Terminal-Only Mandates Are ANCA “Access Restrictions” Even If Valid Under the ADA’s Proprietor Exception: Commentary on Delux Public Charter v. County of Westchester (2d Cir. 2025, Summary Order)

Terminal-Only Mandates Are ANCA “Access Restrictions” Even If Valid Under the ADA’s Proprietor Exception

In Delux Public Charter v. County of Westchester, the Second Circuit (by summary order) held that Westchester County’s 2005 requirement that all passenger service occur in the main terminal is preempted by the Airport Noise and Capacity Act (ANCA) because it is not grandfathered; however, the same rule is not preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) due to the proprietor exception. The plaintiffs’ class-of-one Equal Protection claim also failed.

Note on precedential status: This is a summary order of the Second Circuit; as the Court underscores, such orders do not have precedential effect. Nevertheless, the Court’s reasoning is instructive for airports and carriers navigating ANCA, the ADA, and equal protection challenges.

Introduction

This case involves a clash between local airport management prerogatives and federal aviation preemption regimes. Westchester County owns and operates the Westchester County Airport in White Plains, New York. Plaintiffs—Delux Public Charter (d/b/a JSX), XO Global, and Blade—are federally authorized public charter operators and air carriers that, beginning in 2015, offered public charter services from private Fixed Base Operator (FBO) facilities rather than the main terminal.

In 2021, the County began enforcing a 2005 amendment to its Terminal Use Procedures (codified at Westchester County Municipal Code § 712.462) to require that all passenger service be provided at the main terminal, not at FBOs. Plaintiffs sued, alleging:

  • ANCA preemption (49 U.S.C. § 47524(c)(1));
  • ADA preemption (49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)); and
  • a class-of-one Equal Protection violation (42 U.S.C. § 1983).

The district court granted summary judgment to the County on all three claims. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed as to ADA preemption and Equal Protection, but reversed as to ANCA preemption, holding the 2005 amendment is not grandfathered and is therefore preempted by ANCA. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Summary of the Judgment

  • ANCA: The 2005 Amendment is an “access restriction” on Stage 3 aircraft that “reduces or limits aircraft operations” relative to the preexisting, grandfathered regime. It was not agreed to by all aircraft operators nor approved by the Secretary of Transportation. It therefore is preempted by ANCA. The County’s “grandfathering” defense failed because the 2005 amendment imposed a new terminal-only requirement not present in the 2004 codification.
  • ADA: The same 2005 Amendment is not preempted by the ADA because it falls within the ADA’s proprietor exception. The County, as airport proprietor, may impose reasonable, nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory rules addressing local operational concerns like congestion and environmental impacts.
  • Equal Protection: Plaintiffs’ class-of-one claim fails. They did not identify comparators with the “extremely high degree of similarity” required, and a rational basis—controlling congestion and protecting local quality of life—supports the challenged classification.
  • Disposition: Affirmed in part (ADA and Equal Protection), reversed in part (ANCA), and remanded.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Friends of the East Hampton Airport, Inc. v. Town of East Hampton, 841 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2016): Central to the ANCA analysis. The Court reiterates that ANCA’s procedures are “mandatory and comprehensive,” so local access restrictions not enacted in compliance with ANCA are preempted. The panel relies on this framework to hold Westchester’s 2005 terminal-only rule preempted.
  • Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J., 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987), aff’g 658 F. Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1986): Highlights the scope of the airport proprietor’s authority to manage congestion, including adoption of a perimeter rule at LaGuardia. The panel uses this to sustain the County’s rule against ADA preemption under the proprietor exception.
  • National Helicopter Corp. of America v. City of New York, 137 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998): Explains that the ADA’s proprietor exception permits reasonable, nonarbitrary, and nondiscriminatory regulations of noise and environmental concerns. This undergirds the Court’s conclusion that the ADA does not preempt Westchester’s terminal-use rule.
  • FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993): Sets the deferential rational-basis standard; a law must be sustained if any reasonably conceivable facts support it. The panel applies this to reject the equal protection challenge.
  • Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2010); Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2012); Progressive Credit Union v. City of New York, 889 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2018): These cases define the stringent “class-of-one” comparator requirement and emphasize the strong presumption of validity under rational basis review. They collectively support the dismissal of the equal protection claim.
  • Statutory-interpretation authorities: Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2015) (de novo review on summary judgment); Buono v. Tyco Fire Prods., LP, 78 F.4th 490 (2d Cir. 2023); Grajales v. Commissioner, 47 F.4th 58 (2d Cir. 2022); Cuthill v. Blinken, 990 F.3d 272 (2d Cir. 2021). These shaped the panel’s plain-text focus comparing the 2004 and 2005 Westchester provisions.

Legal Reasoning

1) ANCA Preemption

ANCA creates a national aviation noise and capacity policy. For Stage 3 aircraft (which the plaintiffs operate), any local access restriction “may become effective only if” it is either (a) agreed to by the proprietor and all operators, or (b) submitted to and approved by the Secretary of Transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 47524(c)(1). ANCA exempts from those procedures (i) restrictions in effect on November 5, 1990 (the “grandfather clause,” § 47533(1)), and (ii) “subsequent amendment[s]” to pre-1990 restrictions that “do[] not reduce or limit aircraft operations or affect aircraft safety.” § 47524(d)(4).

Everyone agreed the County did not follow ANCA’s procedures for the 2005 Amendment. Thus, the case turned on whether the 2005 Amendment was a grandfathered “subsequent amendment” that did not “reduce or limit aircraft operations” beyond the grandfathered regime. The Court’s analysis proceeded in three steps:

  1. Assumption that 2004 rules were grandfathered: The FAA had viewed the 2004 codification as a subsequent amendment to earlier pre-1990 Terminal Use Procedures that did not reduce/limit operations; neither side contested this characterization on appeal. The Court therefore assumed, without deciding, that the 2004 law was properly grandfathered.
  2. Plain text comparison—2004 vs. 2005: The 2005 Amendment added an express requirement new to the code: “All Passenger Service provided at the Airport … [must] be provided at the Terminal.” This was a material change because the 2004 law’s restrictions applied only to entities “using the Terminal building or Terminal Ramp” and expressly stated the section “does not apply” to users not providing passenger service or not using the terminal spaces. The 2005 change also removed that carve-out. The Court concluded the 2005 Amendment thus “limit[ed] aircraft operations” within the meaning of § 47524(d)(4).
  3. Rejection of “mere clarification” argument: Westchester argued the amendment simply codified long-standing practice. But the County produced no policy or written instrument requiring public charters to use the terminal before 2005. The Court viewed the absence of such evidence—and the very act of codifying a clarifying requirement—as undercutting the claim that the change was non-substantive. An FAA 2004 letter using “Airport” terminology did not alter the text of the local code or prove that non-terminal areas were already governed.

Result: The 2005 terminal-use mandate is not a grandfathered “subsequent amendment” and is therefore preempted by ANCA because it was not enacted via ANCA’s required procedures. The panel cited Friends of the East Hampton to emphasize that noncompliant local access restrictions on Stage 3 aircraft are preempted.

2) ADA Preemption and the Proprietor Exception

The ADA generally preempts state and local laws “related to a price, route, or service” of an air carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). But the ADA also contains the proprietor exception, preserving the ability of airport owners to carry out their proprietary powers and rights. § 41713(b)(3). Courts have long recognized that proprietors may adopt reasonable, nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory rules to manage local concerns like noise and congestion.

Applying these principles, the Court held the 2005 Amendment is not preempted by the ADA because:

  • It applies equally to all airlines selling seats to the public;
  • It is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory; and
  • It serves classic proprietor interests—reducing ground congestion and protecting environmental and quality-of-life concerns for nearby residents—similar to the perimeter rule upheld for LaGuardia in Western Air Lines.

Crucially, the Court’s ADA analysis does not rescue the rule from ANCA: The statutes serve different purposes, and compliance with the ADA’s proprietor exception does not negate ANCA’s separate procedural demands for access restrictions on Stage 3 aircraft.

3) Equal Protection (Class-of-One)

Under a class-of-one theory, plaintiffs must show they were intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated, without a rational basis. The similarity showing is exacting—an “extremely high degree of similarity.” Even assuming suitable comparators, the burden is to negate “every conceivable basis” that could support the differential treatment.

The Court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs failed on both prongs:

  • No adequate comparators were identified; and
  • In any event, a rational basis exists: management of congestion and protection of environmental and community interests—purposes consistently recognized as legitimate in airport-proprietor jurisprudence.

Impact and Practical Implications

Key takeaways for airports and local governments

  • ANCA’s grandfathering is narrow and text-driven: If a post-1990 amendment adds a new operational requirement—such as imposing a terminal-only mandate where none existed—it likely “reduces or limits aircraft operations” and thus cannot rely on ANCA’s grandfather clause.
  • Document your pre-1990 regime: When invoking grandfathering, proprietors should preserve contemporaneous records showing the scope of pre-1990 restrictions and the fact that any later change is purely clarificatory. The absence of written proof weighed heavily against the County.
  • ADA and ANCA analyses are independent: A rule can be valid under the ADA’s proprietor exception and still be preempted by ANCA. Proprietors must satisfy both regimes where applicable.
  • Congestion/environment rationales remain robust: Neutral, nonarbitrary local operational rules aimed at congestion or environmental impacts are likely to survive ADA preemption and equal protection scrutiny—but ANCA compliance still matters for access restrictions affecting Stage 3 aircraft.
  • Consider the ANCA approval pathway: For new access restrictions, proprietors should either obtain agreement from all operators or seek federal approval. Failure to do so risks invalidation, even if the rule is otherwise reasonable.

Implications for public charter operators and air carriers

  • ANCA is the stronger tool against local access limits: Where a locality imposes new operational constraints (e.g., prohibiting FBO use for passenger service), ANCA may provide a viable preemption path, particularly if the locality cannot show the rule was grandfathered or properly approved.
  • ADA preemption arguments face the proprietor exception: Because terminal-use and congestion policies sit at the heart of airport management, ADA challenges will often fail if the rule is evenhanded and not protectionist or arbitrary.
  • Equal Protection is a steep climb: Class-of-one theories require near identity with comparators and overcoming broad rational basis deference—both are difficult in this context.

Broader legal significance

  • Refined articulation of ANCA “access restrictions”: By treating a terminal-only mandate as limiting aircraft operations, the decision underscores that access restrictions are not limited to noise decibels or flight-hour curfews; location-of-service mandates can qualify, too.
  • Compliance roadmap for future airport rules: When contemplating operational restrictions touching Stage 3 aircraft:
    • Inventory pre-1990 policies;
    • Assess whether the new measure substantively narrows operator choices or locations; and
    • If so, pursue ANCA’s procedural routes (e.g., operator agreement or federal approval) before enforcement.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Stage 3 aircraft: A federal noise-certification category. ANCA focuses specifically on local access restrictions affecting these aircraft; most modern commercial jets fall at least within Stage 3.
  • ANCA grandfather clause: Local noise/access restrictions in effect on Nov. 5, 1990 are exempt from ANCA’s approval procedures, and later amendments are exempt only if they do not reduce/limit operations or affect safety. New restrictions post-1990 usually must go through ANCA processes.
  • Access restriction (ANCA): A local rule that limits how, when, or where aircraft can use the airport. This case treats a terminal-only requirement as an access restriction because it curtails operators’ ability to use alternative facilities (like FBOs) for passenger service.
  • ADA proprietor exception: Even though the ADA broadly preempts state/local rules affecting airline prices, routes, or services, an airport—acting as proprietor—may enact reasonable, nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory rules addressing local operations, congestion, and environmental concerns.
  • FBO vs. Terminal: FBOs are private facilities at airports that provide services such as fueling, hangaring, and sometimes passenger handling for charter and private flights. A terminal is the main passenger facility typically used by scheduled commercial airlines.
  • Class-of-one Equal Protection: A plaintiff claims it alone was irrationally singled out. The plaintiff must show near-identical comparators treated better and negate every conceivable rational basis for the difference.
  • De novo review of summary judgment: The appellate court gives no deference to the district court’s legal conclusions and independently assesses whether the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

What Happens on Remand

  • Relief and implementation: The district court will fashion relief consistent with the holding that the 2005 terminal-only requirement is preempted by ANCA. That may include declaratory and/or injunctive relief against enforcing the 2005 Amendment as an access restriction on Stage 3 operations.
  • County options: The County could seek to regularize any replacement access restriction by pursuing ANCA’s approval pathways (operator consensus or federal approval). Alternatively, it could explore non-access measures that do not reduce or limit operations.
  • Unaddressed alternative theory: Plaintiffs’ alternative argument—that the 2005 Amendment’s expanded definition of “Airline” independently reduced/limited operations—was not reached. The principal ANCA holding makes resolution of that alternative unnecessary for now.

Conclusion

Delux Public Charter v. County of Westchester crystallizes a critical and sometimes misunderstood point: ANCA and the ADA operate on separate tracks. A local airport rule may be perfectly reasonable under the ADA’s proprietor exception—and thus not ADA-preempted—yet still be invalid under ANCA if it constitutes a new access restriction on Stage 3 aircraft adopted without ANCA’s mandatory procedures. The Second Circuit’s text-centered comparison of Westchester’s 2004 and 2005 codes, and its insistence on documentary evidence for “long-standing practice,” signal that ANCA’s grandfathering safe harbor will be construed narrowly.

For airport proprietors, the message is clear: when changing the ground rules in ways that constrain how carriers access facilities, ANCA compliance is essential. For carriers—especially public charter operators—ANCA can be a powerful shield against newly imposed operational constraints, even where ADA challenges face the formidable proprietor exception and equal protection claims confront rational-basis deference.

This commentary is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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