Temporal Proximity Must Be Very Close: One-Year Gap and Isolated Stray Remarks Are Insufficient to Plausibly Plead Discrimination or Retaliation under Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Second Circuit’s summary order in Gehlaut v. New York City Department of Education, No. 24-1741 (2d Cir. Sept. 8, 2025), affirming the dismissal of a New York City public school teacher’s discrimination and retaliation claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).

Although designated as a “Summary Order” without precedential effect under the Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1, the decision is citable under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and offers clear guidance on two recurring pleading issues:

• When derogatory “stray remarks” are too isolated and temporally remote to support an inference of discriminatory motive at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage; and
• How much temporal proximity is required to plausibly allege causation for retaliation when timing is the plaintiff’s primary factual theory.

The plaintiff, Dharmvir Gehlaut, of Indian national origin and Hindu faith, alleged that derogatory comments by his supervisor in mid-2019 were followed by a March 2020 reassignment and June 2021 disciplinary charges. He also claimed the 2021 charges were retaliatory because he had filed a discrimination complaint with the State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) in July 2020 (cross-filed with the EEOC). The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), and the Second Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit (Judges Wesley, Sullivan, and Park) affirmed the district court’s February 8, 2024 judgment dismissing the complaint:

• Discrimination: The complaint did not plausibly allege discriminatory motive. The supervisor’s derogatory remarks in May–June 2019 were isolated and occurred approximately nine months before the March 2020 reassignment and nearly two years before the June 2021 disciplinary charges. Without factual allegations tying the speaker to the decision-making or showing temporal proximity or other indicia of bias, the remarks were “stray” and could not support a plausible inference of discrimination under Title VII, the (amended) NYSHRL, or the NYCHRL.
• Retaliation: The sole causal theory was timing—disciplinary charges (June 2021) occurred after the July 2020 SDHR complaint. A roughly one-year gap is too long, standing alone, to make causation plausible. Even plaintiff’s alternative framing—from a February 17, 2021 right-to-sue letter to June 2021 (about four months)—would not suffice here, given the absence of other supporting facts.
• Time-barred claims: Any claim based on a June 2019 reassignment was untimely under Title VII’s 300-day EEOC charge window and the three-year limitations periods for NYSHRL and NYCHRL (and, as to the DOE, the one-year period under N.Y. Educ. Law § 3813(2-b)).
• Leave to amend: Denial was proper because plaintiff did not identify additional facts he could plead to render discrimination or retaliation plausible.
• Notice-of-claim issue: The panel did not reach whether the plaintiff satisfied N.Y. Educ. Law § 3813(1)’s notice-of-claim requirement for state and city claims against the DOE because dismissal rested on failure to state a claim.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Rule 12(b)(6) standard: The court reviewed de novo, accepting well-pleaded facts as true and drawing reasonable inferences for the plaintiff, citing Palmer v. Amazon.com, Inc., 51 F.4th 491, 503 (2d Cir. 2022). The complaint must state a facially plausible claim (Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)), and must raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the alleged wrongdoing (Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 2018)).
• Title VII discrimination and retaliation baselines: The panel used Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2015), for the proposition that a plaintiff must plausibly allege an adverse action taken at least in part for a discriminatory reason and, for retaliation, an adverse action taken “because” he opposed unlawful practices.
• NYSHRL alignment with NYCHRL: The court reiterated that post-2019 amendments, NYSHRL is construed liberally and aligned with the NYCHRL’s more liberal pleading standard, citing Qorrolli v. Metropolitan Dental Associates, 124 F.4th 115, 122–23 (2d Cir. 2024) and N.Y. Exec. Law § 300.
• NYCHRL standards: For discrimination, the plaintiff must plausibly allege being treated less well because of a protected trait; for retaliation, conduct reasonably likely to deter protected activity suffices, both per Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2013).
• Stray remarks: Isolated derogatory comments, without more, generally do not sustain a discrimination claim. The court invoked Danzer v. Norden Systems, Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1998).
• Temporal proximity and causation: When timing is the sole causal fact, “temporal proximity must be very close,” often less than three or four months, citing Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001). The court also referenced Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85–86 (2d Cir. 1990) (declining to infer causation from approximately three months) and emphasized courts’ discretion in drawing inferences from timing (Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2009)).
• Limitations periods:
  • Title VII charge filing: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (300 days).
  • NYSHRL: N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (3 years).
  • NYCHRL: N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d) (3 years).
  • DOE claims: N.Y. Educ. Law § 3813(2-b) (1 year).
  • Notice of claim (not reached): N.Y. Educ. Law § 3813(1).

Legal Reasoning

1) Discrimination

The court focused on two deficiencies: decision-maker linkage and temporal remoteness.

• Decision-maker linkage: Although the supervisor (Kelly Johnson) transmitted the March 17, 2020 reassignment letter, the complaint did not allege facts showing that Johnson made or influenced the reassignment decision. Without factual allegations tying the derogatory speaker to the adverse action, the remarks lack probative force as to motive.
• Temporal remoteness and isolation: The alleged derogatory comments occurred in May–June 2019, roughly nine months before the March 2020 reassignment and nearly two years before the June 2021 charges. Given the “isolated nature” of the remarks and the absence of temporal proximity, the court deemed any resulting inference of discrimination implausible at the pleading stage, citing Danzer and Espinal.
• Applicability across regimes: The outcome held under Title VII and, notwithstanding the liberalization of NYSHRL (post-2019) and NYCHRL standards, also under those statutes. Even with a “treated less well” framing (NYCHRL) or liberal construction (NYSHRL), plaintiffs still must allege facts plausibly connecting the adverse action to discriminatory motive; isolated, remote remarks without decision-maker involvement do not suffice.

2) Retaliation

The retaliation claim suffered from a paucity of causal facts.

• Protected activity and adverse action: The plaintiff filed with SDHR (and EEOC) in July 2020. Disciplinary charges were served June 2021. The only alleged causal link was timing.
• Temporal proximity alone, and how close is “close”: The court reiterated the rule that when temporal proximity is the sole basis for causation, the proximity must be “very close”—typically three or four months or less. A roughly one-year gap is “far too long” to support a plausible inference of causation, citing Breeden and Hollander.
• Alternative timing argument rejected: Even measuring from the February 17, 2021 EEOC right-to-sue letter (instead of the July 2020 SDHR filing) to June 2021 yields approximately four months—insufficient here, given the “paucity of supporting factual allegations,” and the court’s obligation to “exercise its judgment” in evaluating timing-based inferences (Espinal).
• NYSHRL/NYCHRL alignment: The causation implausibility analysis applied across federal, state, and city law; liberal pleading regimes do not dispense with the need for facts supporting a causal connection.

3) Timeliness

The court confirmed that discrimination claims tied to a June 2019 reassignment were untimely:

• Title VII: First EEOC filing in July 2020 fell outside the 300-day window for a June 2019 act.
• NYSHRL/NYCHRL: The suit was filed December 27, 2022, more than three years after June 2019.
• DOE-specific statute: N.Y. Educ. Law § 3813(2-b) imposes a one-year limitations period for claims against the DOE.

4) Leave to Amend

The panel affirmed the denial of leave to amend because plaintiff did not identify additional facts that would render discrimination or retaliation plausible. A generic assertion that he “may be able” to add facts is insufficient; courts look for a proffer describing what concrete, non-conclusory facts would be added and how they would cure the deficiencies.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Temporal proximity alone rarely suffices unless very short: This order underscores that a one-year gap between protected activity and alleged retaliation does not plausibly plead causation by timing alone. Even four months can be insufficient depending on context and the lack of other factual allegations. Plaintiffs should, where possible, plead additional causal indicia: decision-maker knowledge of the protected activity, intervening antagonism, deviations from policy, shifting explanations, comparator treatment, or continuity of animus.
• Stray remarks doctrine remains robust at the pleading stage: Isolated derogatory comments by a non-decision-maker, especially when remote in time from the adverse action, will not, without more, carry a discrimination claim past Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs should aim to allege a nexus to the actual decision (e.g., remarks by the decision-maker, close temporal proximity, or facts showing the speaker’s influence over the decision).
• NYSHRL’s 2019 amendments do not eliminate plausibility: While the NYSHRL is now construed liberally and aligned with the NYCHRL’s more plaintiff-friendly framework, plaintiffs still must plead specific facts making discrimination or retaliation plausible. Liberal construction does not convert isolated, stale remarks or lengthy gaps into plausible causation or motive.
• Limitations and DOE-specific rules matter: The opinion reinforces that Title VII’s 300-day charge deadline, the three-year windows for NYSHRL/NYCHRL, and the DOE’s one-year limitations period under Education Law § 3813(2-b) can independently bar claims. Counsel should calendar these strictly, particularly for early personnel actions such as reassignments.
• Leave to amend: proffer or forfeit: On appeal, a generic request to amend is not enough. Litigants seeking leave should preview the additional facts they would allege and explain how those facts cure pleading defects (e.g., identify the decision-maker, detail knowledge and causation, or add comparator and pattern-of-conduct facts).
• Citation practice: Although non-precedential, summary orders filed after January 1, 2007 are citable under FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1. Practitioners may cite this order for persuasive value on temporal proximity and stray remarks at the pleading stage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Adverse employment action (discrimination): A materially negative change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment (e.g., demotion, discipline, non-teaching reassignment with negative consequences).
• Protected activity (retaliation): Opposing or complaining about unlawful discrimination (e.g., filing with SDHR/EEOC).
• Temporal proximity: The time interval between a protected act (like a complaint) and an employer’s adverse action. Very short intervals can support a causal inference; lengthy gaps usually cannot, unless other facts bridge the gap.
• Stray remarks: Offensive or biased comments that are isolated, remote in time, or unconnected to the decision-maker or decision process. Standing alone, such remarks generally do not show discriminatory motive.
• Plausibility (Twombly/Iqbal): A complaint must contain enough specific facts to allow a court to reasonably infer liability, not just legal conclusions or a hope that discovery will uncover evidence.
• NYSHRL (post-2019) and NYCHRL standards: Both are construed liberally. Under the NYCHRL, it is often enough to plead that the plaintiff was treated less well because of a protected trait (discrimination) or that the employer engaged in conduct reasonably likely to deter protected activity (retaliation). Still, plaintiffs must include facts supporting motive/causation.
• Statutes of limitations and charge-filing deadlines: These are strict time limits within which claims must be filed (e.g., 300 days for Title VII administrative charges). Missing them typically bars the claim.
• Summary order: A non-precedential appellate disposition that can be cited for persuasive value under FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1.

Conclusion

Gehlaut reinforces two central pleading tenets in employment litigation across federal, state, and city regimes:

1. Isolated, temporally remote stray remarks—especially without allegations linking the speaker to the decision—do not plausibly suggest discriminatory motive.
2. A one-year gap between protected activity and adverse action is too long, by itself, to plausibly allege retaliation; even four months may be insufficient absent additional causal facts.

The decision further underscores the continued vitality of the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard after the NYSHRL’s liberalizing amendments, the importance of timely filings under multiple statutory regimes, and the need to articulate, at the pleading stage, concrete facts tying adverse actions to discriminatory or retaliatory motives. While non-precedential, the order provides practical guidance for drafting and defending employment complaints in the Second Circuit and New York courts applying aligned standards.