Tenth Circuit Adopts a Case-Specific Reading of 18 U.S.C. § 3283: Extended Limitations for Child Sexual Abuse Apply Without the Categorical Approach

Introduction

In United States v. Tso, the Tenth Circuit issued a published decision clarifying a recurring and consequential limitations question in federal child sexual abuse prosecutions: whether the phrase “offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years” in 18 U.S.C. § 3283 must be assessed under the familiar “categorical approach” (focusing on statutory elements), or through a “case-specific” analysis (focusing on the facts of the charged conduct).

The case arose from allegations that defendant–appellant Tom Tso sexually abused a minor between 1998 and 2000 in the Navajo Nation within the District of New Mexico. After a superseding indictment was returned in 2023, Tso moved to dismiss as time-barred, arguing that the five-year limitations period for noncapital offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 governed unless the government could show that the charged federal offense categorically “involves” the sexual abuse of a child. The district court rejected that argument, holding § 3283’s extended limitations period applied and that the categorical approach was inapposite. Tso entered a conditional guilty plea to a lesser offense—abusive sexual contact in Indian Country under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2244(a)(2), and 2246(3)—and received a three-year sentence, reserving his limitations challenge for appeal.

A panel of Judges Tymkovich, Carson, and Federico (with Judge Federico writing) affirmed. Exercising de novo review, the court held that § 3283 requires a case-specific analysis, not the categorical approach, and that the extended limitations period applied on the facts alleged.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit held that § 3283’s phrase “offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18” does not trigger the categorical approach. Instead, courts should apply a case-specific inquiry that focuses on the charged conduct and record developed at the pretrial stage.
Textually, the term “offense involving” does not unambiguously demand an elements-only inquiry; context and usage allow either a generic-crime or conduct-based reading. In the absence of a clear directive, the court looked to legislative history and practical considerations.
Congress’s repeated expansion of limitations for child sexual abuse offenses demonstrates a legislative intent to sweep broadly, favoring a case-specific construction of § 3283 that captures more child-abuse prosecutions.
Practical concerns that led the Supreme Court to adopt the categorical approach in sentencing and immigration contexts (e.g., avoiding “mini-trials” on past convictions) do not carry over to pretrial limitations motions in the case currently being prosecuted.
Aligning with the Second and Third Circuits, the Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant’s reliance on cases like Kawashima and Shular (where the categorical approach was already established for the ACCA/INA context) and concluded § 3283 applies to Tso’s prosecution, rendering it timely.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court’s analysis canvasses the categorical approach lineage—established to classify prior convictions for sentencing enhancements and immigration consequences—before explaining why those principles do not control here.

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990): Introduced the categorical approach in the ACCA context to resolve inconsistent state-law definitions and to avoid fact-intensive relitigation of past crimes. Courts examine only statutory elements (and, for divisible statutes, authorized Shepard documents) to decide if a conviction qualifies as a predicate.
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013): Limited the materials courts can consult (charging documents, plea colloquies, jury instructions) and reaffirmed that the focus is on elements, not facts, for prior convictions. Introduced and refined the modified categorical approach for divisible statutes.
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013): Confirmed the categorical approach’s “long pedigree” in immigration law, again in the post-conviction classification setting.
United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019): Struck down 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague under the categorical approach. Davis also observed that a § 924(c) prosecution focuses on current conduct (not past convictions), suggesting that asking a jury to make a factfinding about risk in the current case would be feasible—while judges making factual findings about prior conduct would raise Sixth Amendment concerns. Tso relies on the former, but the Tenth Circuit draws from Davis that the categorical approach is not naturally suited to pretrial determinations in the pending case.
Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012) and Shular v. United States, 589 U.S. 154 (2020): Both were decided in contexts (INA/ACCA) where the categorical approach was the established method for classifying prior offenses. Kawashima’s construction of “involving” (“necessarily entail”) fits that setting but does not mandate categorical analysis for a pretrial limitations statute like § 3283.
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009): Distinguished between generic-offense analysis and circumstance-specific inquiry in immigration aggravated felony provisions. Tso’s panel cites Davis quoting Nijhawan to show that “offense” can mean either a generic crime or specific conduct, underscoring textual ambiguity in § 3283 and opening the door to a fact-based reading.
United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2015); Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Maxwell, 118 F.4th 256 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. pending (No. 24-1073): These decisions read § 3283 case-specifically, holding that offenses like travel to engage in illicit sex with a minor “involve” the sexual abuse of a child for limitations purposes. The Tenth Circuit aligns itself with this approach.
United States v. Clay, 145 F.4th 1181 (10th Cir. 2025): The Tenth Circuit rejected a similar argument that the term “involving” in another rule (Federal Rule of Evidence 413) requires categorical analysis. Although in a different context, it supports the Tenth Circuit’s reluctance to read “involving” as a universal trigger for categorical treatment.
United States v. Piette, 45 F.4th 1142 (10th Cir. 2022): Held § 3283 is not impermissibly retroactive where the prior limitations period had not expired when Congress extended it. Tso did not contest retroactivity in this appeal, and Piette frames the retroactivity backdrop in the Tenth Circuit.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) Text and Context of § 3283: “Offense involving” allows a conduct-based reading

Section 3283 provides that no statute of limitations “shall preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years” during the life of the child or for ten years after the offense, whichever is longer. The panel acknowledges that “involving” can be consistent with a categorical approach in some settings, but it is not a magic word requiring it. The term “offense” can be used in ordinary speech to refer to either a generic crime or the specific acts in a particular case, and the statute provides no clear signal choosing between the two. That textual indeterminacy, coupled with Supreme Court precedent that does not mandate categorical analysis outside the prior-conviction contexts, leads the court to consider legislative history and practicalities.

2) Legislative History: Congress has repeatedly expanded the time to prosecute child abuse

Since 1990, Congress has steadily extended the time to prosecute sexual offenses against minors. The progression—beginning with allowing prosecution until the child turned 25, then expanding to the child’s lifetime (2003), and then to the child’s lifetime or ten years after the offense (whichever is longer) in 2006—evinces an intent to “cast a wide net” over offenses against children. That structural and historical backdrop strongly supports reading “involving” broadly, in a way that captures real-world instances of child sexual abuse rather than only crimes whose statutory elements expressly reference a child victim.

3) Practical Considerations: Categorical concerns don’t apply at the pretrial, current-case stage

The practical justifications for the categorical approach—avoiding mini-trials about past convictions based on stale records, inconsistent state labels, and potential Sixth Amendment problems if judges find facts—do not fit pretrial limitations motions in the case currently being prosecuted. Here, courts can consider the charging instrument, the elements of the charge, and pretrial submissions to determine whether the prosecution “involves” abuse of a child. This pretrial, case-specific evaluation is more straightforward than the post-conviction classification work that motivated Taylor and its progeny.

4) Fairness/Floodgates

Tso argued that a conduct-based reading would invite prosecutorial overreach, enabling the government to revive stale cases by pleading any factual allegation involving a minor. The court is unpersuaded. It notes that typical “floodgates” and fairness concerns are speculative and that Congress’s choice to expand child-abuse limitations repeatedly cuts in the opposite direction, reflecting a policy judgment to facilitate—not restrict—such prosecutions. The court declines to rely on generalized fairness arguments when statutory history and practical considerations favor the case-specific approach.

5) Alignment with Other Circuits

The Tenth Circuit expressly joins the Second and Third Circuits in adopting a case-specific application of § 3283. This inter-circuit harmony further counsels against extending the categorical approach beyond its established post-conviction arenas (ACCA, INA, and certain § 924(c) questions).

6) Application to Tso

Applying the case-specific approach, the panel concludes that the charged conduct “involves” the sexual abuse of a minor under § 3283. Jane Doe was under 18 when the abuse occurred. Because § 3283 extends the limitations period to the life of the child or ten years after the offense (whichever is longer), the prosecution was timely. The court affirms the denial of the motion to dismiss and Tso’s resulting conviction based on his conditional plea.

Impact and Implications

Binding precedent in the Tenth Circuit: This published opinion squarely holds that § 3283 is assessed case-by-case, not categorically. Future defendants cannot defeat timely prosecutions by insisting that only child-specific statutes qualify.
Broader reach for child-abuse prosecutions: Prosecutors may rely on § 3283 where the facts show the offense “involves” sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a child—even if the offense of conviction does not include a minor as an element. Offenses such as abusive sexual contact (§ 2244), travel to engage in illicit sexual conduct (§ 2423), and potentially other conduct-focused child-abuse offenses are within reach if the record shows under-18 victims.
Pretrial litigation posture: The limitations question will be resolved by judges on pretrial motion, using the charging documents, undisputed facts, and pretrial evidence. The Sixth Amendment concerns that complicate post-conviction categorical analyses are avoided at this stage.
Indian Country cases: While § 3283 is not specific to Indian Country, Tso confirms its applicability in prosecutions arising under the Major Crimes Act/General Crimes statutes (§§ 1152 and 1153) when the underlying charged conduct involves a minor victim.
Retroactivity and ex post facto: Piette remains the law in the Tenth Circuit: an extension applies if the earlier limitations period had not expired when Congress lengthened it. If a prior limitations period had lapsed before the extension, ex post facto concerns may bar revival; those questions were not presented here.
National landscape: By aligning with the Second and Third Circuits (Weingarten, Schneider, Maxwell), the Tenth Circuit reduces the prospect of an immediate circuit split over § 3283. The Supreme Court may yet weigh in (Maxwell’s cert petition is pending), but Tso adds weight to the case-specific consensus.
Charging strategy and defense practice: Prosecutors should draft charging documents and pretrial submissions that clearly establish the child’s age and the abuse’s nexus to the charged crime. Defense counsel must confront the facts, not just the statutory elements, when contesting timeliness under § 3283.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Statute of limitations (SOL): The deadline by which the government must initiate prosecution. The default federal criminal SOL for noncapital offenses is five years (§ 3282), but § 3283 creates a longer period for offenses involving child victims—until the child’s life or ten years after the offense, whichever is longer.
Categorical approach: A method used primarily in sentencing and immigration to classify prior convictions based on statutory elements, not facts. Courts compare the elements of the prior offense to a generic federal definition; if the statute sweeps more broadly, the prior conviction does not qualify, even if the conduct did.
Modified categorical approach: Used only for divisible statutes that list elements in the alternative. Courts consult a limited set of documents to identify which elements formed the basis of the conviction, then apply the categorical analysis.
Case-specific (or circumstance-specific) approach: A fact-focused inquiry into what the defendant did in the current case. For § 3283, courts ask whether the charged offense, as alleged and supported at the pretrial stage, “involves” the sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a minor.
Why the difference matters: Under a categorical reading, only statutes that contain minor-specific elements would qualify for § 3283’s extended SOL. Under a case-specific reading, any federal offense can qualify if the facts show it involves abusing a child (e.g., abusive sexual contact where the victim is under 18).
Indian Country jurisdiction: Sections 1152 and 1153 govern application of federal criminal law in Indian Country. Tso did not dispute federal jurisdiction; the case confirms § 3283 applies in these prosecutions when the conduct involves child victims.
Conditional guilty plea: Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), a defendant may plead guilty while reserving the right to appellate review of a specified pretrial ruling (here, the limitations ruling). If the defendant prevails on appeal, the plea may be withdrawn.

Conclusion

United States v. Tso establishes a clear, published rule in the Tenth Circuit: § 3283’s extended statute of limitations for offenses “involving” the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnapping, of a child under 18 is assessed through a case-specific inquiry, not the categorical approach. The opinion’s textual analysis, emphasis on Congress’s consistent expansion of time to prosecute child abuse, and attention to practical, pretrial realities collectively support that conclusion. In aligning with the Second and Third Circuits, the Tenth Circuit ensures that prosecutions like Tso’s—alleging decades-old abuse but supported by facts showing a minor victim—are not foreclosed by the limitations clock so long as § 3283 applies.

The key takeaway is both simple and significant: for federal child-abuse prosecutions in the Tenth Circuit, timeliness under § 3283 turns on what the case actually involves in fact, not on whether the statute of conviction includes a minor victim as a formal element. That holding is poised to influence charging decisions, defense strategies, and trial court practice across the circuit whenever historic abuse comes to light.