Tapia Error on Plain-Error Review: Ambiguous Treatment Remarks and Checked § 3553(a)(2)(D) Boxes Do Not Make an Upward-Variance Sentence Obviously Unlawful

1. Introduction

Case: United States v. Bullock, No. 25-6003 (10th Cir. Dec. 29, 2025) (Order and Judgment).
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Parties: United States of America (Appellee) vs. Allen James Bullock (Appellant).

The appeal arises from a federal sentencing in the Western District of Oklahoma following convictions for arson and interstate transmission of a threatening communication under 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(i) and 875(c). The conduct stemmed from a domestic dispute in which Bullock threatened and set a fire after learning his girlfriend received a shirt from a male coworker.

The key sentencing issue concerned the interplay between (i) the statutory requirement that courts consider treatment needs in sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D), and (ii) the prohibition against lengthening a prison term to promote rehabilitation, Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 332 (2011). On appeal, Bullock argued the district court impermissibly increased his prison term to provide treatment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed. Because Bullock did not raise a Tapia objection at sentencing, the court reviewed only for plain error under United States v. Doe, 154 F.4th 777, 783 (10th Cir. 2025).

The panel held Bullock failed to show (1) an obvious error or (2) an effect on his substantial rights. In context, the sentencing judge’s references to vocational training and treatment (substance abuse and trauma) did not clearly indicate the prison term was lengthened to achieve rehabilitation. The court also rejected the argument that checked boxes in the written “Statement of Reasons” (tracking § 3553(a)(2)(D)) made any error obvious, relying on United States v. Naramor, 726 F.3d 1160, 1170-71 (10th Cir. 2013).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 332 (2011)
Tapia supplies the governing substantive rule: while a court must consider treatment-related factors under § 3553(a), it may not impose or extend a term of imprisonment to foster rehabilitation. In Bullock, the panel treated Tapia as the legal boundary and then asked whether the record clearly crossed it.
United States v. Doe, 154 F.4th 777, 783 (10th Cir. 2025)
Doe supplies the plain-error framework invoked due to forfeiture: Bullock had to show error that was obvious and that affected substantial rights. The opinion uses Doe both to set the standard and to emphasize the defendant’s burden.
United States v. Werlein, 664 F.3d 1143, 1147 (8th Cir. 2011)
Cited for the methodological point that courts evaluate alleged Tapia problems by examining the full context of the sentencing court’s remarks, not isolated snippets.
United States v. Naramor, 726 F.3d 1160, 1170-71 (10th Cir. 2013)
Central to the panel’s handling of the written judgment. Naramor held there was no error merely because a court checked a box referencing § 3553(a)(2)(D) (“needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment”). Here, the panel applied the same logic: the form’s checked boxes did not, by themselves, make any Tapia violation obvious, especially where the oral explanation suggested a permissible rationale.
United States v. Lemon, 777 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2015)
Cited for the proposition that an ambiguous discussion of rehabilitative needs does not constitute plain error. The Tenth Circuit used this to reinforce that clarity matters: where the record can be read either way, “obviousness” is not met.
United States v. Holman, 840 F.3d 347, 355 (7th Cir. 2016)
Like Lemon, cited to support that ambiguity about treatment opportunities or needs is insufficient to establish a plain Tapia violation.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The decision turns on how to reconcile two sentencing propositions the opinion treats as simultaneously true:

Mandatory consideration: Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D), the court “shall consider” the need for the sentence to provide education, vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment “in the most effective manner.”
Prohibited use of imprisonment as a tool for rehabilitation: Under Tapia, a court cannot lengthen a prison term to make rehabilitation more available or effective.

Applying these principles under plain-error review, the panel focused on two questions:

(a) Was any Tapia error “obvious”?

The panel found no obvious error because the record lacked a clear statement that the judge increased the prison term in order to provide treatment. The court noted the judge:

addressed treatment needs in response to the defense’s own arguments for a variance tied in part to therapy/classes;
implemented treatment-related measures through supervised release conditions and Bureau of Prisons recommendations; and
stated (twice) that “incarceration is not a means of promoting incarceration or rehabilitation,” language the panel read as cutting against a Tapia inference.

Importantly, the panel treated any potentially problematic language as, at most, ambiguous. Under United States v. Lemon and United States v. Holman, ambiguity does not satisfy the “obviousness” prong of plain error.

The panel also addressed the checked boxes on the written Statement of Reasons. Rather than treating those checked boxes as a confession of Tapia error, it applied United States v. Naramor to hold that such form language—particularly when the oral sentencing explanation points elsewhere—does not make a violation obvious.

(b) Did the asserted error affect substantial rights?

Even if the record could support concern about treatment-based reasoning, the panel held Bullock failed to show a reasonable probability of a lower sentence absent the alleged error. The court emphasized the district judge’s reliance on:

an extensive criminal history, including two convictions for second-degree robbery and two firearm-related convictions;
the seriousness of the arson and threats and their impact on victims;
the need to promote respect for the law; and
the need to protect the public through incapacitation.

Those stated reasons, in the panel’s view, made it speculative that removing treatment references would have changed the sentence.

3.3. Impact

Although designated “not binding precedent,” the order is instructive for future sentencing appeals in the Tenth Circuit because it:

Raises the practical bar for unpreserved Tapia claims: Defendants who fail to object at sentencing will face a demanding plain-error inquiry where ambiguity and contextual counter-signals (e.g., explicit disavowal of rehabilitation as a basis for incarceration) will likely defeat the “obviousness” prong.
Limits the evidentiary weight of boilerplate forms: The checked § 3553(a)(2)(D) boxes in the Statement of Reasons, without more, will not necessarily transform permissible consideration of treatment into an obvious Tapia violation, especially when the oral explanation reflects non-rehabilitative sentencing aims.
Encourages preservation: The opinion implicitly incentivizes defense counsel to make timely Tapia objections when treatment is discussed, because preserved error would be reviewed under a less defendant-hostile standard than plain error.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D): A statute requiring judges to consider whether the overall sentence will help provide needed training, medical care, or treatment effectively. This factor can support treatment conditions and recommendations—but it cannot justify increasing prison time to force or facilitate rehabilitation.
Tapia error: A sentencing mistake where a judge uses imprisonment length as a tool to promote rehabilitation (e.g., “I’m giving you extra months so you can finish a program”). Judges may discuss treatment and recommend programs; the problem is using prison duration to achieve it.
Plain-error review (forfeiture): When a defendant did not object in the district court, the court of appeals will reverse only if the error is clear/obvious and likely changed the outcome (and meets additional criteria). Ambiguous records usually do not qualify.
“Substantial rights”: Typically means the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, without the error, the sentence would have been lower.
Statement of Reasons “checked boxes”: A standardized form used at sentencing. This case treats checked boxes as informative but not decisive, especially where the sentencing transcript clarifies the court’s actual rationale.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Bullock reinforces that sentencing courts may (and must) consider treatment needs under § 3553(a)(2)(D) while still complying with Tapia’s prohibition against extending incarceration to promote rehabilitation. On appeal, the decision underscores two practical lessons: (1) context matters—references to treatment do not automatically imply a forbidden motive; and (2) for unpreserved claims, ambiguity and competing lawful explanations will usually defeat plain-error relief, even when the written judgment includes treatment-related checkboxes.