Termination for Timekeeping Discrepancies Is Not an ADA “Failure to Accommodate” Absent a Denied Accommodation, and Pretext Fails Under the Honest-Belief Rule

I. Introduction

In William Shears v. FirstEnergy Corp., the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Energy Harbor Nuclear Corporation (“Energy Harbor”) on William Shears’s disability-based failure-to-accommodate, disability discrimination, and retaliation claims (federal ADA and Ohio Rev. Code § 4112 claims analyzed under the same standard). Shears, a longtime Maintenance Supervisor at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, had Type 2 diabetes and historically received accommodations limiting night work.

During a 2019 refueling outage, Shears worked twelve-hour night shifts and complained repeatedly that the schedule worsened his condition. After submitting a doctor’s note on April 3, 2019, Energy Harbor promptly placed him on leave and then returned him to a day schedule. Shortly thereafter, management audited Shears’s timesheets against badge-access data and concluded there were significant discrepancies. After multiple levels of review (including the Safety Conscious Work Review Team (“SCWRT”)), Energy Harbor terminated Shears for “unprofessionalism and falsification of time records.”

The appeal focused on whether Energy Harbor failed to accommodate Shears during the outage, whether the timesheet-falsification rationale was pretext for disability discrimination, and whether his termination was retaliatory (for requesting accommodation and for assisting coworkers with HR complaints).

II. Summary of the Opinion

Failure to accommodate: Affirmed. Shears waived his “delay” theory by abandoning it at oral argument, and his reframed theory—treating termination as a failure to accommodate because his disability allegedly contributed to the discrepancies—did not fit the ADA accommodation framework and failed on the merits.
Disability discrimination (discriminatory discharge): Affirmed. Energy Harbor articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (timecard falsification), and Shears failed to create a triable issue of pretext under any recognized route (no-basis-in-fact, did-not-actually-motivate, or insufficient-to-warrant).
Retaliation: Affirmed. Even assuming a prima facie case (including under a Cat’s Paw theory), Shears could not show pretext; the pretext analysis mirrored the discriminatory discharge claim.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of review and summary judgment framework

Hrdlicka v. Gen. Motors, LLC: Supplied both the de novo standard for reviewing summary judgment and the ADA discriminatory-discharge prima facie elements and pretext taxonomy used throughout the opinion.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett: Anchored the “genuine dispute of material fact” standard and burden structure at summary judgment.
Fisher v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.: Reinforced that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
King v. Steward Trumbull Mem'l Hosp., Inc.: Justified applying ADA standards to Ohio disability claims because Ohio law “mirrors the ADA.”

2. Waiver, forfeiture, and appellate argument framing

Karst Robbins Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs and United States v. Olano: Supported the court’s conclusion that Shears waived (intentionally relinquished) his “delay” theory by expressly conceding it at oral argument.
Buetenmiller v. Macomb Cnty. Jail: Cited for the proposition that underdeveloped arguments may be forfeited; used to question whether Shears adequately preserved his reframed “termination-as-accommodation” theory.

3. Failure-to-accommodate doctrinal structure

Blanchet v. Charter Commc'ns, LLC and Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc.: Explained why a failure-to-accommodate claim proceeds under a “direct evidence” framework (the denial of accommodation is itself the discriminatory act).
Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ. of Danville Indep. Schs.: Provided the five-element prima facie test for failure to accommodate (including request and denial).
Kellar v. Yunion, Inc. (citing Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc.): Supported the principle that an employer may be entitled to request medical documentation in response to an accommodation request.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dolgencorp, LLC: Distinguished as a case where the employer categorically denied an accommodation request without considering alternatives; here, Energy Harbor requested documentation and then granted the shift accommodation.
McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Association (quoting Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist.): Heavily relied upon by Shears, but the court treated the quoted language as dicta in a non-employment context and rejected its use as a substitute for the established ADA employment accommodation framework.

4. Legitimate reason for discharge and pretext tools

Hudson v. City of Highland Park and Green v. Cent. Ohio Transit Auth.: Confirmed that timecard falsification is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory ground for termination.
Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co.: Supplied the canonical three routes for showing pretext and informed the “honest-belief” discussion; also referenced for suspicious timing principles.
Miles v. S. Cent. Hum. Res. Agency, Inc.: Clarified the “ultimate inquiry” of pretext and the “no basis in fact” meaning (allegations never happened).
Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc.: Emphasized that the pretext inquiry focuses on whether the employer fabricated a reason to conceal discrimination.
Gray v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.: Used to reject arguments that merely “explain” discrepancies as insufficient to show the discrepancies were factually baseless.
Briggs v. Univ. of Cincinnati: Set out the honest-belief rule formulation requiring a reasonably based belief on particularized facts available at the decision time.
Chen v. Dow Chem. Co.: Reinforced that a reasonably informed honest belief can defeat pretext even if the conclusion is later shown mistaken or trivial.
Hartman v. Dow Chem. Co. (quoting Smith v. Leggett Wire Co.): Provided the “did not actually motivate” avenue: showing circumstances suggesting illegal motivation is more likely than the proffered explanation.

5. “Insufficient to warrant” and comparator evidence

Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dep't: Framed the “insufficient to warrant discharge” pretext route.
Strickland v. City of Detroit (quoting George v. Youngstown State Univ.): Expressed the “why was plaintiff singled out?” comparator logic.
Moore v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol.: Restated that comparators must have engaged in substantially identical conduct in the relevant respects.
Blount v. Stanley Eng'g Fastening (quoting Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc.) and citing Arendale v. City of Memphis: Provided the “similarly situated in all relevant respects” and “superficial similarities” warnings; applied to reject Shears’s comparator proffer as underdeveloped and not comparable in seriousness.

6. Retaliation and Cat’s Paw

Pemberton v. Bell's Brewery, Inc.: Confirmed McDonnell Douglas applies to ADA retaliation.
Bose v. Bea: Supplied the Cat’s Paw theory, under which a subordinate’s retaliatory animus can be imputed to the final decisionmaker.
Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ. of Danville Indep. Schs.: Provided the retaliation prima facie elements (protected activity, knowledge, adverse action, causation).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Failure to accommodate: narrowing the claim to a cognizable ADA theory

The court treated Shears’s appellate pivot as decisive. In briefing, he argued Energy Harbor unlawfully delayed moving him to days during the outage, allegedly failing to engage the interactive process based on his repeated complaints. At oral argument, he conceded the company could request medical documentation, effectively abandoning the “delay” theory and waiving it under Karst Robbins Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs and United States v. Olano.

Shears then recast his accommodation claim: because the company allegedly knew his disability was affecting his cognition before April 3, it should have “excused” the later-identified timekeeping discrepancies rather than terminate him. The Sixth Circuit rejected this reframing as inconsistent with the elements of an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim (from Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ. of Danville Indep. Schs.), which centers on whether a reasonable accommodation was requested and denied. Here, after documentation arrived, Energy Harbor granted the shift accommodation. The termination decision—discipline for perceived falsification—was analyzed under discriminatory discharge/retaliation frameworks, not transformed into a separate accommodation denial.

The court also separated Shears’s case from Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dolgencorp, LLC: unlike the categorical refusal in Dolgencorp, Energy Harbor requested documentation (permitted under Kellar v. Yunion, Inc. and Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc.) and then accommodated. And the court declined to import the quoted language from McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Association into the employment accommodation analysis, emphasizing McPherson’s non-employment posture and dicta character.

2. Disability discrimination: pretext fails under honest belief and underdeveloped comparators

Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework (as referenced through Hrdlicka v. Gen. Motors, LLC), the court assumed a prima facie case and accepted Energy Harbor’s stated reason: falsifying time records—recognized as legitimate in Hudson v. City of Highland Park and Green v. Cent. Ohio Transit Auth..

The case turned on pretext. The court systematically rejected all three classical approaches (from Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. and reiterated in Hrdlicka):

No basis in fact: The badge data showed discrepancies; Shears’s arguments largely “explained” them rather than showing they “never happened” (the distinction drawn via Miles v. S. Cent. Hum. Res. Agency, Inc. and reinforced with Gray v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.).
Did not actually motivate: Shears’s assertions that the conclusion of willfulness was “ridiculous” and that punishment was too harsh were deemed unsupported; moreover, the record showed multiple review layers and no evidence of discriminatory motive more likely than the proffered reason (using the framing from Hartman v. Dow Chem. Co. / Smith v. Leggett Wire Co.).
Insufficient to warrant: Shears’s comparator evidence lacked detail showing similarly situated employees engaged in comparable dishonest conduct but were treated more leniently, failing under Blount v. Stanley Eng'g Fastening, Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., and Arendale v. City of Memphis.

Central to the holding was the honest-belief rule. Citing Briggs v. Univ. of Cincinnati and Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., the court credited the investigation’s structure: audit based on badge data, fact-finding interview with a second manager present, review by the Maintenance Manager, and independent SCWRT review with direct engagement of Shears. This constituted a “reasonably informed and considered decision” under Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co.. The court also rejected Shears’s reliance on a doctor’s letter linking his condition to impaired judgment because it was created after termination.

3. Retaliation: even assuming Cat’s Paw, pretext remains dispositive

For retaliation, Shears invoked Cat’s Paw (Bose v. Bea), arguing Beahon’s alleged retaliatory animus tainted the ultimate decision. The court declined to resolve disputed knowledge/causation questions at the prima facie stage because, even assuming a prima facie case (as the district court did), the claim failed at the pretext stage for the same reasons as the discriminatory discharge claim: Energy Harbor’s reason (time falsification) was not shown pretextual. The opinion thus treats pretext as a common “fail point” when the same termination decision supports both discrimination and retaliation theories.

C. Impact

Claim framing discipline: The decision underscores that an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim is not an all-purpose vehicle to challenge discipline for workplace violations allegedly connected to a disability; plaintiffs must identify a denied reasonable accommodation within the established prima facie framework.
Documentation requests as interactive-process steps: By citing Kellar v. Yunion, Inc. (and Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc.), the opinion reinforces employer latitude to request medical documentation, particularly when the employer ultimately grants the requested accommodation upon receipt.
Honest-belief rule strength in misconduct cases: The investigation described here—objective data comparison, interviews, and multi-tier review—illustrates the kind of process that can shield employers at summary judgment even where the employee disputes intent.
Comparator rigor: The opinion is a reminder that “timesheet errors” is too broad a comparator category; the relevant comparator must match on seriousness and the employer’s perception of dishonesty.
Appellate consequences of oral-argument concessions: Explicit abandonment at oral argument can waive issues otherwise preserved in briefing, shaping the entire appeal’s trajectory.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment: A case can be decided without trial when no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party on a material fact (Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett).
Interactive process / medical documentation: Employers and employees must communicate about accommodations, and employers may request documentation to substantiate restrictions (as reflected through Kellar v. Yunion, Inc. and Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc.).
Direct-evidence framework for accommodations: In accommodation cases, the “denial of accommodation” is treated as direct evidence of disability discrimination (Blanchet v. Charter Commc'ns, LLC; Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc.).
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting: In circumstantial-evidence discrimination/retaliation cases, the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing; the employer offers a legitimate reason; then the plaintiff must show pretext (Hrdlicka v. Gen. Motors, LLC).
Pretext: The plaintiff must show the stated reason is not the real reason—because it didn’t happen, didn’t motivate, or wasn’t sufficient (Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co.).
Honest-belief rule: Even if the employer is wrong, it can win if it reasonably and honestly believed its stated reason based on what it knew at the time (Briggs v. Univ. of Cincinnati; Chen v. Dow Chem. Co.).
Cat’s Paw: A biased subordinate’s intent can be attributed to the final decisionmaker if the subordinate meaningfully influenced the decision (Bose v. Bea).
Waiver vs. forfeiture: Waiver is intentional abandonment (often fatal on appeal) (United States v. Olano); forfeiture is failure to properly develop/preserve an argument (often reviewed less favorably) (Buetenmiller v. Macomb Cnty. Jail).

V. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision affirms a disciplined separation between accommodation doctrine and misconduct-based termination analysis. Once Shears conceded that requesting medical documentation was permissible and Energy Harbor in fact granted the requested shift accommodation upon receipt, his effort to recast termination for timekeeping discrepancies as an ADA “failure to accommodate” could not satisfy the governing prima facie framework. On discriminatory discharge and retaliation, Energy Harbor’s time-falsification rationale—supported by badge-data auditing and multi-layer review—stood unrebutted under the honest-belief rule, and Shears’s comparator evidence lacked the specificity required to show disparate treatment for comparable dishonest conduct. The opinion thus reinforces that, in the Sixth Circuit, plaintiffs must meet accommodation elements precisely and must confront misconduct rationales with concrete evidence of pretext—not merely alternative explanations for the misconduct.