Supervised Visitation Conditioned on Rehabilitation Programs Upheld Under Best-Interest Review in Nonprecedential Memorandum Decision

Supervised Visitation Conditioned on Rehabilitation Programs Upheld Under Best-Interest Review in Nonprecedential Memorandum Decision

Case: In re the Parenting of J.E.B. & B.L.B., 2025 MT 216N (Mont. Sept. 23, 2025) — Noncitable memorandum opinion

Introduction

This commentary examines the Montana Supreme Court’s nonprecedential memorandum decision in Parenting of J.E.B. & B.L.B., affirming a district court’s amended parenting plan that required supervised visitation for the father, Matthew J. Brooks, and conditioned the resumption of unsupervised parenting time on his completion of specified treatment and rehabilitation programs. The case arises out of post-dissolution parenting disputes between Matthew (Respondent–Appellant, pro se on appeal) and Jessica L. Brooks (Petitioner–Appellee), following allegations and undisputed findings of domestic violence and alcohol use occurring in the children’s presence.

Two central issues frame the decision:

  • Whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering supervised visitation and program-completion prerequisites based on best-interest findings tied to domestic violence, alcohol use, and mental health concerns.
  • Whether Matthew’s appeal was timely in light of an earlier 2024 order and a later 2025 order denying his motion to revise the parenting plan.

Justice Jim Rice, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the district court. The Court deemed the appeal timely under Montana Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(3)(b) and held that the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and its parenting orders were not an abuse of discretion.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed an amended final parenting plan that:

  • Requires Matthew to have supervised visitation with the parties’ two minor children.
  • Allows a transition to unsupervised parenting time only after Matthew completes a batterer’s program, parenting classes, a chemical dependency assessment and all resulting recommendations, individual therapy, and resolves his pending PFMA (Partner or Family Member Assault) criminal case.

On timeliness, although Jessica argued the appeal was untimely if aimed at the district court’s February 6, 2024 order, the Supreme Court recognized that Matthew’s notice of appeal referenced the district court’s later February 12, 2025 order (denying his motion to revise) and was filed seven days after that order. Invoking M. R. App. P. 4(3)(b)—which provides that an appeal from a judgment brings up for review prior orders leading to that judgment—the Court deemed the appeal timely based on the collective content of Matthew’s filings and his consistent contesting of the parenting issues below.

Substantively, the Court applied settled standards of review: clear-error review for factual findings and abuse-of-discretion review for parenting orders. It concluded that the district court’s findings—documenting multiple undisputed acts of domestic violence by Matthew against a subsequent partner, some occurring in the presence of the children; alcohol use in the children’s presence contrary to the original parenting plan; and ongoing concerns about Matthew’s insight and mental health—were supported by the record. The orders mandating supervised visitation and program completion were thus within the district court’s discretion to safeguard the children’s best interests.

Finally, the Court declined to consider Matthew’s post-submission motion to file a supplemental reply brief, noting that the appellate rules do not provide for such additional pleadings after briefing closes.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • M. R. App. P. 4(3)(b): The Court relied on this rule to resolve the timeliness issue. The rule states that an appeal from a judgment draws into question all previous orders and rulings excepted or objected to that led up to and resulted in that judgment. Here, Matthew’s appeal from the February 12, 2025 order permitted review of earlier parenting orders, including the February 6, 2024 order, because parenting matters were contested throughout and the later order was appealed timely.
  • Boeshans v. Boeshans, 2025 MT 187, 423 Mont. 450, 573 P.3d 1226: Boeshans is cited for two bedrock points:
    • Factual findings pertaining to parenting plans are reviewed for clear error—whether they are supported by substantial evidence, whether the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or whether the reviewing court is firmly convinced a mistake was made.
    • Parenting orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion, a deferential standard given the trial court’s superior vantage on credibility and child-focused factfinding.
  • Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, Section I, Paragraph 3(c): This decision is a memorandum opinion and is expressly designated noncitable; it does not serve as precedent. While insightful as a teaching tool, it cannot be relied upon as binding authority in other cases.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis unfolds in two layers: threshold appellate procedure and merits review under settled standards.

1) Appellate Timeliness

Jessica challenged timeliness on the theory that Matthew’s appeal attacked the February 6, 2024 order but was filed over a year later. The Court resolved this by:

  • Recognizing that Matthew’s notice of appeal referenced the February 12, 2025 order (denying his motion to revise) and was filed seven days later—well within the time limit.
  • Applying M. R. App. P. 4(3)(b) to hold that an appeal from the later order drew into question prior orders and rulings that “led up to and resulted in” that order, especially where the parenting issues were continuously contested. On that basis, the Court deemed the appeal timely.

Takeaway: In parenting litigation featuring serial orders, a timely appeal from a later final order may permit review of earlier contested rulings under Rule 4(3)(b). That said, this is a nonprecedential application and should not be treated as a substitute for best practices in preserving and timely appealing earlier final orders.

2) Substantive Parenting Plan Review

On the merits, the Court credited the district court’s detailed factfinding, which included:

  • Multiple, “undisputed” incidents of physical violence by Matthew against his subsequent partner, Erica, including events when the parties’ children and Erica’s children were present.
  • Use of alcohol in the children’s presence, contradicting the original final parenting plan’s prohibitions against subjecting the children to persons using alcohol or illegal drugs and to domestic violence or profane language.
  • Concerns about Matthew’s mental health and insight: even after beginning batterer programming, he characterized his conduct as “out of control” and “getting out of hand,” which the court found reflected an inadequate understanding of what drives his abusive behavior.
  • A serious safety marker: within the prior nine months, Matthew had pointed a firearm at his former partner’s head, signaling heightened risk.
  • Child-centered outcomes: since residing primarily with Jessica and restricting Matthew to supervised visits, the children were “doing well,” with the younger child showing less aggressive behavior than when unsupervised time with Matthew had been allowed.

Given these findings and the statutory best-interest factors (not cited by section number in the opinion but referenced generally), the district court ordered that Matthew’s parenting time remain supervised unless and until he completed a constellation of rehabilitative steps—batterer programming, parenting education, chemical dependency evaluation and compliance, individual therapy, and resolution of the criminal matter. The Supreme Court concluded that these conditions fell squarely within the district court’s discretion to protect the children’s physical, mental, and emotional welfare.

3) Rejection of Appellant’s Arguments

The Court addressed, and implicitly rejected, several of Matthew’s challenges:

  • Temporal limitation of prohibitions: Matthew argued the original plan’s prohibitions applied only “directly prior to or during” visits, and the PFMA-related incident occurred outside parenting time and without alcohol. The Court found this unavailing because the district court identified other undisputed incidents of drinking and violence occurring in the children’s presence—squarely within the plan’s protective scope.
  • Bond disruption: Matthew contended that supervised visits undermined the children’s bond and security. The district court’s contrary best-interest finding—crediting improved child behavior and overall well-being under the supervised regimen—was supported by the record and thus not clearly erroneous.
  • Rehabilitation claim: While Matthew pointed to participation in programs, the district court determined he had not yet demonstrated genuine insight into his abusive conduct. The Supreme Court deferred to that assessment, underscoring that partial or early-stage participation is not equivalent to successful rehabilitation for best-interest purposes.

Impact

Because this is a memorandum decision under the Court’s Internal Operating Rules, it is nonprecedential and noncitable. Nonetheless, it offers practical guidance on two recurring fronts in parenting litigation:

  • Safety-first, best-interest framework: Montana trial courts retain wide discretion to impose supervised visitation and require completion of targeted treatment programs where the record shows children’s exposure to domestic violence and substance use. The Court’s deference signals that well-documented findings—particularly undisputed evidence of violence in children’s presence and measurable improvements under supervision—will typically withstand appellate scrutiny.
  • Program-completion conditions: Conditioning expanded parenting time on verifiable completion of batterer intervention, substance-use evaluation and compliance, parenting classes, and therapy is a permissible and practical means to safeguard children while offering a path to reunification. Completion is not merely a check-the-box exercise: insight and behavioral change matter.
  • Appeals from later orders can reach prior rulings: When a party timely appeals a later order (e.g., denial of a motion to revise), M. R. App. P. 4(3)(b) may allow the appeal to encompass earlier contested parenting decisions that led to the later order. Practitioners should still assume that independent deadlines apply to earlier final orders and avoid relying on this pathway.
  • Appellate procedure discipline: Post-submission supplemental briefing is disfavored and generally not permitted under the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure, as this opinion’s footnote underscores.

In short, while the opinion sets no new legal rule, it robustly reaffirms the core principles governing parenting-plan modifications involving family violence: careful factfinding drives best-interest determinations; appellate courts defer to trial courts on those findings; and safety-based conditions on visitation are both lawful and prudent when the evidence supports them.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Memorandum (nonprecedential) opinion: A short decision resolving a case by applying settled law. It cannot be cited as authority in other cases and does not establish new precedent.
  • Best interests of the child: The guiding standard in parenting disputes. Courts consider a range of factors (safety, stability, health, parent-child relationships, etc.) to determine what arrangement best serves each child’s welfare.
  • Supervised visitation: Parenting time occurs in the presence of a neutral supervisor or at a supervised visitation center. It’s used to mitigate safety risks while preserving parent-child contact.
  • Batterer intervention program: A structured educational/therapeutic program designed to address domestic violence behavior, increase accountability, and prevent recurrence.
  • Chemical dependency evaluation: A professional assessment to determine whether substance use is present and, if so, what treatment is indicated. Courts often require compliance with all recommendations.
  • PFMA (Partner or Family Member Assault): A Montana criminal offense involving assaultive conduct against an intimate or family member. A pending PFMA case can inform civil parenting orders, which are based on the court’s best-interest assessment and not dependent on a criminal conviction.
  • Standard of review—clearly erroneous: Appellate courts uphold a trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence unless a mistake is clear.
  • Standard of review—abuse of discretion: Appellate courts defer to a trial court’s discretionary decisions (like crafting parenting conditions) unless the decision exceeds the bounds of reason or is based on an incorrect legal standard.
  • M. R. App. P. 4(3)(b): An appeal from a final judgment can bring earlier rulings into review if they led to that judgment and were properly contested below.
  • Ex parte interim order with order to show cause: A temporary order issued without hearing from the other party in urgent circumstances, followed promptly by a hearing where the affected party can contest the order.

Conclusion

Parenting of J.E.B. & B.L.B. is a noncitable memorandum decision that nonetheless provides a clear window into Montana courts’ approach to parenting plans where domestic violence and alcohol use have exposed children to harm. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s fact-driven, best-interest analysis, upholding supervised visitation and a structured suite of rehabilitative prerequisites as a reasonable, evidence-based safeguard. On the appellate front, the Court applied M. R. App. P. 4(3)(b) to deem the appeal timely, and it reiterated that post-submission supplemental briefing is generally not allowed.

The key takeaways are straightforward:

  • Detailed, undisputed evidence of violence and substance use in children’s presence supports stringent safety conditions, including supervision.
  • Program participation must translate into demonstrable insight and compliance; completion benchmarks provide an objective basis for revisiting restrictions.
  • Appellate deference is substantial in parenting-plan cases; absent clear error or abuse of discretion, district court orders will stand.
  • Appellate timeliness can, in some scenarios, be satisfied by appealing a later order that brings prior contested rulings within the scope of review under Rule 4(3)(b).

While not precedential, this decision reinforces settled law: Montana courts prioritize child safety, rely on careful factfinding, and use supervised visitation plus targeted rehabilitation as a pragmatic path to safer parent-child relationships.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Montana

Comments