Tailored, Treatment-Gated Cohabitation Restrictions Upheld: Sixth Circuit Affirms Temporary Ban on Living with Women for a Domestic-Violence Recidivist

Introduction

In United States v. Stephen Terrell Horn, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a special condition of supervised release that temporarily prohibits the defendant from residing with any woman until he begins domestic violence counseling and demonstrates progress. Although the condition implicates the freedom of association, the panel held it to be substantively reasonable because it bears a close nexus to both Horn’s history of domestic-violence offenses against women with whom he lived and the public-protection and rehabilitation goals of supervised release. The decision, while not designated for publication, clarifies how district courts within the Sixth Circuit may craft and justify conditions that restrict intimate association when the record shows a concrete, individualized risk tied to the defendant’s criminal history.

The case arises from Horn’s supervised release violations following a federal sentence for firearm offenses. Within days of starting supervision, Horn violated multiple conditions, including a residency approval requirement by living with the mother of his child against Probation’s instruction. The district court imposed a split sentence and added the challenged special condition, prompting Horn’s appeal on substantive reasonableness and associational-rights grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit reviewed the special condition for abuse of discretion, assessing both procedural and substantive reasonableness. The panel:

• Confirmed procedural reasonableness, noting the district court explained in open court why the restriction was necessary, citing Horn’s repeated domestic-violence history against cohabiting women and continued noncompliance under supervision.
• Upheld the condition as substantively reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), emphasizing:
  • A close nexus between the condition and Horn’s history and characteristics, as well as the goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and protecting the public.
  • The condition’s tailoring and temporariness: it applies only until Horn engages in domestic-violence counseling and shows progress.
  • Consistency with Sentencing Commission policy statements (USSG § 5D1.3).
• Distinguished this case from a prior Sixth Circuit decision that vacated a similar cohabitation limitation imposed on a drug offender with no domestic-violence history, and analogized it to a case upholding a ban where the defendant repeatedly abused women with whom he lived.

The court concluded that the district judge did not abuse discretion because the restriction was individualized, justified on the record, and no broader or longer than necessary to accomplish the statutory goals.

Factual Background and Procedural Posture

Horn’s criminal history between 2012 and 2018 includes four assaults against women:

• 2012: Misdemeanor domestic violence after punching his mother and dragging her across the floor.
• 2016: Misdemeanor assault for pushing and grabbing a woman’s neck.
• 2017: Domestic violence against a live-in girlfriend, including choking that left visible neck injuries and slashing her tires.
• 2018: Threats against the same girlfriend’s life and property, causing fear for her safety.

Additional offenses and supervision violations followed (e.g., aggravated menacing, criminal damage, escape, OVI). In 2020, while on state supervision, Horn attempted to saw off a shotgun barrel, discharging it and injuring another. Investigators found a revolver he admitted was his. He later pled guilty to federal firearm offenses: possessing a firearm after misdemeanor domestic-violence convictions (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9), 924(a)(2)) and possessing an unregistered firearm (26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), 5871). The district court imposed 46 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release with conditions, including residency approval.

Released on January 12, 2025, Horn violated three conditions within ten days: unauthorized drug use, failure to comply with testing, and residency violations (living with the mother of his child against Probation’s instruction). After continued concerns and a 30-day continuance, the district court imposed:

• A split revocation sentence: six months’ imprisonment and six months in a halfway house, followed by two years of supervised release.
• Mental-health treatment and domestic-violence counseling.
• A special condition prohibiting him from residing with a female until he begins counseling and demonstrates progress indicating reduced risk of harm.

Horn appealed only the substantive reasonableness of the no-cohabitation-with-women condition, arguing it unduly burdened his freedom of association by preventing him from living with his stepmother or the mother of his child—women he claimed he had not harmed and who were willing to house him.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Brogdon, 503 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2007): Supplies the abuse-of-discretion standard and the bifurcated review for procedural and substantive reasonableness of supervised release conditions. The panel relied on Brogdon’s framework to evaluate whether the district court explained its rationale and whether the condition complied with § 3583(d).
• United States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 2001): Requires the district court to state reasons in open court for the sentence and any special conditions. The panel noted the district court satisfied this requirement by walking through Horn’s domestic-violence history and ongoing risk.
• United States v. Carter, 463 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2006): Articulates § 3583(d)’s three-part test for special conditions:
  1. Reasonable relation to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors;
  2. No greater deprivation of liberty than necessary;
  3. Consistency with Sentencing Commission policy statements.
  The panel used these criteria, focusing especially on the “no greater deprivation” prong because that was the thrust of Horn’s argument.
• United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 1997): Emphasizes the twin goals of supervised release—rehabilitation and public protection—and recognizes district courts’ broad discretion to impose conditions serving those goals. The decision frames the permissibility of conditions even when they implicate important liberties, so long as they are tailored to those goals.
• United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1990): Acknowledges heightened scrutiny for conditions affecting fundamental rights (speech/association) but upholds them when primarily designed for rehabilitation and protection of the public. This case establishes the Sixth Circuit’s willingness to sustain targeted, rehabilitative restrictions.
• United States v. Faber, 718 F. App’x 349 (6th Cir. 2017): Confirms procedural reasonableness where the sentencing judge articulates the rationale for a special condition tied to probation’s goals. The panel cited Faber in concluding the district court’s explanation sufficed.
• United States v. Brandenburg, 157 F. App’x 875 (6th Cir. 2005): Upheld a prohibition on cohabiting with women for a defendant with a “history of abusing women with whom he lives,” reasoning the court could believe he was likely to abuse any female cohabitant. This case is the linchpin for the panel’s affirmance: Horn’s pattern of cohabitant abuse squarely parallels Brandenburg, and Horn’s condition is narrower because it is treatment-gated and potentially time-limited.
• United States v. Worthington, 145 F.3d 1335 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table): Vacated a condition barring cohabitation with an “unrelated, unmarried female” where the underlying offense (drug crimes) had no nexus to the restriction. This contrast underscores the Sixth Circuit’s insistence on a tight fit between the condition and the defendant’s particular risks.
• United States v. Worley, 685 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2012): Cited by Horn (not binding in the Sixth Circuit) for the proposition that restrictions impinging on association must be reasonably necessary to protect specific individuals and support rehabilitation. The panel acknowledged the associational concern but found the necessary nexus and tailoring present here.
• USSG § 5D1.3 (Policy Statements): The panel found no conflict between the condition and Sentencing Commission policy, which contemplates individualized conditions to address risks, including mental health and domestic-violence programming when pertinent.

Legal Reasoning and Application

The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in three steps aligned with § 3583(d).

1. Reasonable Relation to § 3553(a) Factors:
   • Nature of the offense and history/characteristics: Horn’s record shows a persistent pattern of violence against women with whom he cohabited, including his mother and a live-in girlfriend. Many incidents occurred while under supervision, demonstrating recidivism and noncompliance.
   • Deterrence and protection of the public: The condition directly targets the setting in which Horn’s past violent conduct occurred—cohabitation with women—thereby reducing the perceived risk of harm while rehabilitation is underway.
   • Rehabilitation: The condition is tied to Horn’s entry into domestic-violence counseling, making the restriction part of a rehabilitative trajectory rather than a purely punitive ban.
2. No Greater Deprivation of Liberty Than Necessary:
   • The restriction is temporary and contingent: it lifts upon Horn’s initiation of counseling and some indication of progress, unlike the Brandenburg restriction, which ran the entire term of supervised release without early termination.
   • The restriction is targeted: it addresses only cohabitation with women—the context that historically precipitated Horn’s violence. It does not bar all association, employment, travel, or other core liberties.
   • The district court considered and expressly rejected less restrictive living arrangements (e.g., with his stepmother or the mother of his child) based on individualized risk, citing the breadth of prior cohabitant abuse and concerns about ongoing noncompliance.
3. Consistency with Policy Statements:
   • The condition aligns with the Guidelines’ approval of individualized special conditions to mitigate specific risks and to facilitate treatment (USSG § 5D1.3). There is no identified policy conflict.

The panel further emphasized the “close nexus” principle as dispositive when conditions implicate associational rights: the more tightly the condition tracks the defendant’s demonstrated risk profile, the more likely it is to be sustained. On that metric, this case falls on the “Brandenburg side of the spectrum,” not on the Worthington side.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished, the decision has meaningful guidance value for district courts, probation officers, and practitioners within the Sixth Circuit.

• For district courts:
  • Make a detailed, on-the-record explanation grounded in the defendant’s history and the § 3553(a) factors, especially when a condition may restrict associational freedoms.
  • Demonstrate tailoring. Treatment-gated conditions that lift upon documented progress can satisfy the “no greater deprivation than necessary” requirement.
  • Ensure a close nexus between the restriction and the specific risks the defendant presents; a mismatch (as in Worthington) is vulnerable on appeal.
  • Consider crafting clear benchmarks for lifting the restriction (e.g., initiation of counseling, compliance milestones, positive reports), as done here.
• For probation:
  • Document individualized risk assessments linking residential configurations to historical harm patterns.
  • Coordinate with treatment providers to establish objective indicators of progress that can inform modification or termination of conditions.
• For defense counsel:
  • Preserve objections at sentencing and propose narrower, evidence-based alternatives (e.g., approval-based exceptions, chaperoned settings, no-contact-with-victim terms) if appropriate.
  • Proffer treatment plans and safeguards demonstrating that less restrictive arrangements will adequately protect potential cohabitants.
• Substantive law:
  • Reaffirms that conditions affecting the freedom of association can be upheld when they are individualized, rehabilitative in design, and closely connected to protecting identifiable groups at risk.
  • Endorses the reasonableness of gender-specific residential restrictions when the record shows a sustained pattern of gender-targeted cohabitant violence—especially where the restriction is temporary and treatment-linked.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Special condition of supervised release: A court-ordered rule that applies during supervised release, tailored to the defendant’s risks and rehabilitation needs. Violations can lead to revocation and further sanctions.
• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness:
  • Procedural reasonableness asks whether the judge explained the condition and considered the right factors.
  • Substantive reasonableness asks whether the condition itself is reasonably related to statutory goals, narrow enough, and consistent with policy statements.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) test:
  1. Reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors (e.g., the defendant’s history, deterrence, public protection, rehabilitation).
  2. No greater deprivation of liberty than necessary.
  3. Consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements.
• Freedom of association in supervised release: Although individuals retain constitutional protections, courts may impose targeted, rehabilitative restrictions that limit association if they closely fit the risks and needs of the particular defendant.
• Close nexus: A tight fit between the restriction and the defendant’s demonstrated conduct and risks. Here, the restriction on cohabiting with women directly addresses the setting in which Horn repeatedly committed domestic violence.
• Treatment-gated condition: A restriction that lifts when the defendant begins treatment and shows progress. This design demonstrates tailoring and promotes rehabilitation.

Observations and Unanswered Questions

• Scope and clarity: The condition prohibits “residing with a female.” The opinion treats the term as covering any adult woman, including relatives and intimate partners. The decision does not address edge cases (e.g., shared housing with multiple tenants, temporary stays, or female minors), but the record suggests the court intended a broad application subject to later modification upon demonstrated progress.
• Associational rights: The panel recognizes careful review is warranted when fundamental rights are implicated, yet it reiterates that well-tailored, rehabilitative conditions with a close nexus are generally upheld.
• Standard of review and preservation: Defense counsel did not object post-pronouncement, but the panel proceeded under abuse-of-discretion review rather than plain error. Practitioners should still preserve objections to ensure full appellate review.
• Gender specificity: The opinion does not engage in a separate equal-protection analysis of gender-based conditions; instead, it treats gender as part of the individualized risk nexus, grounded in the defendant’s actual offense pattern.

Conclusion

United States v. Horn confirms that in the Sixth Circuit, a special condition restricting cohabitation with a particular class of persons can be sustained where the record shows a sustained, individualized pattern of violence in that precise context; the district court explains the link to § 3553(a) factors; and the condition is tailored—especially when it is temporary and treatment-gated. The court’s reliance on Brandenburg and distinction from Worthington underscore the centrality of the close-nexus requirement. While the opinion is unpublished and thus nonprecedential, it provides clear, practical guidance: when fundamental rights are implicated, individualized findings, tight tailoring, and rehabilitative structure are the keys to substantive reasonableness under § 3583(d).