Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Affirms De Novo Authority Over Stipulated Violations and Clarifies Which Judicial Conduct Rules Apply to Appointive Candidates

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Affirms De Novo Authority Over Stipulated Violations and Clarifies Which Judicial Conduct Rules Apply to Appointive Candidates

Introduction

In In the Matter of the Honorable Elizabeth Boso, No. 24-436 (W. Va. Oct. 24, 2025), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia issued a significant disciplinary opinion that does two things at once: it reasserts and sharpens the Court’s de novo authority over judicial discipline—making clear it is not bound by parties’ stipulations to facts or violations—and it clarifies the scope of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct as applied to different statuses of persons seeking judicial office.

The case arises from a residency misrepresentation made by Elizabeth Boso (now a Nicholas County magistrate) while seeking appointment to a Kanawha County magistrate vacancy. Although Boso and Judicial Disciplinary Counsel (JDC) stipulated to six rule violations and jointly recommended a two-month suspension without pay, censure, and costs, the Court’s independent review concluded that only one violation—Rule 4.1(A)(9) (knowingly or recklessly false or misleading statements by a “judge or judicial candidate”)—was legally supportable on the record. Five other charged violations were inapplicable because, at the time of the relevant conduct, Boso was neither a “judge” nor a “judicial candidate subject to public election.”

Despite trimming the violations from six to one, the Court imposed the same sanction recommended by the Judicial Hearing Board (Board): a two-month suspension without pay, a public censure, and assessment of costs ($618.45), emphasizing the seriousness of dishonesty undertaken to obtain judicial office and its impact on public confidence.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The Court adopts a new express syllabus point: in judicial disciplinary proceedings, it is not bound by parties’ admissions or stipulations to facts or rule violations and will independently determine whether such stipulations are legally and factually supported.
  • Boso’s January 2024 appointment application used a Kanawha County address she did not reside at; her email to the appointing judge asserted she had “maintained a residence” in Kanawha County, despite having sold her condominium months earlier. The Court holds these representations violated Rule 4.1(A)(9).
  • The Court rejects alleged violations of Rules 1.1, 1.2, and 2.16(A) because those rules apply to “judges,” and at the relevant times Boso was not yet a judge (nor a “judge-elect” within the Code’s terms). It also rejects Rule 4.2(A)(1) and (A)(2) because those subsections apply only to judicial candidates “subject to public election,” whereas Boso was seeking appointment at the time of the misrepresentations.
  • Sanctions: The Court adopts the Board’s recommendation—suspension without pay for two months, censure, and costs—considering public perception of the judiciary and deterrence, and comparing the case to In re Callaghan and In re Rock.

Case Background

The facts are straightforward and well-documented:

  • Residence and employment: Boso lived at a Summersville, Nicholas County address since 2005, working as a magistrate assistant in Nicholas and Kanawha Counties. She owned a Charleston condominium from 2021 to June 9, 2023, then sold it and returned to Nicholas County work in March 2023.
  • November 2023: Seeking to run for a new Kanawha County magistrate seat, Boso texted two Kanawha County court staff about renting to have a Kanawha address. In a text to assistant Kristie Trabert, she offered $150/month to “use your address for my purpose,” asking to keep it “on the down low.” No written lease; Boso never visited the home.
  • January 2024: After Magistrate Mike Ferrell resigned, Trabert encouraged Boso to apply. On January 22, Boso told Trabert, “I’m using our address,” and emailed Chief Judge Akers seeking appointment: “I had moved to Kanawha County in 2021 and … maintained a residence in Kanawha” to run in the upcoming election. On January 23, Boso applied for the vacancy, listing Trabert’s Dunbar address as her home address (application was not sworn but contained an attestation).
  • January 26: Chief Judge Akers appointed someone else. That day, Boso filed to run for Nicholas County magistrate listing her Summersville address as her legal residence.
  • Discipline: After referral to JDC, Boso admitted her email about “maintain[ing] a residence” in Kanawha County was a “misstatement” and that her primary residence was Nicholas County. She and JDC stipulated to six rule violations and the Board recommended a 2‑month suspension, censure, and costs.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Independent de novo authority: Syllabus Point 1, W. Va. Jud. Inquiry Comm’n v. Dostert, 165 W. Va. 233, 271 S.E.2d 427 (1980), and In re Starcher, 202 W. Va. 55, 501 S.E.2d 772 (1998), anchor the Court’s plenary review. The Court builds on Starcher—where stipulated facts bind the parties—to clarify that stipulations do not bind the Court’s legal conclusions or its acceptance of violations.
  • Purpose of judicial discipline: Syllabus, In re Gorby, 176 W. Va. 16, 339 S.E.2d 702 (1985), frames the mission: maintaining public confidence in the judiciary’s honor and integrity. This informs both the legal analysis and sanctioning.
  • Non-binding nature of stipulations (new express holding): The Court aligns with other jurisdictions—e.g., Iowa, Utah, Wisconsin, Oklahoma—in holding it is not bound by parties’ stipulated violations. It cites: Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lynch; In re Christensen (Utah); In re Ziegler (Wis.); and State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. McGee. It also invokes Florida’s In re Flynn to refuse a stipulation resting on a misreading of the Code (“political party” vs. “political organization”).
  • Sanctions jurisprudence: Syllabus Point 6, In re Watkins, 233 W. Va. 170, 757 S.E.2d 594 (2013), lists available sanctions. Syl. Pt. 3, In re Cruickshanks, 220 W. Va. 513, 648 S.E.2d 19 (2007), provides factors for considering suspension (relationship to administration of justice; personal vs. public persona; violence/callous disregard; criminal indictment; mitigation/aggravation).
  • Comparative cases:
    • In re Callaghan, 238 W. Va. 495, 796 S.E.2d 604 (2017): Lawyer/judicial candidate sanctioned for false campaign flyer close to election—key comparator for dishonesty undertaken to attain judicial office and its effect on public confidence. Sanction there was stiffer (two-year suspension) with “extremely limited remorse.”
    • In re Rock, 249 W. Va. 631, 900 S.E.2d 57 (2024): Family court judge reprimanded for lack of candor toward JDC about her role in drafting a critical letter—illustrates the weight placed on truthfulness in judicial oversight processes.
    • Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Karl, 192 W. Va. 23, 449 S.E.2d 277 (1994): The Court emphasizes that pre‑bench misconduct can warrant discipline to protect the judiciary’s integrity.
    • State ex rel. Johnson v. Robinson, 162 W. Va. 579, 251 S.E.2d 505 (1979): Supports the Court’s textual approach—avoid interpretations rendering rule provisions superfluous.

2) Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three principal steps.

a) The Court’s de novo role and the non-binding nature of stipulations

The opinion clarifies that while stipulated facts bind the parties (and are deemed proven as if by clear and convincing evidence for the parties’ purposes), the Court remains free—indeed obligated—to examine whether stipulated violations and their legal predicates are supported by the law and the record. The Court explicitly adopts the rule that “in judicial disciplinary proceedings, the Court is not bound by admissions or stipulations to facts or violations of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct and may employ its independent, de novo review to determine whether such admissions or stipulations are both legally and factually supported.”

This ensures disciplinary outcomes remain consistent with the Code’s text and structure, not simply the product of negotiated bargains, and reinforces the constitutional duty “to make a completely independent evaluation of the record.”

b) Textual application of the Code based on status and timing

  • Who is a “judicial candidate”? The Code’s Terminology defines a “judicial candidate” to include a person seeking selection “by election or appointment.” Boso became a judicial candidate when she emailed the Chief Judge on January 22, 2024, to be considered for the vacancy.
  • Rule 4.1(A)(9) applies: It prohibits a “judge or judicial candidate” from knowingly or recklessly making false or misleading statements. Boso’s resume, application, and email created the impression she resided in Kanawha County and had maintained a residence there after 2021—statements the Court finds were false or misleading. Her own sworn testimony acknowledged the “misstatement.”
  • Rule 4.2 does not apply: Rule 4.2 governs “judicial candidates in public elections” and requires compliance with election laws and conduct consistent with judicial integrity. Because all alleged misrepresentations occurred while Boso was seeking appointment, not while she was a candidate “subject to public election,” Rule 4.2(A)(1) and (A)(2) did not apply. The Court underscores the deliberate textual distinction between candidates in public elections (Rule 4.2) and candidates for appointive office (Rule 4.3), and refuses to accept a stipulation premised on the wrong subsection.
  • Rules 1.1, 1.2, and 2.16(A) do not apply: Those rules are addressed to “judges.” At the relevant times (application in January 2024; JIC response in February; sworn statement in May 2024 before swearing-in), Boso was not a judge under the Code. The opinion also rejects the suggestion that candidates are subject to those “judge” rules as a kind of catch-all, noting that would render the candidate-specific provisions superfluous—contrary to standard interpretive canons.
  • Alleged lack of candor to JIC: The Court examined whether any statements to JIC/JDC were themselves false statements actionable under Rule 4.1(A)(9). The record did not establish that Boso lied about the timing of the rental arrangement or her search for Kanawha lodging; texts corroborated efforts in 2023, so no additional false-statement violation was found on that theory.

c) Sanction analysis

Applying the Cruickshanks factors, the Court emphasizes two points:

  • Relationship to administration of justice and public perception: Even though the conduct occurred pre-appointment and did not result in the appointment, dishonesty used to obtain judicial office directly affects public confidence. The public expects “scrupulous honesty,” and dishonesty “strikes at the very heart” of judicial authority.
  • Mitigating considerations: Boso cooperated, accepted responsibility, showed genuine remorse, and has years of service with no prior misconduct noted. Nevertheless, deterrence, accountability, and consistency warranted a suspension.

Comparing to Callaghan (election falsehoods; stiffer sanction) and Rock (post‑appointment lack of candor; reprimand), the Court places this case between those poles. The underlying dishonesty here sought professional gain in the judicial appointment process—serious enough to warrant suspension and formal condemnation. The Court therefore adopts the Board’s recommended sanctions: two-month suspension without pay, public censure, and costs.

3) Impact and Future Significance

a) De novo review and stipulations: negotiations won’t control outcomes

  • Parties can no longer assume that a stipulated package of admitted violations and agreed sanctions will be rubber-stamped. The Court will test every stipulated violation against the Code’s text, the subject’s status at the time, and the record.
  • Practically, JDC, respondents, and the Board must ensure that each charged rule corresponds precisely to the person’s status at the time (judge vs. candidate; candidate for public election vs. candidate for appointment) and that the record supports each element.

b) Clarifying the Code’s coverage by status

  • Rules limited to “judges” (e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.2, 2.16(A)) do not apply to lay candidates. Judges-elect are not silently folded into “judge” for these provisions absent textual support.
  • Rule 4.1 applies to all judicial candidates (election or appointment). False or misleading statements made in pursuit of appointment are squarely covered.
  • Rule 4.2 applies only to candidates “subject to public election”. It cannot be used as a back-door to charge appointive candidates for conduct occurring before they enter an election race.
  • Rule 4.3 governs appointive candidacies. While not the basis of additional liability here, the opinion highlights the structural separation between appointive and elective candidacies in the Code.

c) Charging precision and training

  • Disciplinary authorities should charge under the correct provisions, identify the subject’s status at each point in time, and explain rule applicability. Vague “catch-all” charging under judge-specific rules for candidate conduct is disfavored.
  • Candidates for judicial office—especially appointive candidates—should receive training on the Code’s status-sensitive provisions. Misstatements made in applications, emails, resumes, or informal communications can trigger Rule 4.1 liability.

d) Sanctions focus on misconduct, not the count of violations

  • This opinion confirms that sanctions turn on the gravity and context of the misconduct, its impact on public confidence, and comparative consistency—not on the raw number of rules violated. Even with only one sustained violation, the same suspension and censure were imposed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Judicial candidate: Any person seeking selection to judicial office “by election or appointment.” One becomes a candidate as soon as they declare to the appointing/election authority.
  • Candidate “subject to public election”: A judicial candidate engaged in an electoral campaign. Special campaign-related rules (Rule 4.2) apply only to such candidates.
  • Rule 4.1(A)(9): Prohibits any judge or judicial candidate from knowingly or recklessly making false or misleading statements—broadly covering both elective and appointive pathways.
  • Rules 1.1, 1.2, 2.16(A): Apply to “judges” and include duties to comply with law (1.1), promote confidence in integrity/impartiality (1.2), and be candid with disciplinary agencies (2.16(A)). These do not automatically extend to lay candidates.
  • Censure vs. reprimand vs. admonishment:
    • Admonishment: Lowest formal discipline, often private.
    • Reprimand: Public declaration of misconduct without suspension.
    • Censure: Formal, public condemnation of conduct under the Code—stronger than a reprimand and often paired with suspension.
  • De novo review: The Court reviews the record independently and is not bound by the Board’s findings or the parties’ stipulations as to violations or sanctions, though stipulated facts bind the parties themselves.
  • Residence vs. domicile: “Residence” can be a place where one lives; “domicile” is a permanent home with intent to remain. Here, Boso admitted her domicile and residence remained in Nicholas County at the relevant time.

Conclusion

The Boso opinion is a precedential marker in two respects. First, it formalizes the Supreme Court of Appeals’ plenary supervisory role over judicial discipline: the Court is not bound by parties’ stipulations to violations and will conduct its own legal and factual assessment. Second, it clarifies the Code’s status-sensitive architecture. Rule 4.1 reaches false statements by all judicial candidates, including appointive candidates; Rule 4.2 is reserved for candidates “subject to public election”; and judge-specific provisions (Rules 1.1, 1.2, 2.16(A)) do not govern non-judge candidates.

Applying these principles, the Court pared back five inapplicable violations but sustained a Rule 4.1(A)(9) violation for misrepresentations about residency in pursuit of a judicial appointment. Recognizing the corrosive effect of dishonesty on public trust in the judiciary, the Court imposed a two‑month suspension without pay, a public censure, and costs. The message is clear: truthfulness is non-negotiable for those who seek the robe, whether through appointment or election, and disciplinary charging must meticulously track both the Code’s text and the candidate’s status at the time of the conduct.

Key Takeaways

  • New express rule: The Court is not bound by stipulated violations; it will independently confirm legal and factual support.
  • Rule 4.1(A)(9) applies to appointive and elective judicial candidates; false statements in pursuit of appointment are sanctionable.
  • Rule 4.2 applies only to candidates “subject to public election”; it does not govern appointive candidacies.
  • Rules 1.1, 1.2, 2.16(A) apply to “judges,” not lay candidates or judges-elect, absent textual authority.
  • Sanctions emphasize the gravity of the misconduct and its effect on public confidence—not the number of rules charged.

Case Details

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