Temporary Physical Custodianship and the Inference of Sexual Gratification under West Virginia Sexual Abuse Statutes

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s decision in State of West Virginia v. Joseph B. addresses two key questions in the prosecution of sexual offenses against minors: (1) whether a defendant can be deemed a “custodian” under West Virginia Code § 61-8D-1(4) based solely on actual physical possession or care of a child on a temporary basis, and (2) whether touching a minor’s breasts may, without more, permit the inference of sexual gratification under the definition of “sexual contact.” Joseph B., the petitioner, was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse (W. Va. Code § 61-8B-7) and sexual abuse by a custodian (W. Va. Code § 61-8D-5) following a jury trial in Wetzel County. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting both convictions and the trial court’s rulings on his motions for judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

In a memorandum decision filed April 22, 2025, the Court held:

• Custodianship: Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational jury could find that Joseph B. was the victim’s “custodian” because his minor niece was in his actual physical possession or care when the abuse occurred, regardless of any formal custodial agreement.
• Sexual Gratification: The jury was entitled to infer that touching the victim’s breasts was done for the purpose of sexual gratification, given the location of the contact and absence of any medical necessity.
• Judgment of Acquittal: The trial court properly denied the petitioner’s pre-verdict motion and was not required to rule on the post-verdict motion, which was untimely under Rule 29(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• Outcome: The convictions and sentence—one to five years for first-degree sexual abuse and ten to twenty years for sexual abuse by a custodian—were affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The decision rests primarily on established West Virginia authority regarding sufficiency of evidence and definitional issues:

• State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995): Articulates the standard for appellate review of sufficiency—whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• State v. Juntilla, 227 W. Va. 492, 711 S.E.2d 562 (2011): Confirms the de novo standard of review for denial of motions for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency.
• Harris v. Hatcher, 236 W. Va. 599, 760 S.E.2d 847 (2014): Holds that whether a person is a “custodian” under § 61-8D-5 is a factual question for the jury.
• State v. Beck, 167 W. Va. 830, 286 S.E.2d 234 (1981): Permits conviction on uncorroborated victim testimony unless inherently incredible.
• State v. Todd C., 250 W. Va. 642, 906 S.E.2d 295 (2023): Recognizes that a factfinder may infer sexual gratification from the location of touching (e.g., breasts or pubic area) absent any medical explanation.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning can be broken into three parts:

1. Custodianship as a Question of Fact: W. Va. Code § 61-8D-1(4) defines “custodian” to include “a person over the age of 14 years who has or shares actual physical possession or care and custody of a child on a full-time or temporary basis, regardless of whether that person has been granted custody.” Joseph B.’s argument—that he was not responsible because his adult daughter invited the niece—ignored that statutory wording. The Court emphasized that the jury could credit the victim’s and her mother’s testimony that the child was placed in the petitioner’s care and that he was expected to “keep [her] safe.”
2. Inference of Sexual Gratification: By definition under § 61-8B-1(5), “sexual contact” includes touching the breasts when done for sexual gratification. The Court applied Todd C. to hold that a jury may infer gratification from the nature and location of the contact absent a non-sexual purpose. The victim’s detailed description of breast-grabbing, nipple-squeezing, and the petitioner’s admonition not to tell anyone sufficed.
3. Timeliness of Post‐Verdict Motions: Under Rule 29(c), a renewed motion for judgment of acquittal must be filed within ten days of jury discharge unless extended. Joseph B.’s second motion, filed thirteen days after verdict, was untimely and unrebutted by any extension request, relieving the court of any obligation to rule.

Impact

This decision carries significant implications:

• It reinforces that “custodian” encompasses temporary caregivers without formal custody, potentially widening the scope of § 61-8D-5 to include more familial or informal caretakers.
• It confirms that juries may—and indeed must—draw common‐sense inferences about sexual gratification from the context and anatomy involved in the alleged touching.
• It underscores the importance of strict compliance with procedural deadlines for post‐verdict motions in criminal trials.
• Future prosecutions will likely cite this case when contesting informal custodial arrangements or when relying on victim testimony to establish intent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Custodian: Anyone over age 14 who actually has care or custody of a child, even if only for one night and without a court order or parental delegation in writing.
• Sexual Contact: Under W. Va. Code § 61-8B-1(5), this means touching intimate parts (like breasts) with intent to sexually gratify either party.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: A conviction stands if any rational jury, seeing the evidence most favorably to the State, could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• De Novo Review: The appellate court re-evaluates the trial court’s rulings on legal issues—like denial of acquittal—without deference to the trial judge.
• Judgment of Acquittal (Rule 29): A motion to dismiss charges for insufficient evidence, which must be renewed promptly after trial.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Appeals in State of West Virginia v. Joseph B. has clarified that under West Virginia’s sexual abuse statutes, physical possession or care of a child—even on a temporary basis—constitutes custodianship, and that juries may infer sexual gratification from the nature of the contact alone. By affirming the convictions on both counts, the Court cements these principles as binding precedent. Criminal practitioners will need to account for this broad view of custodial status and the permissive inference of intent when preparing both prosecutions and defenses in sexual abuse cases involving minors. Moreover, the decision reaffirms the critical nature of timely post-verdict motions in preserving appellate rights.