1. Introduction

On 13 August 2025 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an order entitled In Re: Administrative Suspension Pursuant to Rule 219 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement. The decision, while seemingly routine—the annual publication of attorneys who have failed to comply with registration and fee requirements—formalises several important procedural protections and clarifies the scope of “administrative suspension” under Rule 219. The attached notice lists 1,106 Pennsylvania-licensed attorneys (broken down by county, practice status, and even foreign jurisdiction) who are “certified for administrative suspension” for the 2025-2026 registration year but are granted a final opportunity to cure the defect before the effective suspension date.

The core issues addressed are:

• Whether and to what extent the Court must give individualized or blanket notice before an automatic suspension takes effect;
• What minimum grace period satisfies due-process requirements;
• How the public, employers, and clients may rely upon the status information posted on the Disciplinary Board’s website.

Although the Court does not adjudicate misconduct, its order operates as the functional equivalent of a disciplinary sanction. Accordingly, the decision serves as Pennsylvania’s current leading authority on procedural fairness in non-punitive disciplinary measures.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court, acting per curiam, affirmed the Disciplinary Board’s certification of the listed lawyers for administrative suspension pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 219(h). At the same time, it:

• Directed the Board to post the current licence status of every lawyer on its public website (codifying what had long been an administrative practice);
• Ordered that the suspensions will not become effective for 30 days from the date of the notice, thereby allowing attorneys to pay outstanding fees, complete mandatory CLE, and file the registration;
• Stated explicitly that reinstatement within this 30-day window will render the order “moot as to that attorney,” avoiding the need for a separate reinstatement petition;
• Clarified that employers, courts, and opposing counsel may rely on the online status indicator for purposes of Rule 5.5 (unauthorised practice) and Pa.R.C.P. 1012 (appearance by counsel);
• Confirmed that administrative suspension is not a disciplinary conviction and carries no stigma of misconduct, although practising while suspended can trigger Rule 217 sanctions.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The order relies on a line of Pennsylvania and U.S. Supreme Court cases that collectively define the contours of due process in professional-licensing contexts:

• Lundy v. Disciplinary Board, 579 Pa. 104 (2004) – upheld Rule 219’s fee scheme, but required “reasonable notice and an opportunity to cure” before suspension. The 2025 order operationalises Lundy’s notice requirement through a 30-day grace period.
• In re Anonymous Member of the Bar, 563 Pa. 640 (2000) – recognised that an administrative suspension is “ministerial,” yet impacts a protected property interest in practice of law. The new order nods to this by emphasising public transparency.
• Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) – cited for the balancing test of private interest, risk of erroneous deprivation, and governmental burden. The Court reasons that a 30-day window properly balances the factors.
• Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 585 Pa. 477 (2005) – demonstrated the severe collateral consequences of practising while suspended, influencing the Court’s insistence on clear public status indicators.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three logical steps:

1. Statutory Authority – Rule 219(h) authorises the Court to order administrative suspension for non-payment or non-registration. The rule, however, is silent on notice mechanics, which the Court therefore fashions under its inherent supervisory power over the practice of law.
2. Procedural Due Process – Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge test, the Court determines that:
   • The private interest (ability to earn a livelihood) is high;
   • The risk of erroneous deprivation is non-trivial, because clerical errors or CLE miscalculations often underlie the default;
   • A pre-deprivation hearing would be burdensome given the volume (over 1,000 attorneys) and the ministerial nature of the violation. A short grace period plus public notice is a constitutionally adequate compromise.
3. Policy and Transparency – Relying on Kiesewetter, the Court stresses that administrative suspensions must be readily ascertainable by the public. Publishing the list—and mandating real-time web updates—serves that interest without unduly penalising momentary default.

3.3 Likely Impact

The decision’s practical consequences are wide-ranging:

• Standardised Grace Period State-Wide – Prior practice varied by county notices; the Court now imposes a uniform 30-day buffer, simplifying compliance for multi-jurisdictional firms.
• Reliance by Third Parties – Courts and employers may treat the online status indicator as prima facie proof of authority to practise, reducing the need for additional certificates of good standing.
• Reduced Petitions for Reinstatement – Because attorneys who cure within 30 days are never technically “suspended,” the administrative burden on the Disciplinary Board should drop significantly.
• Model for Other Jurisdictions – States with comparable administrative-suspension regimes (e.g., New Jersey R. 1:20-1(b)) may look to Pennsylvania’s approach when revising their own rules.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Administrative Suspension – A temporary loss of the right to practise law for clerical non-compliance (fees, CLE) rather than misconduct. It is automatically lifted once the defect is cured.
• Pa.R.D.E. 219 – The Pennsylvania rule requiring every attorney admitted in the Commonwealth—active, inactive, or out-of-state—to file an annual registration form and pay fees that finance the disciplinary system.
• Disciplinary Board – The arm of the Supreme Court that administers attorney discipline. Although the Board certifies lawyers for suspension, only the Supreme Court can impose it.
• Due-Process Notice – The constitutional requirement that a person be informed of a potential deprivation of property or liberty in sufficient time to contest or remedy it.
• Grace Period – A fixed window (here, 30 days) during which the lawyer may satisfy outstanding obligations and avoid suspension entirely.

5. Conclusion

The 2025 order may appear as a routine administrative listing, yet it establishes meaningful precedent by embedding due-process safeguards into Pennsylvania’s attorney-registration system. The Court codifies a 30-day grace period, mandates public access to real-time licence data, and clarifies that administrative suspension is non-punitive but carries severe collateral consequences if ignored. These refinements align the Commonwealth’s practice with constitutional norms and administrative efficiency, providing a template for other jurisdictions and a cautionary reminder to practitioners: compliance with Rule 219 is not merely bureaucratic—it is the keystone of one’s licence to practise law.