Tenth Circuit Clarifies Limits on Voluntary Dismissal of Chapter 7 Cases and Enforcement of Turnover Orders: Commentary on McGann v. Jagow

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Tenth Circuit’s unpublished Order and Judgment in McGann v. Jagow, Nos. 25‑1065 & 25‑1066 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025), arising from a pro se debtor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy in Colorado. Although designated as nonprecedential, the decision provides persuasive and detailed guidance on:

• When a Chapter 7 debtor may (and may not) obtain voluntary dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 707(a); and
• The standards governing civil contempt and attorney-fee sanctions for failure to comply with a turnover order.

The case involves Debtor–Appellant Sherry Ann McGann and Chapter 7 Trustee–Appellee Jeanne Y. Jagow. McGann appealed two bankruptcy court orders—each affirmed by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) and then by the Tenth Circuit:

1. Appeal No. 25‑1065: An order holding McGann in civil contempt for failing to comply with a turnover order requiring delivery of a key and access to her real property in Grand Lake, Colorado; and
2. Appeal No. 25‑1066: An order denying McGann’s motion to voluntarily dismiss her Chapter 7 case under § 707(a).

The decision is important for three reasons:

• It reaffirms that a Chapter 7 debtor has no absolute right to dismiss the case and that “cause” under § 707(a) does not exist where dismissal would prejudice creditors or allow the debtor to selectively honor obligations.
• It underscores that property remains property of the estate until properly administered, and a debtor cannot unilaterally refinance or encumber estate property in order to pay only favored creditors.
• It demonstrates a strict, technical approach to turnover orders: late, misdirected, or partial compliance can support civil contempt and compensatory fee sanctions.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

McGann filed a Chapter 7 petition in December 2020. At filing, she owned real property at 1535 Grand Avenue in Grand Lake, Colorado (the “Property”), subject to four liens. She received a Chapter 7 discharge in March 2021. In May 2022, the Trustee settled an adversary proceeding involving two lienholders.

After the settlement, McGann attempted to convert her Chapter 7 case to Chapter 12 or 13, but the bankruptcy court denied conversion in May 2023 after nearly a year of proceedings. In June 2023, the court authorized the Trustee to employ a realtor to market the Property, over McGann’s objection.

On August 25, 2023, the Trustee moved for an order compelling McGann to turn over a key and grant access to the Property (the “Turnover Motion”). Following a hearing, the bankruptcy court entered an October 24, 2023 order (the “Turnover Order”) requiring McGann to:

• Provide the Trustee with a key to the Property by November 13, 2023; and
• Allow the Trustee reasonable access to the Property.

McGann:

• Moved for reconsideration of the Turnover Order; and
• Filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss her Chapter 7 petition (the “Motion to Dismiss”).

In her Motion to Dismiss, McGann claimed she had a conditional loan approval that would allow her to:

• Pay the two remaining lienholders on the Property and other “legitimate” creditors; but
• Refuse to pay other creditors and administrative expenses incurred by the Trustee (which she labeled “illegitimate”).

She proposed to grant the new lender a first lien on the Property in connection with the refinance.

McGann did not provide the key by the November 13 deadline. The court denied her motion to reconsider the Turnover Order on November 20, 2023, explicitly warning that further noncompliance could lead to contempt. On January 3, 2024, the Trustee filed a motion for an order to show cause (the “Contempt Motion”). On January 31, 2024—about eleven weeks after the deadline—McGann mailed a key not to the Chapter 7 Trustee, as ordered, but to the Office of the United States Trustee.

Around the same time, the bankruptcy court denied the Motion to Dismiss, finding McGann had failed to demonstrate “cause” under § 707(a). It later denied her motion to reconsider that ruling.

B. Bankruptcy Court and BAP Rulings

At a February 2024 hearing on the Contempt Motion, McGann argued, among other things:

• The Trustee was proceeding with “unclean hands”; and
• Her mental health issues, including post‑traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), should mitigate any noncompliance.

The bankruptcy court rejected these arguments, found McGann in civil contempt for violating the Turnover Order, and awarded attorney’s fees to the Trustee as a sanction. The Trustee later documented $7,012.50 in fees incurred in enforcing the Turnover Order; McGann did not respond to the fee motion, and the court deemed objections waived.

Separately, the court denied McGann’s Motion to Dismiss, holding that:

• She had not shown “cause” under § 707(a);
• Her proposal to refinance estate property and selectively pay some creditors would structurally conflict with the bankruptcy system and prejudice creditors; and
• Her mere ability (or claimed ability) to repay certain creditors did not itself constitute cause for dismissal.

McGann appealed both the contempt finding and the denial of dismissal to the BAP, which affirmed in separate decisions. She then appealed to the Tenth Circuit.

C. The Tenth Circuit’s Holdings

The Tenth Circuit:

• Affirmed the civil contempt finding and fee award (Appeal No. 25‑1065), concluding that:
  • McGann violated a specific and definite court order of which she had notice;
  • Her late, misdirected delivery of the key did not constitute compliance; and
  • The Trustee’s attorney’s fees were a proper compensatory sanction for her noncompliance.
• Affirmed the denial of McGann’s Motion to Dismiss (Appeal No. 25‑1066), holding that:
  • Debtors have no absolute right to voluntary dismissal of a Chapter 7 case;
  • “Cause” under § 707(a) is determined under a totality-of-circumstances test focused on creditor prejudice and the integrity of the process; and
  • McGann’s proposal—dependent on refinancing estate property and selectively paying creditors—was structurally defective and prejudicial.

The court also denied McGann’s motions for appointment of counsel, to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), and to supplement the record with transcripts and materials post‑dating the orders on appeal, though it allowed supplementation with a May 3, 2022 bankruptcy hearing transcript. It reaffirmed the Tenth Circuit’s policy of filing IFP motions under seal due to sensitive financial information.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Treatment of BAP Decisions and Standard of Review

• Miller v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. (In re Miller), 666 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2012).

  Cited for the principle that when a case comes to the Tenth Circuit via the BAP, the court reviews the bankruptcy court’s orders, not the BAP’s decision. The BAP is an intermediate appellate tribunal whose rulings may be persuasive but are not binding.

• Bird v. Wardley (In re White), 144 F.4th 1216 (10th Cir. 2025), quoting Johnson v. Riebesell (In re Riebesell), 586 F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 2009).

  Reinforces that the BAP is a “subordinate appellate tribunal” and that its rulings are owed no deference as precedent in the Tenth Circuit, though they may guide the appellate court’s reasoning.

• Standard of Review – Abuse of Discretion.
  • Lucre Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. Schempp Real Estate, LLC (In re Lucre Mgmt. Grp., LLC), 365 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 2004): finding of contempt reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • Redmond v. Kester (In re Kester), 339 B.R. 749 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2006): decisions on motions to voluntarily dismiss bankruptcy petitions reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • Mid‑Continent Cas. Co. v. Village at Deer Creek Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 685 F.3d 977 (10th Cir. 2012): defines abuse of discretion as an “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment” and as a decision that leaves the appellate court with a “definite and firm conviction” of error or that “exceeded the bounds of permissible choice.”

B. Contempt Standards

• In re Lucre Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 365 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 2004).

  Cited for the elements of civil contempt: a party may be held in contempt if (1) it violated a “specific and definite” court order and (2) had notice of that order.

C. Voluntary Dismissal Under § 707(a)

• Smith v. Geltzer (In re Smith), 507 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2007).

  Cited to emphasize that under § 707(a) a debtor has no absolute right to dismiss a Chapter 7 case. Dismissal is discretionary and permitted only “for cause,” after notice and a hearing.

• Sicherman v. Cohara (In re Cohara), 324 B.R. 24 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2005).

  Cited for the proposition that a debtor’s ability to repay debts alone does not constitute “cause” for dismissal under § 707(a). The Tenth Circuit relies on this to reject McGann’s argument that her conditional ability to pay creditors justified dismissal.

• Peterson v. Atlas Supply Corp. (In re Atlas Supply Corp.), 857 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1988).

  Cited for the general principle that whether to grant a motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition lies within the discretion of the bankruptcy judge.

D. Procedural and Appellate Principles

• Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2008).

  The court notes it liberally construes McGann’s pro se filings but does not act as her advocate—an important constraint on how much the court will reconstruct undeveloped or vague arguments.

• United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2019).

  Cited for the rule that appellate courts generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief; such arguments are deemed waived.

• Robinson v. Tenantry (In re Robinson), 987 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1993).

  Cited to support the proposition that a bankruptcy court does not commit clear error by failing to address an argument that was not properly raised before it.

E. Rules and Nonprecedential Status

• Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

  These rules govern when oral argument is unnecessary. The panel unanimously determined that oral argument would not materially assist decision-making and submitted the case on the briefs.

• Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

  The order explains it is not binding precedent except under law‑of‑the‑case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel, but may be cited for its persuasive value under these rules.

IV. Legal Reasoning

A. Civil Contempt and Enforcement of the Turnover Order (Appeal No. 25‑1065)

1. Existence of a Clear, Specific Order and Notice

The first requirement for civil contempt is a “specific and definite” order. Here, the Turnover Order unambiguously directed McGann to:

• “Provide the Trustee with a key to the Property” by a fixed date (November 13, 2023); and
• Allow the Trustee reasonable access to the Property.

McGann never claimed lack of notice of this order. Indeed, she:

• Filed a motion to reconsider it, demonstrating actual knowledge; and
• Was later warned explicitly that noncompliance could lead to contempt.

Thus, both elements identified in In re Lucre Mgmt. Grp.—a specific order and notice—were clearly met.

2. Noncompliance: Late and Misdirected Delivery

The record reflects two principal defects in McGann’s purported compliance:

1. Untimeliness. She did not send any key until January 31, 2024—approximately eleven weeks after the November 13 deadline.
2. Wrong recipient. She mailed the key to the Office of the United States Trustee, rather than to the Chapter 7 Trustee, despite being ordered to provide the key to the Trustee managing her case.

On appeal, McGann characterized this as “compliance under duress” and as a “good-faith effort to comply.” The Tenth Circuit rejected that framing, focusing instead on whether the terms of the order had been met. They had not. A good-faith belief that alternative action is sufficient does not excuse failure to follow the explicit requirements of a court order.

3. Harm and Attorney-Fee Sanctions

McGann argued that the Trustee had shown “no actual harm,” apparently trying to undermine the fee sanction. The record, however, documented that:

• The bankruptcy court directed the Trustee to detail fees incurred in enforcing the Turnover Order and addressing noncompliance.
• The Trustee submitted a fee motion for $7,012.50.
• McGann did not respond to the fee motion; the bankruptcy court treated any objection as waived and found the fees reasonable and necessary.
• McGann did not appeal the separate fee award order.

By the time of the Tenth Circuit appeal, the underlying fee award stood unchallenged. The record therefore supported a conclusion that the Trustee suffered compensable harm in the form of attorney’s fees and litigation costs. The sanction was purely compensatory—a classic civil contempt remedy.

4. Mental Health and “Unclean Hands” Arguments

McGann raised two mitigating arguments, both rejected on procedural and substantive grounds.

a. PTSD and Mental Health Factors

McGann asserted the bankruptcy court should have considered her PTSD and other mental health issues in deciding whether to hold her in contempt. The Tenth Circuit emphasized:

• She did not show that she ever argued, in the bankruptcy court, that PTSD interfered with her ability to comply with the Turnover Order.
• The only cited reference to PTSD was in a request to appear remotely at the contempt hearing—not as a reason for noncompliance.

Relying on In re Robinson, the court held that a trial court does not err by failing to consider an argument not properly raised before it. Because the mental-health-based compliance argument was not clearly developed below, McGann could not show an abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court’s failure to address it.

b. “Unclean Hands” by the Trustee

McGann argued that the Trustee’s alleged misconduct—failure to collect certain assets, “harassment,” and withholding claims—meant the Trustee had “unclean hands” and thus should not be allowed to pursue contempt sanctions.

The BAP, and then the Tenth Circuit, applied the traditional equitable definition of unclean hands: equity will not aid a party whose conduct has been “unlawful, unconscionable, or inequitable.” The record showed:

• The bankruptcy court heard McGann’s accusations at the contempt hearing and rejected them.
• The Trustee’s contempt motion was plainly grounded in McGann’s failure to comply with the Turnover Order.
• McGann did not cite specific record evidence showing inequitable conduct by the Trustee related to the contempt proceedings.

Given that, the Tenth Circuit saw no abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court’s refusal to deny relief on unclean-hands grounds.

5. Appellate Waiver and Record Limitations

The court also declined to consider additional arguments raised for the first time in McGann’s reply brief, citing United States v. Leffler. This reiterates that:

• Arguments must be raised in the opening brief; and
• The appellate record is generally limited to materials before the bankruptcy court at the time of the challenged order.

In short, the Tenth Circuit concluded that:

• The Turnover Order was clear and definite;
• McGann had notice and failed to comply as ordered; and
• The bankruptcy court properly exercised its discretion in finding civil contempt and imposing compensatory sanctions.

B. Denial of Voluntary Dismissal Under § 707(a) (Appeal No. 25‑1066)

1. No Absolute Right to Dismiss; Debtor’s Burden to Show “Cause”

Section 707(a) provides that “[t]he court may dismiss a case under [Chapter 7] only after notice and a hearing and only for cause.” The Tenth Circuit, aligning with In re Smith and In re Cohara, stresses:

• A debtor has no absolute right to dismissal of a Chapter 7 case.
• The debtor bears the burden of proving “cause” for dismissal.
• The decision is entrusted to the bankruptcy judge’s discretion.

While “cause” is not exhaustively defined, courts evaluate it under a totality of the circumstances, focused heavily on:

• Whether dismissal would prejudice creditors;
• Whether the case has been abused or manipulated; and
• Whether dismissal serves or undermines the bankruptcy system’s orderly distribution scheme.

2. Structural Defect: Attempted Refinance of Estate Property

The bankruptcy court, as summarized and adopted by the BAP and the Tenth Circuit, identified a “structural flaw” in McGann’s proposal:

• The Property was property of the bankruptcy estate, not McGann’s personal property.
• McGann’s proposed loan commitment depended on granting a first lien to a new lender—effectively encumbering estate property.
• She was not entitled to refinance the Property during the bankruptcy proceedings.
• The bankruptcy court itself lacked authority to approve a refinance of estate property on the terms proposed.

In other words, McGann’s plan assumed legal powers she did not have: the ability to pledge estate property as collateral to a new lender outside the trustee‑controlled process. This made her proposed “solution”—dismissal coupled with refinance to pay certain creditors—legally unworkable.

That structural defect was, standing alone, a sufficient basis to reject dismissal.

3. Ability to Pay Is Not, by Itself, “Cause”

Even setting aside the refinance issue, the bankruptcy court alternatively held—and the Tenth Circuit agreed—that a debtor’s ability or willingness to pay creditors does not constitute “cause” under § 707(a). In re Cohara is directly on point: a debtor cannot convert a Chapter 7 case into a personal repayment regime on her own terms simply because she is now willing or able to pay.

McGann framed her proposal as offering to pay “all creditors immediately” and argued that the case was therefore “no longer necessary” and had become “abusive.” The courts rejected that view for two independent reasons:

• Selective repayment—distinguishing between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” creditors—is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority and distribution rules.
• Even a sincere, unconditional ability to repay does not override the institutional interest in maintaining orderly, equal treatment of creditors through the trustee and the statutory framework.

4. Totality of the Circumstances: Prejudice to Creditors

The bankruptcy court conducted a totality-of-circumstances analysis and identified several ways in which dismissal would prejudice creditors and other estate constituencies. The Tenth Circuit accepted that reasoning.

a. Effect of Prior Discharge on General Unsecured Creditors

Crucially, McGann had already received a Chapter 7 discharge under § 727 in March 2021. The bankruptcy court observed:

• Her discharge had not been revoked; and
• Dismissal of the case would not “nullify the effect of the discharge.”

As a result, if the case were dismissed:

• General unsecured creditors would remain barred by the discharge from pursuing her personally; and
• They would lose the only remaining avenue for recovery—the bankruptcy estate’s administration of assets (particularly the Property).

This is a heavy form of prejudice: creditors had been stayed from collection for over three years, and dismissal would leave them with no recovery despite the existence of estate assets.

b. Timing and Delay

McGann filed the Motion to Dismiss more than three years after the petition date. During that time:

• Creditors were prevented from collecting due to the automatic stay and later the discharge injunction.
• The Trustee had undertaken significant administration, including adversary proceedings and settlement involving lienholders.

Dismissal at such a late stage, after creditors had endured years of delay and reliance on the bankruptcy process, was deemed prejudicial.

c. Removal of the Property from the Estate

The bankruptcy court also reasoned that dismissal would remove the Property from the estate. Combined with the existing discharge, this would mean:

• Debtor regains full control over a valuable asset; and
• Creditors, especially unsecured creditors, lose access to that asset as a source of repayment.

That is the opposite of what the Chapter 7 system is designed to accomplish.

d. Objection by the Trustee and Reordering of Priorities

Additional factors weighed against dismissal:

• The Trustee objected to dismissal.
• Dismissal would likely further delay any payments (if they were ever made).
• McGann’s plan would effectively “reorder distribution priorities” by:
  • Favoring certain creditors and lienholders;
  • Refusing to pay some claims she deemed “illegitimate”; and
  • Refusing to pay certain priority administrative expenses, including the Trustee’s professionals.

The Bankruptcy Code establishes a detailed priority scheme for distribution of estate assets. A debtor cannot use § 707(a) to exit the system when it becomes inconvenient, then selectively honor or repudiate claims outside that framework.

5. Misfocused and Undeveloped Appellate Arguments

On appeal, McGann tried to recast the case as one about:

• “Trustee misconduct,” including alleged failures to collect over $1.3 million;
• Various judgments, offsets, and settlement terms; and
• Alleged failures to enforce prior bankruptcy hearing rulings.

The Tenth Circuit emphasized that:

• The scope of the appeal was limited to whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss.
• It was not a vehicle to litigate all perceived wrongs in the bankruptcy process or to obtain broad review of the Trustee’s administration.

Many of McGann’s factual contentions related to events outside the relevant timeframe or beyond the context of the dismissal motion, including a hearing in April 2025 and a Hawaii state court ruling in May 2025—both occurring long after the January 31, 2024 order. Such material could not properly be considered.

Further, many of her points were asserted as bullet points or conclusory statements without showing how they demonstrated abuse of discretion under § 707(a). The court therefore concluded she had not rebutted the bankruptcy court’s articulated reasons for denying dismissal.

V. Impact and Practical Significance

A. For Chapter 7 Debtors Seeking Voluntary Dismissal

McGann v. Jagow underscores several key points for Chapter 7 debtors (and their counsel) in the Tenth Circuit and beyond:

• No “exit on demand” after discharge. Once a debtor has received a discharge and the case has progressed significantly, voluntary dismissal is disfavored where it would leave creditors worse off than continued administration.
• Ability to pay is insufficient. A debtor cannot justify dismissal solely by pointing to a new source of funds or a willingness to pay selected creditors.
• Selective payment is problematic. Proposals that favor some creditors and not others—or that refuse to pay administrative expenses—are inherently suspect and may constitute an abuse of the process, not “cause” for dismissal.
• Estate property remains under court and trustee control. Debtors cannot refinance, pledge, or encumber estate property on their own initiative as a mechanism to escape the bankruptcy framework.

B. For Trustees and Creditors

The ruling is also reassuring for trustees and creditors:

• Trustee objections carry weight. A trustee’s opposition to dismissal—especially where dismissal would derail administration of significant estate assets—plays an important role in the totality-of-circumstances analysis.
• Discharge’s continuing effect matters. Courts will closely consider the interplay between an unreversed discharge and dismissal; where dismissal would lock in discharge protections while depriving creditors of estate assets, dismissal is unlikely.
• Administrative expense protection. Courts remain attentive to the statutory priority of trustee and professional fees. A debtor’s attempt to avoid paying those expenses is a strong factor against dismissal.

C. For Compliance with Turnover Orders

On the contempt side, the decision reinforces that:

• Turnover orders must be strictly obeyed. Debtors cannot unilaterally modify what is required (e.g., who receives keys, when, in what manner) and later claim good-faith compliance.
• Delay and misdirection can equal contempt. Substantial delay in compliance, or sending required items to the wrong party, satisfies the “violation” prong of contempt where the order is clear.
• Attorney fees are a standard remedy. Trustees can obtain compensatory fee awards for the costs of enforcing court orders, and failure to object to fee motions is treated as waiver.

D. For Appellate Practice in Bankruptcy Cases

Finally, the opinion has broader appellate practice implications:

• Focus on the specific orders appealed. Litigants cannot transform a narrow appeal into a referendum on all perceived errors throughout a bankruptcy case.
• Develop arguments and cite the record. Vague references, unsupported accusations, or bullet-point lists of grievances without clear linkage to the standard of review will be disregarded.
• No new arguments in reply. Substantive issues introduced for the first time in a reply brief will be treated as waived.
• Record scope is fixed in time. Events and rulings that occur after the challenged order generally cannot be used to attack that order on appeal.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Property of the Estate

When a debtor files bankruptcy, a legal entity called the “estate” is created. Almost all the debtor’s property at that time—like McGann’s Grand Lake property—becomes property of the estate. The Chapter 7 Trustee, not the debtor, controls estate property and decides whether to sell it, settle disputes over it, or abandon it.

Because the Property was estate property:

• McGann could not unilaterally refinance it or give a new lender a first lien; and
• The bankruptcy court had very limited authority to permit such a refinance outside the statutory framework and over the Trustee’s objection.

B. Turnover Orders

A turnover order is a court directive requiring a debtor (or someone else) to deliver property or grant access to property belonging to the estate so the trustee can administer it. In this case, the Turnover Order required McGann to give a key to the Chapter 7 Trustee by a set date and allow reasonable access.

Failure to follow a turnover order can lead to:

• Civil contempt;
• Coercive sanctions (e.g., per-day fines until compliance); and/or
• Compensatory sanctions (e.g., attorney’s fees incurred to enforce compliance).

C. Civil Contempt vs. Criminal Contempt

Civil contempt is a tool used by courts to:

• Enforce compliance with their orders; and
• Compensate parties for harm caused by violations.

In civil contempt, sanctions often end when the party complies, or they are measured by actual losses (like attorney’s fees). By contrast, criminal contempt is punitive and punishes past disobedience regardless of future compliance; it requires more stringent procedural protections.

D. Section 707(a) “Cause” to Dismiss a Chapter 7 Case

Under 11 U.S.C. § 707(a), a bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 7 case “for cause.” Examples of cause might include:

• Failure to file required documents;
• Using bankruptcy in bad faith as a tactic (for example, serial filings); or
• Cases where continuing the case serves no legitimate purpose and harms creditors or the system.

However, the statute does not list all possible causes, and courts must assess the totality of the circumstances. Crucially, as this case reemphasizes, a debtor’s mere ability or expressed willingness to pay some or all creditors is not by itself sufficient “cause.”

E. Unclean Hands

The unclean hands doctrine is an equitable principle: a court will not aid a party whose own conduct related to the matter at issue has been wrongful or inequitable. To invoke it successfully, a debtor must show:

• Specific acts of misconduct by the party seeking relief (here, the Trustee); and
• A close connection between that misconduct and the relief being sought (such as contempt sanctions).

General complaints about a trustee’s administration of the estate, without record-supported evidence of inequitable conduct closely tied to the contempt motion, are insufficient.

F. Discharge and Its Relationship to Dismissal

A Chapter 7 discharge is a court order wiping out the debtor’s personal liability on many pre‑bankruptcy debts. In McGann’s case:

• She received a discharge in March 2021.
• That discharge had not been revoked.
• Dismissal of the case would not cancel or reverse the discharge.

Thus, if the case were dismissed:

• Creditors could not sue her personally on discharged debts; and
• They would also lose the estate-driven recovery process over assets like the Property.

This double loss is why the bankruptcy and appellate courts concluded dismissal would severely prejudice creditors.

G. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP)

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel is a specialized three-judge panel of bankruptcy judges that hears appeals from bankruptcy courts in circuits (like the Tenth) that have chosen to use a BAP. Its decisions:

• Are binding on the parties in that appeal; but
• Are not binding precedent on the Court of Appeals, which reviews bankruptcy court rulings directly.

The Tenth Circuit treats the BAP as a “subordinate appellate tribunal.” Its analysis may be persuasive, but the Tenth Circuit independently reviews the original bankruptcy court orders.

VII. Conclusion

McGann v. Jagow illustrates how appellate courts manage two recurring themes in consumer bankruptcy:

1. Enforcement of court orders. The Tenth Circuit’s affirmance of civil contempt sanctions underscores that:
   • Court orders—especially turnover orders in bankruptcy—must be followed to the letter;
   • Late or misdirected attempts at compliance are not an adequate substitute; and
   • Attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing such orders are a standard, compensatory remedy.
2. Limits on debtor control over case termination. The decision reiterates that:
   • A Chapter 7 debtor cannot exit the system at will, particularly after receiving a discharge and after years of estate administration;
   • “Cause” to dismiss under § 707(a) is a demanding standard focused on creditor interests and the integrity of the process;
   • A debtor’s claimed ability to pay—and especially selective willingness to pay—does not amount to cause; and
   • Attempts to refinance or encumber estate property outside the trustee’s control are structurally incompatible with Chapter 7 administration.

While the Order and Judgment is technically nonprecedential, subject only to law-of-the-case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel, it offers persuasive and detailed guidance to bankruptcy courts, trustees, and practitioners in the Tenth Circuit. It reinforces the principle that the bankruptcy system is not a tool for private, post‑hoc renegotiation of debts on the debtor’s preferred terms; instead, it is a structured, court‑supervised process, with clear rules concerning property of the estate, creditor priorities, and the enforcement of judicial orders.