Tailored Rule 37 Sanctions and Deference to Jury Verdicts: A Commentary on Smith v. State Farm Lloyds

I. Introduction

The Fifth Circuit’s unpublished per curiam opinion in Smith v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 24‑40282 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025), arises from a tornado-damage insurance dispute but is most instructive for its treatment of:

• Sanctions for late disclosure of expert-related materials under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37; and
• The extraordinarily high bar for overturning a jury verdict on “weight of the evidence” or “tainted by prejudice” grounds.

Although designated as non‑precedential under 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the opinion is a textbook illustration of how the Fifth Circuit expects district courts to:

• Apply tailored, proportionate sanctions when Rule 26 disclosure violations concern expert “facts or data,” and
• Guard jury trials through limiting instructions and curative measures, rather than reflexively ordering mistrials or excluding entire expert witnesses.

At the same time, it forcefully reaffirms the appellate court’s deference to jury determinations in civil trials—particularly in fact-intensive insurance and bad-faith cases where both sides marshal competing experts.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Dispute

Gary and Martha Smith purchased a homeowner’s policy from State Farm Lloyds in April 2019. Six months later, a tornado struck their Texas home. They submitted a claim under the policy. State Farm investigated, dispatched a property inspector, and ultimately paid the Smiths a total of $292,901.67 for covered losses and additional living expenses.

The Smiths believed the loss was substantially greater and that State Farm had:

• Underestimated the tornado damage;
• Underpaid the claim; and
• Handled the claim in bad faith, including by engaging in unfair or deceptive practices under Texas insurance law.

B. Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas

The Smiths sued State Farm in the Eastern District of Texas, alleging:

• Breach of contract (failure to pay all amounts due under the policy); and
• Violations of Texas insurance statutes (unfair or deceptive practices, bad faith).

After pretrial discovery, the matter went to a jury trial lasting five days. The trial included:

• Eight witnesses;
• 36 factual stipulations; and
• 384 trial exhibits.

Central to the appeal is the testimony of State Farm’s engineering expert, Joe Shahid, who inspected and photographed the Smiths’ home and prepared an expert report regarding the nature and extent of the tornado damage, and the scope of necessary repairs.

C. The Late-Disclosed Photographs

State Farm:

• Timely disclosed Shahid as an expert witness; and
• Made him available for and subjected him to a deposition by the Smiths.

However, on the eve of trial, State Farm produced a large cache of previously undisclosed materials: 993 photographs taken by Shahid of the Smiths’ property. These photographs were among the “facts or data” he had considered in forming his expert opinions and writing his report.

This late production violated:

• The district court’s scheduling order;
• Local Rule E.D. Tex. R. CV‑26(d); and
• Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii), which requires timely disclosure of all “facts or data considered by the [expert] witness.”

On the second day of trial, the Smiths moved to:

• Exclude Shahid’s testimony in its entirety; and
• Exclude any other witness who relied on the late‑produced photographs.

They also invoked Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1), which authorizes sanctions for discovery violations, including exclusion of evidence and witnesses.

D. The District Court’s Middle-Ground Ruling

The district court acknowledged the violation but adopted a calibrated remedy:

• Allowed Shahid to testify as an expert witness (he had been timely disclosed and deposed);
• Excluded the 993 late-disclosed photographs themselves from evidence;
• Prohibited references to those excluded photographs; and
• Instructed the jury about the limits on Shahid’s testimony and the inadmissibility of many of his photographs.

In short, the court allowed the witness but barred the information that had been untimely produced. When counsel for State Farm strayed into using the excluded photos, the court either:

• Struck the testimony; or
• Promptly admonished counsel in front of the jury.

E. The Jury’s Verdict and Post-Trial Motions

The jury ultimately returned a defense verdict, specifically finding that State Farm did not:

• Fail to comply with the insurance policy;
• Engage in any unfair or deceptive act or practice that damaged the Smiths; or
• Fail to pay the “full and complete insurance claim.”

The district court entered judgment for State Farm and thereafter denied the Smiths’ motion for a new trial. Notably, throughout trial, the Smiths:

• Repeatedly objected to evidentiary issues; but
• Chose not to move for a mistrial when invited to do so by the court, and at one point expressly declined the court’s invitation.

F. Issues on Appeal

On appeal, the Smiths advanced two principal arguments:

1. The district court abused its discretion by allowing Shahid to testify, despite State Farm’s serious Rule 26 violation regarding his photographs.
2. The verdict was “tainted” by the late-produced photographs and resulting evidentiary violations, and was also contrary to the great weight of the evidence; therefore, judgment on the verdict should not have been entered, and a new trial should have been granted.

The Fifth Circuit rejected both arguments and affirmed in full.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Expert Testimony and Discovery Sanctions

The panel held that the district court acted “well within its discretion” in:

• Allowing Shahid to testify as an expert;
• Excluding the late‑disclosed photographs from evidence; and
• Issuing and enforcing limiting instructions to cure any possible prejudice.

The court emphasized that:

• Rule 37(c)(1) prohibits a party from using undisclosed “information or witness,” but does not require exclusion of the witness if the sanction can be confined to the undisclosed information;
• Shahid had been timely identified and deposed; and
• Any prejudice from the late photographs was minimal, in part because they largely duplicated photos already disclosed.

Relying on a line of Fifth Circuit cases, the court concluded there was no “manifest error” in the district court’s evidentiary management and thus affirmed the denial of the motion to exclude Shahid.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Alleged Prejudice

The court next held that the jury’s verdict was amply supported by the record and that no reversible error arose from any evidentiary issue related to the photographs. The key points:

• The standard for overturning a civil jury verdict is extremely demanding: reversal is warranted only when there is a “complete absence of probative facts” to support the jury’s conclusion.
• Appellate courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and affirm unless the evidence “points overwhelmingly the other way.”
• The Smiths failed to meet that heavy burden.

The court noted that:

• State Farm presented testimony from Shahid (regarding the scope of necessary repairs) and Gary Boyd (regarding method and cost of repair);
• The jury was entitled to credit those experts over the plaintiffs’ contrary experts; and
• State Farm’s investigation, payments (totaling $292,901.67), and willingness to reconcile repair estimates undercut the claim of bad faith.

Finally, the court underscored that:

• The district court issued limiting instructions whenever problematic evidence or argument arose; and
• The Smiths’ failure to move for a mistrial—indeed, their explicit decision not to seek one—undermined their later assertion that the trial was incurably tainted.

Given the strong evidentiary support for the verdict and the adequacy of the trial court’s curative measures, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Governing Legal Framework

1. Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii): Expert Disclosures

Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) requires a party disclosing a retained expert to provide, among other things, the “facts or data considered by the witness in forming” his or her opinions. This includes:

• Photographs;
• Measurements;
• Testing results; and
• Any other information the expert reviewed or generated and used in forming opinions.

The rule’s purpose is to prevent “trial by ambush” by ensuring that opposing parties can:

• Prepare for cross‑examination of the expert; and
• Retain and instruct their own experts using the same or comparable data.

2. Rule 37(c)(1): Sanctions for Failure to Disclose

Rule 37(c)(1) supplies the default sanction for failing to comply with Rule 26(a) or (e):

If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence … unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.

The key textual features, as the panel’s reasoning highlights, are:

• The disjunctive phrasing “information or witness”; and
• The exception when the failure is “substantially justified or is harmless.”

Rule 37(c)(1) also authorizes other or additional sanctions, such as payment of fees, informing the jury, or more severe penalties, depending on the gravity of the violation.

3. Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Balancing Prejudice and Probative Value

Rule 403 allows a trial court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is “substantially outweighed” by dangers such as:

• Unfair prejudice;
• Confusing the issues;
• Misleading the jury; or
• Needless cumulative evidence.

This rule is a flexible, context‑dependent tool. The trial judge is seen as best situated to gauge the actual risk of juror confusion or unfair prejudice.

4. Standards of Review: Abuse of Discretion and “Manifest Error”

The Fifth Circuit reviews evidentiary rulings—including admission or exclusion of expert testimony and discovery sanctions—for abuse of discretion. It will reverse only if the decision is “manifestly erroneous.” This:

• Recognizes the trial judge’s proximity to the live testimony, the flow of evidence, and the overall conduct of trial; and
• Prevents appellate courts from second‑guessing granular, on‑the‑spot evidentiary judgments.

5. Appellate Review of Jury Verdicts

The standard for overturning a civil jury verdict is exceptionally deferential:

• Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946): only when there is a “complete absence of probative facts” to support the jury’s conclusion does reversible error appear.
• Gibraltar Sav. v. LDBrinkman Corp., 860 F.2d 1275, 1297 (5th Cir. 1988): a verdict stands if there is “any competent and substantial evidence tending fairly to support the verdict.”
• Dawson v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 978 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1992): the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and affirm unless the proof “points overwhelmingly the other way.”

This deference is heightened where the verdict turns on:

• Credibility determinations; and
• Competing expert testimony on technical or specialized matters.

B. Precedents and Their Influence

1. Discovery Violations and Expert Testimony

• Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2004)
  Primrose established that “[t]he admission or exclusion of expert testimony is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court,” and that appellate courts will not disturb those decisions absent “manifest error.” It also illustrated that courts sometimes allow expert testimony despite imperfections or timing issues in disclosure, particularly where:

  • The opposing party can adequately prepare; and
  • Any prejudice can be addressed through limitation or instruction rather than outright exclusion.

  The Smith panel relies heavily on Primrose for this broad proposition of discretion, citing it for the principle that both admission and exclusion are within the trial court’s legitimate range of options.

• BCE Emergis Corp. v. Cmty. Health Sols. of Am., Inc., 148 F. App’x 204 (5th Cir. 2005)
  In BCE Emergis, the court upheld the exclusion of expert testimony as a sanction for discovery violations. That case exemplifies the other side of the spectrum: when a violation is serious and prejudicial, exclusion can be proper.

  By citing BCE Emergis, the panel implicitly situates Smith as a contrasting example where the district court instead chose the less drastic option of limiting, rather than barring, expert testimony—highlighting that either approach may be appropriate, depending on prejudice and justification.

• Tex. A&M Rsch. Found. v. Magna Transp., Inc., 338 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2003)
  In Tex. A&M, a party failed to disclose certain invoices, but had properly designated the witness whose testimony those invoices supported. The Fifth Circuit deemed the prejudice “negligible,” stressing that the adverse party knew about the witness and his role. The court therefore upheld the admission of the testimony, despite the documentation issue.

  The Smith panel borrows this logic: the Smiths had already deposed Shahid and knew his opinions; the late‑disclosed photographs did not alter the substance of his testimony or ambush them, especially where the photos were largely cumulative of images already produced.

• Campbell v. Keystone Aerial Surveys, Inc., 138 F.3d 996, 1004–05 (5th Cir. 1998)
  Campbell approved a trial court’s decision to permit expert testimony while excluding certain photographs under Rule 403. The case stands for the proposition that:

  • The court may surgically exclude visual evidence that risks unfair prejudice or confusion; while
  • Still admitting the underlying expert testimony, if it remains probative and fair.

  Smith follows the same pattern: photographs are excluded; the expert’s core opinions survive, subject to limiting instructions and cross‑examination.

• United States v. Edelman, 873 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1989)
  Edelman emphasizes that the trial judge is “best positioned” to gauge whether testimony will confuse or mislead the jury. The panel in Smith invokes this principle to support deference to the trial court’s decision that Shahid’s testimony—without the excluded photos—would be more probative than prejudicial.

• United States v. Valles, 484 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 2007)
  Valles reiterates two key propositions:

  • Appellate courts give “great weight” to a trial court’s assessment of the prejudicial effect of evidence; and
  • Prejudice can often be cured—or rendered harmless—by effective limiting instructions.

  This case reinforces the Smith panel’s conclusion that any potential prejudice from the late photographs was mitigated by strong curative actions taken by the district court.

2. Jury’s Role and Appellate Deference

• Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946)
  The Supreme Court in Lavender held that a jury verdict must stand unless there is a “complete absence of probative facts” to support it. This sets a very high threshold for overturning verdicts on appeal. Smith adopts this standard verbatim in rejecting the Smiths’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

• Wright v. Paramount‑Richards Theatres, 198 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1952)
  Wright underscores that the jury—not the court—is “the fact‑finding body.” The jury weighs contradictory evidence, judges credibility, and draws ultimate factual conclusions. Appellate courts focus on the reasonableness of the inferences the jury could draw from the record.

  Smith relies on Wright to reinforce that where experts conflict—as they did here on the extent of tornado damage—the jury is entitled to prefer one side’s experts over the other’s.

• Gibraltar Sav. v. LDBrinkman Corp., 860 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1988) and Dawson v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 978 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1992)
  Both decisions spell out the strong presumption in favor of jury verdicts:

  • Gibraltar: any “competent and substantial evidence” is enough to support the verdict.
  • Dawson: evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict; reversal is warranted only if the evidence “points overwhelmingly the other way.”

  Smith quotes Dawson and applies that standard, concluding that the record, if anything, supports the jury’s findings rather than undermining them.

• Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000)
  Weeks establishes the presumption that juries follow the court’s limiting or curative instructions. Smith leans on this presumption to reject the argument that jurors improperly relied on the excluded photographs or were unduly influenced by them.

3. Curative Instructions and Failure to Seek a Mistrial

• Winter v. Brenner Tank, Inc., 926 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1991)
  Winter is central to the panel’s discussion of waiver and prejudice. It holds that where a party’s counsel “acquiesced in the court’s curative instructions” by not requesting a mistrial when improper comments were made, that party cannot later rely on the same comments to challenge the verdict.

  In Smith, the panel notes that the plaintiffs had multiple opportunities to move for a mistrial, including at the court’s invitation, but declined to do so. That “acquiescence” supports the conclusion that any lingering prejudice was minimal or that the Smiths were content to proceed under the curative instructions.

• Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 631 F.3d 724 (5th Cir. 2011) and United States v. Diaz‑Carreon, 915 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1990)
  These cases reinforce Winter’s implication: failure to request a mistrial is strong evidence that counsel viewed any alleged error as curable and not so prejudicial as to require restarting the trial. In Learmonth, the court explicitly likened such failure to a concession that remaining prejudice was minimal.

  The Smith panel quotes Learmonth and Diaz‑Carreon to make the same point: litigants cannot tolerate an error in hopes of a favorable verdict and then complain only after losing.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning Applied to the Facts

1. The Rule 26/37 Violation and Sanctions

The core legal question was not whether State Farm violated Rule 26—that was undisputed—but whether the district court’s chosen remedy was adequate and within its discretion.

The panel’s reasoning proceeds as follows:

1. Violation established. State Farm failed to timely disclose 993 photographs that Shahid had taken and considered. This contravened:
   • Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii);
   • The local rules; and
   • The scheduling order.
2. Applicable sanction framework. Rule 37(c)(1) provides that a party who fails to provide information or identify a witness as required is not allowed to use that information or witness at trial unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless.
3. Disaggregating “information” and “witness.” Crucially, the court reads the rule as permitting differential treatment:
   • State Farm properly disclosed the witness (Shahid) months before trial; but
   • It improperly failed to disclose certain information (the photos he took).

   Therefore, the sanction could be focused on the “information” without necessarily barring the “witness.”

4. Tailored remedy adopted. The district court:
   • Excluded the late‑disclosed photographs;
   • Struck references to them; and
   • Kept them from the jury’s deliberations.

   It simultaneously allowed Shahid to testify based on the timely disclosed data and his prior deposition testimony.

5. Harmlessness and minimal prejudice. The court found that:
   • The photos largely duplicated images already produced;
   • The Smiths had deposed Shahid, so his opinions were no surprise; and
   • Limiting his testimony and disciplining references to the excluded photos minimized any unfair advantage.

   The panel accepted this assessment, citing Valles and Tex. A&M for the proposition that when the opposing party already knows what the witness will say, the prejudice from a supplemental document lapse is much reduced.

6. Rule 403 balancing. Drawing on Campbell and Edelman, the panel observes that the trial judge rightly evaluated whether the late photographs would mislead or confuse the jury. By excluding them outright and circumscribing Shahid’s reliance on them, the judge concluded that the probative value of Shahid’s testimony outweighed the risk of prejudice. The appellate court saw no manifest error in that balancing.

In other words, the Fifth Circuit endorses a middle path: rather than automatically excluding an expert because of a Rule 26 error, a district court may allow the expert but surgically bar the undisclosed materials, provided that approach adequately protects the opposing party against prejudice.

2. Alleged Taint of the Verdict and Weight of the Evidence

The Smiths argued that the verdict was unjust for two overlapping reasons:

• The jury was unfairly influenced by Shahid and by references to the late photographs; and
• The verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

The Fifth Circuit rejected both contentions, applying well-settled principles:

1. Curative instructions and presumed compliance. The district court:
   • Clarified the limits of Shahid’s testimony;
   • Explained that many of his photographs were inadmissible; and
   • Struck testimony or admonished counsel when excluded materials crept into questioning.

   Under Weeks and Valles, the appellate court presumes the jury followed those instructions. The Smiths offered no persuasive reason to depart from that presumption.

2. Failure to seek mistrial as evidence of minimal prejudice. Citing Winter, Learmonth, and Diaz‑Carreon, the panel gives weight to the fact that the Smiths:
   • Did not request a mistrial when the issues arose; and
   • In fact, expressly declined an invitation to move for a mistrial at one point.

   That conduct is treated as an implicit concession that the curative instructions were adequate and that any residual prejudice was not severe enough to warrant restarting the trial.

3. Substantial evidence supporting the verdict. On the merits, the record contained substantial evidence favoring State Farm:
   • Expert testimony (Shahid) that the home could be restored with limited repairs;
   • Expert testimony (Boyd) that the Smiths’ estimates overstated the necessary work and reflected a remodel rather than required repairs;
   • Evidence of State Farm’s investigative efforts and willingness to adjust cost discrepancies; and
   • Nearly $300,000 already paid to the Smiths, in contrast to the plaintiffs’ escalating demands (from $2.5 million pre‑suit to $25–250 million at closing argument).

   Given this, the panel found no basis to say the evidence “point[ed] overwhelmingly the other way” as required under Dawson, nor that there was a “complete absence of probative facts” as in Lavender.

4. Role of the jury in choosing between competing experts. Both sides presented experts offering “sharply divergent views” on the damage. Under Wright, it is precisely the jury’s function to resolve such conflicts. The appellate court refused to reweigh the evidence or second‑guess which experts the jury believed.

Accordingly, the panel affirmed both the jury’s verdict and the district court’s denial of a new trial.

D. Impact and Significance

1. Tailored Application of Rule 37(c)(1)

Although Smith is unpublished, it offers useful guidance for litigants and trial judges in the Fifth Circuit regarding Rule 37(c)(1):

• Courts are not compelled to choose the “nuclear option” of excluding an expert witness when only certain materials (facts or data) were untimely disclosed.
• The text of Rule 37(c)(1)—“information or witness”—supports a more nuanced approach: exclude the undisclosed data, but allow the witness if that suffices to cure prejudice.
• Where the undisclosed material is cumulative or duplicative of timely‑produced evidence, courts may deem the violation harmless or remediable with narrower sanctions.

This reinforces a discretion‑preserving and proportionality‑oriented sanction regime, in line with modern discovery principles.

2. Strategic Lessons for Litigators

For practitioners, the case conveys several practical messages:

• Timely, complete expert disclosures remain critical. A violation can trigger exclusion of data, sanctions, and credibility attacks in front of the jury—even if the expert survives.
• To argue for exclusion, demonstrate concrete prejudice. Generic complaints about late disclosure are less persuasive than specific showings of how trial strategy, expert preparation, or cross‑examination were impaired.
• Preserve remedies at trial. If a party sincerely believes the proceedings are fatally tainted, it should request a mistrial. Declining to do so while reserving the issue for appeal is risky; appellate courts may treat the failure as evidence that prejudice was limited.
• Expect appellate courts to lean heavily on curative instructions. Once a judge issues detailed limiting instructions and polices them actively, counsel faces an uphill battle on appeal in trying to show incurable prejudice.

3. Insurance and Bad-Faith Litigation

On the substantive insurance issues, Smith underscores:

• Reasonable investigation and substantial payment can undercut bad‑faith claims. Where the insurer:
  • Conducts inspections via qualified experts;
  • Shares appraisals with the insured;
  • Offers to reconcile or negotiate repairs; and
  • Pays a significant sum under the policy;
  A jury may reasonably find no breach and no unfair or deceptive practice—even if the insured believes much more is owed.
• Quantum demands do not establish bad faith. Plaintiffs’ demands of $2.5 million pre‑litigation and up to $250 million at closing, compared with the $292,901.67 actually paid, are noteworthy but not legally dispositive. The panel notes them mainly to show:
  • The breadth of the parties’ disagreement; and
  • The reasonableness of the jury’s choice to credit State Farm’s view of the loss.

In future Texas insurance cases, Smith lends support to defense arguments that robust claim handling and significant payment can defeat allegations of breach and bad faith, especially where expert testimony supports the insurer’s evaluation.

4. Non-Precedential but Persuasive

Because the opinion is unpublished under 5th Cir. R. 47.5, it is not binding precedent. Nonetheless, it is:

• Persuasive authority on how the Fifth Circuit views Rule 37 sanctions in the expert‑disclosure context;
• A practical roadmap for district judges confronting similar disputes over late‑produced expert materials; and
• A clear warning that appellate courts will rarely disturb a verdict where the trial judge has conscientiously managed discovery violations and protected the jury from tainted evidence through targeted remedies.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Expert Disclosures and “Facts or Data” (Rule 26)

When a party hires an expert, Rule 26 requires more than just a name and a short summary. The disclosing party must provide:

• A written report;
• The expert’s opinions;
• The basis and reasons for those opinions; and
• All “facts or data considered” in forming those opinions.

“Facts or data” generally includes anything the expert reviewed or created and relied upon—photographs, notes, test results, calculations, measurements, and prior case materials. The idea is that the opposing side should have the full picture of what informed the expert’s opinions before trial begins.

2. Sanctions for Discovery Violations (Rule 37(c)(1))

Rule 37(c)(1) is designed as a strong incentive for compliance:

• If you fail to disclose required information or a witness, you generally cannot use that information or witness at trial.
• However, if the failure is substantially justified (for example, genuinely unavoidable) or harmless (for example, the information is purely cumulative), the court can let it in.
• The court may also impose lesser sanctions tailored to the harm, such as excluding only certain documents, allowing a late deposition, or instructing the jury about the violation.

3. Rule 403: Excluding Evidence for Unfair Prejudice

Even relevant evidence can be excluded under Rule 403 if there is a serious risk that the jury will be:

• Swayed by emotion rather than reason (unfair prejudice);
• Distracted from the key issues (confusion); or
• Impressed by repeated, cumulative proof that adds little to the case.

In practice, courts frequently use Rule 403 to:

• Exclude particularly inflammatory photographs;
• Limit repetitive or cumulative exhibits; or
• Prevent parties from misusing visual aids that overstate their case.

4. “Abuse of Discretion” and “Manifest Error”

When an appellate court reviews a trial judge’s evidentiary decisions, it does not ask what the appellate panel would have done. Instead, it asks:

• Was the decision within a reasonable range of options, given the law and facts?

If so, even if the appellate judges might have ruled differently, there is no “abuse of discretion.” A “manifestly erroneous” decision is one that is clearly wrong—outside the reasonable range—given the governing rules.

5. Curative Instructions and Harmless Error

When something potentially improper happens—such as a reference to excluded evidence—a trial judge often:

• Strikes the testimony; and
• Instructs the jury to disregard it for any purpose.

Under Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent, courts assume that juries follow those instructions unless there is a compelling reason to think otherwise. If an instruction can neutralize the harm, any error may be deemed “harmless,” meaning it does not justify a new trial or reversal.

6. Challenging a Jury Verdict: “Weight of the Evidence”

On appeal, parties sometimes argue that the verdict is against the “weight of the evidence.” In federal courts, this is an extremely hard argument to win. Appellate courts:

• Do not re-try the case;
• Do not reweigh witnesses’ credibility; and
• Look only for some reasonable evidentiary basis that could support the jury’s decision.

If such a basis exists—especially where experts disagree—the verdict is almost always affirmed.

VI. Conclusion

Smith v. State Farm Lloyds is a concise but instructive decision on two recurring themes in federal civil litigation:

• Discovery Sanctions and Expert Witnesses. The Fifth Circuit endorses a flexible, proportional approach to Rule 37(c)(1): when a party fails to timely disclose expert “facts or data,” the proper remedy may be exclusion of those materials—not necessarily exclusion of the expert himself—especially where:
  • The expert was timely identified and deposed; and
  • The late‑produced materials are largely duplicative and limited prejudice can be cured through instructions and tailored rulings.
• Robust Deference to Jury Verdicts. Reaffirming settled standards, the court holds that a jury verdict must stand if supported by any competent and substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and will not be overturned absent a complete lack of probative support or proof that overwhelmingly points the other way.

For trial lawyers, Smith underscores the importance of:

• Meticulous compliance with expert disclosure rules;
• Promptly seeking appropriate remedies (including mistrial, when warranted) rather than banking objections for appeal; and
• Recognizing that effective curative actions by trial judges make appellate reversal on evidentiary grounds highly unlikely.

For judges, it confirms that:

• Careful, on-the-record management of discovery violations and limiting instructions will be respected on appeal; and
• Tailored sanctions that preserve, rather than destroy, the core of a fair trial are not only permissible but favored, provided they adequately redress any harm.

Even as an unpublished opinion, Smith v. State Farm Lloyds offers a useful, modern illustration of how the Fifth Circuit expects district courts to balance the competing interests of enforcement of discovery rules, efficient trial management, and respect for the central role of juries in resolving factual disputes.