Tanzi v. State: Affirmation of Due Process Limits and Postconviction Relief Procedures in Florida Capital Cases
Introduction
Michael A. Tanzi was convicted of first-degree murder, carjacking, kidnapping and armed robbery and sentenced to death for the abduction, sexual battery and strangulation of Janet Acosta. After the Governor signed a death warrant, Tanzi filed a third successive postconviction motion challenging:
- The constitutionality of Florida’s compressed 30-day post-warrant litigation schedule and denial of additional public records;
- The application of Florida’s lethal injection protocol to an obese inmate with medical conditions;
- The Governor’s authority over the timing of death warrants;
- His death sentence under Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence (including Apprendi, Ring, Hurst and Erlinger).
The Supreme Court of Florida had jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1), (7) and (9) of the Florida Constitution and, after reviewing the circuit court records and precedent, affirmed the summary denial of relief, denied habeas petition and dismissed all extraordinary writ requests.
Summary of the Judgment
On April 1, 2025, the Florida Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision:
- It affirmed the circuit court’s summary denial of Tanzi’s successive Rule 3.851 motion on due-process, public-records and method-of-execution claims.
- It held that Florida’s 30-day compressed schedule for death-warrant litigation does not violate due process (Barwick v. State).
- It ruled that Tanzi was not entitled to additional records under Rule 3.852(h) or (i) because he failed to show good cause or a colorable postconviction claim (Cole v. State; Dailey v. State).
- It rejected Tanzi’s Eighth Amendment challenge to the etomidate lethal injection protocol and alternative methods of execution as untimely and meritless (Asay v. State; Glossip v. Gross).
- It upheld the Governor’s discretion in setting and enforcing death warrants (Abdool v. Bondi; Ferguson v. State; Valle v. State).
- It denied a new habeas claim based on Erlinger v. United States, reaffirming that Erlinger does not disturb Florida precedent on capital sentencing (Davis v. State; State v. Poole; Ford v. State).
- It denied Tanzi’s emergency “all writs” petition for wheelchair relief.
The Court declined oral argument, denied stays of execution, and directed issuance of mandate immediately.
Analysis
Precedents Cited
- Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993) — Requires a preliminary hearing to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is needed on initial and successive 3.851 motions.
- Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 2023) — Rejected due-process challenge to Florida’s 30-day post-warrant litigation schedule.
- Cole v. State, 392 So. 3d 1054 (Fla. 2024) — Held that Rule 3.852 requires a showing of colorable claim and good cause before granting additional public records; applies equally to subdivisions (h)(3) and (i).
- Dailey v. State, 283 So. 3d 782 (Fla. 2019) — Public-records requests must relate to a colorable claim and be timely.
- Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695 (Fla. 2016) — Approved Florida’s etomidate protocol; reiterated Eighth Amendment standard for method-of-execution claims.
- Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015) — Established the two-prong test for method-of-execution challenges under the Eighth Amendment.
- Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) — Held that Eighth Amendment does not demand elimination of all risk of pain.
- Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 2014) — Rejected challenge to the Timely Justice Act’s 180-day execution requirement.
- Ferguson v. State, 101 So. 3d 362 (Fla. 2012) & Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2011) — Recognized broad gubernatorial discretion in death-warrant timing.
- Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016) & Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) & State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020) — Defined jury findings required for a death sentence under Sixth and Eighth Amendments.
- Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) — Held that Eighth Amendment does not require a jury to recommend death.
- Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024) — Related to the federal ACCA; does not apply to Florida post-conviction death-penalty cases.
- Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 2016) — Held that a unanimous advisory jury recommendation satisfies Hurst’s jury-finding requirements.
- Ford v. State, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S22 (Fla. Feb. 7, 2025) — Clarified that Erlinger does not disturb Florida capital sentencing precedents.
Legal Reasoning
The Court applied established standards without receding from precedent. Its step-by-step reasoning was:
- De novo review of summary denial under Rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) (Owen v. State).
- Due process claim: Florida’s 30-day compressed schedule provides notice and opportunity to be heard (Asay; Barwick).
- Public-records claim: Rule 3.852(h) applies only to pre-1998 cases; Tanzi’s case post-dates the rule’s effective date. Even under subdivision (h)(3), he failed to show colorable claims or good cause (Cole; Dailey).
- Method-of-execution claim: Untimely under Rule 3.851(d)(1) and no exception; no substantial risk of severe pain beyond current protocol; no known available alternative significantly safer (Glossip; Asay; Schwab; Grossman).
- Governor’s authority: Long-standing statutory and constitutional authority to set and enforce death warrants; no new challenge to § 922.052(2)(b) (Abdool; Ferguson; Valle).
- Habeas/Erlinger claim: Repackaged Apprendi/Ring/Hurst issues previously rejected (Tanzi I; Tanzi IV); Erlinger does not apply to state death sentences on collateral review and does not overrule Spaziano or Poole (Ford).
- All-writs petition: No basis to override corrections officers’ medical determinations; petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies and lacked a clear legal right (Williams; Huffman).
Impact
Tanzi v. State will reinforce several pillars of Florida capital postconviction practice:
- It cements the validity of compressed 30-day post-warrant litigation schedules against due-process attack.
- It clarifies the narrow scope of Rule 3.852 public-records tools: no “fishing expeditions” and strict good-cause/colorable claim requirements.
- It underscores the need for timely filing of method-of-execution claims and the high bar for showing unconstitutional risk under the Eighth Amendment.
- It reaffirms the Governor’s broad discretion in setting execution dates, thereby limiting collateral attacks on warrant timing.
- It confirms that new federal sentencing cases (e.g., Erlinger) do not retroactively alter Florida’s capital-postconviction framework.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Huff Hearing: A preliminary screening in postconviction proceedings to decide if an evidentiary hearing is necessary.
- Rule 3.851(d)(1) Deadline: One-year limit after direct appeal mandate to file a motion to vacate death sentence.
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Rule 3.852 Public Records:
- (h) applies only to pre-October 1, 1998 mandates;
- (i) requires demonstrating how records relate to a colorable claim and good cause for lateness.
- Method-of-Execution Test (Glossip-Baze): A condemned inmate must show (1) a substantial, imminent risk of severe pain and (2) a known, available alternative with significantly less risk.
- Compressed Warrant Schedule: Florida’s statutory scheme that requires completion of post-warrant litigation within 30 days of signing the death warrant.
- Erlinger Distinction: Federal ACCA element case—does not apply to Florida death sentences on collateral review and does not disturb Hurst, Davis or Spaziano.
Conclusion
In Tanzi v. State, the Florida Supreme Court emphatically reaffirmed established limitations on successive postconviction motions, clarified the narrow scope of post-warrant discovery, upheld Florida’s lethal injection protocol, and recognized the Governor’s discretion over death-warrant timing. It rejected attempts to relitigate Hurst-era jury-finding rules under the guise of recent federal direct-appeal decisions. The decision fortifies procedural finality in capital cases and underscores the high thresholds for due-process, Eighth Amendment and jurisdictional challenges in Florida’s postconviction landscape.
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