Tenant’s Statutory Right to Cure Violations under ORS 90.392: Mandatory Notice Requirement

Introduction

KKMH Properties, LLC v. Shire, 373 Or 676 (2025), is a residential eviction case decided by the Supreme Court of Oregon on May 15, 2025. The landlord, KKMH Properties, LLC (“landlord”), served the tenant, Michael P. Shire (“tenant”), with a 30-day “for cause” termination notice under ORS 90.392, alleging extensive property damage at the rental premises. The notice expressly stated there was “no cure opportunity.” Tenant refused to vacate and defended the forcible-entry-and-detainer (FED) action by challenging the validity of the notice. He argued that ORS 90.392(3)(c) requires a landlord to inform a tenant, in every termination notice that is based on a curable violation, that the violation can be cured and how—regardless of the landlord’s belief about the tenant’s financial ability or the practical likelihood of cure.

The key legal issue before the court was one of statutory construction: when does ORS 90.392(3)(c) obligate a landlord to state that a violation can be cured? This question presented a clash between a “subjective” approach (does the landlord believe the tenant can cure within the minimum period?) and an “objective”/legal-right approach (does the tenant have a statutory right to cure that violation?).

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Oregon unanimously held that, under ORS 90.392, a termination notice must state that the violation can be cured whenever, as a matter of law, the tenant has a right to cure it. The court explained that:

ORS 90.392(4) creates a broad category of violations that can be cured—“by a change in conduct, repairs, payment of money or otherwise.”
ORS 90.392(5) carves out repeat violations for which the tenant does not have a right to cure.
ORS 90.392(3)(c) requires that a termination notice “state that the violation can be cured, describe at least one possible remedy to cure the violation and designate the date by which the tenant must cure the violation,” if the tenant has the right to cure under subsection (4).

Because the tenant’s alleged violation—extensive property damage—was curable as a matter of law, the notice was invalid for failing to inform the tenant of the right to cure. The court reversed the trial court’s FED judgment and the Court of Appeals’ affirmance, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

C.O. Homes, LLC v. Cleveland, 366 Or 207 (2020): Held that an eviction claim hinges on the validity of the termination notice. A tenant may defend by showing the notice failed to satisfy statutory requirements.
Hickey v. Scott, 370 Or 97 (2022): Reinforced that ORLTA notice statutes demand precise and accurate information so tenants know exactly what they must do to avoid termination. In the nonpayment-of-rent context, notices must state the precise amount needed to cure.

Those cases shaped the court’s understanding of ORS 90.392(3)(c) as another notice statute whose purpose is to convey actionable information—here, that the tenant has a statutory right to cure certain breaches.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s construction of ORS 90.392(3)(c) proceeded in three steps:

Textual distinction of curable vs. non-curable violations: ORS 90.392(4) defines curable violations as those the tenant can remedy “by a change in conduct, repairs, payment of money or otherwise.” Subsection (5) expressly states the tenant “does not have a right to cure” certain repeat violations. The plain text thus creates two mutually exclusive categories.
Notice contents: Subsection (3)(c) requires notice of the right to cure only “if the tenant can cure the violation as provided in subsection (4).” The court stressed that the statute does not place any subjective qualifier on a landlord’s belief or focus on the practical likelihood of cure; it depends solely on the tenant’s legal right.
Statutory context & purpose: ORLTA notice statutes are designed so a tenant “does not have to guess” about how to prevent termination or defend an FED action. Tying the cure notice to the existence of a statutory right, rather than to a landlord’s assessment of the tenant’s financial or practical ability, best serves that remedial purpose.

Legislative History Highlights

1973 (ORS 91.820): Authorized 30-day termination with 14-day cure right and 10-day no-cure repeat-violation termination. Notices needed only to describe the breach and termination date.
1989 (SB 602): Added the first express notice requirement—30-day notices “shall also state that the tenant can avoid termination by remedying the breach within 14 days.” Sponsors explained the “right to cure already exists” and the amendment merely “makes it clear” notices must say so.
2005 (HB 2524): Refinements required notices to “describe at least one possible remedy” and “designate the date by which the tenant must cure.” Sponsors emphasized these changes provided additional actionable detail without altering the underlying right to cure.

Impact

This decision clarifies landlord obligations and tenant protections under ORLTA § 90.392:

Landlords must include cure information in every “for cause” termination notice when the violation is legally curable. Failing to do so will render an FED action subject to dismissal.
Landlords cannot evade the notice requirement by assuming tenants lack resources or by betting on practical impossibility of cure within the statutory window.
Tenants gain clear assurance of their cure rights, and eviction trial courts will apply ORS 90.392 as a matter of law, not landlord discretion.
Future litigation will focus on categorizing breaches as curable under subsection (4) versus non-curable repeat breaches under subsection (5), rather than on landlord beliefs.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“For cause” termination (ORS 90.392): A landlord’s right to end a tenancy based on a tenant’s breach of the lease or statute, rather than nonpayment of rent alone. It carries a 30-day notice in most cases.
“Cure”: The tenant’s opportunity to rectify the breach (repair damage, change behavior, pay fees, etc.) so the lease continues.
Subsections (4) vs. (5):
- Subsection (4) covers breaches the tenant can lawfully cure (“change in conduct, repairs, payment of money or otherwise”).
- Subsection (5) addresses repeat breaches within six months, for which the legislature removed the cure right and shortened the required notice period from 30 to 10 days.
FED action: A special fast-track lawsuit (forcible-entry-and-detainer) to evict a tenant who remains after a valid termination notice.

Conclusion

KKMH Properties, LLC v. Shire establishes a clear rule: whenever a tenant has a statutory right to cure a violation under ORS 90.392(4), the landlord’s 30-day “for cause” termination notice must state that right, identify at least one way to cure, and set the cure deadline. That requirement cannot be sidestepped by landlord judgments about a tenant’s financial ability or the practical likelihood of cure. Instead, the statutory analysis is binary—either the violation is curable as a matter of law, or it falls within the non-curable repeat-violation exception of subsection (5). This decision reinforces the remedial objectives of Oregon’s Landlord-Tenant Act, ensuring tenants receive precise, actionable information and preserving access to housing stability whenever the law grants a cure right.