Tailoring Nuisance Injunctions to Regulatory Standards: Limits on Shutdown Orders in Huynh v. Blanchard

I. Introduction

The concurring opinion by Justice Huddle in Steve Huynh, et al. v. Blanchard, et al. (Supreme Court of Texas, No. 21‑0676, opinion filed June 7, 2024) addresses a recurring tension in Texas nuisance law: how far courts may go in shutting down lawful, regulated businesses as a remedy for private nuisance, and how such injunctions must interact with a detailed statutory and regulatory framework—in this case, odor regulation at poultry facilities under the Texas Clean Air Act and Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) rules.

The case pits a group of neighboring landowners and property owners (“the Neighbors”) against several poultry growers and the integrator, Sanderson Farms, Inc. (“the Growers”), over extremely unpleasant and intrusive odors from large-scale chicken-growing operations. A jury found that the Growers negligently and intentionally created a private nuisance, but characterized the resulting injury as “temporary” rather than of a character that recurs “repeatedly, continually, and regularly.” The trial court responded by issuing a shutdown injunction that effectively closed the entire chicken-growing operation.

The Supreme Court—both the majority and Justice Huddle’s concurrence—agreed that the trial court abused its discretion in entering such a broad injunction and remanded for a narrower, properly tailored injunction. Justice Huddle’s opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Bland (and joined by Justice Young as to Part I), crystallizes several important principles:

• A permanent injunction can, in appropriate circumstances, be used to abate a temporary nuisance.
• A jury’s finding that a nuisance is temporary does not preclude a judicial finding of “imminent harm” for purposes of injunctive relief.
• Damages are not an “adequate remedy at law” when they would require perpetual, piecemeal litigation to address recurring injuries.
• Most significantly, a trial court may not use a shutdown injunction as its first resort where a comprehensive regulatory scheme already specifies what level of emissions is lawful. Any injunction must be narrowly tailored and must align with the Legislature’s policy choices and TCEQ’s regulatory framework concerning poultry-facility odors.

The commentary below synthesizes and analyzes Justice Huddle’s concurring opinion as an important statement of the “guardrails” on equitable relief in nuisance cases involving regulated activities.

II. Background and Procedural Posture

A. Parties and Factual Setting

The petitioners include:

• Individual growers (Steve and Yvonne Huynh; Thinh Bao Nguyen; Timmy Huynh),
• Their poultry-farm entities (Huynh Poultry Farm, LLC; T & N Poultry Farm, LLC; Timmy Huynh Poultry Farm), and
• Sanderson Farms, Inc., a major poultry integrator.

The respondents are neighboring individuals and entities who own and occupy nearby properties (including Malakoff Properties, LLC). They complained that large poultry facilities, operated under contract with Sanderson Farms, emitted severe odors that substantially interfered with their ability to use and enjoy their land.

TCEQ had received complaints about these facilities and had responded by issuing multiple Notices of Violation (NOVs), ultimately leading to a Strategic Odor Control Plan or similar comprehensive compliance agreement designed to bring the operations into compliance with Texas air-quality law.

B. Trial and Jury Findings

At trial, the jury was asked:

1. Whether each Grower negligently or intentionally caused a private nuisance to each Neighbor; and
2. Whether the nuisance caused injuries that were:
   • (Option 1) “of such a character as to recur repeatedly, continually, and regularly”; or
   • (Option 2) “of such a character that any anticipated recurrence would be only occasional, irregular, intermittent, and not reasonably predictable.”

The jury:

• Found that each Grower negligently and intentionally created a private nuisance with respect to each Neighbor (liability finding), and
• Selected the second option—i.e., the injuries were of a character that any recurrence would be “occasional, irregular, intermittent, and not reasonably predictable.”

No party challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting these factual findings on appeal. Therefore, as Justice Huddle emphasizes, these findings are binding factual “building blocks” for any equitable relief.

C. Equitable Relief: The Trial Court’s Shutdown Injunction

Despite the “temporary” characterization of the injury, the trial court issued what Justice Huddle describes as a total shutdown injunction. According to the concurrence, this order:

• Effectively shut down the entire chicken-growing operation;
• Prohibited conduct beyond what the Neighbors had actually requested; and
• Failed to distinguish between lawful and unlawful levels of operation or odor.

Justice Huddle characterizes this as “cracking a nut with a sledgehammer” and emphasizes that this was the trial court’s first attempt at an equitable remedy—not a last resort after narrower, targeted injunctions had failed.

D. Appeal and Supreme Court Review

The Growers challenged the injunction, arguing among other things that:

• No injunction should issue because:
  • The jury found a “temporary” nuisance,
  • The temporary nature of the nuisance precluded any finding of “imminent harm,” and
  • The Neighbors had an adequate remedy at law in the form of damages.
• Even if an injunction were permissible, the shutdown order was overly broad and an abuse of discretion.

The Supreme Court agreed that the shutdown injunction was an abuse of discretion and remanded for the trial court to fashion a narrower injunction. Justice Huddle concurred in that judgment but wrote separately to:

• Agree that some injunction was proper, while clarifying why the “temporary nuisance” finding did not bar equitable relief; and
• Sharply criticize the scope and design of the shutdown injunction and the majority’s approach to balancing the equities and handling the jury’s findings.

III. Summary of Justice Huddle’s Concurring Opinion

Part I – Why an Injunction Was Proper

• Respect for Jury Findings: The jury’s findings on nuisance and the “temporary” character of injury are binding factual determinations. The court may not ignore or relabel them absent a legal or factual sufficiency challenge.
• Permanent Injunction for a Temporary Nuisance: A “temporary” nuisance (in the sense that its effects come and go) may still justify a permanent injunction if the underlying condition will continue and cause recurring injury.
• Imminent Harm as a Legal Question: Whether harm is “imminent” is a legal question for the court, not a fact question for the jury. A jury’s “temporary nuisance” finding does not foreclose a judicial finding of imminent harm.
• No Adequate Remedy at Law: Monetary damages are inadequate where the harm is ongoing, difficult to predict, and would “leave all parties in a state of perpetual litigation.” Injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent future wrongs.

Part II – Why the Shutdown Injunction Exceeded Proper Limits

• Narrow-Tailoring Requirement: Injunctions must be narrowly drawn and precise. They must abate only the unlawful aspect of the conduct (the nuisance) and not enjoin lawful business activity.
• No Punitive Use of Equity: Injunctions are corrective, not punitive. Courts must focus on abating the nuisance, not on punishing perceived bad behavior (e.g., unrelated subsidy issues) that does not cause the nuisance.
• Lawful vs. Unlawful Activities: Operating a poultry farm is not inherently unlawful. The key is identifying when the level of odor crosses from lawful to unlawful, and limiting the injunction to that boundary.
• Deference to Regulatory Framework: Texas’s Clean Air Act and TCEQ regulations (including Health & Safety Code § 382.068) specifically govern poultry-facility odors. Courts must align injunctions with this statutory scheme, including TCEQ-issued NOVs and odor-control plans, rather than ignoring it.
• Incremental Equitable Relief: A total shutdown might be appropriate only after narrower injunctions, crafted in harmony with TCEQ standards, have failed and violations persist. It should not be the court’s first remedial step.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Jury Fact-Finding and Appellate Deference

• Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2016)
  Cited for the principle that appellate courts may set aside jury findings only when unsupported by legally or factually sufficient evidence. Also provides the modern definition of “nuisance.”
• Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2003)
  Reaffirms that the jury is the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight of evidence; courts cannot substitute their judgment.
• Benoit v. Wilson, 239 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. 1951)
  Emphasizes that the jury, not the court, is the fact-finder; courts cannot supplant jury findings with their own.
• Livingston v. Livingston, 537 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.)
  Clarifies that while the jury determines ultimate fact issues, the trial court decides the “expediency, necessity, and propriety” of equitable relief based on those facts.
• Bostow v. Bank of Am., No. 14‑04‑00256‑CV, 2006 WL 89446 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 17, 2006, no pet.)
  Similar point: jury decides facts; the court applies equitable principles and chooses the form of relief.

Justice Huddle relies heavily on these cases to argue that the Supreme Court must accept the jury’s “temporary” injury finding and may not recharacterize the nuisance as “permanent” simply to justify particular remedies.

B. Temporary vs. Permanent Injury and Nuisance

• Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines (E. Tex.), L.P., 449 S.W.3d 474 (Tex. 2014)
  Held that the ultimate question whether an injury to real property is temporary or permanent is one of law, but underlying factual questions are for the jury. Justice Huddle uses this not to justify disregarding jury findings, but to stress that courts must respect underlying factual determinations.
• Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2004)
  A key nuisance case discussing temporary vs. permanent nuisances and stating that characterization as temporary or permanent should not depend solely on whether a nuisance can be abated. Also notes that injunctions may be used regardless of the label, and warns against “perpetual litigation” as a substitute for equitable relief.

These precedents underpin Justice Huddle’s view that a nuisance can be “temporary” because its symptoms are intermittent, yet still justify a permanent injunction to stop its ongoing recurrence.

C. Standards for Injunctive Relief

• Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. 2020)
  Restates the four elements for a permanent injunction: (1) wrongful act, (2) imminent harm, (3) irreparable injury, and (4) no adequate remedy at law.
• Operation Rescue–Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998)
  Holds that “imminent harm” is a legal question for the court; the jury may decide underlying facts but not the legal conclusion.
• W & T Offshore, Inc. v. Fredieu, 610 S.W.3d 884 (Tex. 2020)
  Cited for the distinction between fact questions (for the jury) and legal questions (for the court), reinforcing the Operation Rescue principle.
• Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002)
  States the general rule that equitable relief is available only when there is no adequate remedy at law.
• Sharma v. Vinmar Int’l, Ltd., 231 S.W.3d 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)
  Illustrates that damages are inadequate when potential harm cannot be easily calculated.
• Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. 2016); Repka v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 186 S.W.2d 977 (Tex. 1945)
  Stand for the principle that a “multiplicity of suits” undermines the adequacy of a legal remedy.

D. Limits on the Scope of Injunctions

• Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2003)
  States that injunctions must be narrowly drawn and precise. This is a cornerstone of the concurrence’s criticism of the shutdown order.
• TMRJ Holdings, Inc. v. Inhance Techs., LLC, 540 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.)
  An injunction must not enjoin a defendant from acting within its lawful rights; overbroad injunctions are an abuse of discretion.
• Fairfield Ests. L.P. v. Griffin, 986 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.)
  Similarly warns against injunctions that prohibit lawful activities or grant more relief than the plaintiff is entitled to.
• Wiese v. Heathlake Cmty. Ass’n, 384 S.W.3d 395 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.)
  Injunctions must be sufficiently specific and not so broad as to prohibit lawful activities. They should prevent repetition of violations but not restrain lawful exercises of rights.
• Holubec v. Brandenburger, 214 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.)
  Notes that injunctions are granted only to restrain existing nuisances, not to prohibit acts merely because they might become a nuisance.
• Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1958)
  Injunctions must not be used as punishment; equity is remedial, not penal.
• eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979)
  Federal authorities cited for the general equity principles that discretion must be guided by standards and that the scope of injunctive relief must be dictated by the extent of the violation.
• Operation Rescue–Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex., Inc., 937 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996), aff’d as modified, 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998)
  Cited as an example where a more narrow injunction was tried and failed before a broader remedy was justified.

E. Nuisance and Economic Activity

• Sherman Gas & Elec. Co. v. Belden, 123 S.W. 119 (Tex. 1909)
  An early acknowledgment that lawful industrial activity can change property values and cause discomfort; some incidental interference is inevitable in an industrial society.
• Crosstex (again)
  Provides the modern formulation: a nuisance is a substantial and unreasonable interference with land use causing discomfort or annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

F. Regulatory Framework: Clean Air Act and TCEQ

• Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975)
  Explains that under federal law (the Clean Air Act), states have primary responsibility for designing and implementing air-quality regulatory programs.
• BCCA Appeal Grp., Inc. v. City of Houston, 496 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016)
  Describes the Texas Clean Air Act (TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ch. 382) and TCEQ’s role; emphasizes the Legislature’s choice to centralize air-quality regulation at the state level.
• Brazoria County v. Tex. Comm’n on Envt’l Quality, 128 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.)
  Notes that TCEQ is the primary state agency charged with air-quality protection in Texas.
• Slay v. Tex. Comm’n on Envt’l Quality, 351 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. denied)
  An example of TCEQ’s enforcement actions under this regime.
• In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 476 F. Supp. 2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
  A federal case emphasizing the need for injunctive relief to be coordinated and consistent with state regulatory action in environmental matters.

Justice Huddle uses this body of authority to argue that trial courts must not fashion nuisance injunctions in a vacuum. Instead, they must recognize and harmonize their orders with the Legislature’s and TCEQ’s detailed policy choices about acceptable emission levels and compliance mechanisms, particularly as codified in:

Texas Health & Safety Code § 382.068 (“Poultry Facility Odor; Response to Complaints”), which:

• Directs TCEQ to respond to poultry-odor complaints,
• Provides for NOVs when violations are found, and
• Requires a “comprehensive compliance agreement” including an “odor control plan” when multiple NOVs occur within a year.

V. Legal Reasoning in Depth

A. Permanent Injunctions May Abate “Temporary” Nuisances

Justice Huddle carefully disentangles two distinct questions often conflated:

1. How to characterize the injury for damages purposes (temporary vs. permanent injury to real property), and
2. What sort of equitable relief is appropriate (including whether a permanent injunction should issue).

The jury’s answer to Question 4—choosing the option that injuries would recur only “occasionally, irregularly, intermittently, and not reasonably predictably”—means:

• The nuisance is not constantly present; its effects ebb and flow.
• The future recurrences are not predictable enough to be treated as a single, permanent, lump-sum damage event.

Yet, the underlying condition (large-scale chicken-growing operations emitting odors) is understood to continue indefinitely. Justice Huddle analogizes this to a chronic disease whose symptoms flare and subside; the disease remains “permanent” even though symptoms are intermittent.

Accordingly:

• A nuisance can be “temporary” in effect (intermittent harm) but still justify permanent injunctive relief to prevent its recurring symptoms.
• Texas precedent (Schneider; Crosstex) expressly recognizes that the availability of abatement by injunction does not turn on the temporary/permanent label.

Justice Huddle also warns that the Court should not suggest trial courts may simply disregard a jury’s “temporary” finding and unilaterally relabel the nuisance as “permanent” to support other remedial choices. That would usurp the jury’s fact-finding role and conflict with cases like Benoit and Golden Eagle Archery.

B. Temporary Nuisance Findings Do Not Negate “Imminent Harm”

The Growers argued that because the nuisance was found to be temporary and intermittent, there could be no “imminent” harm—a required element of permanent injunctive relief under Pike. Justice Huddle rejects this.

Relying on Operation Rescue, she notes that “imminent harm” is a legal question for the court, to be answered based on the facts found by the jury. The jury decides whether the nuisance exists and its character; the court then decides whether those facts amount to imminent harm justifying an injunction.

Thus:

• The intermittent nature of the nuisance does not preclude imminence; it may still be reasonably certain that offensive odors will recur, even if one cannot predict exactly when.
• The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the risk of future, recurring nuisance-level odors constituted “imminent harm.”

C. Why Damages Were Not an Adequate Remedy at Law

Another key argument from the Growers was that Neighbors had an adequate legal remedy in damages, making injunctive relief unnecessary. Justice Huddle rejects this by focusing on the future, recurring nature of the harm.

If the only injury were past episodes of odor, and those damages were readily calculable, then damages could suffice. But here:

• The nuisance is ongoing and expected to continue in unpredictable episodes.
• The precise quantum of future harm cannot be calculated in advance.
• Requiring Neighbors to wait for each recurrence and then seek new damages would lead to “a state of perpetual litigation.”

Under Campbell and Repka, the prospect of a multiplicity of suits undermines the “adequacy” of a legal remedy. Schneider similarly warned against resolving ongoing nuisance disputes through serial lawsuits. Accordingly, Justice Huddle concludes that an injunction is justified to prevent such a cycle.

D. The Core Error: A Shutdown Injunction as First Resort

The heart of the concurrence is its critique of the scope of the trial court’s injunction, not the decision to issue an injunction per se. Key points:

• Equity as a Last Resort: Injunctions, especially permanent ones, are extraordinary remedies that should follow a finding that legal remedies are inadequate. Within equity, the least restrictive effective relief should be chosen before more drastic measures like wholesale shutdowns.
• Narrow-Tailoring and Non-Punitive Character:
  • Injunctions must be drawn as narrowly as possible to abate only the nuisance.
  • They may not function as punishment for unrelated “sins” or regulatory misbehavior that do not themselves create the nuisance-level odors.
  • Evidence of, for instance, improper acquisition of subsidies may be legally irrelevant unless tied causally to the nuisance conditions.
• Lawful vs. Unlawful Odor Emissions:
  • It is not inherently unlawful to operate a chicken farm or emit some odor.
  • The legal line is the point at which odors become a “substantial and unreasonable” interference for an ordinary person.
  • An injunction must be crafted to prohibit conduct that crosses that line, but still permit lawful operations below that line.

Justice Huddle stresses that it will “almost never” be appropriate to issue a total shutdown as the very first injunctive remedy in a regulated context like this. A shutdown might become appropriate if the Growers willfully violate a narrower injunction that is designed to align with statutory/regulatory standards. But not at the outset.

E. Mandatory Alignment with the Texas Clean Air Act and TCEQ Odor Regulations

The most significant doctrinal development in the concurrence is its insistence that any nuisance injunction involving air emissions from a regulated facility must be harmonized with the existing regulatory scheme.

Under the Texas Clean Air Act (TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ch. 382), TCEQ is tasked with protecting air quality and abating related nuisances. Section 382.068 specifically addresses poultry-facility odors:

• TCEQ must respond to odor complaints.
• TCEQ may issue NOVs when it finds violations.
• After three NOVs in a year, TCEQ must require a “comprehensive compliance agreement,” including an odor-control plan “sufficient to control odors.”

In this case:

• TCEQ had issued several NOVs to the Growers.
• A Strategic Odor Control Plan (or similar compliance plan) was in place between TCEQ and the Growers.
• The Neighbors argued that the Growers did not properly implement the plan and that TCEQ did not adequately enforce it.

But, crucially:

• This is not evidence that the Plan itself was insufficient to abate nuisance-level odors if properly implemented.
• The trial court may not ignore TCEQ’s considered judgment as to what is sufficient to comply with Texas law.

Justice Huddle concludes that, on remand, the trial court must:

• Ascertain the lawful level of poultry-farm odor emissions as reflected by TCEQ’s regulatory framework and the Odor Control Plan;
• Identify the operational parameters (number of chickens, frequency of cycles, ventilation, maintenance, litter-handling practices, etc.) that TCEQ has determined will keep the facility within lawful limits; and
• Craft an injunction that dovetails with these regulatory determinations, prohibiting operations that exceed those parameters while allowing operations that comply.

The injunction need not simply copy the Odor Control Plan verbatim, but it also cannot ignore it. Courts must respect the Legislature’s balancing of the Growers’ economic interests and the Neighbors’ property rights and may not “create [their] own” regulatory regime through sweeping injunctions.

F. Progressive Use of Equity: Narrow First, Broad Later if Needed

Finally, the concurrence outlines a progressive model for equitable relief in environmental nuisance cases:

1. First step: Issue a narrowly tailored injunction that:
   • Prohibits conduct causing nuisance-level odors,
   • Is consistent with TCEQ’s odor-control requirements, and
   • Leaves room for lawful, compliant operations.
2. Only if that fails: If the defendant willfully violates the narrow injunction or continues to operate in defiance of statutory/regulatory standards, a broader injunction (up to and including a shutdown) may become justified.

This incremental approach is consistent with Operation Rescue, where the court considered that earlier, narrower injunctions had failed before approving a more robust order. It also dovetails with general equity principles that courts should impose only as much restraint as necessary to prevent ongoing violations.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Private Nuisance

A private nuisance in Texas is:

A condition that substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities attempting to use and enjoy it.

It is not every odor or annoyance; the interference must be substantial and unreasonable from the viewpoint of an ordinary person, not someone unusually sensitive or intolerant.

2. Temporary vs. Permanent Nuisance / Injury

• Temporary nuisance/injury: Harm that is not continuous; it recurs in episodes and is not predictable enough to be treated as one permanent injury. Damages are typically recovered for the specific periods of harm.
• Permanent nuisance/injury: Harm that is ongoing and predictable, where the condition causing it is expected to continue indefinitely and the damage can be measured in one lump sum (e.g., diminished market value of the property).

Importantly for this case, temporary vs. permanent is primarily a damages characterization. Whether a court can issue an injunction to stop the harmful condition is a separate question.

3. Permanent Injunction and Its Elements

To obtain a permanent injunction, a plaintiff must show:

1. A wrongful act (here, the creation of a nuisance);
2. Imminent harm (a real and immediate threat that the wrongful act will cause future injury);
3. Irreparable injury (harm that cannot be adequately compensated by money damages); and
4. No adequate remedy at law (damages are insufficient—either because future harm is uncertain, difficult to calculate, or would require multiple suits).

4. Imminent Harm

“Imminent harm” does not mean harm is happening every moment. Instead, it means:

• There is a present threat of future injury,
• The injury is likely to occur if nothing is done, and
• The timing and recurrence are sufficiently foreseeable to justify preventive relief.

This is a legal determination made by the judge, based on the facts found by the jury.

5. Adequate Remedy at Law

A remedy at law (usually money damages) is “adequate” if it fully and efficiently compensates the plaintiff without undue complication or repeated litigation. A remedy is often considered inadequate when:

• Future harm is uncertain or hard to quantify,
• The plaintiff would have to bring many separate lawsuits over time, or
• The harm has a significant non-monetary component (e.g., ongoing loss of enjoyment of property).

6. Notice of Violation (NOV) and Odor Control Plan

• A Notice of Violation (NOV) is an official TCEQ finding that a regulated party has violated an environmental rule or permit condition.
• When multiple NOVs occur within a year for a poultry facility, § 382.068 requires a comprehensive compliance agreement, including an odor control plan that TCEQ’s executive director considers sufficient to control odors.

In the injunction context, these documents provide a technical and regulatory benchmark for what operational controls are necessary to keep odors within legally acceptable levels.

7. Abuse of Discretion and Overbroad Injunctions

• A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or without reference to guiding rules and principles.
• An injunction is overbroad (and therefore an abuse of discretion) if it:
  • Restrains lawful conduct along with unlawful conduct,
  • Grants more relief than the plaintiff is entitled to, or
  • Is not sufficiently specific in describing prohibited acts.

VII. Impact and Implications

A. For Nuisance Plaintiffs (Neighbors and Landowners)

• Neighbors retain the ability to obtain injunctive relief even when a nuisance is factually characterized as temporary/intermittent.
• However, they should not expect an automatic shutdown order. Courts are likely to impose more carefully calibrated injunctions that:
  • Incorporate or mirror TCEQ’s compliance plans and regulatory thresholds,
  • Focus on specific operational practices that cause nuisance-level odors, and
  • Allow some level of continued operation under lawful, odor-controlled conditions.
• Strategically, plaintiffs will need to present technical evidence on:
  • Which specific practices generate unreasonable odors, and
  • What changes (consistent with TCEQ standards) would reduce smells below nuisance levels.

B. For Regulated Businesses (Agricultural and Industrial Defendants)

• This concurrence strengthens the position that compliance with environmental regulations matters not only for avoiding agency penalties but also for shaping the scope of private nuisance remedies.
• However, regulatory compliance is not an absolute shield against civil nuisance liability; private suits may still be brought, and injunctions may still issue.
• Businesses should expect that:
  • Courts will look closely at TCEQ NOVs and compliance agreements,
  • Failure to implement agreed-upon odor-control measures will weigh heavily in favor of injunctive relief, and
  • Persistent noncompliance with narrower injunctions could ultimately justify more drastic remedies, including shutdowns.

C. For Trial Courts Fashioning Equitable Relief

The concurrence provides a clear roadmap:

• Step 1: Accept and respect the jury’s factual findings (including temporary vs. intermittent character of the nuisance).
• Step 2: Independently assess:
  • Imminent harm,
  • Irreparable injury, and
  • The adequacy of legal remedies.
• Step 3: Identify the statutory and regulatory framework (e.g., Clean Air Act, Health & Safety Code § 382.068, applicable TCEQ rules, NOVs, and any Odor Control Plan).
• Step 4: Craft a narrow injunction that:
  • Targets the specific operational aspects resulting in nuisance-level odors,
  • Is consistent with what TCEQ has deemed sufficient for compliance, and
  • Does not prohibit lawful operations that stay within those bounds.
• Step 5: Reserve broader remedies (up to a shutdown) for situations where:
  • Defendants persistently violate the narrow injunction, or
  • The court, on an expanded record, determines that compliance within lawful limits is not feasible.

D. For the Relationship Between Tort Law and Regulation

Justice Huddle’s concurrence implicitly addresses the interplay between private nuisance suits and public regulatory enforcement:

• Private nuisance claims remain available; TCEQ’s process is not exclusive.
• But courts are not free to disregard the Legislature’s policy judgments about what constitutes acceptable emissions and how compliance should be achieved.
• In environmental nuisance cases, equitable relief needs to be coordinated with, and informed by, existing regulatory standards.

This reflects a broader principle of regulatory deference in equity: when the Legislature has established detailed technical standards and enforcement tools, equity should not reinvent those standards from scratch.

E. For the Role of the Jury

Finally, the concurrence forcefully defends the jury’s central role:

• Jury findings on nuisance and the nature of the interference cannot be casually recharacterized by courts.
• Appellate and trial courts must treat those findings as the factual foundation upon which equitable remedies are built.
• This preserves the constitutional right to jury trial on fact questions while preserving judicial authority over legal questions (e.g., imminence, adequacy of legal remedies, and the form of injunctive relief).

VIII. Conclusion

Justice Huddle’s concurrence in Huynh v. Blanchard confirms that:

• Injunctions remain available to abate nuisance-level odors from regulated poultry operations, even where the nuisance is intermittent and characterized as “temporary.”
• A jury’s finding of temporary/intermittent nuisance does not bar a judicial finding of imminent harm or the issuance of a permanent injunction.
• Damages are inadequate when future nuisance episodes are uncertain, unquantified, and would require serial litigation.

But the opinion is most significant for its robust insistence on limits to equitable power:

• Shutdown injunctions against lawful businesses are disfavored as a first remedy, especially where a comprehensive regulatory framework exists.
• Any nuisance injunction must be narrowly tailored, abating only unlawful conduct and avoiding the prohibition of lawful operations.
• Trial courts must align their injunctions with the Texas Clean Air Act and TCEQ’s regulatory scheme, including odor-control plans mandated by Health & Safety Code § 382.068.

Taken together, these principles set an important precedent for future Texas nuisance cases involving regulated industries. They preserve meaningful relief for injured neighbors while ensuring that courts respect legislative policy choices and do not wield equitable powers as a blunt instrument to shut down lawful economic activity without first exhausting narrower, carefully tailored remedies.