a supposed right”) and this Court’s statement in CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n that:

“A motion for sanctions is a claim for affirmative relief that survives nonsuit if the nonsuit would defeat the purpose of sanctions.”

The Supreme Court now draws an important distinction:

  • The meaning of “claim” in CTL/Thompson arose in a different procedural context (nonsuit and whether a sanctions request survives it).
  • For TCPA purposes, “claim for relief” must be read within § 27.001(6) and in light of the enumerated pleadings and the 2019 exclusion, not in isolation or by importing definitions from unrelated doctrines.

In other words:

  • CTL/Thompson holds that a sanctions motion can be “affirmative relief” for purposes of determining whether a nonsuit wipes it out; but
  • That does not mean every sanctions motion is a TCPA “legal action” that triggers anti-SLAPP protections, discovery stays, interlocutory appeals, and fee-shifting.

The Court refuses to let an expansive, context-free notion of “claim” swallow the carefully structured TCPA framework and its post-2019 limiting language.

4. TCPA’s Structural Features and Avoiding Absurd Results

The Court also examines the TCPA’s structural features:

  • Filing a TCPA motion to dismiss suspends discovery unless the court allows limited discovery related to the motion. (§§ 27.003(c), 27.006(b))
  • A denial of the motion is immediately appealable and stays all trial-court proceedings. (§§ 27.008(a), 51.014(a)(12), 51.014(b))

If every discovery motion or sanctions request were a “legal action,” then:

  • Each such motion could be met with a TCPA motion, automatically freezing discovery on the underlying merits;
  • Any denial of the TCPA motion would launch an interlocutory appeal, staying the entire case while appellate courts adjudicate collateral discovery disputes.

This would:

  • “Serve only to drag out the litigation for reasons unrelated to the merits of the underlying claims”; and
  • “Subvert” the TCPA’s dual purpose of both facilitating participation in public discussion and preserving access to courts for meritorious claims. (§ 27.002)

The Court thus invokes both textual canons and practical coherence: the statutory design (stays, expedited appeals, fee-shifting) makes sense if applied to substantive suits that may chill speech, but not to every run-of-the-mill discovery fight.

5. Reservations: Not All Procedural Motions Are Excluded

The Court is careful not to announce a categorical rule that procedural motions can never be legal actions. In a key footnote, it states:

“We certainly are not holding that a procedural motion can never be a legal action; indeed, the TCPA’s language confirms that it can if it ‘amend[s] or add[s] a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief.’”
(§ 27.001(6)(A))

This leaves room for:

  • Filings that are styled as “motions” but functionally amend or add substantive claims—for example, a “motion for leave” accompanied by an amended pleading adding a defamation claim; or
  • Pseudo-motions that substantively operate as claims (e.g., a “motion” that actually asserts a new cause of action against a third party without formal amendment).

The key is function, not label: if the motion changes the landscape of substantive rights and remedies by adding or amending claims, it may still be a TCPA “legal action.”

D. Application to the Two Cases

1. Ferchichi v. Whataburger

In Ferchichi:

  • Plaintiffs’ motion sought:
    • An order compelling production of the surveillance video; and
    • Sanctions (attorney’s fees) for the need to bring the motion.
  • Whataburger’s TCPA motion targeted only the sanctions portion.

Under the Supreme Court’s reasoning:

  • The motion did not initiate a new lawsuit or cause of action.
  • It did not add or amend any existing pleadings or substantive claims.
  • It complained of alleged discovery abuse—conduct wholly ancillary to the negligence claims already pleaded.

Therefore, it was:

“a motion to compel and for sanctions [that] does not present a substantive underlying claim for relief and therefore is not a ‘legal action’ subject to dismissal under the TCPA.”

Result:

  • The trial court’s denial of Whataburger’s TCPA motion was correct (though for different reasoning than the court of appeals used).
  • The Fourth Court of Appeals’ dismissal and TCPA fee/sanctions award for Whataburger was reversed.

2. Haven at Thorpe Lane v. Pate

In Haven:

  • Haven’s motion to compel:
    • Addressed alleged noncompliance with third-party subpoenas and claims of privilege by the Mothers; and
    • Requested fees, costs, and expenses “incurred in obtaining the foregoing relief.”
  • The Third Court of Appeals treated this as adding a “claim for relief” against new parties—thus a “legal action.”

The Supreme Court rejects that characterization:

  • The motion did not assert any new substantive cause of action (e.g., defamation or abuse of process) against the Mothers.
  • It did not amend the pleadings to make the Mothers defendants in the underlying fraud/DTPA case.
  • The fee request was derivative of the discovery dispute and entirely discretionary with the trial court.

Thus, as in Ferchichi, the motion:

  • Was a procedural step aimed at enforcing discovery obligations; and
  • Did not “amend or add a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief” within the meaning of § 27.001(6)(A).

Result:

  • The trial court’s denial of the Mothers’ TCPA motion was correct because the TCPA did not apply at all.
  • The Third Court of Appeals’ reversal, TCPA dismissal of the motion to compel, and directive to award TCPA fees/sanctions to the Mothers were reversed.

E. Interaction with Prior Precedent and Lower-Court Splits

1. Aligning with Montelongo and Best

This decision fits neatly within the Court’s existing TCPA jurisprudence:

  • Montelongo v. Abrea focused on when amended pleadings constitute new “legal actions.” There, the Court looked to whether new parties, new essential facts, or new legal theories were added. Here, the Court reinforces that “legal action” is about substantive claim-structure, not day-to-day litigation motions.
  • State ex rel. Best v. Harper confirmed that the TCPA’s “legal action” definition is broad but not limitless, and that remedies can be “legal” if they are statutory. Here, the Court reaffirms that “legal relief” is not limited to damages/injunctions, but clarifies that not every request for legal relief equals a new claim for TCPA purposes.

2. Resolving the Post-2019 Court-of-Appeals Split

Post-2019, Texas courts of appeals diverged on whether sanctions motions are “legal actions”:

  • The Ninth Court of Appeals (Thuesen v. Scott) held that a motion for sanctions under Rule 13 and Chapter 10 is not a legal action because the movant has no entitlement as of right; sanctions are discretionary.
  • The First Court of Appeals (Kinetic Content, LLC v. Dang) similarly reasoned that a sanctions motion does not assert an existing right to relief and thus does not “amend or add a claim” under § 27.001(6)(A).
  • By contrast, the Fourth Court of Appeals (in Ferchichi) and the Third Court of Appeals (in Haven and earlier in KB Home Lone Star Inc. v. Gordon) took the view that sanctions motions seeking monetary relief are “legal actions” because they request relief from alleged sanctionable conduct.

The Supreme Court’s decision squarely rejects the San Antonio and Austin line of cases and effectively endorses the narrower Beaumont–Houston approach, though on somewhat broader textual grounds: it focuses on the nature of “legal action” and “claim for relief” rather than solely on the discretionary nature of sanctions.

3. Harmonizing with Youngkin v. Hines and Anti-SLAPP Policy

In Youngkin v. Hines, the Court described the TCPA as a “special motion to dismiss, subject to expedited review,” designed to quickly dispose of suits that threaten free speech or petition rights. By preventing parties from weaponizing the TCPA against discovery-sanctions motions, this decision keeps the anti-SLAPP regime aimed at:

  • Lawsuits and substantive claims that may chill public participation; not
  • Routine, intra-litigation enforcement of discovery and procedural rules.

V. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. Impact on TCPA/Anti-SLAPP Practice

The decision has immediate and significant practical consequences:

  • Reduced use of TCPA against discovery and sanctions motions.
    • Parties can no longer effectively halt discovery and seek interlocutory appeal merely by characterizing a discovery or sanctions motion as a “legal action” targeting their speech or petition activities.
  • Clarified boundaries.
    • Lawyers must now distinguish between:
      • Pleadings that assert or amend substantive claims (potential TCPA “legal actions”); and
      • Procedural motions enforcing rules and orders (generally not “legal actions”).
  • Fewer interlocutory TCPA appeals over collateral issues.
    • Appellate courts should see fewer TCPA-based appeals arising from discovery disputes, easing docket pressure and reducing delay in the underlying cases.

B. Impact on Discovery and Sanctions Strategy

For trial practice, the opinion implies the following:

  • Ordinary opposition, not TCPA, is the proper response to discovery sanctions motions.
    • A party facing a motion to compel or for sanctions should respond on the merits, file counter-motions if appropriate, and rely on trial courts to police abuses.
    • If a sanctions motion is frivolous or abusive, a party may still seek sanctions under Rule 13 or Chapter 10, but not under the TCPA.
  • Sanctions requests remain viable but are not autonomous “claims.”
    • Counsel may still seek attorney’s fees, costs, and sanctions for discovery misconduct; trial courts retain full authority under Tex. R. Civ. P. 215 and related rules.
    • But those requests do not morph into stand-alone “legal actions” for TCPA purposes.

At the same time, practitioners should be alert to the Court’s footnoted caveat: if a procedural filing genuinely adds or amends substantive claims (for example, an intervention asserting new causes of action), it may still trigger the TCPA.

C. Nonparties, Subpoenas, and the Right to Public Participation

The Haven fact pattern involved nonparties who had engaged in public criticism of a developer and organized an online group. They attempted to use the TCPA to block a subpoena-related motion aimed at obtaining their communications.

This decision establishes that:

  • Nonparties who are merely the targets of discovery motions typically cannot invoke the TCPA to dismiss those motions as “legal actions.”
  • However, this does not mean nonparties lose all protection:
    • They may move to quash subpoenas, assert privileges or constitutional objections, or seek protective orders; and
    • Courts remain obligated to protect associational and privacy interests within the ordinary discovery framework.

The Court effectively channels protection for nonparties’ speech and association interests back into traditional discovery and privilege doctrines, rather than into the TCPA’s specialized anti-SLAPP regime.

D. Litigation Efficiency and Systemic Effects

Doctrinally, the decision reinforces that the TCPA is not a general-purpose weapon for all perceived retaliatory or abusive conduct within litigation. Systemically:

  • It helps preserve trial courts’ ability to manage and sanction discovery without being routinely interrupted by TCPA motions and appeals.
  • It mitigates the risk that anti-SLAPP protections themselves become tools for delay and leverage in ordinary litigation skirmishes.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. The TCPA in Plain Terms

The Texas Citizens Participation Act is Texas’s “anti-SLAPP” statute. It is designed to:

  • Let people quickly dismiss lawsuits that punish them for speaking out on public matters or participating in government (for example, testifying, petitioning, or communicating with officials); and
  • Prevent meritless suits from chilling free speech by making plaintiffs pay fees and possibly sanctions if they bring such cases.

It does this by providing a special motion to dismiss that must be heard early and, if granted, requires fee-shifting.

2. “Legal Action” vs. “Motion”

Not every paper filed in a lawsuit is a “legal action” under the TCPA. Roughly:

  • Legal actions are:
    • Lawsuits or their building blocks (petitions/complaints, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc.), where someone sues someone else for specific relief (money, injunction, declaration, etc.).
  • Ordinary motions are:
    • Requests to the judge about how the case should be run—e.g., discovery disputes, continuances, scheduling, protective orders.

Only the first category typically triggers the TCPA.

3. Prima Facie Case

A prima facie case means enough evidence on each essential element of a claim to support a judgment if no contrary evidence is offered. Under the TCPA, once coverage is established, the plaintiff (or nonmovant) must produce such evidence or face dismissal. In these consolidated cases, the Court never reached this step because the filings were not “legal actions” to begin with.

4. Ejusdem Generis

Ejusdem generis is a Latin phrase meaning “of the same kind.” In statutory interpretation, it means:

If a law lists specific things (like “cars, trucks, motorcycles”) followed by a general phrase (“and other vehicles”), the general phrase is limited to things similar to the listed items (like buses), not completely different things (like boats or airplanes).

Here, the Court used this principle to hold that “any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal, declaratory, or equitable relief” must be similar to the listed items (lawsuit, petition, complaint, etc.)—that is, filings that assert substantive claims for relief.

5. Discovery Sanctions

“Sanctions” in discovery are penalties or remedies courts can impose when a party or nonparty violates discovery rules or orders (for example, refusing to produce documents, destroying evidence, or abusing the process). Sanctions can include:

  • Attorney’s fees and costs;
  • Orders compelling production or testimony;
  • Striking pleadings or excluding evidence; and in extreme cases
  • Dismissing claims or rendering default judgment.

These are tools to enforce the rules governing how lawsuits are litigated; they do not themselves constitute new, standalone lawsuits.

VII. Conclusion

This decision establishes a clear and important limitation on the scope of the Texas Citizens Participation Act:

  • Motions to compel discovery and for related monetary sanctions—without more—are not “legal actions” under § 27.001(6).
  • They therefore cannot be targeted by TCPA motions to dismiss, nor do they trigger the statute’s discovery stays and interlocutory appellate review.

By anchoring “legal action” to lawsuits and pleading-like assertions of substantive claims, and by emphasizing the 2019 exclusion for procedural motions that do not add or amend such claims, the Court:

  • Resolves a split among the courts of appeals;
  • Prevents the TCPA from being deployed in routine discovery and sanctions fights; and
  • Reaffirms that the statute must be construed in a manner that furthers its dual goals: protecting public participation while safeguarding access to court for meritorious claims.

Going forward, Texas litigants must understand that while the TCPA remains a potent shield against suits that threaten free speech, it is not a general-purpose device for resisting discovery orders or sanctions requests. Those disputes must largely be addressed within the ordinary procedural and sanctions framework of Texas civil practice, not through the anti-SLAPP machinery.

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