Supreme Court of Ohio’s December 3, 2025 Case Announcements: Extraordinary Writs, Administrative Appeals, and Juvenile Custody Conflicts

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I. Introduction

The document titled 12/03/2025 Case Announcements, 2025-Ohio-5386 is not a single opinion but a comprehensive set of docket dispositions by the Supreme Court of Ohio for December 3, 2025. It gathers:

• Merit decisions with slip opinions (binding precedent and discipline).
• Merit decisions without opinions (summary disposition of numerous original actions and miscellaneous filings).
• Motions and procedural rulings (including certified questions and conflict certifications).
• Appeals accepted for review (identifying forthcoming precedential decisions).

Although the full text of the individual slip opinions (for example, Sparks v. Frederick, 2025-Ohio-5370) is not reproduced, the case announcements themselves reveal important patterns in the court’s current jurisprudence. They particularly highlight:

1. The court’s continued, and increasingly structured, approach to extraordinary writ practice (mandamus, prohibition, procedendo, quo warranto).
2. Emerging doctrinal issues regarding res judicata in administrative appeals under R.C. Chapter 2506, via a certified question in Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville.
3. A certified inter-district conflict regarding juvenile custody and parental unsuitability findings, in In re A.S. versus In re B.K..
4. Ongoing enforcement of attorney professional discipline, as in Disciplinary Counsel v. Mollica.

This commentary treats the announcements as a collective “opinion” snapshot of the Supreme Court’s current directions in Ohio law, focusing on the new questions accepted for review and the procedural doctrines reinforced by the summary rulings.

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II. Summary of the Case Announcements

A. Merit Decisions with Opinions

• Sparks v. Frederick, 2025-Ohio-5370 (No. 2025-0424)
  Appeal from Marion App. No. 9-24-58. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals. All seven justices concurred.
• State ex rel. Papageorgiou v. Avalotis Corp., 2025-Ohio-5371 (No. 2025-0429)
  Appeal from Franklin App. No. 23AP-689, 2025-Ohio-846. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth District’s judgment. All seven justices concurred.
• Disciplinary Counsel v. Mollica, 2025-Ohio-5372 (No. 2025-0792)
  Attorney discipline matter (Board of Professional Conduct case No. 2024-034). The court imposed a one-year suspension from the practice of law, conditionally stayed. Six justices concurred; Justice Brunner did not participate.

Without the text of these slip opinions, the announcements tell us primarily the results (affirmance or discipline) and the unanimity or disagreement of the justices.

B. Merit Decisions Without Opinions – Extraordinary Writs and Miscellaneous Actions

The court summarily disposed of a large number of original actions and miscellaneous cases, almost all by granting motions to dismiss and dismissing the causes. These include:

• Mandamus actions: e.g., Scales v. McMonagle, State ex rel. Cook v. Summit Cty. Clerk of Courts, State ex rel. Saunders v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, State ex rel. Justice v. O'Shaughnessy, State ex rel. Wasserman v. Mackey, State ex rel. Tingler v. Brown, State ex rel. Nixon v. Miller, State ex rel. Alford v. Diehl, State ex rel. Moss v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas, State ex rel. Whiteside v. Miller, State ex rel. Mack v. Richland Cty. Sheriff's Office, State ex rel. King-Malone v. Gill, and others.
• Mandamus and prohibition actions: e.g., State ex rel. Rielinger v. Russo, State ex rel. Jabbar v. Bryant, State ex rel. Papageorgiou v. Avalotis Corp. (in the court of appeals), State ex rel. Rielinger v. Mona.
• Prohibition and/or procedendo: e.g., Tichavakunda v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Wilcox v. Fankhauser.
• Quo warranto: State ex rel. King-Malone v. Gill.
• Miscellaneous filings: e.g., Minton v. Adams Cty. Common Pleas Court, Lattimore v. Ohio Bar Assn., Cooper v. Kennedy.

The dominant pattern: respondents moved to dismiss; the Supreme Court granted the motions and dismissed the actions in brief orders. Where relators filed multiple or unusual motions (frequently in pro se prisoner filings), those motions were individually denied.

C. Motions and Procedural Rulings

Key procedural rulings include:

• Repeated post-judgment “relief” requests denied in State ex rel. Suggs v. Watson (Nos. 2024-1676 and 2025-0053).
• Certified question accepted in Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville, No. 2025-0753, from the U.S. District Court (S.D. Ohio):

  “Whether a party must bring affirmative claims for damages and declaratory relief within an R.C. [Ch.] 2506 administrative appeal to avoid res judicata.”

• Alternative writ of mandamus granted in State ex rel. Utz v. Parikh, No. 2025-1142, with a full evidence and briefing schedule set under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.05.
• Conflict certified and appeal accepted in In re A.S., Nos. 2025-1224 and 2025-1225 (Summit App. No. 31183, 2025-Ohio-1349) addressing:

  “When, after a child is adjudicated dependent, the child's natural parent regains legal custody and the juvenile court closes the case, may the trial court subsequently award custody to a nonparent without first finding that the natural parent is presently unsuitable?”

  The conflict case is identified as In re B.K., 2013-Ohio-1190 (8th Dist.).

D. Appeals Accepted for Review

The only explicit appeal accepted is In re A.S., consolidated with the conflict case, signaling that the Supreme Court will soon provide statewide guidance on the parental unsuitability requirement in juvenile custody shifts after dependency proceedings.

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III. Analysis

A. Merit Decisions with Opinions

Although the announcements list three slip opinions, the opinions themselves are not set out. We can still identify doctrinal themes.

1. Sparks v. Frederick, 2025-Ohio-5370

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals (Marion App. No. 9-24-58), with unanimous concurrence. An affirmance without dissent typically indicates:

• The court agrees both with the result and, at least in substance, with the reasoning of the court of appeals.
• The issue, while important enough to merit a slip opinion (rather than dismissal or summary affirmance without opinion), did not produce controversy among the justices.

Because the factual and legal context of Sparks is not included, its precise precedential value cannot be described here; but the affirmance signals that the Third District’s approach on the underlying legal question will now be cemented as statewide precedent through the slip opinion.

2. State ex rel. Papageorgiou v. Avalotis Corp., 2025-Ohio-5371

This case arrives from Franklin App. No. 23AP-689, 2025-Ohio-846, which itself appears to have been an original action in mandamus or similar extraordinary relief (the “State ex rel.” styling and corporate respondent are typical of such cases). The Supreme Court again affirmed without dissent.

The affirmance indicates:

• The Supreme Court endorses the Tenth District’s handling of whatever mandamus or administrative-law issue was presented.
• Given that the case was significant enough for a full slip opinion, it likely resolves or clarifies some aspect of extraordinary writ standards, administrative review, or public-law obligations of private entities (such as contractors on public projects).

Without the text, we must refrain from speculating about the specific legal rule; but going forward, Papageorgiou will be cited as binding authority on the contours of the relief or duty at issue.

3. Disciplinary Counsel v. Mollica, 2025-Ohio-5372

The Supreme Court accepted the Board of Professional Conduct’s certified report in case No. 2024-034 and imposed a one-year suspension from the practice of law, conditionally stayed on Attorney Matthew Christopher Mollica (Reg. No. 0097415).

In Ohio attorney discipline:

• Discipline is governed primarily by Gov.Bar R. V.
• A “conditionally stayed” suspension means:
  • The lawyer is technically suspended for a period (here, one year), but
  • The actual enforcement of that suspension is stayed (not imposed) provided the lawyer complies with specific conditions (often related to restitution, monitoring, counseling, CLE, or no further misconduct).

The court’s agreement with the Board’s recommendation, and the absence of dissent (other than Justice Brunner’s nonparticipation), suggests that:

• The misconduct was serious enough to warrant a suspension but
• The court believed rehabilitation and protection of the public could be achieved via conditions rather than immediate removal from practice.

Such dispositions reinforce a graduated system of sanctions: public reprimands, stayed suspensions, actual suspensions, and disbarment, chosen to balance deterrence, public protection, and the possibility of attorney reform.

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B. Extraordinary Writ Practice and Summary Dismissals

The bulk of the announcements involve original actions in the Supreme Court: mandamus, prohibition, procedendo, quo warranto, and various miscellaneous filings. Almost uniformly, the court:

• Considered a motion to dismiss filed by respondents; and
• Granted the motion and dismissed the cause, usually unanimously.

1. Types of Writs Involved

Key extraordinary writs appearing in the announcements include:

• Mandamus – a writ ordering a public official or entity to perform a clear legal duty when the relator has a clear legal right and no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
• Prohibition – orders a lower court or official to stop exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power that it lacks.
• Procedendo – directs a lower court to proceed to judgment where it has stalled or refused to act.
• Quo warranto – challenges whether an individual is lawfully holding a public office or a corporate franchise.

Because these remedies are extraordinary, the threshold is intentionally high; they are not substitutes for appeal and cannot be used to relitigate matters that could be addressed in the ordinary appellate system.

2. Pattern of Dismissals

Cases such as Scales v. McMonagle, Tichavakunda v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, State ex rel. Rielinger v. Russo, State ex rel. Cook v. Summit Cty. Clerk of Courts, State ex rel. Saunders v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, State ex rel. Justice v. O'Shaughnessy, State ex rel. Wasserman v. Mackey, State ex rel. Tingler v. Brown, State ex rel. Nixon v. Miller, State ex rel. Taylor v. O'Malley, and many others show:

• Relators (often prisoners or pro se litigants) sought to use mandamus or prohibition to:
  • Attack underlying criminal judgments,
  • Compel specific procedural acts, or
  • Raise broad constitutional theories (e.g., “sovereign citizen” arguments in Minton).
• The court systematically denied collateral attacks where an adequate remedy by appeal or postconviction relief existed, or where the petition was facially deficient.
• In a few instances, the court dismissed under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.04 (State ex rel. Black v. Alachua Cty. Sheriff's Office), which authorizes sua sponte dismissal of original actions that plainly lack merit.

This pattern reinforces longstanding doctrine: extraordinary writs cannot be used to circumvent jurisdictional limits, avoid res judicata, or replace ordinary appellate mechanisms.

3. Vexatious Litigators and Judicial Control of Abusive Filings

In two cases, some justices expressed a desire to go further than dismissal:

• State ex rel. Justice v. O'Shaughnessy, No. 2025-1166
  Majority: Mandamus dismissed by granting respondents’ motion.
  Separate opinion: Justices Fischer, DeWine, and Hawkins concurred in dismissal and indicated they would also sua sponte declare the relator a vexatious litigator.
• State ex rel. Tingler v. Brown, No. 2025-1189
  Majority: Mandamus dismissed; relator’s various motions denied; Justice Fischer concurred and would “sua sponte again declare relator to be a vexatious litigator,” implying the relator has previously been so designated. Justice Brunner would have denied the motion to dismiss and issued an alternative writ.

Under Ohio law (R.C. 2323.52), a vexatious litigator is a person who habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds engages in frivolous conduct in civil actions. A vexatious-litigant designation:

• Restricts the person from filing new lawsuits or motions without prior leave of the court.
• Is intended to protect courts and opposing parties from abusive, repetitive, or frivolous litigation.

The expressed willingness of some justices to apply (or reapply) vexatious-litigant status, even sua sponte, signals a robust judicial intolerance for abusive extraordinary-writ filings—especially in the criminal and prisoner context.

4. Internal Disagreements on Threshold for Dismissal vs. Alternative Writ

Several orders reveal a recurring jurisprudential disagreement about how quickly the court should dismiss mandamus petitions, especially those arising in the corrections or public-records context:

• State ex rel. Nixon v. Miller, No. 2025-1201
  Majority: Motion to dismiss granted; cause dismissed.
  Separate opinions:
  • Chief Justice Kennedy dissented, stating she would order an answer and issue an alternative writ, relying on her dissent in State ex rel. Jordan v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2025-Ohio-3051.
  • Justice Brunner also dissented and would likewise order an answer and an alternative writ.
• State ex rel. Mack v. Richland Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. 2025-1259
  Majority: Motion to dismiss granted; cause dismissed (including the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation, dismissed sua sponte).
  Separate opinions:
  • Justice Brunner concurred in part and dissented in part; she would issue an alternative writ as to the BCI.
  • Chief Justice Kennedy dissented and would require an answer and alternative writ as to both respondents.
• State ex rel. Alford v. Diehl, No. 2025-1264
  Majority: Motion to dismiss granted.
  Separate:
  • Chief Justice Kennedy dissented, again referencing her Jordan dissent and arguing for an answer and alternative writ.

Although the text of State ex rel. Jordan v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. is not provided, the repeated reference to the Chief Justice’s dissent there suggests the following:

• She advocates a more generous approach at the pleading stage, particularly in prisoner or corrections-related mandamus actions.
• She appears to favor:
  • Requiring respondents to answer and
    
  • Allowing some factual development under an alternative writ
  before dismissing, in cases where the complaint is not clearly frivolous on its face.

In contrast, the majority’s pattern of granting motions to dismiss indicates a preference for:

• Resolving many mandamus actions on the pleadings and attachments,
• Strictly enforcing doctrines such as adequate remedy at law and failure to state a clear legal right, and
• Reserving the alternative-writ procedure for a small subset of cases.

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C. Notable Miscellaneous Filings

1. Sovereign Citizen and Collateral-Attack Filings

Minton v. Adams Cty. Common Pleas Court, No. 2025-1160, is representative of filings grounded in “sovereign citizen” theories or pseudo-legal constructs:

• Relator filed an “amended motion that no final appealable order exists” in a common pleas case.
• He further filed:
  • An “amended motion proposing plaintiff's sovereign citizenship grounds for immediate dismissal,”
  • An “amended motion for judicial notice of foreign awards,” and
  • An “amended motion for order to convert tort action into prohibition action.”

The Supreme Court:

• Denied all such motions,
• Granted respondents’ motions to dismiss, and
• Denied a motion to strike as moot.

This underscores that:

• “Sovereign citizen” claims and foreign “awards” have no legal effect in Ohio courts.
• The Supreme Court will not allow parties to repackage ordinary disputes in pseudo-legal language to obtain extraordinary relief.

2. Attempts at Bar Admission by Extraordinary Means

In Lattimore v. Ohio Bar Assn., No. 2025-1174, the relator sought “admission without examination by order of the Supreme Court.” The court:

• Denied the request,
• Granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss,
• Denied leave to amend the complaint, and
• Dismissed the cause.

Under the Ohio Constitution and Supreme Court rules for admission, the court has ultimate authority over admission to the practice of law. However:

• There are structured routes to admission (e.g., bar exam, admission on motion with reciprocity), and
• “Admission by order” outside those regulated pathways is extraordinary and seldom, if ever, granted without a specific, rule-based mechanism.

This decision reinforces that litigants cannot circumvent formal admission rules by framing their request as an original action against a bar association or similar body.

3. Miscellaneous Discovery/Criminal Filings

In Cooper v. Kennedy, No. 2025-1244, the relator filed a “motion of discovery and exculpatory evidence” and a “motion of forfeiture.” The Supreme Court:

• Denied these motions,
• Granted respondent’s motion to dismiss, and
• Dismissed the cause.

This again illustrates a consistent line: the Supreme Court does not serve as a discovery court of first instance, nor does it entertain requests to order exculpatory evidence or forfeiture in the context of original actions, where regular trial and appellate courts are the appropriate fora.

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D. Motions and Procedural Rulings of Systemic Significance

1. Repeated Post-Judgment Attacks: State ex rel. Suggs v. Watson

Two docket entries, Nos. 2024-1676 and 2025-0053, both captioned State ex rel. Suggs v. Watson, concern relator’s requests for “relief from judgment or order” in a mandamus case. In both:

• The Supreme Court denied the request.
• In No. 2025-0053, Justice Brunner dissented.

These entries reflect the court’s insistence on:

• The finality of its judgments, and
• The limited scope of post-judgment relief mechanisms (analogous to Civ.R. 60(B) in lower courts, but far narrower in original action practice).

Repeated or serial attempts to reopen final decisions are disfavored and will almost always be denied absent extraordinary showing.

2. Certified Question on Res Judicata and Administrative Appeals: Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville

The most doctrinally significant procedural ruling is in Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville, No. 2025-0753. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio certified the following question of state law under S.Ct.Prac.R. 9.05(B):

“Whether a party must bring affirmative claims for damages and declaratory relief within an R.C. [Ch.] 2506 administrative appeal to avoid res judicata.”

The Supreme Court agreed to answer this question, set a briefing schedule, and denied petitioners’ motion to strike one respondent’s brief. Justice DeWine dissented in part (would have declined to answer and deemed the motion moot). Justice Brunner dissented in part (would have struck a respondent’s name from the brief).

a. Background: R.C. Chapter 2506 Administrative Appeals

R.C. Chapter 2506 provides for administrative appeals to the courts of common pleas from decisions of local administrative bodies—zoning boards, boards of building appeals, civil service commissions, and similar entities making quasi-judicial decisions.

Common characteristics:

• The court of common pleas reviews the record of the administrative body.
• It may consider additional evidence in limited circumstances.
• The proceeding is typically styled as an “administrative appeal,” not an ordinary civil suit for damages.

b. Res Judicata Concept

Res judicata refers to claim preclusion: once a final judgment on the merits is rendered, the parties are barred from relitigating:

• The same claim, and
• Any claim that was or could have been raised in the original action.

In addition, issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) may bar relitigation of specific issues actually litigated and essential to the judgment.

C. The Certified Question’s Significance

Property owners, developers, and regulated entities often:

• File an R.C. 2506 appeal to challenge a zoning or permit denial, while
• Also contemplating or filing a separate civil action seeking:
  • Damages (e.g., for inverse condemnation or takings), and/or
  • Declaratory or injunctive relief (e.g., constitutional challenges).

The certified question asks: Must all such affirmative claims be joined within the 2506 appeal to avoid being barred later by res judicata? Two competing views exist:

1. Joinder-required view: Because res judicata bars any claim that could have been raised in the initial action, parties must:
   • Assert all related claims—including constitutional, declaratory, and damages claims—within the 2506 appeal, or
   • Risk having those claims held barred in subsequent suits.
2. Separate-suit-allowed view: Some courts have treated 2506 appeals as a specialized review mechanism, not a full civil action; thus:
   • Certain independent claims (especially federal §1983 or takings claims) may be brought separately,
   • Without being precluded by the 2506 appeal, provided they are not actually litigated there.

The Supreme Court’s forthcoming answer will have broad ramifications for:

• Land-use and zoning litigation strategy across Ohio;
• Whether regulated parties must bundle constitutional and damages claims with an administrative appeal;
• The interaction between state administrative-review mechanisms and federal civil-rights actions (particularly under 42 U.S.C. §1983).

Justice DeWine’s partial dissent (preferring not to answer) may reflect caution about entangling state-law res judicata doctrine with ongoing federal litigation, or skepticism that a certified question is necessary. Justice Brunner’s partial dissent (regarding striking a party’s name from a brief) highlights concerns about party status and participation in the certified-question process.

3. Alternative Writ Granted: State ex rel. Utz v. Parikh

In State ex rel. Utz v. Parikh, No. 2025-1142, the Supreme Court, sua sponte, granted an alternative writ in mandamus and set a structured schedule for:

• Filing of evidence within 20 days;
• Relator’s brief within 30 days;
• Respondent’s brief within 20 days thereafter; and
• Relator’s optional reply within 7 days thereafter.

Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.05:

• An alternative writ is issued when the court determines that the complaint states a potentially meritorious claim that merits further proceedings.
• The alternative writ commands the respondent either to perform the act demanded or to appear and show cause why the requested relief should not be granted.

This stands in contrast to the many cases dismissed at the pleading stage. The issuance of an alternative writ in Utz signals that:

• The court sees a substantial legal question or colorable entitlement to relief.
• The case may result in a precedential decision clarifying some aspect of mandamus doctrine once fully briefed and decided.

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E. Conflict Certification and Appeals Accepted: Juvenile Custody and Parental Unsuitability

1. The Certified Conflict: In re A.S. and In re B.K.

In Nos. 2025-1224 and 2025-1225, the Supreme Court:

• Recognized a certified conflict from the Ninth District Court of Appeals (Summit App. No. 31183, 2025-Ohio-1349),
• Accepted the appeal for review, and
• Consolidated the conflict case with the appeal.

The certified issue is:

“When, after a child is adjudicated dependent, the child's natural parent regains legal custody and the juvenile court closes the case, may the trial court subsequently award custody to a nonparent without first finding that the natural parent is presently unsuitable?”

The conflict case is In re B.K., 2013-Ohio-1190 (8th Dist.), which reached a different conclusion on this question than the Ninth District did in In re A.S..

a. Background: Parental Rights and Unsuitability Findings

Ohio law has long recognized:

• Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children.
• Nonparents (e.g., grandparents, relatives, foster parents) may obtain custody only in limited circumstances.

Key Supreme Court precedents (not cited in the announcements but central to the context) include:

• In re Perales (1977) – held that before granting custody of a child to a nonparent over the objection of a parent, a court must find the parent is unsuitable (e.g., abandoned the child, contractually relinquished custody, or otherwise unfit).
• In re Hockstok (2002) – reaffirmed that parental unsuitability is generally required before awarding custody to a nonparent.

In the dependency context:

• Juvenile courts may temporarily deprive a parent of custody if the child is adjudicated dependent, abused, or neglected.
• The focus is often on best interests of the child and remedial services.
• Over time, parents may regain legal custody if conditions improve.

b. The Legal Question in In re A.S.

The conflict question arises when:

1. A child is previously adjudicated dependent.
2. The natural parent nonetheless later regains legal custody.
3. The juvenile court case is then closed.
4. Later, a court considers whether to place the child with a nonparent (e.g., a relative or foster parent).

The question: Must the court first find the now-custodial parent to be presently unsuitable before transferring custody to a nonparent?

Two competing approaches appear to underlie the conflict:

1. Unsuitability-required view:
   • Even after dependency proceedings, once the parent has regained legal custody and the case is closed, the familiar Perales/Hockstok rule applies.
   • The court must find the parent currently unsuitable before awarding custody to a nonparent.
2. Best-interest/continuing-authority view:
   • Perhaps a prior dependency adjudication or continuing jurisdiction allows the juvenile court to focus on best interests without a new unsuitability finding.
   • Under this approach, the court may consider the prior dependency record as sufficient to support a later nonparent custody award.

In re B.K. (8th Dist.) adopts one of these positions; In re A.S. (9th Dist.) adopts the opposite, giving rise to an inter-district conflict.

c. Potential Impact of the Forthcoming Decision

The Supreme Court’s resolution will profoundly affect:

• Parents recovering from past dependency cases – who may fear later nonparent custody challenges.
• Relatives and foster caregivers – whose ability to secure long-term custody may depend on whether courts must re-find parental unsuitability.
• Juvenile courts – which will require clear statewide guidance on:
  • When parental unsuitability is required,
  • How prior dependency adjudications interact with later custody disputes, and
  • What procedural safeguards must be provided to parents.

The decision will further clarify the balance between:

• The constitutional rights of parents, and
• The state’s parens patriae role in protecting children’s best interests.

Justices DeWine and Hawkins dissented from the court’s determination that a conflict exists, and Justice DeWine also dissented from accepting the appeal. This may signal concerns about the proper use of conflict certification or skepticism that the decisions are truly irreconcilable. Nevertheless, a majority has chosen to resolve the issue.

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IV. Key Precedents and Doctrinal Threads

Although the announcements themselves cite relatively few prior cases, the following precedents and doctrines are implicated:

A. In re B.K., 2013-Ohio-1190 (8th Dist.)

In re B.K. is identified as the conflict case with In re A.S.. While the announcements do not summarize its holding, logically it:

• Takes a position, one way or the other, on whether a court may award custody to a nonparent after a parent regains custody post-dependency without a new unsuitability finding.
• Represents an approach to interpreting Perales and Hockstok in the former-dependency context.

The Supreme Court’s decision in In re A.S. will either:

• Affirm and extend the reasoning of In re B.K. statewide, or
• Disapprove it and align all appellate districts with the alternative view.

B. State ex rel. Jordan v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2025-Ohio-3051 (Dissent by Kennedy, C.J.)

The announcements repeatedly state that Chief Justice Kennedy would dissent and order an answer / alternative writ “for the reasons set forth in her dissenting opinion in State ex rel. Jordan v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2025-Ohio-3051.” While the text of that dissent is not provided, its repeated citation shows:

• It is a foundational statement of her view on how the court should treat certain mandamus petitions—likely those involving inmates and the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.
• She prefers that:
  • Respondents be compelled to answer rather than obtain dismissal solely on the pleadings, and
  • More cases proceed under the alternative-writ procedure when the complaint presents arguable claims.

Thus, her Jordan dissent has ongoing influence, at least for her and some colleagues, in framing a more open-door approach to prison-related mandamus actions. The majority, however, is consistently applying a more restrictive, dismissal-oriented approach.

C. General Doctrines Applied Implicitly

Across the cases, several established doctrines are being consistently applied, even where not explicitly cited:

• Adequate Remedy at Law – Mandamus and prohibition are unavailable where a relator has or had an adequate remedy by appeal or other regular procedure.
• Mootness – As seen in State ex rel. Whiteside v. Miller, where the respondent’s motion to dismiss was denied as moot and the case dismissed sua sponte as moot; once the underlying issue is resolved or the relief no longer meaningful, an extraordinary writ will not issue.
• Standing and Proper Parties – For example, in Tichavakunda, the court sua sponte dismissed as to certain individuals (including one deceased), indicating a strict approach to proper party status.
• Finality of Judgments and Limited Post-Judgment Relief – As in the Suggs cases; once the Supreme Court has resolved an original action, reopening it is exceptional.

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V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Extraordinary Writs: What They Are and Are Not

• Mandamus – Think of this as an emergency order telling a public official: “You must do this; it is your clear legal duty.” It is used only when there is no regular way (like ordinary appeal) to get that done.
• Prohibition – An emergency “stop” order to a court or official: “You are acting outside your authority. Stop now.”
• Procedendo – An order telling a lower court, “You must move forward and issue a decision; you cannot simply sit on the case indefinitely.”
• Quo warranto – “By what authority?” A challenge asking whether someone is lawfully holding a public office or corporate privilege.

These writs are not substitutes for appeal. If a party could have raised an issue in the normal trial and appellate process, the Supreme Court will almost always refuse to provide extraordinary relief.

B. Alternative Writ vs. Peremptory Writ vs. Summary Dismissal

• Summary dismissal – The court throws out the case at the start (often on a motion to dismiss), because even if all the relator’s factual allegations are true, there is no legal basis for relief.
• Alternative writ – The court sees enough merit to require more process. It orders the respondent to either:
  • Do what the relator wants, or
  • Appear and show cause why it should not be compelled to act.
  The case then proceeds with evidence and briefing.
• Peremptory writ – A final writ issued without further process because the right to relief is clear and undisputed.

C. Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion)

Res judicata means “the thing has been judged.” In simple terms:

• If you sue someone and get a final decision, you usually cannot:
  • Sue again over the same issue, or
  • Bring new claims that you could have brought the first time and that arise from the same underlying events.

The Sheetz certified question asks whether this rule requires all damage and declaratory claims to be packed into a single R.C. 2506 appeal, or whether certain claims can be pursued separately without being barred.

D. Dependency, Custody, and Parental Unsuitability

• Dependent child – A court finding that a child’s conditions or environment warrant state intervention (e.g., parental neglect or inability to provide care) even if there is no proven abuse.
• Legal custody – The right to make important decisions for a child and have physical care, subject to the rights of others (like visitation).
• Nonparent custody – When someone who is not the child’s mother or father (such as a grandparent) is awarded legal custody.
• Parental unsuitability – A legal conclusion that a parent is unfit or unsuitable to have custody because of conduct such as abuse, neglect, abandonment, or other serious concerns.

The conflict in In re A.S. is about whether courts must make a fresh finding of current unsuitability before taking custody from a parent (who previously regained custody after dependency) and giving it to a nonparent.

E. Vexatious Litigator

A vexatious litigator is someone who:

• Files many lawsuits or motions,
• Without reasonable grounds,
• That are mainly meant to harass or delay.

In Ohio, once designated a vexatious litigator, a person must get permission from a court before filing new actions. References in Justice and Tingler show the Supreme Court’s willingness to consider this tool to curb abusive filings in extraordinary-writ cases.

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VI. Conclusion: Significance of the December 3, 2025 Announcements

The December 3, 2025 Case Announcements provide a clear snapshot of current trends in the Supreme Court of Ohio’s jurisprudence:

1. Strict gatekeeping in extraordinary writs.
   The court strongly favors:
   • Resolving mandamus, prohibition, and related actions on motions to dismiss,
   • Enforcing doctrines like adequate remedy at law, mootness, and finality, and
   • Using vexatious-litigant concepts to deter abusive filings.
   Internal dissents (especially by Chief Justice Kennedy and Justice Brunner) highlight a live debate about how generous the court should be at the pleading stage.
2. Emerging statewide rules on administrative appeals and res judicata.
   By accepting the certified question in Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville, the court is poised to:
   • Clarify whether parties must consolidate damages and declaratory claims inside an R.C. 2506 appeal,
   • Shape litigation strategies for land-use, zoning, and regulatory disputes, and
   • Define the interaction between state administrative review and later civil-rights or takings litigation.
3. Imminent clarification of parental-rights doctrine after dependency.
   The acceptance of In re A.S. and certification of conflict with In re B.K. show that the court will soon answer:
   • Whether courts must make a present unsuitability finding before transferring custody from a parent (who had regained custody post-dependency) to a nonparent.
   This decision will significantly affect juvenile practice, parents’ rights, and children’s welfare across Ohio.
4. Continued enforcement of professional discipline with calibrated sanctions.
   In Disciplinary Counsel v. Mollica, the court imposed a one-year conditionally stayed suspension, reaffirming a nuanced sanctioning approach that both protects the public and recognizes the possibility of attorney rehabilitation.
5. Affirmance of lower-court reasonings through slip opinions.
   Unanimous affirmances in Sparks and Papageorgiou indicate confidence in the courts of appeals’ legal reasoning and expand their holdings into statewide precedent through the slip opinions.

Taken together, these announcements mark a period in which the Supreme Court of Ohio is:

• Vigorously policing the boundaries of its original jurisdiction,
• Preparing to provide important new guidance on administrative-law preclusion and juvenile custody standards, and
• Continuing its core oversight roles in attorney discipline and the uniform administration of justice across Ohio’s appellate districts.