Terminal Degree and Leadership Experience as Valid Gender-Neutral Factors under the Equal Pay Act and CFEPA

Introduction

In Jennifer Williams v. Alabama State University, 23-12692 (11th Cir. Dec. 23, 2024), plaintiff Jennifer Williams challenged her former employer, Alabama State University (the “University”), on the grounds that it paid her less than her male successor in the Athletic Director role. Williams asserted violations of the federal Equal Pay Act (EPA), Alabama’s Clarke-Figures Equal Pay Act (CFEPA), and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. The key issues were whether Williams established a prima facie case of sex-based pay discrimination, and if so, whether the University’s stated grounds for paying Dr. Jason Cable—a male successor—a higher salary constituted legitimate “factors other than sex” under the EPA and CFEPA. The Eleventh Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed summary judgment for the University, recognizing credentials and extensive athletic administration experience as valid, gender-neutral justifications for a pay differential and holding that Title IX does not provide an implied private right of action for employment discrimination by educational institutions.

Summary of the Judgment

Williams had served as Athletic Director at the University at a salary of $135,000. Upon her voluntary resignation in 2021, the University hired Dr. Jason Cable at $170,000.
Williams sued under the EPA, CFEPA, and Title IX, alleging a pay disparity based on sex.
The district court granted summary judgment to the University. Williams appealed.
The Eleventh Circuit held:
1. Williams established a prima facie pay discrimination claim under both the EPA and CFEPA by showing that a male successor was paid more for substantially the same work.
2. The University met its burden on the affirmative defense of “a factor other than sex” by presenting uncontroverted evidence that Dr. Cable’s terminal degree and over thirteen years of progressive leadership experience in athletic administration—especially within the SWAC conference—justified the higher salary.
3. In light of Joseph v. Board of Regents (11th Cir. 2024), Title IX does not provide an implied private cause of action for employee sex discrimination in educational institutions.
Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the University on all claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) – Established the EPA’s prima facie framework: equal work, equal pay, unless justified by a statutory defense.
Baker v. Upson Regional Medical Center, 94 F.4th 1312 (11th Cir. 2024) – Recent Eleventh Circuit decision reaffirming the two-step analysis under the EPA: plaintiff’s prima facie burden, then employer’s affirmative defense under one of four exceptions.
Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1992) – Clarified that experience and education are affirmative defenses, not elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.
Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988) – Confirmed that “factors other than sex” may include unique job characteristics or exigent business circumstances.
Joseph v. Board of Regents, 121 F.4th 855 (11th Cir. 2024) – Held that Title IX does not create an implied private right of action for employment discrimination by employees of federally funded educational institutions.

Legal Reasoning

Under both the EPA and CFEPA, once a plaintiff shows that opposite-sex employees performed equal work but received unequal pay, the employer must prove one of four statutory defenses. The University invoked the fourth defense—“a factor other than sex”—by presenting Dr. Rolle’s uncontroverted affidavit. He explained that the University sought an athletic “executive” with:

A terminal degree (Ph.D. in Higher Education Administration)
Over thirteen years of progressive leadership roles in athletic administration, including high-level positions in the SWAC conference

These qualifications were objectively measurable and aligned with the University’s revised job posting criteria after Williams’s departure. The court found that Dr. Cable’s credentials and career history constituted legitimate, gender-neutral factors permitting his higher compensation. No evidence rebutted those factors, and Williams did not contest that she had fewer relevant years of experience and lacked a terminal degree.

On Title IX, the Eleventh Circuit adhered to prior binding precedent in Joseph: while Title IX protects students from sex discrimination, it does not imply a private right of action for employees who claim sex-based employment discrimination at federally funded educational institutions.

Impact

This decision clarifies and reinforces several points:

Affirmative Defense Strengthened: Employers can rely on credentials (e.g., terminal degrees) and extensive relevant experience to justify pay differentials under Sections 206(d)(1)(iv) of the EPA and Ala. Code § 25-1-30(b)(4).
State Law Convergence: The Eleventh Circuit’s alignment of the CFEPA with the federal EPA provides predictability for litigants in Alabama, adopting the same two-step framework and defensive exceptions.
Title IX Limitation: Reinforces that Title IX does not cover staff or faculty employment discrimination, directing such claims to statutory schemes like Title VII, EPA, or state counterparts.
Job Postings and Negotiation: Employers are reminded to draft transparent job requirements, clearly articulate the weight of experience and education, and document negotiations to solidify “factor other than sex” defenses.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prima Facie Case: The plaintiff must show same job, same duties, but different pay for men vs. women.
Factor Other Than Sex: A statutory safety valve allowing pay differences if based on bona fide reasons—seniority, merit, production, or any other non-sex factor.
Summary Judgment: A court ruling that ends a case before trial when there is no genuine factual dispute and one side is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Implied Private Right of Action: A cause of action not explicitly written into a statute but inferred by courts. Joseph confirmed Title IX does not create such a right for employee discrimination.

Conclusion

Jennifer Williams v. Alabama State University affirms that employers may use objective, measurable credentials and extensive relevant experience as valid, gender-neutral justifications for pay disparities under the EPA and CFEPA. It also underscores the Eleventh Circuit’s position that Title IX does not extend to employment discrimination claims by university staff. This ruling will shape future pay-equity litigation by strengthening the “factor other than sex” defense and guiding educational institutions in structuring job postings, compensation packages, and record-keeping practices to withstand equal pay challenges.