Superseding Cause Doctrine in Premises Liability: Intentional Intervening Acts Exonerate Property Owners

Introduction

The case of Gignak v. Bruno, decided on April 10, 2025 by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Third Department, addresses the boundaries of premises‐liability claims when a third party’s intentional act intervenes. Plaintiff Amy Gignak sued Beverly Ann Bruno (“the mother”), alleging negligence and assault/battery after Gignak fell onto a glass vase in the mother’s Florida residence. The key issues include (1) whether New York or Florida substantive law applies, (2) whether the mother owed a duty to maintain the premises in a safe condition, and (3) whether the partner’s intentional shove constituted a superseding cause that severed the mother’s liability under her nondelegable duty. Gignak appeals from an order dismissing her complaint on summary judgment, challenging the application of duty principles and causation doctrines.

Summary of the Judgment

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the complaint against the mother. First, it held that New York’s choice‐of‐law analysis presented no actual conflict with Florida law, so New York substantive tort law governed. Second, the court emphasized that a landowner’s nondelegable duty to maintain safe premises can be extinguished if an intervening act is extraordinary, intentional, and unforeseeable. Here, the partner’s deliberate shove broke the causal chain, qualifying as a superseding cause. Accordingly, even if the mother negligently placed a vase near a slippery shower area, her liability was excused by the partner’s independent wrongful act.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Eccles v. Shamrock Capital Advisors, LLC (42 NY3d 321 [2024]): Established that New York law applies to procedural issues, while the law of the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship governs substantive tort claims.
• Campney v. Hatch (229 AD3d 879 [2024]): Reaffirmed the rule that the law of the place where the tort occurred typically governs primary conduct in tort cases.
• Porter v. Stone (231 AD3d 1402 [2024]) and Vance v. Burkhart (229 AD3d 869 [2024]): Clarified that a property owner owes a nondelegable duty to maintain reasonably safe premises based on foreseeability of harm.
• Mirand v. City of New York (84 NY2d 44 [1994]): Articulated the test for superseding cause—whether the subsequent act was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the original negligence.
• Maheshwari v. City of New York (2 NY3d 288 [2004]): Held that an extraordinary, intentional act by a third party breaks the causal chain and relieves the original tortfeasor of liability.

Legal Reasoning

1. Choice of Law: The court applied New York’s borrowing principles, found no actual conflict between New York and Florida premises‐liability rules, and therefore used New York substantive law for both negligence and causation.

2. Duty of Care: Under New York law, a property owner must maintain safe conditions. However, the complaint lacked an explicit allegation of ownership or control by the mother, a threshold defect. Even assuming ownership, the mother’s duty is nondelegable but subject to interruption by superseding causes.

3. Superseding Cause: The partner’s video‐confessed shove into the vase was intentional and unforeseeable. Applying Mirand and Maheshwari, the court deemed the shove an “extraordinary” intervening act. It extinguished any liability the mother might have borne for negligence in placing the vase or tolerating a leaky shower area.

4. Summary Judgment Standard: With the issue joined and the mother asserting CPLR 3211(a) and 3212 defenses, the court properly converted the motion to summary judgment. No triable issue remained as to any element of the mother’s duty, breach, or proximate cause because the partner’s act superseded any asserted negligence.

Impact

This decision reinforces and clarifies several aspects of New York tort law:

• It underscores the strictness of pleading ownership or control to impose premises liability.
• It affirms that intentional third‐party acts, when extraordinary and unforeseeable, will relieve property owners of a nondelegable duty.
• It illustrates the interplay between choice‐of‐law analysis and summary judgment on procedural versus substantive grounds.
• Future litigants will need to anticipate superseding‐cause challenges when a third party’s misconduct follows an alleged dangerous condition on the premises.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Nondelegable Duty: A landowner cannot shift responsibility for keeping the premises safe to another person. Even if a contractor or visitor causes harm, the owner may remain liable unless a superseding cause intervenes.

Superseding Cause: An event that interrupts the sequence linking the defendant’s negligence to the ultimate harm. If the event is intentional, criminal, or unforeseeable, it “breaks” the chain, exonerating the original defendant.

Choice of Law: Rules to decide which jurisdiction’s laws apply. New York uses its own law for procedural matters and the law of the place with the most significant relationship for substantive tort issues, unless there is an actual conflict.

Summary Judgment (CPLR 3212): A pretrial procedure to dismiss claims if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Conclusion

Gignak v. Bruno delivers a clear directive: when an intentional, unforeseeable act by a third party causes injury, a property owner’s nondelegable duty does not extend to that event. The decision confirms the rigorous pleading requirements for premises liability, reinforces the doctrine of superseding cause, and clarifies choice‐of‐law and summary judgment processes in New York tort jurisprudence. Practitioners should heed these principles when evaluating liability and defenses in premises‐related injury claims.