Swearing-In Does Not Moot Eligibility Challenges; Election-Law Injunctions Must Satisfy Montana’s Four-Factor Test

Case: Bartel v. Middlestead, 2025 MT 195 (Mont. Sept. 2, 2025)

Court: Supreme Court of Montana

Authoring Justice: Justice James Jeremiah Shea

Introduction

This decision addresses two recurring problems in election litigation: whether an eligibility challenge to a county officer becomes moot once the successful candidate is sworn in, and what standard governs requests for injunctive relief in cases brought under Montana’s election laws. The appellant, Lee A. Bartel (self-represented), challenged Jeramie Paul Middlestead’s eligibility to serve as Big Horn County Sheriff, alleging that Middlestead did not meet statutory residency and voter registration requirements for the office. After the district court denied a preliminary injunction that would have prevented Middlestead’s swearing-in, Bartel appealed.

The Montana Supreme Court affirms the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, while clarifying two important legal points: first, that swearing-in does not moot an eligibility dispute because courts retain equitable power to fashion effective relief, including removal; and second, that election-law injunctions authorized by statute are still governed by the State’s general four-factor standard for preliminary injunctions. The ruling thus stabilizes the framework for handling time-sensitive election disputes involving office qualifications.

Summary of the Judgment

Not moot after swearing-in. The case (and the motion) was not rendered moot by Middlestead’s December 16, 2024 swearing-in. A court can still grant effective relief, including ordering relinquishment of office if eligibility is not established (citing Serrania v. LPH, Inc.; Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Stuivenga; In re Big Foot Dumpsters & Containers, LLC; Wilkie v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.; Flying T Ranch, LLC v. Catlin Ranch, LP; and Downs v. Piocos).
Correct legal standard for election-related injunctions. Section 13-35-108, MCA, authorizes injunctions in election cases, but the standard for whether to issue them is the general four-factor test in § 27-19-201(1), MCA (2023). The statutes must be read harmoniously (§ 1-2-101, MCA).
No abuse of discretion. The district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in denying preliminary relief. It reasonably found that while serious questions warranted further investigation (likely success factor), Bartel had not shown likely irreparable harm, the equities weighed against issuing an injunction after the swearing-in, and public interest favored continuity in law enforcement pending a full merits determination.
Hearing management and due process. The court had discretion over the nature of the preliminary injunction hearing and afforded Bartel a meaningful opportunity to be heard; no due process violation occurred (citing Smith v. Bd. of Horse Racing).
Remand for merits. The underlying case proceeds; the denial of a preliminary injunction does not resolve the merits of eligibility or the request for permanent relief.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Mootness and effective relief:
- Serrania v. LPH, Inc., 2015 MT 113; Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Stuivenga, 2012 MT 75; In re Big Foot Dumpsters & Containers, LLC, 2022 MT 67; Wilkie v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 2021 MT 221. These decisions anchor the principle that a case is not moot if the court can still grant “effective relief” or “restore the parties to their original position.” Applying this, the Court held that eligibility challenges remain justiciable post-swearing-in because courts can compel relinquishment of office or other equitable remedies.
Equitable power to do complete justice:
- Flying T Ranch, LLC v. Catlin Ranch, LP, 2022 MT 162; Trs. of Wash.-Idaho-Mont. Carpenters-Emps. Ret. Tr. Fund v. Galleria P’ship, 239 Mont. 250 (1989). These cases support the proposition that courts of equity can “fashion an equitable result,” including in election disputes where removal may be an appropriate post-election remedy.
Post-election removal for ineligibility:
- Downs v. Piocos, 2023 MT 173. The Court previously affirmed voiding a county attorney election where the candidate failed to meet statutory residency requirements. Bartel relies on Downs to show that meaningful relief remains possible after swearing-in, confirming no mootness and preserving removal as a merits remedy.
Standard of review on preliminary injunctions:
- Driscoll v. Stapleton, 2020 MT 247 (superseded by statute on other grounds). Denial of preliminary injunctions is reviewed for manifest abuse of discretion; underlying legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. The Court adhered to this framework.
Due process at injunction hearings:
- Smith v. Board of Horse Racing, 1998 MT 91. Due process requires an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, but the nature of the preliminary injunction hearing lies within the court’s discretion. The Court found that standard satisfied.

Statutory Framework and Harmonization

Election-law injunction authorization: § 13-35-108, MCA, permits courts to enjoin violations of election laws or compel performance of election-law duties.
Preliminary injunction standard: § 27-19-201(1), MCA (2023), establishes a four-factor test: likely success on the merits; likelihood of irreparable harm absent relief; balance of equities; and the public interest.
Harmonization canon: § 1-2-101, MCA, requires reading statutes in harmony. The Court held that § 13-35-108 authorizes the remedy in election cases, but § 27-19-201(1) supplies the governing standard for whether to grant it. Thus, there is no free-floating “election exception” to the general injunction test.
Expedited handling of election cases: § 13-36-206, MCA, directs that election contests be heard with “all convenient dispatch,” but this priority does not displace the four-factor test or automatically satisfy the “public interest” factor.
Continuity in sheriff’s office: § 7-32-2122, MCA, provides that the undersheriff executes the office when a vacancy occurs. The Court noted the statute but still affirmed the district court’s discretion to weigh continuity and stability in law enforcement against preliminary injunctions.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) Mootness. The Court rejected the argument that swearing-in mooted the dispute. Under the “effective relief” test, the district court retains equitable power to remedy an eligibility violation even after office assumption, including ordering relinquishment. The Court cited Downs v. Piocos to underscore the availability of post-election invalidation when statutory qualifications are not met. Therefore, both the case and the motion were justiciable.

2) The governing injunction standard. The Court harmonized § 13-35-108 with § 27-19-201(1) and held that election-related injunctions are decided under the same four-factor standard as other preliminary injunctions. The Court expressly rejected the notion that the election code creates a stand-alone or automatic injunction regime divorced from the general standard.

3) Application to the record. The Court found no manifest abuse of discretion in the district court’s balancing:

Likelihood of success: The district court acknowledged serious questions about eligibility requiring further investigation; this factor leaned toward Bartel. The Supreme Court found no abuse in the trial court’s desire for a fuller record.
Irreparable harm: The Court emphasized that harm must be likely, not merely possible. At the preliminary stage, Bartel’s showing was too speculative.
Balance of equities: With Middlestead already sworn in, the district court reasonably weighed the status quo and potential disruption against interim relief, pending a fuller merits determination.
Public interest: Although § 13-36-206 mandates prompt handling of election disputes, it does not establish that injunctions are always in the public interest. The district court permissibly concluded that continuity and stability in law enforcement weighed against a preliminary injunction, notwithstanding the undersheriff backstop in § 7-32-2122.

4) Hearing management and due process. The district court had latitude over the format and scope of the preliminary injunction hearing. Bartel had a meaningful opportunity to present his case and respond to arguments; any evidentiary or timing limitations did not rise to an abuse of discretion. Importantly, the denial of preliminary relief does not end the lawsuit—the permanent injunction request remains for adjudication on remand.

Impact

No automatic mootness after swearing-in. Candidates assuming office cannot evade judicial scrutiny of statutory qualifications merely by being sworn in. District courts retain authority to order post-swearing removal if the merits show ineligibility, aligning with Downs.
Unified injunction standard for election cases. Litigants must satisfy Montana’s four-factor § 27-19-201(1) test even when proceeding under § 13-35-108. This promotes consistency, predictability, and principled balancing in election disputes.
Strategic recalibration for challengers and officials. Challengers must build a robust, early factual record—particularly on residency and voter registration—to meet the “likely success” and “irreparable harm” prongs. Officeholders benefit from the Court’s emphasis on continuity and the status quo pending merits.
Guidance to trial courts. District courts retain discretion to manage expedited schedules (§ 13-36-206) while still applying the four-factor test. Courts should acknowledge statutory backstops (e.g., undersheriff authority) but may weigh real-world stability concerns when evaluating the public interest.
Administrative and governance stability. By limiting preliminary removal absent a strong showing on all four factors, the decision reduces the risk of whipsawing leadership changes mid-litigation, while preserving the ability to remove ineligible officeholders after a full merits determination.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness: A case is moot if the court cannot offer any meaningful remedy. Here, because a court could still order the sheriff to step down if ineligible, the case was not moot despite the swearing-in.
Preliminary injunction (four-factor test):
- Likelihood of success on the merits: Are you likely to win at trial?
- Irreparable harm: Will you suffer harm that cannot be fixed with money or later remedies unless an injunction is issued now?
- Balance of equities: Do the hardships favor granting the injunction?
- Public interest: Is granting the injunction good for the community and consistent with legal policy?
Harmonization of statutes: When two laws cover similar ground, courts try to read them together so they both apply coherently, unless they truly conflict. Here, the election-injunction statute authorizes relief, and the general injunction statute supplies the test.
Equitable power: Courts can craft flexible remedies to achieve fairness, such as ordering an officeholder to relinquish office if later found ineligible.
Standard of review—manifest abuse of discretion: Appellate courts will not second-guess a trial court’s judgment on preliminary injunctions unless it was unreasonable, arbitrary, or based on a legal error.
Residency and voter registration for office: Eligibility often turns on fact-intensive questions about where a person actually lives and intends to remain (residency/domicile), and where they are registered to vote, as prescribed by statute.

Conclusion

Bartel v. Middlestead sets out two clarifying principles for Montana election litigation. First, the assumption of office does not moot an eligibility challenge: courts retain equitable authority to grant effective relief, including removal, after swearing-in. Second, while Montana’s election laws authorize injunctive relief, courts must apply the State’s general four-factor preliminary injunction standard in deciding whether to grant such relief; expedited handling of election cases does not displace that test or automatically satisfy the public interest requirement.

On the specific record, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of preliminary relief, emphasizing that the district court reasonably found insufficient proof of likely irreparable harm and determined that the equities and public interest favored continuity in law enforcement pending a fuller merits record. The case proceeds on remand for a determination of eligibility and any permanent remedy, preserving Montana courts’ capacity to ensure that statutory qualifications for public office are enforced without unnecessarily destabilizing governance during litigation.