Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Steele v. Latimer, 521 P.2d 304 (Kan. 1974): The Kansas Supreme Court recognized the implied warranty of habitability, requiring landlords to ensure premises are “suitable for human habitation.” This foundational principle anchors what a “reasonable insured landlord” would understand “habitability” to mean, aligning with the policy’s own reference to what makes premises “habitable or livable.”

• K.S.A. § 58-2553(a): The Residential Landlord and Tenant Act codifies habitability obligations. The court specifically noted that Kansas law makes the “provision of heat and the maintenance of heating appliances” habitability duties (§ 58-2553(a)(3), (5)). The plaintiff’s negligence allegations track those statutory duties, linking the claims to habitability.

• Washburn S. Apartments LLC v. Hession, 570 P.3d 1268 (Kan. Ct. App. 2025): Cited to confirm that the requirements of habitability are codified, reinforcing the clarity and objective content of “habitability” under Kansas law.

• Liggatt v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 46 P.3d 1120 (Kan. 2002): Ambiguities in insurance policies are construed in favor of the insured; if no ambiguity exists, the plain meaning controls. The court found the habitability exclusion unambiguous.

• Catholic Diocese of Dodge City v. Raymer, 840 P.2d 456 (Kan. 1992): Policies are construed to effect the parties’ intent, applying a reasonable insured standard, which the court used to assess the clarity of “habitability.”

• BancInsure, Inc. v. FDIC, 796 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2015): Insurance policies are contracts under Kansas law; interpretation is a question of law. The court relied on this as part of its standard interpretative framework.

• Speth v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 35 P.3d 860 (Kan. 2001): The insurer bears the burden to prove an exclusion applies. The court held Atain met that burden.

• Kelvion, Inc. v. PetroChina Canada Ltd., 918 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 2019): Terms like “any,” “pertains to,” and “related to” are broad, supporting the court’s conclusion that the exclusion reaches all claims dealing with the subject matter of habitability, irrespective of the cause-of-action label.

• Hamilton Specialty Ins. Co. v. Transition Investment, LLC, 818 F. App’x 429 (6th Cir. 2020): Distinguished. The Sixth Circuit interpreted a narrower exclusion limited to statutory and regulatory violations and applied Michigan law that narrowly construes “arising out of.” Kansas law contains no similar rule; the Atain policy, by contrast, expressly included “claims under common law” and “any other claim … related to habitability.”

• Birch v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 812 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2015); Allen v. Sybase, Inc., 468 F.3d 642 (10th Cir. 2006): De novo review of summary judgment; when cross-motions are filed, inferences are drawn in favor of the non-prevailing party below. The court nonetheless found no genuine dispute because the exclusion plainly applied to the pleaded allegations.

• Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1998): Arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived. Used to decline consideration of an underdeveloped “duty to investigate” contention.

Legal Reasoning

1) Unambiguous policy language viewed through a reasonable insured lens. The court began with Kansas’s interpretive rule: policies are construed as contracts to effect the parties’ intent from the standpoint of a reasonable insured. Here, a reasonable landlord would know “habitability” is the legal obligation to provide premises suitable for human habitation (Steele) and that Kansas has codified those obligations (§ 58-2553(a)). The policy itself defined the scope by including “matters that make a premises habitable or livable for human beings” as well as sanitation, health, and safety. Thus, “habitability” in the exclusion aligns with Kansas law and the policy’s own explanatory language.

2) Breadth of “any,” “pertains to,” and “related to.” Citing Kelvion, the court emphasized that “any,” “pertains to,” and “related to” are expansive terms. The exclusion therefore reaches all claims that deal with the subject matter of habitability—not just claims expressly pleaded as breach of the implied warranty or statutory violations. The express inclusion of “claims under common law” and “violations of any federal law” further underscored the comprehensive scope.

3) Application to the underlying allegations. The wrongful death petition alleged that Eagle’s Pointe failed to maintain, inspect, and repair the furnace and failed to warn about its condition—failures that resulted in a lack of heat. Kansas law specifically identifies providing heat and maintaining heating appliances as habitability duties. Because the claims are inextricably tied to habitability, they fall within the exclusion.

4) Rejection of the landlord’s “label-versus-necessity” argument. Eagle’s Pointe argued the exclusion applies only if liability necessarily requires a finding that the implied warranty or statutory duties were breached. The court rejected this interpretation as contradicting the policy’s broad text. Limiting the exclusion to implied-warranty and statutory claims would impermissibly narrow “any matter that pertains to habitability” and “any other claim … related to habitability.”

5) Distinguishing Hamilton (Sixth Circuit). The Sixth Circuit case involved (a) a narrower exclusion tied to statutory/regulatory violations and (b) Michigan law that construes “arising out of” narrowly. Kansas law contains no similar rule, and the Atain exclusion explicitly sweeps in common-law claims and any claim related to habitability. The Tenth Circuit therefore found Hamilton inapposite.

6) Procedural points. The court conducted de novo review of the summary judgment and, looking to the face of the petition, found the exclusion obviously triggered. It also held that Eagle’s Pointe’s suggestion that Atain failed to adequately investigate was waived for lack of meaningful development and citation. Finally, the court clarified it was not opining on negligence liability—only on coverage under Atain’s policy.

Impact and Implications

For coverage law in Kansas: This decision crystallizes a subject-matter approach to habitability exclusions. When the allegations concern failures that Kansas law identifies as habitability duties—such as providing heat and maintaining heating appliances—coverage will be barred under a broadly worded exclusion even if the plaintiff pleads only negligence and avoids an express implied-warranty or statutory claim.

For policy drafting and underwriting: Insurers seeking to limit exposure to habitability-related risks can rely on broad formulations—“any matter that pertains to” and “any other claim that is related to habitability,” expressly including “common law” claims and “violations of any federal law.” The opinion validates that such language is unambiguous and enforceable under Kansas law when applied to fact patterns squarely within codified habitability duties.

For insured landlords and property managers: Standard liability policies containing habitability exclusions may not respond to catastrophic loss allegations arising from heating, sanitation, health, or safety conditions of residential premises. Landlords should review policies for habitability exclusions and consider specialized coverage or endorsements if they wish to insure against these risks. Pleading labels in the underlying suit will not salvage coverage where the substance of the claim is habitability.

For litigants and settlement dynamics: Plaintiffs cannot preserve a defense-funded litigation forum merely by styling claims as negligence if the factual basis is habitability. The defense funding calculus may shift early, influencing settlement leverage and timing. Coverage counsel should evaluate the “subject matter” of the petition at the outset.

Across jurisdictions: The Tenth Circuit’s analysis is grounded in Kansas law and this policy’s text. Other jurisdictions may treat “arising out of” or “related to” language differently (as noted in Hamilton under Michigan law). Counsel should not assume identical outcomes elsewhere without carefully checking local doctrine and policy wording.

Nonprecedential but persuasive: Although the order is not binding precedent, it is citable for persuasive value and is likely to be influential in Kansas federal courts and state courts considering similar exclusions and allegations.