Precedents and Authorities Cited

• United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2008): Establishes that revocation hearings under Rule 32.1 are less formal than plea hearings and do not entail the “full panoply” of criminal trial rights. Supports the conclusion that Rule 11 plea-advisement requirements (including warnings about non-binding recommendations) do not apply to revocation admissions and frames the appellate plain error standard for unpreserved challenges to revocation proceedings.
• Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2): Enumerates the process rights at revocation—notice, evidence disclosure, opportunity to appear/present evidence/cross-examine, counsel, and allocution—but no requirement that a defendant be advised about the court’s authority to vary from recommended sentences or advisory ranges.
• Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(B): Requires plea-hearing advisement that a sentencing recommendation is non-binding and that the defendant cannot withdraw a plea if the court rejects it. The panel confirms this rule does not govern revocations.
• United States v. Williams, 994 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2021): Confirms abuse-of-discretion review for revocation sentences and application of § 3553(a) factors via § 3583(e).
• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Reinforces deferential review of sentences both within and outside the Guidelines range and the district court’s broad discretion to weigh § 3553(a) factors.
• United States v. DeRusse, 859 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2017): Clarifies that reversal for substantive unreasonableness is warranted only if a sentence is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable,” or exceeds the bounds of permissible choice.
• United States v. Blair, 933 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2019): Appellate courts do not reweigh § 3553(a) factors; the question is whether the sentence falls within a range of rationally available choices.
• United States v. Barnes, 890 F.3d 910 (10th Cir. 2018): There is no algorithm for weighting § 3553(a) factors; substantial variances are upheld when supported by valid reasons.
• United States v. Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079 (10th Cir. 2019): Deference extends to the district court’s determination of how much weight to accord various facts and factors.
• United States v. Steele, 603 F.3d 803 (10th Cir. 2010): A supervised-release violation is a breach of the court’s trust; a second breach in a short time can justify an upward variance. The panel relied on Steele to uphold Mr. King’s above-range sentence for his second revocation.
• United States v. Livingston, 586 F.3d 819 (10th Cir. 2009): Distinguished. Concerns a stipulated-facts bench trial and waiver advisements impacting appeal rights, not revocation admissions.
• United States v. LeBlanc, 175 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 1999): Distinguished. Involved ambiguous admissions and misadvice about the maximum; here, the defendant had clear notice of the two-year maximum and the advisory range before admitting the violation.
• Statutes and policy statements: 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (appellate jurisdiction over sentences), 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (final orders), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (revocation sentencing factors), and the advisory Chapter 7 policy statements (U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4) establishing the 4–10 month range referenced by the court.

Legal Reasoning

A. Voluntariness of the Admission at Revocation

The defense framed the admission as involuntary because the district court did not warn that it could impose a sentence above the advisory range even though both parties recommended within-range terms. The panel’s reasoning proceeds in two steps:

1. Governing procedural framework. Revocation proceedings are governed by Rule 32.1, not Rule 11. Rule 32.1 prescribes specific process rights but does not require the court to deliver plea-like advisements about sentencing recommendations or the ability to withdraw an admission if the court rejects a recommendation. Relying on Fay, the panel emphasized the “less formal” nature of revocations and the inapplicability of the “full panoply” of rights and colloquy requirements associated with criminal prosecutions and guilty pleas.
2. Actual notice. Even if more were required (it is not), the record independently defeats the voluntariness challenge. Before Mr. King admitted the violation:
   • The probation violation report clearly stated the statutory maximum (two years) and the advisory range (4–10 months).
   • Defense counsel confirmed receipt and review of the report.
   • The government stated on the record, before the stipulation, that the maximum custody term upon revocation was two years.
   With this information, Mr. King admitted the violation. Because neither Rule 32.1 nor any cited authority required a Rule 11(c)(3)(B)-type advisement at revocation—and because Mr. King had actual notice of the court’s authority—there was no error, let alone plain error.

B. Substantive Reasonableness of the Upward Variance

On sentencing, the district court adopted an advisory policy-statement range of 4–10 months but imposed 21 months. Under Gall, Williams, DeRusse, Blair, Barnes, and Cookson, the appellate inquiry is deferential and asks whether the sentence falls within the range of rationally available choices in light of § 3553(a), as incorporated by § 3583(e).

The panel highlighted the district court’s individualized analysis:

• Mitigation considered: Mr. King’s “incredibly rough and adverse childhood,” mental-health and substance-use issues, documented efforts at rehabilitation (e.g., progress toward a commercial driver’s license), and acceptance of responsibility.
• Aggravation emphasized:
  • Serious underlying criminal history—robbery involving firing a gun during a home invasion.
  • First revocation in which he admitted to a domestic-violence incident and associating with a known felon (while on supervision), resulting in a short prison term and renewed supervision.
  • Second set of alleged domestic-violence offenses (presence of a minor, deadly weapon, strangulation), followed by 2,000+ calls to the victim and acts aimed at dissuading cooperation with prosecution.
  • Continued criminal behavior despite a substantial 50-month original sentence and a prior revocation.
• Core purposes of sentencing: The court found that the need for specific deterrence and to protect the public “heavily outweighed” mitigating considerations.
• Disparity: Any disparity from an above-range sentence was “warranted,” the court explained, because the Chapter 7 range did not capture the succession and persistence of Mr. King’s conduct during and after his first revocation.

Responding to the defendant’s four appellate arguments, the panel concluded:

1. Rehabilitation not ignored: The district court explicitly acknowledged rehabilitative efforts and acceptance of responsibility; it simply found they were outweighed by aggravating factors. Appellate courts do not reweigh the § 3553(a) factors.
2. Deterrence weighting was permissible: Disagreement with how a court weighs policy considerations—such as the efficacy of incarceration for deterrence—does not render a sentence substantively unreasonable.
3. Disparity claim unavailing: The court reasonably explained why any variance-produced disparity was warranted by the facts of this case.
4. Breach-of-trust rationale supported: Under Steele, a “second breach of trust in a fairly short time” is a recognized, reasonable basis for an upward variance at revocation. Mr. King’s second violation in just over a year fit squarely within that framework.

Given this record and the deferential standard, the panel held the 21-month sentence was not “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable,” and thus affirmed.

Impact and Practical Implications

While nonprecedential, the opinion carries persuasive weight and clarifies several operational points for supervised-release practice in the Tenth Circuit:

• No Rule 11-type advisement at revocations. District courts need not advise a defendant—before accepting an admission—that they can impose a sentence above an agreed recommendation or above the advisory policy-statement range. Defense counsel should not assume a plea colloquy will occur at revocation.
• Notice still matters. A violation report that states the statutory maximum and advisory range, coupled with on-the-record confirmation of receipt/review and the government’s articulation of the maximum, can decisively defeat later claims of involuntariness.
• Document the § 3553(a) analysis. District courts contemplating substantial upward variances at revocation should explicitly weigh mitigating and aggravating factors, explain the need for specific deterrence and protection of the public, and tie any perceived disparities to case-specific features such as repeated breaches of trust. King demonstrates how such a record withstands appellate scrutiny.
• Second revocations are different. King, echoing Steele, reinforces that a second revocation in short succession can justify a significant upward variance, especially where the conduct is serious and persistent.
• Preservation matters for defendants. Challenges to the voluntariness of an admission raised for the first time on appeal face the high bar of plain-error review. Counsel who seek plea-like advisements at revocation should request them on the record and object if they are not given, even though the law does not require them.
• Policy arguments about deterrence are typically insufficient. General social-science or “real-world data” arguments against incarceration’s deterrent effect, without more, are unlikely to carry the day on substantive-reasonableness review where concrete facts justify deterrence and public-protection findings.
• Guidelines vs. policy statements. The Chapter 7 ranges are advisory policy statements; they are not binding and do not preclude substantial upward variances when the facts warrant them.