Temporal Limits of Compassionate Release: Second Circuit Confirms Ineligibility for Pre-SRA Offenses

1. Introduction

United States v. Coonan (2d Cir. July 9 2025) addresses whether inmates convicted for conduct that occurred before November 1 1987 may access modern “compassionate-release” (sentence-reduction) relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) as amended by the First Step Act of 2018.

James “Jimmy” Coonan—former leader of the infamous Hell’s Kitchen “Westies” gang—was sentenced in 1988 to 75 years’ imprisonment for racketeering-related crimes dating back to the mid-1960s. Having served roughly 38 years, Coonan sought a sentence reduction, arguing that the 2018 amendments opened § 3582(c)(1) to all federal inmates. The district court and, now, the Second Circuit disagreed.

The panel (Lynch, Park, Robinson, JJ.) holds that § 3582(c)(1) remains unavailable to defendants whose offenses pre-date the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) effective date of November 1 1987—despite the procedural expansion embodied in the First Step Act (“FSA”). The opinion fortifies a growing consensus among circuits and clarifies the dual-track sentencing regime that has persisted for almost four decades.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Main Holding: The SRA’s effective-date clause (§ 235(a)(1)) limits § 3582(c)(1) to “offenses committed after November 1 1987.” The FSA did not disturb that temporal limitation. Accordingly, prisoners like Coonan are categorically ineligible for a § 3582(c)(1) sentence-reduction motion.
Disposition: District court’s denial of Coonan’s motion affirmed.
Scope: Applies circuit-wide to all pre-SRA offenders, irrespective of sentence length, health concerns, or administrative exhaustion.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Below are the key authorities the panel relied upon, with emphasis on how each case shaped the interpretive pathway.

United States v. Argitakos, 862 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1988)
—Earliest Second Circuit decision interpreting § 235(a)(1). Held that § 3582(c)(2) did not apply to pre-1987 offenses. Coonan extends Argitakos’s logic from subsection (c)(2) to (c)(1).
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) & United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)
—Supreme Court explanations of the SRA’s overhaul and the Guidelines’ framework. The panel cites them to trace congressional design and highlight the prospective nature of the reforms.
United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020)
—Recognized that “compassionate release” is a misnomer; § 3582(c)(1) authorizes reductions. Demonstrated post-FSA expansion of inmate-initiated motions yet implicitly limited to post-1987 offenses.
United States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566 (2d Cir. 2022)
—Set standards of review for denial of § 3582 motions; affirmed de novo review for statutory interpretation questions—framework used in Coonan.
Springfield Hospital, Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403 (2d Cir. 2022) & Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, 580 U.S. 405 (2017)
—Statutory-interpretation principles: courts read statutes as a whole; phrases not construed in isolation.
Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 176 (2016)
—Policy arguments cannot trump clear statutory text; used to rebut Coonan’s purposive reading of FSA.
Cross-Circuit Cases (persuasive):
- United States v. Jackson, 991 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 2021)
- United States v. King, 24 F.4th 1226 (9th Cir. 2022)
- United States v. Rogge, 2025 WL 1718222 (8th Cir. 2025)
These decisions underscore a nationwide trend limiting § 3582 to post-SRA conduct.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

SRA’s Effective-Date Clause is Unambiguous. Section 235(a)(1) explicitly confines the SRA (including § 3582) to crimes committed after November 1 1987. The panel re-affirms that statutory text governs, citing settled canons of construction.
FSA Added Procedure, Not Substantive Scope. The 2018 amendment merely inserted “or upon motion of the defendant” into § 3582(c)(1). Congress did not amend—nor even mention—the limiting language in § 235(a)(1). Under the “strong presumption” that Congress legislates consciously, silence equals acquiescence.
Historical Dual-Regime Context. Because Congress has repeatedly postponed, rather than abolished, the pre-SRA parole system (18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218), federal sentencing remains bifurcated:
- Pre-1987 offenses → Old parole regime + no § 3582 relief.
- Post-1987 offenses → Guidelines regime + § 3582 relief.
Maintaining the parole commission demonstrates legislative endorsement of differential treatment.
Legislative Intent & Policy Arguments. Even if a broad “ameliorative” purpose animated the FSA, courts must honor express statutory limits. The opinion cites Rodriguez (1987) for the warning against pursuing statutory purposes “at all costs.”
Constitutional Avoidance Not Triggered. Because the statutory language admits of only one reasonable interpretation, the equal-protection concerns raised by Coonan (age-based discrimination) cannot influence construction.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

Clarifies Eligibility Nationwide. While several circuits had already ruled similarly, the Second Circuit’s published decision eliminates any lingering ambiguity within the influential New York-based circuit.
Practical Consequences for Pre-SRA Prisoners. Roughly 100–200 federal inmates sentenced for pre-1987 conduct remain incarcerated. Their only early-release avenue is still parole under the deferral-ridden PCRA, not modern compassionate-release motions.
Guidance for District Courts. Judges within the circuit can dispose of pre-SRA § 3582 motions at the jurisdictional threshold, conserving resources.
Legislative Pressure. The opinion highlights pending bills (e.g., S. 1248 – 118th Cong.) that would extend compassionate release to all inmates. Congress now has a clear judicial statement of the status quo, sharpening the stakes for statutory amendment.
Federal-State Analogy. States contemplating retroactive reforms may look to Coonan as a cautionary example of the necessity for explicit retroactivity language.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Below is a plain-English guide to the legal architecture underlying the opinion.

Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1984: Massive overhaul that:
- Created the U.S. Sentencing Commission & Guidelines.
- Prospectively abolished parole for new federal convictions.
- Added § 3582(c)(1) & (c)(2) for limited sentence modifications.
- Effective only for crimes on/after Nov 1 1987.
Pre-SRA Parole System: 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g) allowed prisoners to seek release from the Parole Commission. Congress has kept the Commission alive through serial extensions.
Compassionate Release vs. Parole:
- Parole = administrative early-release decision under the old system.
- Compassionate Release / Sentence Reduction = judicial modification of an already-imposed sentence under § 3582(c)(1).
First Step Act (FSA) of 2018: Criminal-justice reform package. Relevant here: empowered prisoners themselves, after exhausting BOP procedures, to file § 3582(c)(1) motions.
Canon of Constitutional Avoidance: Courts choose a plausible statutory interpretation that avoids serious constitutional questions—but only if multiple plausible readings exist. Where text is clear, the canon is inapplicable.
“Dual-Track” Federal Sentencing: Term describing coexistence of (a) parole-eligible pre-1987 sentences and (b) guideline-based post-1987 sentences, each with distinct review mechanisms.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Coonan stands as a definitive affirmation that § 3582(c)(1) compassionate-release relief is temporally bounded. The Second Circuit’s methodical textual analysis—bolstered by precedent and legislative history—precludes extension of modern sentence-reduction procedures to pre-SRA offenses absent an explicit act of Congress. For aging inmates like Coonan, the path to early freedom remains through the Parole Commission or legislative change, not the courthouse door of § 3582(c)(1).

In the broader legal landscape, the decision underscores the judiciary’s fidelity to statutory text over policy aspiration, reinforces the “dual-track” federal sentencing regime, and places renewed focus on Congress as the arbiter of retroactive criminal-justice reform.