Targeting the Federal Consent Scheme: The Sixth Circuit on Conflict Preemption under the Interstate Horseracing Act

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Churchill Downs Technology Initiatives Co. v. Michigan Gaming Control Board (No. 25‑1235, Dec. 16, 2025) marks a significant development in the law governing the intersection of federal regulation of interstate horserace wagering and state gambling control. The case centers on TwinSpires, an Oregon-based electronic wagering platform owned by Churchill Downs Inc., which accepts wagers via an online application on horseraces run in various states.

The key legal question is whether Michigan may, through its Michigan Horse Racing Law (MHRL), require TwinSpires to obtain a state “third‑party facilitator” license in order to accept interstate pari-mutuel wagers from bettors physically located in Michigan. TwinSpires argued that this licensing requirement conflicts with the federal Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 (IHA), which establishes a specific three‑party consent scheme governing interstate off-track wagering. Michigan, by contrast, maintained that the IHA preserves its authority to define what wagering is “legal” within its borders and that its licensing regime is a permissible exercise of that power.

The district court granted a preliminary injunction barring Michigan from enforcing its licensing requirement against TwinSpires. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that TwinSpires is likely to succeed on its claim that the IHA conflict-preempts Michigan’s targeted licensing scheme. The court rejected Michigan’s attempt to characterize the licensing requirement as part of defining “legal” wagering, and clarified how far state gambling regulation may go before it crosses into forbidden interference with the IHA’s federal framework.

This commentary examines the opinion in depth, explaining the background, the court’s reasoning, the precedents relied upon, and the broader implications for federal–state relations in gambling regulation and beyond.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Pari‑mutuel Wagering and the Interstate Horseracing Act

Horseracing wagers in the United States traditionally take place in pari‑mutuel pools: a system in which all bets of a given type are pooled, the house (here, the racetrack or operator) takes a percentage “takeout,” and the remainder is distributed among winning bettors. By definition, participants are “wagering with each other and not against the operator.” See 15 U.S.C. § 3002(13).

For much of U.S. history, these wagers were local and physically tied to racetracks. With the advent of interstate simulcasting and account wagering in the 1970s, bets began to flow across state lines: a bettor in State A might wager on a race in State C through an operator located in State B. This raised conflicts among states with differing gambling policies and created pressure for a uniform federal framework. In response, Congress enacted the Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA) in 1978.

The IHA:

• Acknowledges that states retain “primary responsibility for determining what forms of gambling may legally take place within their borders,” 15 U.S.C. § 3001(a)(1); but
• Identifies “the limited area of interstate off-track wagering on horseraces” as one requiring federal action to ensure cooperative, non-conflicting regulation among states. § 3001(a)(3).

Substantively, the IHA:

• Bans accepting an “interstate off-track wager” except as provided in the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 3003.
• Defines “interstate off-track wager” as “a legal wager placed or accepted in one State” on a horse race “taking place in another State,” including pari-mutuel wagers “where lawful in each State involved.” § 3002(3).
• Allows an “off-track betting system” (any group “in the business of accepting wagers on horseraces at locations other than” the track) to accept interstate wagers only if it has obtained three consents, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3002(7), 3004(a):
  • Consent of the host racing association (the racing association conducting the race),
  • Consent of the host racing commission (the regulator in the state where the race is run), and
  • Consent of the off-track racing commission (the regulator in the state where the wager is accepted).

Notably, the statute does not expressly include the state where the bettor is located as a separate “consent” state.

B. Michigan’s Regulation: The MHRL and Third‑Party Facilitators

Michigan has a long history of regulating horseracing, having banned racing in 1819, then later legalizing and regulating pari-mutuel wagering in 1933. In 1995, the state enacted the Michigan Horse Racing Law (MHRL), creating a licensing regime for racetracks, simulcasting, and wagering.

In 2010, TwinSpires began accepting online wagers from Michiganders without authorization under then-existing state rules. In 2013, the Executive Director of the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) instructed TwinSpires to cease accepting such wagers, though no further enforcement followed at that time.

In 2019, Michigan amended the MHRL to address electronic betting platforms. Key features of the amended regime include:

• Race-meeting license requirement: Racetracks must hold a race-meeting license to conduct live racing and associated wagering.
• Third‑party facilitator license: A race-meeting licensee may accept wagers “electronically through a licensed third-party facilitator.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 431.317(8).
• Joint contracting requirement: To obtain a third-party facilitator license, the facilitator must “have a joint contract with all race meeting licensees and certified horsemen's organizations in [Michigan].” § 431.308(1)(d)(i).
• Criminalization of unlicensed acceptance: A person who accepts wagers on live or simulcast horse races without the requisite license is guilty of a felony. § 431.317(9)–(10).

In practice, because Michigan has only one racetrack, Northville Downs, TwinSpires entered into an agreement with Northville and horsemen’s groups, sharing a portion of Michigan wagers with Northville. The MGCB granted TwinSpires a third-party facilitator license in 2020 and renewed it through 2024.

C. The Dispute: Suspension and Litigation

In early January 2025, Northville temporarily lost its race-meeting license. The MGCB responded by ordering all licensed third-party facilitators to stop accepting wagers from Michigan residents. TwinSpires refused to halt its operations. The MGCB then suspended TwinSpires’ third-party facilitator license.

By late January 2025, Northville’s race-meeting license was restored, and other third-party facilitators were permitted to resume accepting wagers under the MHRL. However, the Board maintained its suspension of TwinSpires’ license, effectively excluding TwinSpires from the Michigan online pari-mutuel wagering market.

TwinSpires filed suit in federal court, alleging that Michigan’s licensing requirement, as applied to interstate wagering on out-of-state races accepted out-of-state, is preempted by the IHA. It sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the MHRL licensing provisions against it. The district court granted the preliminary injunction; the State appealed and sought a stay of the injunction in both the district court and the Sixth Circuit, which both courts denied.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

Judge Nalbandian, writing for a unanimous panel, affirmed the preliminary injunction. The key holdings are:

1. Conflict preemption under the IHA: TwinSpires is likely to succeed on its claim that the MHRL’s third-party facilitator licensing requirement conflicts with the IHA by:
   • Interfering with Congress’s objective of a uniform, cooperative two-state consent scheme for interstate off-track wagering (host state + accepting state), and
   • Targeting the federal consent structure by effectively adding an additional consent, controlled by the bettor’s state, to the IHA’s three consents.
2. Field preemption reserved: Although the district court had found field preemption, the Sixth Circuit declined to reach that broader question, resolving the case solely on conflict-preemption grounds.
3. Interpretation of “legal” wagers under the IHA: The court agreed with Michigan that “legal” in the IHA’s definition of “interstate off-track wager” (§ 3002(3)) refers to legality under state law, including the laws of:
   • The state where the wager is placed,
   • The state where the wager is accepted, and
   • The state where the race occurs.
   However, it held that states may not leverage this concept of “legality” to impose additional consent structures that conflict with the IHA’s design.
4. Preliminary injunction factors: TwinSpires established:
   • A strong likelihood of success on the merits (preemption),
   • Irreparable harm via lost access to 18,000 Michigan customers and damage to reputation and goodwill (not adequately compensable by money damages),
   • That the balance of equities favors TwinSpires, especially because the state’s claimed harms are largely self-inflicted, and
   • That the public interest supports enjoining a law likely invalid under the Supremacy Clause.

On this basis, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting preliminary injunctive relief and affirmed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Preemption Framework and the Court’s Choice of Ground

The court began with the Supremacy Clause and the familiar taxonomy of preemption:

• Express preemption – where Congress explicitly states that federal law displaces state law.
• Implied preemption, which includes:
  • Field preemption – where federal regulation is so pervasive that it occupies an entire regulatory field.
  • Conflict preemption – where compliance with both federal and state law is impossible, or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191, 210–11 (2020).

The district court had grounded its ruling in field preemption, essentially concluding that Congress had occupied the field of interstate off-track wagering. The Sixth Circuit, however, elected not to address field preemption and instead found that Michigan’s law is likely conflict-preempted:

“Because conflict-preemption principles suffice to resolve this case, we leave field preemption for another day.” (Slip op. at 7.)

This is an important methodological choice. By limiting its holding to conflict preemption, the court avoids a sweeping pronouncement that might cast doubt on a wide array of state gambling regulations. Instead, it focuses on a targeted clash: Michigan’s specific licensing scheme versus the IHA’s specific consent structure.

The court also notes that the usual presumption against preemption does not apply here. That presumption is often invoked in areas of traditional state regulation (e.g., family law, medical malpractice), but the court emphasized that “regulation of interstate gambling isn’t a traditional area of state regulation,” citing Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001). This makes it easier to find conflict preemption on the face of the statute, without presuming that Congress intended to leave states broad latitude over interstate aspects of gambling.

B. The IHA’s Consent Structure and Its Objectives

The IHA’s basic policy statements, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3001, provide the backdrop for the court’s analysis:

• Congress sought to “prevent interference by one State with the gambling policies of another” and to “ensure States will continue to cooperate with one another in the acceptance of legal interstate wagers.” § 3001(a)(3).
• At the same time, Congress disclaimed “primary responsibility for determining what forms of gambling may legally take place within their borders,” leaving that responsibility to the states. § 3001(a)(1).

To implement those goals, Congress created a three-consent structure (15 U.S.C. § 3004(a)):

1. Host racing association – the track or racing association conducting the race, which must have a written agreement with the relevant horsemen’s group authorizing consent.
2. Host racing commission – the regulatory body in the state where the race occurs.
3. Off-track racing commission – the regulatory body in the state where the wager is accepted.

These actors have effectively absolute “veto” power over interstate off-track wagering. The IHA does not condition their veto rights, does not require them to act reasonably, and does not provide an alternative route around a withheld consent. Nor does it confer any equivalent veto power on the state where the bettor happens to reside, if that state is different from the “off-track” (accepting) state.

The Sixth Circuit understands this architecture as central to Congress’s objective of a uniform and cooperative interstate regime: two states (race state and acceptance state) plus the host association/horsemen’s group must agree, and no other state may unilaterally inject itself as an additional gatekeeper.

C. Michigan’s MHRL: What It Regulates and Whom It Targets

The 2019 amendments to the MHRL effectively condition the legality of electronic pari-mutuel wagering by Michigan residents on two things:

• The existence of a licensed in-state racetrack (here, Northville Downs) with a valid race-meeting license; and
• A third-party facilitator license held by the online wagering platform (e.g., TwinSpires), obtained by contracting with all in-state race meeting licensees and certified horsemen’s organizations.

Thus, in order for a Michigander to lawfully place an interstate pari-mutuel bet through TwinSpires on an out-of-state race:

• The host racing association (where the race is run) and host racing commission must consent (IHA requirement);
• The off-track racing commission in the state where TwinSpires is deemed to accept the bet (here, Oregon) must consent (IHA requirement); and
• Additionally, TwinSpires must:
  • Contract with Michigan’s racetrack(s) and horsemen’s organizations, and
  • Obtain and maintain a Michigan third-party facilitator license (MHRL requirement).

When Northville briefly lost its race-meeting license, the MGCB directed third-party facilitators to halt acceptance of Michigan bets; TwinSpires refused, and the Board suspended TwinSpires’ license. Even after Northville’s license was restored, the Board left TwinSpires’ license suspended, effectively blocking TwinSpires from participating in the Michigan market while allowing others to resume operations.

Crucially, the MHRL does not regulate only the “forms of gambling” allowed in Michigan (e.g., whether certain bet types are permissible). It explicitly regulates who may accept wagers for Michigan residents and under what licensing conditions. The panel characterizes this as an attempt to “intrude[] into the federal scheme by regulating how betting platforms accept wagers,” rather than a neutral rule about resident conduct.

D. Why the MHRL Is Conflict-Preempted

The panel offers two central reasons why Michigan’s licensing scheme is likely preempted under conflict-preemption principles.

1. The MHRL Interferes with the IHA’s Objectives and Methods

First, the court reads the MHRL as directly undermining the IHA’s mechanism for achieving Congress’s goals of uniformity and cooperative regulation. The IHA:

• Creates a closed world of three consenters,
• Gives each an unconditional veto, and
• Provides no alternative paths when consent is withheld.

Michigan, by contrast, “tells regulated parties that the IHA’s two-state scheme isn’t enough” and adds an additional state-imposed hurdle. In the court’s words:

“By thwarting the IHA's methods for achieving its stated objectives, the MHRL poses an obstacle to the IHA. That's a conflict.” (Slip op. at 8.)

The panel analogizes this to Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n – Ohio Div., Inc. v. DeWine, 666 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2012). In that case, the IHA allowed horsemen’s groups to veto off-track wagering agreements. Ohio enacted a statute barring horsemen’s groups from “unreasonably” withholding consent. The Sixth Circuit held that Ohio’s statute was preempted because it reduced the absolute nature of the IHA veto and created “an alternative path” inconsistent with the federal scheme.

Here, Michigan attempts something structurally similar: it does not curtail any existing IHA veto directly, but it adds a fourth consent-type requirement (Michigan licensing) that operators must satisfy before they may accept wagers. This, the court holds, is equally impermissible. Just as Ohio could not “supplement” the IHA by limiting the horsemen’s veto, Michigan may not supplement the IHA by imposing an additional, non-federal consent requirement on betting platforms.

2. Michigan’s Law “Targets” the Federal Scheme, Rather than Regulating General Primary Conduct

Second, the court finds the MHRL particularly problematic because it is tailored to the IHA’s subject matter and designed to function as an add-on to the federal consent structure, rather than as a generally applicable gambling regulation.

Drawing on Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373 (2015), the panel highlights the importance of the “target” of a state law in preemption analysis. In Oneok, state antitrust claims targeting retail natural gas price manipulation were allowed to coexist with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) regulation of wholesale rates, partly because the state laws targeted different conduct and served distinct purposes.

By contrast, the MHRL’s third-party facilitator license requirement:

• “Doesn't even regulate primary conduct” such as whether individuals may gamble, how much they may wager, or what bet types are allowed;
• Instead, is “a tailor-made addition to the IHA,” aimed at controlling how IHA-regulated off-track wagering systems accept interstate bets; and
• Thus functions as an attempt to “regulate the federal government as well” by reshaping the federally constructed consent process, not merely the underlying conduct of Michigan residents.

The court analogizes to cases like:

• Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013) (Reavley, J., concurring), where local ordinances aimed directly at undocumented immigrants were held conflict-preempted because they intruded on the federal immigration scheme; and
• King v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 148 F.4th 628 (9th Cir. 2025), where the Ninth Circuit warned against interpretations that would let states indirectly “target” federal entities by means of facially neutral but functionally targeted statutes.

The upshot is that while states may adopt generally applicable regulations—even if such laws incidentally affect federally regulated activities—they may not design statutes to operate as a de facto extension or alteration of the federal regulatory framework.

The panel explicitly distinguishes the MHRL from regulations that might pass muster:

• A state law that regulates “wager types” (e.g., forbidding certain exotic bets) could be a legitimate definition of permissible “forms of gambling” and only incidentally affect interstate wagering.
• A state-wide ban on interstate horserace wagering might be permissible as a determination that this entire category is not a legal “form[] of gambling,” though the court flags this as a “difficult question” it does not resolve.
• Generally applicable consumer protection or zoning rules, applied neutrally, are often upheld even when they indirectly constrain federally regulated activity.

In contrast, Michigan’s law is not general or incidental: it specifically conditions the acceptance of IHA-governed bets on an additional state-specific licensing requirement, thereby directly altering the methodology Congress chose.

E. Michigan’s “Legality” Argument and the Court’s Response

Michigan’s principal defense hinged on the IHA’s definition of “interstate off-track wager” as “a legal wager placed or accepted in one State” concerning a race in another. 15 U.S.C. § 3002(3). The state argued:

1. The IHA applies only to legal wagers; if a wager is illegal under Michigan law, then the IHA simply does not apply.
2. Under the IHA’s own terms, a wager must be “lawful in each State involved”; thus, Michigan is fully empowered to define what counts as a “legal” wager within its borders.
3. The third-party facilitator license requirement is simply part of Michigan’s definition of a “legal” wager: if the operator lacks a Michigan license, the wager is not legal, and the IHA never comes into play.

The Sixth Circuit accepts part of Michigan’s premise but rejects its conclusion:

• The court agrees that “legal” in § 3002(3) “contemplates legality in three states” and refers to legality under state law. It also recognizes that the IHA “leaves states with the ‘primary responsibility for determining what forms of gambling may legally take place within their borders.’”
• However, the court holds that states cannot use the notion of “legality” to smuggle in additional consent regimes that contradict the IHA’s structure. The panel draws a line between:
  • Defining forms of gambling and regulating primary conduct (e.g., what types of bets may be placed, or whether horserace wagering is allowed at all), which is permitted; and
  • Regulating the method and structure by which federally regulated off-track betting systems accept interstate wagers—particularly by imposing an additional “consent”-like licensing layer—which is not.

The court underscores that Congress “contemplated a three-state scenario” (bettor’s state, accepting state, and race state), yet did not include the bettor’s state as a separate consenting authority. That omission is read as deliberate:

“It’s telling that the consent provision doesn’t apply, by its terms, to the bettor’s state.” (Slip op. at 12.)

Thus, although Michigan might possess the “greater” power to ban certain forms of gambling entirely, the court holds that this greater power does not include the “lesser” power to reconfigure the federal consent mechanism via targeted licensing requirements. In effect, a state may decide that particular bets may not be placed at all, but it may not decide that they may be placed only after an extra, non-federal consent is obtained.

F. Distinguishing Monarch and Gulfstream

Michigan relied heavily on two out-of-circuit decisions rejecting IHA preemption challenges: Monarch Content Mgmt., LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Gaming, 971 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2020), and Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 479 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). The Sixth Circuit distinguished both.

1. Monarch (Ninth Circuit)

In Monarch, Arizona law required any simulcast of live racing “that originates from outside” the state to be offered to every commercial live-racing permitholder and additional wagering facility in Arizona. The Ninth Circuit viewed this as:

• An intrastate allocation rule, governing which in-state tracks could receive out-of-state simulcasts; and
• At most, a condition on how Arizona’s off-track racing commission would exercise its consent under the IHA (i.e., it would withhold consent unless certain in-state conditions were met).

The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the IHA gives the off-track commission an unqualified veto over interstate wagers; a state law structuring that commission’s internal decision-making did not diminish rights of other IHA consenters or impose additional consents.

The Sixth Circuit embraces that distinction:

• In Monarch, there were still only the three IHA-mandated consents; Arizona’s law merely gave content to the reasons why Arizona’s own commission might withhold its consent.
• In contrast, Michigan’s MHRL “waters down the three IHA-required consents by declaring ‘these three are not enough’” and forces platforms to clear a separate state licensing hurdle. This does not regulate the exercise of an IHA consent right but adds a new, parallel condition that must be satisfied.

2. Gulfstream (Eleventh Circuit)

In Gulfstream, Florida’s Wagering Act limited pari-mutuel wagering on out-of-state simulcasts to in-state facilities holding specific permits. The Eleventh Circuit, in a brief footnote, found no conflict with the IHA because:

• The Florida statute regulated which in-state venues could offer simulcasts;
• The IHA “regulates interstate wagering, not simulcasting”; and
• Florida’s law did not purport to control or add requirements to the IHA consents themselves.

The Sixth Circuit agrees that Gulfstream is distinguishable: Florida’s statute operated essentially as a zoning and licensing rule for in-state facilities and did not intrude upon the three-consent structure the IHA established. Again, the contrast with Michigan’s direct regulation of the acceptance mechanism for IHA-governed wagers is central.

G. The Preliminary Injunction Analysis

After resolving the preemption question, the panel turns to whether a preliminary injunction is justified under the familiar Winter factors as interpreted by recent Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit cases, including Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339 (2024), Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008), and a string of circuit precedents.

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

As discussed, the court holds that TwinSpires has “demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success” on its conflict-preemption claim. This factor, while not dispositive by itself, strongly favors injunctive relief, especially in a constitutional preemption case.

2. Irreparable Harm

The panel emphasizes that a movant must show non-speculative, imminent harm that cannot be adequately remedied by money damages. The court distinguishes between:

• Lost profits alone (generally compensable by damages); and
• Loss of competitive position and goodwill, which are often difficult to quantify and thus irreparable.

TwinSpires asserted that:

• It risked losing access to its approximately 18,000 Michigan users if forced to shut down operations; and
• Michigan’s public characterization of its operations as “illegal gambling activity” harmed its reputation and customer goodwill.

The court found these harms sufficient, analogizing to cases like Collins Inkjet Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 781 F.3d 264 (6th Cir. 2015). Moreover, it noted that TwinSpires sought an injunction promptly after its license suspension, not years later, thus avoiding the kind of delay that can undermine a claim of irreparable harm (Huron Mountain Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 545 F. App’x 390 (6th Cir. 2013)).

3. Balance of Equities and 4. Public Interest

When the government is a party, the balance-of-equities and public-interest factors merge. See Kentucky v. Biden, 57 F.4th 545, 556–57 (6th Cir. 2023). The court concludes that enjoining enforcement of a likely-preempted law:

• Imposes little cognizable harm on the state beyond the loss of enforcing an invalid statute;
• Avoids self-inflicted harm (e.g., loss of revenue from Northville Downs caused by the state’s own suspension orders); and
• Advances the public interest in maintaining constitutional supremacy and respecting federal statutory design, citing cases like Dahl v. Bd. of Trs. of W. Mich. Univ., 15 F.4th 728, 736 (6th Cir. 2021): “Enjoining the enforcement of a law that violates constitutional rights is always in the public interest.”

Michigan’s asserted harms—interest in gambling regulation, revenue losses, and competitive distortions—were either not caused by the injunction or flowed from the state’s own enforcement choices. On this record, the balance and public interest decisively favor TwinSpires.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

Several technical doctrines and terms underlie the court’s reasoning. This section briefly explains them in more accessible terms.

A. Pari‑mutuel Wagering

In pari-mutuel betting:

• All bets of a given type (e.g., “win” bets on a particular race) go into a common pool.
• The operator (racetrack, online platform) takes a pre-set percentage, known as the “takeout,” to cover costs and profit.
• The remaining pool is divided among winning bettors, so bettors effectively wager against each other rather than the house.

This differs from fixed-odds betting, where a bettor bets against the house at odds set in advance.

B. Preemption: Field vs. Conflict

• Field preemption: Congress has comprehensively regulated a subject (e.g., nuclear safety, certain aspects of immigration), indicating that there is no room left for states to regulate in that field at all.
• Conflict preemption: A state law remains within a state’s basic area of competence but still must yield if:
  • It is impossible to comply with both state and federal law; or
  • Even if technically possible, the state law undercuts the objectives and mechanisms Congress adopted.

The Sixth Circuit used the second type—“obstacle” conflict preemption—to resolve this case.

C. The IHA’s Consent System

Think of the IHA as requiring three separate “green lights” before an interstate off-track bet can be accepted:

1. The host track (and the horsemen’s group it contracts with) must approve the export of betting on its races.
2. The host state’s regulator must agree.
3. The accepting state’s regulator (where the off-track betting operator is located) must agree.

If any one of these three says “no,” the bet cannot legally be accepted under federal law. No other government entity is given this veto power under the IHA.

D. “Forms of Gambling” vs. Targeted Consent Regulation

The IHA explicitly respects state authority over “what forms of gambling may legally take place within their borders.” This allows states to:

• Ban or permit horserace wagering generally;
• Limit which bet types or games are allowed; and
• Enact general consumer protection and integrity rules.

But the Sixth Circuit emphasizes that this “form of gambling” authority is not a license to reengineer the federal consent process by adding new, state-specific conditions that function as extra vetoes (such as Michigan’s platform-specific licensing tied to in-state track contracts). That move crosses from permissible state regulation into impermissible interference with a federal regulatory method.

E. Preliminary Injunction and “Irreparable Harm”

A preliminary injunction is an emergency, temporary court order that aims to preserve the status quo while a case is litigated. To obtain it, the plaintiff must show, among other things, that:

• They are likely to win the underlying case; and
• They will suffer irreparable harm (harm that cannot be fixed later through money damages or that cannot be accurately measured) if the injunction is not granted.

Examples of irreparable harm include:

• Loss of constitutional rights;
• Harm to reputation or goodwill; and
• Permanent loss of a customer base or competitive position.

The Sixth Circuit held that TwinSpires’ threatened loss of customers and goodwill, coupled with the Supremacy Clause issues, qualified as irreparable harm.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Immediate Consequences for Horserace Wagering and State Regulation

Within the Sixth Circuit (Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee), this decision sets an important precedent on what states may and may not do in the realm of interstate horserace wagering:

• States may:
  • Decide whether horserace wagering is allowed at all within their borders;
  • Regulate in-state racetracks and physical wagering facilities;
  • Define permissible bet types and other aspects of “forms of gambling”; and
  • Adopt neutral, generally applicable laws (e.g., consumer protection, fraud prevention) that may incidentally affect horserace wagering.
• States may not:
  • Impose targeted licensing or consent schemes on out-of-state off-track betting systems that function as a fourth consent on top of the IHA’s three consents;
  • Use the label “legal” or “illegality” to sidestep the IHA framework by declaring IHA-compliant wagers “illegal” unless operators secure additional state-specific approvals that directly condition the acceptance of interstate bets.

Operators of interstate wagering platforms now have stronger grounds to challenge state laws that attempt to condition their participation in a state’s market on extra consent-like requirements beyond the IHA.

B. Guidance on “Targeting” Federal Schemes

The opinion contributes to a broader line of federal–state jurisprudence emphasizing that:

• States may generally regulate local conduct, even in areas touched by federal law, so long as the state regulation is truly general and not designed to disrupt federal schemes; but
• Where a state statute is tailored to the particulars of a federal system (like the IHA’s consent architecture), and operates in practice as an alteration or extension of that system, conflict preemption is likely.

This reasoning is not limited to gambling. It may inform future cases in areas like immigration, banking, telecommunications, and any domain where Congress has crafted a detailed consent or licensing regime.

C. Federalism and Anti-Commandeering Context

The court’s reliance on Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (2018), and other federalism cases underscores the delicate balance Congress struck in the IHA:

• Congress did not attempt to force states to legalize or maintain any form of gambling (which could raise anti-commandeering concerns);
• Instead, it set conditions under which interstate off-track wagering may occur, leaving states free to say “no” via the IHA’s own consent mechanisms or by banning forms of gambling outright;
• But what states may not do is overlay the federal consent framework with their own parallel veto points, thereby undermining the cooperative structure Congress designed.

This case thus illustrates how federal law can respect state sovereignty over core policy choices (such as whether to allow gambling) while still preempting specific state mechanisms that disrupt an interstate regulatory system.

D. Possible Future Litigation

Because the panel did not reach field preemption, future litigants may test whether the IHA occupies the entire field of interstate off-track wagering, potentially narrowing state authority even further. Additionally:

• Other states with licensing or consent regimes that touch out-of-state off-track systems may face challenges; and
• Courts outside the Sixth Circuit will need to decide whether to follow the reasoning of Churchill Downs, align with Monarch and Gulfstream, or craft their own approaches.

For now, within the Sixth Circuit, the line is clear: state laws that functionally add a fourth IHA consent are highly vulnerable to conflict-preemption challenges.

VII. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Churchill Downs Technology Initiatives Co. v. Michigan Gaming Control Board establishes a clear and important principle: while states retain primary authority to decide which forms of gambling are allowed within their borders, they may not target and modify the federal consent structure Congress created in the Interstate Horseracing Act by bolting on additional, state-specific licensing consents for off-track wagering operators.

By affirming the preliminary injunction in favor of TwinSpires, the court:

• Clarifies that “legal” in the IHA’s definition of “interstate off-track wager” includes state law, but cannot be used to justify schemes that conflict with the federal statute’s design;
• Reinforces prior Sixth Circuit precedent (notably Horsemen’s Benevolent) holding that states cannot create “alternative paths” around the IHA’s consent rules; and
• Provides a nuanced articulation of conflict preemption that distinguishes permissible state regulations of gambling forms and primary conduct from impermissible, targeted efforts to reshape federal regulatory mechanisms.

As interstate and online gambling continue to proliferate, Churchill Downs will stand as a key reference point in determining how far states can go in regulating their residents’ participation without crossing the line into federally preempted interference. It is a notable reaffirmation of federal supremacy in areas where Congress has crafted detailed interstate cooperative schemes, even in a domain—gambling—where state sovereignty has historically been dominant.