Termination‐Based Discrimination Claims Accrue at Decision Communication, Not Grievance Resolution

Introduction

In Ikedilo v. Statter, 23‐7947 (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the dismissal and disposition of a discrimination, hostile‐work‐environment, retaliation, accommodation and contract dispute arising from a general surgery residency program at Montefiore Medical Center. Dr. Ojinika Ikedilo, a Black Nigerian woman and resident physician, alleged that she suffered race and national‐origin discrimination, retaliation, disability and pregnancy‐related discrimination, and breach of contract when: (1) she received negative evaluations; (2) her fellowship evaluation was delayed; (3) she was terminated or forced to remediate; and (4) she was denied a requested test‐date accommodation. The district court dismissed most claims under Rule 12(b)(6) as time‐barred or insufficiently pleaded, granted summary judgment on others, and the Second Circuit affirmed in a summary order.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. Key holdings include:

Statute of Limitations and Accrual: Claims based on termination accrue on the date the termination decision is made and communicated (April 2016), not when internal appeals conclude (November 2016). Consequently, New York‐law discrimination claims filed more than three years after the communicated decision and § 1981 claims filed more than four years after that date are time‐barred.
Failure to Timely Send Evaluation: A § 1981 claim for racial discrimination based on a one‐week delay in sending a fellowship summary evaluation failed because the plaintiff did not plead any lost benefit, salary, or insurance gap “but for” race.
Failure to Accommodate: The district court properly dismissed federal and state disability and pregnancy accommodation claims where the requested accommodation (an extra exam sitting or extended remediated residency year) would impose undue hardship and substantial modifications beyond what federal law requires.
§ 1981 Discriminatory Termination: Summary judgment was warranted because the plaintiff offered no direct evidence of racial animus and no comparator who was similarly situated “in all material respects” but treated more favorably.
§ 1981 Retaliation: The plaintiff did not engage in any protected activity under § 1981—no formal or informal race discrimination complaint—so summary judgment for the defendants was proper.
Breach of Contract: The implied covenant of good faith cannot override Montefiore’s contractual discretion to require residents to meet benchmarks (e.g., ABSITE score in the 30th percentile) before promotion or reinstatement. There was no bad faith or breach.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980): Held § 1981 claims accrue when the adverse decision is made and communicated, not when a grievance is resolved.
Pauk v. Board of Trustees of CUNY, 654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981): Applied Ricks’ accrual analysis to tenure denials under New York law; grievance procedures do not toll limitations.
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015) & Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Pleading standards for plausibility under Rule 12(b)(6).
City of Pontiac Gen. Employees’ Retirement Sys. v. MBIA, Inc., 637 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2011): Standard of review for motions to dismiss.
Comcast Corp. v. NAACP, 589 U.S. 327 (2020): ‘‘But‐for’’ causation requirement in § 1981 discrimination claims.
Dean v. University at Buffalo School of Medicine, 804 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2015): Reasonable‐accommodation standard under Section 504/ADA.
Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Associates, 716 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2013): Title VII retaliation analysis, incorporated into § 1981 retaliation.
M/A-Com Sec. Corp. v. Galesi, 904 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1990): Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in New York contract law.

Legal Reasoning

1. Accrual and Tolling: The controlling inquiry is when the “discriminatory acts” occurred–in this case, when Dr. Statter informed Dr. Ikedilo of termination. The mere existence or pendency of an internal review or grievance procedure does not render the initial decision “tentative” or toll the applicable limitations period.

2. Statute of Limitations: Federal‐law § 1981 actions borrow the four‐year federal statute; Title IX, Title VI, § 504, and state/local human rights claims borrow New York’s three‐year personal‐injury statute. Acts outside the limitations window cannot be revived by later appeal.

3. Failure to Accommodate: Federal law requires “reasonable” accommodations of known disabilities or pregnancy‐related conditions, but does not obligate an institution to restructure its program or grant repeated exceptions or suspensions of standard requirements unless the modification is reasonable and imposes no undue hardship. Accommodations that fundamentally alter the program (e.g., a mid‐year exam retake, extended clinical service) are not required.

4. Disparate Treatment: To defeat summary judgment on a § 1981 discrimination claim, a plaintiff must produce evidence of similarly situated comparators treated more favorably. A shared low test score alone, absent comparable clinical‐performance metrics, is insufficient.

5. Retaliation: Protected activity under § 1981 requires opposition to an “unlawful employment practice.” Informal expressions of dissatisfaction (“I feel singled out”) without mention of race or national origin do not satisfy the requirement.

6. Implied Covenant in Contract: The implied duty of good faith cannot be used to negate an express contractual right to set program benchmarks and exercise promotion discretion. “Bad faith” cannot be inferred from enforcement of a contract’s clear terms.

Impact

This decision—though non‐precedential—reinforces several key doctrinal points:

Practitioners must calculate accrual dates for discrimination‐based termination claims from the date of communicated decision, not from final grievance outcomes.
Institutional grievance or appeal procedures cannot extend or toll statutory deadlines absent specific tolling provisions.
Reasonable‐accommodation analyses remain fact‐intensive; entities can resist undue modifications that impair core program structure.
To survive summary judgment, plaintiffs must identify well‐matched comparators or proffer direct evidence of bias.
§ 1981 retaliation protections are not triggered by generalized complaints absent reference to unlawful, race‐based employment actions.
Contract claims in the academic and health‐care context will be assessed in light of institutional discretion and legitimate program objectives.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Accrual Date: The day a plaintiff learns of the adverse, discriminatory decision—filing deadlines run from that point, regardless of appeals.

• Statute of Limitations: The legal “clock” for bringing claims: four years for § 1981, three years for Title VI, Title IX, § 504, state and local human rights statutes in New York.

• Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal: Tests whether the complaint’s factual allegations, accepted as true, state a plausible claim for relief.

• Summary Judgment: A court‐stage where, if no genuine dispute exists over material facts, one side wins as a matter of law.

• Reasonable Accommodation: Adjustments that enable participation without fundamentally altering a program or causing undue hardship.

• Comparator Analysis: In disparate‐treatment claims, plaintiffs must point to “similarly situated” individuals treated differently on account of protected status.

• Protected Activity: Under § 1981 retaliation, opposition to employment practices made unlawful by § 1981, typically discriminatory acts based on race/national origin.

Conclusion

Ikedilo v. Statter reaffirms that discrimination claims based on termination accrue when the adverse decision is communicated—even if internal appeals follow—and that grievance processes do not toll limitations periods. It underscores the high pleading and proof thresholds at both the motion‐to‐dismiss and summary‐judgment stages in § 1981 and related claims. Institutions may lawfully enforce program benchmarks and deny accommodations that fundamentally alter their structure or impose undue hardship. For future plaintiffs and counsel, the decision highlights the importance of timely filing, precise comparator identification, and clear invocation of protected activity when alleging retaliation or discrimination under federal, state, or local laws.