Termination Notice as Trigger for Statute of Limitations in Discrimination Claims: Ikedilo v. Statter

Introduction

In Ikedilo v. Statter, No. 23-7947 (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the question of when the statute of limitations begins to run on various federal, state, and local discrimination and retaliation claims arising from an adverse employment decision. Plaintiff-appellant Dr. Ojinika Ikedilo, a general surgery resident at Montefiore Medical Center, sued her supervisors and the institution under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VI, Title IX, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the New York State and City Human Rights Laws, and state contract theories. She alleged race, national origin and pregnancy discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, failure to accommodate, and breach of contract. The district court dismissed the bulk of her claims as time-barred under Rules 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment on the remainder. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in full, clarifying the accrual rules for termination-based discrimination claims, the standards for reasonable accommodation requests, and the requirements for comparator evidence in a § 1981 case.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s November 6, 2023 judgment in all respects. Key holdings:

Statute of Limitations and Accrual: Claims challenging termination accrued when the decision was communicated (April 2016), not when an internal appeals panel concluded (November 2016). Internal grievance processes do not toll or delay accrual.
Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissals: Discrimination and retaliation counts were time-barred under the applicable three-year (Title IX, Title VI, § 504, NYSHRL, NYCHRL) and four-year (§ 1981) limitations. The § 1981 claim for failure to forward a summary evaluation was dismissed for lack of “but-for” causation.
Reasonable Accommodation: A request to retake an annual exam outside program-defined windows was unreasonable as a matter of law, warranting dismissal of failure-to-accommodate claims.
Summary Judgment on Surviving Counts: Plaintiff failed to produce comparator evidence of similarly situated residents or to show she engaged in protected activity, and her contract claims lacked any breach or bad-faith exercise of institutional discretion.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Delaware State College v. Ricks (449 U.S. 250, 1980): Holds accrual date is when the adverse decision becomes final and communicated, not when a grievance is resolved.
Pauk v. Board of Trustees of CUNY (654 F.2d 856, 2d Cir. 1981): Applies Ricks accrual reasoning to tenure denial under state and collective bargaining rules.
Littlejohn v. City of New York (795 F.3d 297, 2d Cir. 2015) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (556 U.S. 662, 2009): Standards for pleading plausibility under Rule 12(b)(6).
Comcast Corp. v. NAACP (589 U.S. 327, 2020): Requires “but-for” causation for § 1981 discrimination.
Second Circuit and New York cases on summary judgment, comparator evidence in discrimination cases (Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 2000) and contract principles (M/A-Com Sec. Corp. v. Galesi, 904 F.2d 134, 2d Cir. 1990).

2. Legal Reasoning

Accrual of Claims: The court reaffirmed that the statute of limitations for employment-based discrimination claims begins on the date an adverse decision is made and communicated, not when an internal appeals process concludes. Drawing on Ricks and Pauk, the panel explained that internal remedies do not render a communicated decision “tentative,” nor do they toll limitations.

Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissals: To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead facts establishing plausible claims within the limitations period. Here, all Title IX/VI/§ 504/NYSHRL/NYCHRL counts accruing before October 28, 2016 (three-year limitation) and § 1981 counts before October 28, 2015 (four-year limitation) were time-barred. The § 1981 claim for delay in forwarding an evaluation failed “but-for” causation because no harm to pay or benefits was pleaded.

Reasonable Accommodation: Federal and state disability–pregnancy accommodation law requires reasonable, not undue-hardship, adjustments. The panel held that allowing Dr. Ikedilo to retake an annual exam six months after its sole administration was not “reasonable” but a substantial modification of program requirements.

Summary Judgment Standards: On her surviving § 1981 discrimination claim, Plaintiff adduced neither direct evidence nor a single comparator who was similarly situated “in all material respects.” On her retaliation claim, she identified no protected opposition to unlawful practices. Her contract claims failed because Montefiore’s House Officer Agreement vested “sole discretion” in promotion decisions and did not impose a duty of good faith that would prevent academic competence requirements.

3. Impact

This decision clarifies for employers and employees in the Second Circuit that:

Adverse employment decisions trigger limitations periods upon communication, regardless of internal review processes.
Reasonable accommodation does not require re-administering annual assessments outside established program schedules.
Discrimination plaintiffs must present comparators with closely analogous performance issues to survive summary judgment.

Future litigants will rely on Ikedilo to determine accrual dates in contexts ranging from academic tenure denials to professional licensing decisions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Accrual Date: The moment you learn of a final adverse decision (e.g., termination), the clock starts on your limited time to sue.
Rule 12(b)(6) Pleading Standard: You must state enough facts that, if true, show your claim is legally plausible.
“But-For” Causation: In § 1981 cases, you must prove the unlawful factor (race, etc.) was the actual cause of your harm.
Reasonable Accommodation: Adjustments must help the individual but need not unduly burden the institution or rewrite core program requirements.
Comparator Evidence: To show disparate treatment, compare yourself to someone with the same job performance and circumstances, differing only by protected trait.

Conclusion

Ikedilo v. Statter reaffirms that the statute of limitations for discrimination claims begins upon notification of an adverse decision, not upon resolution of internal appeals. It underscores the necessity of timely filing, plausible pleading, clear comparator evidence, and reasonableness in accommodation requests. By affirming dismissal and summary judgment on all counts, the Second Circuit has provided a clear roadmap for both litigants and institutions navigating the intersection of employment decisions, internal grievance mechanisms, and civil rights statutes.