Temporary Medical Relocation, Lost Wills, and Executor Renunciation in Oklahoma Probate:
A Commentary on Estate of Cunningham, Moore & Oklahoma City Community Foundation v. McClendon

I. Introduction

The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in In the Matter of the Estate of Jimmy Fred Cunningham (No. 121,999, decided Oct. 14, 2025) is a significant probate opinion that clarifies three recurring and practically important questions in Oklahoma estate law:

How to determine a decedent’s “residence” for probate venue when the decedent has been temporarily relocated for medical care.
When and how a photocopy of a will, or a “lost” will, can be admitted to probate and whether a defectively executed later will can revoke a valid earlier one.
What is required for a nominated executor (personal representative) to be deemed to have “renounced” or forfeited the right to serve under 58 O.S. § 108.

The case pits appellants Cheryl Moore and the Oklahoma City Community Foundation, Inc. (“OCCF”) against appellee Lisa McClendon in a contest between two instruments: a 2018 will favoring the McClendons and a purported 2019 will and trust structure benefitting OCCF and, indirectly, Murray State College.

Although the Court ultimately sustains the probate of the 2018 will and rejects the 2019 document, it simultaneously restores Moore as personal representative, rejecting the trial court’s view that she had renounced her appointment by delay alone. The opinion is thus as much about procedural and doctrinal clarity as it is about which will governs Cunningham’s estate.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirms in part and reverses in part the district court’s interlocutory probate order. Its key holdings are:

Venue / Residence: Venue is proper in Johnston County under 58 O.S. § 5(1). Cunningham’s late-life relocation to Oklahoma County for medical treatment did not effect an abandonment of his established residence (domicile) in Johnston County. The district court’s residency finding was not clearly against the weight of the evidence.
2019 Will – Execution and Lost Will Theory: The photocopy of the 2019 will does not satisfy the execution formalities of 84 O.S. § 55 and therefore cannot itself be admitted to probate. Nor can it be probated as a “lost or destroyed will” under 58 O.S. § 82, because the proponents failed to prove the original was in existence at the decedent’s death (or fraudulently destroyed during his lifetime).
Revocation of 2018 Will: The defective 2019 will does not revoke the validly executed 2018 will. Under 84 O.S. § 101 and Leard v. Askew, a later instrument purporting to revoke an earlier will must itself be executed with statutory formalities before its revocation clause can take effect.
Renunciation of Executor Appointment: It was clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence for the district court to conclude that Cheryl Moore renounced her right to serve as personal representative under 58 O.S. § 108 merely because she did not file for probate within 30 days of Cunningham’s death. Absent proof that she knew she was nominated, and in light of good cause (lack of knowledge and lack of possession of the will), no renunciation occurred. Moore remains entitled to appointment as personal representative under the 2018 will.

The Court remands to the Johnston County district court for further proceedings consistent with these holdings.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Cunningham’s Movements and Relationships

Cunningham lived in Oklahoma City (Oklahoma County) for approximately 37 years, owning a home there and periodically visiting his farm in Johnston County.
In 2018 he moved from Oklahoma City to live full time on his Johnston County farm and resided there for about four years.
He formed close relationships with:
- Cheryl Moore – originally his hairdresser, later his tax and estate-planning advisor and long-time friend of ~40 years.
- Lisa and Benny McClendon – neighbors in Johnston County, who assisted with farm upkeep.

B. The 2018 and 2019 Estate Plans

May 15, 2018 Will (“2018 Will”):
- Drafted by a lawyer at the Little Law Firm in Madill, Oklahoma; McClendons were not present during the consultation or execution.
- Names Cheryl Moore as personal representative.
- Devises Cunningham’s entire estate to Mr. and Mrs. McClendon.
March 27, 2019 Estate Plan (“2019 Will” and Trust):
- Prepared by Cunningham’s long-time Oklahoma City lawyer, Peter White.
- Creates a revocable living trust (“Jimmy F. Cunningham Revocable Living Trust”).
- Executes a 2019 will that:
  - Names Moore as personal representative again.
  - Leaves residue to the Trust.
  - Expressly revokes all prior wills.
- The Trust provides that OCCF receives the residuary trust assets, to administer them for the benefit of Murray State College in Tishomingo.

C. Final Illness and Death

January 2022: Cunningham becomes acutely ill at his Johnston County farm; transported to a local hospital, then to Mercy Hospital in Oklahoma City.
He remains in Oklahoma County in:
- Mercy Hospital, then
- a skilled nursing facility, then
- an assisted living facility for about two months, until a further hospitalization and surgery.
He dies at Mercy Hospital in Oklahoma County on June 6, 2022.
He still owns real and personal property in Johnston County at death and had been living exclusively on his Johnston County farm from 2018 until his medical transfer in 2022.

D. Probate Proceedings

October 18, 2023: McClendon files a petition in Johnston County to probate the 2018 will.
November 6, 2023: Moore and OCCF file an objection (later amended), asserting:
- Venue lies in Oklahoma County because Cunningham was residing there at death.
- The 2019 will revoked the 2018 will and should be probated.
January 5, 2024: District court evidentiary hearing; the court:
1. Finds Cunningham was still a resident of Johnston County at death; venue proper there.
2. Finds Moore “renounced” her right as personal representative by failing to petition for probate within 30 days of death.
3. Finds the 2019 will fails to comply with 84 O.S. § 55 and refuses to probate it, admitting the 2018 will instead.
Moore and OCCF appeal; the Oklahoma Supreme Court retains the case.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Venue and “Residence” When the Decedent Has Moved for Medical Care

1. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

Venue in Oklahoma probate is governed by 58 O.S. § 5. The primary rule for an Oklahoma resident is straightforward:

“Wills must be proved, and letters testamentary or of administration granted … [i]n the county of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death, regardless of where he died.” 58 O.S. § 5(1).

Thus the question became not whether Cunningham was an Oklahoma resident, but which county was his “residence” (domicile) at death.

Oklahoma case law equates “residence” in this context with legal “domicile”:

Jones v. Burkett, 1959 OK 221, 346 P.2d 338: Residence is “the place where one’s habitation is fixed without the present purpose of removing therefrom. It is synonymous with ‘Domicile.’” A person can have only one domicile at a time; a previously established domicile is presumed to continue until a new one is established.
Suglove v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1979 OK 168, 605 P.2d 1315: To change domicile, there must be (1) actual abandonment of the prior domicile with intent not to return, and (2) actual residence in another place with intent to make it a permanent home. Intent is inferred from objective indicia: habits, business and domestic relations, political participation, community activities, and other facts manifesting the requisite intent.

Under Burke v. Burke, 1926 OK 673, 249 P. 1110, residency is a question of fact for the trial court, reviewed on appeal under a “clearly against the weight of the evidence” standard in this equitable context.

2. Application: Temporary Medical Stay vs. Change of Domicile

The appellants argued that Cunningham had effectively moved back to Oklahoma County:

He regretted leaving Oklahoma City and selling his house there.
He told Moore multiple times he wanted to move back.
While in Oklahoma City for medical treatment, he allegedly looked for property to buy.
He spent roughly five months in Oklahoma County facilities before his death.

The Court, however, found these facts insufficient to show legal abandonment of his Johnston County domicile. It emphasized that all of Cunningham’s moves to Oklahoma County in 2022 were “medically driven decisions, not housing choices”: he was transferred by ambulance to a hospital, then a skilled nursing facility, then an assisted living facility, then back to the hospital where he died. Throughout, he was a patient, not a voluntary residential mover in the legal sense.

The Court analogized to several older decisions:

James v. Sanders, 1923 OK 690, 218 P. 877. A young Native American woman, long resident at St. Agnes Academy (Carter County), left the sanitarium and stayed 12 days with friends in Love County, where she executed a will. She later chose to return to St. Agnes, which she regarded as “home,” and died there. The Court held Carter County retained venue because her domicile remained at St. Agnes; the short stay elsewhere for health reasons did not effect a change.
Anderson v. Jackson, 1935 OK 170, 41 P.2d 815. After a divorce, decedent temporarily lived with his mother in Hugo (Choctaw County), using others’ furniture and renting furnished apartments, while maintaining ownership, burial, and deep connections in McCurtain County. The Court found insufficient evidence that he had abandoned McCurtain County as his legal residence.
In re Davis’ Estate, 1935 OK 242, 43 P.2d 115, and Breedlove v. Tulsa County Court, 1935 OK 1101, 58 P.2d 305. In both, decedents left their long-established residences solely to receive care elsewhere in their final illnesses. In each case, the original county remained their legal residence; the health-driven relocation was not a domicile change.

These cases stand for a consistent proposition: a move prompted by illness or medical necessity ordinarily does not change domicile, absent clear evidence of abandonment and the formation of a new permanent residence.

In Cunningham, the Court also noted:

Cunningham owned real and personal property in Johnston County and had lived on his Johnston County farm full-time for about four years before the illness.
The evidence about where he wanted to live in the future (if he recovered) was conflicting—Moore claimed he intended to stay in Oklahoma City; McClendon claimed he intended to return to the farm.
Speculative evidence about hypothetical future living arrangements, especially when contingent on uncertain recovery from serious illness, is not enough to prove abandonment of an established domicile.

Given the deferential standard of review and the weight of authority, the Court held that the district court’s finding—that Cunningham remained a resident of Johnston County at death—was not clearly against the weight of the evidence and must be affirmed.

3. Doctrinal Takeaway on Venue and Domicile

Newly reinforced principle:

For purposes of 58 O.S. § 5(1), a decedent’s temporary stay in another county for medical treatment—even for several months—does not, without more, constitute a change in legal residence/domicile.
Intent to abandon a prior domicile and establish a new one must be proven by objective, non-speculative evidence, and mere statements of regret or future desire to move are insufficient where the actual move is compelled by health and the decedent never establishes normal residential life in the new location.

Practically, this narrows the circumstances in which a change in probate venue can be predicated on late-life medical relocation and will likely make venue challenges more difficult where decedents left home only due to illness.

B. The 2019 Will: Execution Formalities, Photocopies, and Lost Wills

1. Execution Formalities under 84 O.S. § 55

The Court begins its will-validity analysis with the familiar rule from In re Estate of Speers, 2008 OK 16, 179 P.3d 1265: when a will is offered for probate, the “factum of the will” requires proof of:

Compliance with statutory execution formalities.
Testamentary capacity.
Absence of undue influence, fraud, or duress.

Here, no one challenged Cunningham’s competency or claimed undue influence, fraud, or duress. Everything turned on formal execution under 84 O.S. § 55, which requires that a non-holographic, non-nuncupative will:

Be in writing;
Be subscribed at the end by the testator (or another at his direction in his presence);
Be subscribed in the presence of, or acknowledged to, the attesting witnesses;
Be declared by the testator to be his will; and
Be attested by two witnesses, each signing at the end at the testator’s request and in his presence.

Additionally, if the will is “self-proved,” the statute requires the testator’s acknowledgment and the witnesses’ affidavits before an officer authorized to take acknowledgments (typically a notary), with seal affixed.

The proffered 2019 instrument suffered from multiple defects:

It was only a photocopy, not an original document.
It appeared to be partially executed:
- It bore Cunningham’s signature;
- It bore only one witness signature;
- It was undated and lacked a notarial seal or other indicia of self-proof.

Witnesses (attorneys Peter White and James Dawson) testified that the original 2019 will had been properly executed, but that original could not be produced. The photocopy did not show a fully completed execution page.

Given these shortcomings, the Court held the copy of the 2019 will did not satisfy § 55 and therefore could not be admitted as a formally executed will.

2. Photocopies and Duplicates: Goodwin and Shaw

The proponents argued, implicitly, that a copy might suffice. The district court relied on In re Estate of Goodwin, 2000 OK CIV APP 147, 18 P.3d 373, and the Supreme Court expressly approved that reasoning.

In re Shaw’s Estate, 1977 OK 237, 572 P.2d 229: The Court allowed probate of a duplicate original will that itself complied with § 55—i.e., it contained original signatures and was executed with statutory formalities. A “duplicate original” is effectively another original document, not a mere photocopy.
Goodwin (COCA): Distinguished Shaw and refused to probate a pure photocopy of a will, which, by definition, does not contain original signatures, even if a properly executed original once existed.

Following Goodwin, the Supreme Court in Cunningham refused to treat the photocopy as a functional equivalent of the original, especially where the copy itself did not show full compliance with § 55 (two witnesses, notary, date).

3. The Lost Will Statute: 58 O.S. § 82 and Janzen v. Claybrook

There is, however, a distinct statutory mechanism for “lost or destroyed” wills—58 O.S. § 82. The Court carefully analyzes whether the 2019 will might be admitted under that provision instead.

“No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will, unless:

the same is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator or is shown to have been fraudulently destroyed in the lifetime of the testator, and

its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses.

… A copy of the alleged lost or destroyed will can be admitted into evidence … if the copy is properly identified, and the court shall determine what probative value, if any, is to be assigned to such copy.”

As interpreted in Janzen v. Claybrook, 1966 OK 200, 420 P.2d 531, § 82 imposes two cumulative requirements:

Proof that the will was in existence at the testator’s death (or that it was fraudulently destroyed during life); and
Proof of its contents by at least two credible witnesses.

In Cunningham:

The proponents did offer two attorneys (White and Dawson) who testified that Cunningham validly executed the 2019 will, and they were able to identify the photocopy. This helps address the “contents” prong and identification.
But they did not provide evidence that the original will was in existence at the time of Cunningham’s death, nor did they claim or prove fraudulent destruction.

The Court emphasizes that the burden of proof lies with the will’s proponents. Absent evidence that the original 2019 will existed at death (or was fraudulently destroyed), the requirements of § 82 are not met. Accordingly, the 2019 will cannot be probated as a lost or destroyed will.

4. Doctrinal Takeaways on Lost Wills and Photocopies

Key clarified rules:

A photocopy of a will:
- Cannot itself satisfy execution requirements of 84 O.S. § 55 unless it represents a duplicate original bearing actual signatures and formalities.
- May be used as evidence under 58 O.S. § 82 in a lost-will proceeding, but only as part of satisfying the separate statutory elements.
Under 58 O.S. § 82, the proponent must prove:
- Existence of the original will at death (or fraudulent destruction); and
- Clear and distinct proof of its provisions, typically by two credible witnesses.
Failure on the “existence at death” element is fatal, even if the contents are proved.

This opinion thus reinforces a strict approach: missing originals of later wills will not easily displace prior valid wills absent robust proof under § 82.

C. Can a Defective Later Will Revoke a Valid Earlier Will?

1. Statutory Text: 84 O.S. § 101

Cunningham’s 2019 document contained an express revocation clause purporting to revoke all prior wills. The question was whether that clause was effective even though the 2019 will itself could not be probated.

84 O.S. § 101 provides that a written will may be revoked:

“By a written will or other writing of the testator, declaring such revocation or alteration, and executed with the same formalities with which a will should be executed by such testator.” (emphasis added)

Thus, revocation by later writing is conditioned on that later writing being properly executed under § 55.

2. Leard v. Askew: The Defective Subsequent Will

The Court relies heavily on Leard v. Askew, 1911 OK 37, 114 P. 251, which presented a very similar issue:

There was a prior valid will.
A later will purported to revoke it.
The later will, however, was defectively executed.

Leard holds that a subsequent will containing a revocation clause must itself be admissible to probate—proved by the same kind, quality, and method of evidence required to prove the earlier will—before the revocation clause can be effective. If the subsequent will is defectively executed, the revocation clause fails with it.

3. The Puckett v. Brittain Distinction

The appellants argued that Puckett v. Brittain, 1931 OK 604, 3 P.2d 876, supported giving effect to the 2019 revocation clause even if the will was not itself probated. The Court carefully distinguishes Puckett.

In Puckett, a 1916 will was offered for probate; opponents claimed a 1923 will existed that revoked it. The trial court excluded evidence of the 1923 will’s execution and loss, on the theory such evidence was inadmissible unless the 1923 will was itself offered for probate.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that evidence of the 1923 will’s execution and loss was admissible for the limited purpose of showing revocation of the 1916 will—even though the 1923 will was not formally offered for probate at that stage. The decision focused on admissibility and the need for a new trial; it did not say a defectively executed will could revoke a valid will.

In Cunningham:

The district court did admit the copy of the 2019 will and the testimony of White and Dawson concerning its execution.
The question became not whether such evidence was admissible (as in Puckett), but whether the 2019 will had been sufficiently proven—both for probate and for revocation purposes.
Unlike the 1923 will in Puckett, which apparently complied with formalities, the 2019 instrument on its face lacked the requisite formalities (e.g., only one witness signature, no notary seal, undated).

Thus, the Court concludes, Puckett does not help the proponents; admissible evidence of a later document cannot overcome the fact that the document fails to meet statutory formalities required by § 55 and § 101.

4. Result and Policy

Applying § 101 and Leard, the Court affirms that the 2019 instrument, never shown to exist in a fully executed, compliant form, did not revoke the 2018 will. The reasoning reflects strong policy concerns:

Allowing partially executed or unproven later writings to revoke formal wills would inject uncertainty into probate, invite fraud, and defeat the purpose of execution formalities.
Requiring that revocatory writings themselves be properly executed ensures that revocation of a will is as deliberate and solemn as its creation.

As a result, the 2018 will stands not only because the 2019 will cannot be probated, but also because the 2019 document is legally insufficient to revoke it.

The Court notes that, given this conclusion, it need not reach the doctrine of dependent relative revocation (cited via In re Estate of Ausley, 1991 OK 105, 818 P.2d 1226), which sometimes rescues an earlier will when a testator’s later attempt to revoke it is conditioned on a new will that fails.

D. Renunciation of Executor’s Right to Appointment Under 58 O.S. § 108

1. The Statutory Text and Its Key Elements

The final issue concerns who should serve as personal representative. Both the 2018 and 2019 wills name Cheryl Moore as personal representative. McClendon, however, was appointed by the district court after that court concluded Moore had renounced or forfeited her right by failing to petition for probate within 30 days.

58 O.S. § 108 provides:

“If the person named in a will as executor, for thirty (30) days after he has knowledge of the death of the testator, and that he is named as executor, fails to petition the proper court for the probate of the will, and that letters testamentary be issued to him, he may be held to have renounced his right to letters, and the court may appoint any other competent person administrator, unless good cause for delay is shown.” (emphasis added)

Thus, the statute requires:

Knowledge of the testator’s death;
Knowledge that the person is named as executor in the will;
Failure to petition within 30 days thereafter; and
No “good cause” for the delay.

It is also permissive (“may be held to have renounced”), not automatic, even when all conditions are satisfied.

2. The Secrest Precedent and Knowledge Requirement

The Court relies heavily on Secrest v. Secrest, 1930 OK 328, 294 P. 91, which interpreted substantially identical language (then codified at § 1136, C.O.S. 1921).

In Secrest, the decedent’s son was named as executor in the will but did not know of his nomination.
The widow, who had possession of the will, initiated probate and was appointed administratrix with the will annexed.
Only after proceedings commenced did the son learn he had been named executor. He then appeared, contested the widow’s appointment, and sought his own.
The lower court held he had forfeited his right by failing to petition within 30 days of death; the Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing the statutory requirement that the 30-day period runs only after the nominee has:
- knowledge of the testator’s death, and
- knowledge that he is named as executor.

Secrest held that the son had “shown good cause for delay and waived no rights he may have under the will,” because he did not know he had been nominated and did not possess the will.

3. Application to Moore

In Cunningham, the district court appeared to treat the mere passage of time—Moore’s failure to petition within 30 days of Cunningham’s death—as sufficient to establish renunciation. The Supreme Court finds this clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence and the statutory text.

Key factual points:

Cunningham died June 6, 2022.
Moore did not file a probate petition within 30 days; indeed, she did not file until October 2023, after McClendon had already sought to probate the 2018 will.
Moore asserted she did not know she was named as personal representative under either the 2018 or 2019 will until after McClendon initiated proceedings.
Moore never had possession of the 2018 will (or the fully executed 2019 will).

McClendon argued that Moore:

Knew of Cunningham’s death;
Knew of the existence of a will (generally) and need for probate, because there were non-trust assets;
Nonetheless failed to act within 30 days.

Even accepting those points arguendo, the Court held they do not satisfy § 108’s requirements. The statute requires knowledge that one is named as executor, not merely awareness that a will exists or that probate may be needed.

Under Secrest and § 108, Moore’s lack of knowledge of her nomination—and lack of will custody—constitutes “good cause for delay,” preventing any deemed renunciation. The Court also notes:

The trial court identified no evidence that Moore was unfit or incompetent to serve.
Moore’s substantive disagreement with McClendon over which will should be probated does not equate to renunciation of her statutory and testamentary right to serve.

4. Doctrinal Takeaways on Renunciation

Clarified rule (and likely the most distinctly “new” emphasized principle in the opinion):

A nominated executor does not automatically forfeit or renounce the right to appointment merely by failing to petition for probate within 30 days of the testator’s death.
The 30-day period under 58 O.S. § 108 does not begin to run until the nominee has:
- knowledge of the death, and
- knowledge that he/she is named as executor in the will.
Even then, renunciation is discretionary (“may be held”), and the nominee can avoid it by showing “good cause” for the delay—lack of knowledge and lack of possession of the will being classic examples.

The Court’s reversal on this point significantly reinforces the rights of nominated personal representatives, especially where the will is held by another interested party.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Residence vs. Domicile (for Probate Venue)

Domicile (or “residence” in § 5): Your true, fixed, permanent home—the place you intend to return to and remain, even if you are temporarily away.
You can only have one domicile at a time.
To change domicile, you must:
1. Leave your old home with no intention of going back; and
2. Establish a new home and intend to stay there permanently.
Temporary stays elsewhere (e.g., for medical treatment, schooling, or work) generally do not change domicile without clear intent to abandon the old home and make the new place permanent.

2. Execution Formalities and Self-Proved Wills

Oklahoma law (84 O.S. § 55) requires most wills to be:
- Written;
- Signed by the testator (or at his direction and in his presence);
- Signed by two witnesses who see the signature or have it acknowledged to them, and who sign at the end in the testator’s presence.
A “self-proved” will goes further:
- The testator and witnesses sign sworn statements before a notary;
- The notary’s certificate and seal are attached;
- This can eliminate the need to produce the witnesses in court later.

3. Lost or Destroyed Wills

When the original will cannot be found after death, the law presumes it may have been revoked by destruction—unless the proponent proves otherwise.
Under 58 O.S. § 82, a lost or destroyed will can still be probated if:
1. It is proven to have been in existence when the testator died (or to have been fraudulently destroyed while the testator lived); and
2. At least two credible witnesses clearly and distinctly prove what the will said.
A copy (including a photocopy) may be used as evidence of contents, but it does not, by itself, satisfy the statute.

4. Revocation of Wills

A will can be revoked in several ways (not all discussed in detail here), but one common method is by a later written will that expressly declares the earlier one revoked.
Under 84 O.S. § 101, that later writing must itself be executed with all the formalities required of a will. A defective later writing cannot validly revoke a properly executed will.

5. Renunciation of Executor Appointment

Being named as executor (personal representative) in a will gives you priority to be appointed by the court.
If you know that:
- the testator has died, and
- you are named as executor,
and you then wait more than 30 days without petitioning for probate, the court may treat you as having renounced your right—unless you show good cause for the delay (for example, you did not actually know you were nominated, or you did not have the will).
Even when the 30 days runs, renunciation is not automatic; it is a discretionary determination based on the full circumstances.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Venue and Forum Selection in Probate

Litigants will find it harder to shift venue based on a decedent’s late-life medical transfers. Probate will typically be in the county of the decedent’s long-standing home or homestead, not the location of the hospital, nursing facility, or assisted living center.
Lawyers should pay close attention to:
- Where the decedent lived before illness;
- Where real property is located;
- Evidence of intent to permanently relocate before major health events.

B. Lost Wills and Document-Retention Practices

The decision highlights the severe risk posed by failure to locate an original later will. A missing original, without strong proof that it existed at death, will often leave an earlier will in place.
Estate planners and fiduciaries should:
- Implement rigorous document-retention and safekeeping protocols.
- Consider executing duplicate original wills when appropriate, as in Shaw.
- Keep detailed execution records that may later help prove existence at death if the original is lost.
Charitable beneficiaries (like OCCF here) should be especially attentive, as their rights may depend on being able to prove the later will’s continued existence at death.

C. Revocation Strategy and Risk Management

The opinion sends a clear signal: a testator’s later, but defectively executed, attempt to revoke a prior will will not succeed. Formalities matter for revocation as much as for initial execution.
Practitioners should ensure:
- Revocation clauses are included in fully compliant later wills; and
- Testators are advised not to rely on informal writings or partial executions to alter their estate plans.

D. Protection of Nominated Executors and Testator’s Choice

By reaffirming Secrest and emphasizing knowledge and good cause, the Court strengthens the protection of the testator’s choice of personal representative.
Custodians of wills (often beneficiaries or adverse parties) cannot easily manipulate the 30-day rule by withholding the will and then arguing that the nominee has renounced by inaction.
Future disputes over personal representative appointments will likely involve closer scrutiny of:
- Who had possession of the will;
- When and how the nominee learned of the nomination;
- Whether the nominee’s delay was reasonable in light of that knowledge.

E. Charitable Planning and Trust Structures

Although the Court’s decision turns on formalities rather than policy preferences, it indirectly underscores the vulnerability of charitable and institutional beneficiaries to failures in execution and document management.
Where a charity’s interest depends on a later will and trust, practitioners should:
- Ensure impeccable compliance with execution formalities;
- Confirm safekeeping and tracking of originals;
- Consider mechanisms (e.g., notices, duplicate custody) that can later help prove the instrument survived until death.

VII. Conclusion

Estate of Cunningham is a comprehensive reaffirmation and clarification of several foundational principles in Oklahoma probate law.

On venue, it confirms that domicile—not temporary medical presence—controls, and that an established residence in one county continues absent clear abandonment and establishment of a new permanent home.
On will execution and lost wills, it underscores the indispensability of statutory formalities and the demanding proof required to probate a lost will or rely on a photocopy.
On revocation, it holds firmly that a later defective writing cannot revoke a prior valid will; the revoking instrument must itself meet all will formalities.
On executor renunciation, it significantly refines practice by insisting that:
- The 30-day clock in 58 O.S. § 108 begins only when the nominee knows both of the death and the nomination; and
- Mere delay—without knowledge and absent consideration of good cause—does not amount to renunciation.

Taken together, these holdings promote predictability, protect testators’ expressed choices (both as to beneficiaries and personal representatives), and reinforce the central role of formal compliance in Oklahoma estate planning and probate administration. For practitioners, the case is an important guidepost in litigating venue disputes, lost-will claims, revocation questions, and contests over the right to serve as personal representative.

Temporary Medical Relocation, Lost Wills, and Executor Renunciation in Oklahoma Probate: A Commentary on Estate of Cunningham, Moore & Oklahoma City Community Foundation v. McClendon