Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119 (2019).

  Bucklew crystallized the modern method-of-execution test: a prisoner must show (1) the State’s chosen method carries a substantial risk of severe pain that “superadds” terror, pain, or disgrace to the death sentence, and (2) a feasible and readily implemented alternative that would significantly reduce that risk, which the State has refused to adopt without a legitimate penological reason. The dissent leans on Bucklew’s core concepts, particularly its recognition that “cruelty” encompasses harm to “body or mind” and its acknowledgment that the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a painless death but forbids the deliberate addition of needless suffering.

• Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality).

  Baze introduced the “superadds” language and underscored that a substantial risk of suffocation raises Eighth Amendment concerns. Justice Sotomayor uses Baze to anchor the proposition that risks of suffocation are particularly salient in method-of-execution challenges—a point directly relevant to nitrogen hypoxia’s reliance on oxygen displacement.

• Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015).

  Glossip requires prisoners to identify a known and available alternative method. Justice Sotomayor acknowledges the “macabre” nature of this comparative exercise but applies it faithfully: on this record, a firing squad meaningfully reduces time to unconsciousness relative to nitrogen hypoxia, and thus the quantum of severe suffering. The dissent flags doctrinal unease with this requirement but operates within its constraints.

• Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

  The dissent invokes Watts for the principle that the law recognizes “torture of mind as well as body.” Though Watts arose in a different context, the maxim undergirds the dissent’s insistence that psychological torment counts in the Eighth Amendment calculus.

• Dunn v. Price, 587 U.S. 929 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting from grant of application to vacate stay).

  Cited to show that States previously touted nitrogen hypoxia as “painless” and yielding unconsciousness “within seconds.” The subsequent empirical record—seven executions by Alabama and Louisiana—now contradicts these assurances.

• Smith v. Hamm, 601 U.S. ___ (2024) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay and denial of certiorari).

  A precursor dissent noting concern that Alabama’s protocol was “heavily redacted” and that empirical claims of painlessness were untested. Boyd supplies the empirical follow-through that Smith predicted would be critical.

• Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014).

  Quoted for the Eighth Amendment’s dignity values, reinforcing the dissent’s broader constitutional narrative that experimental execution methods that foreseeably inflict needless suffering betray fundamental constitutional commitments.

Legal Reasoning

1) The evidentiary record of nitrogen hypoxia

The dissent emphasizes that, unlike earlier stages of litigation, courts now have a concrete record from seven executions carried out by Alabama and Louisiana. Firsthand accounts consistently describe immediate convulsions, gasping for air, and violent thrashing against restraints; loss of consciousness does not occur “within seconds” but rather in two to four minutes, and, on the District Court’s assumptions, potentially up to seven minutes. Death is then pronounced roughly 16–23 minutes after initiation.

The District Court credited key points material to the Bucklew analysis:

• “Agonal breathing” (gasping, muscle jerks, grunting near death) is not alone proof of pain because it can be involuntary and occur when unconscious. However, experts on both sides agreed that severe psychological pain persists from initiation of gas flow until loss of consciousness.
• The “key question” is the time to loss of consciousness, which the court assumed was typically about two minutes but could be longer; even if seven minutes, the court believed its bottom-line conclusion would not change.
• Prisoner “cooperation” affects duration: holding one’s breath or taking short breaths can prolong consciousness—a phenomenon the dissent underscores is often an involuntary reflexive response to oxygen deprivation rather than willful resistance.

2) Superadded psychological torment is constitutionally cognizable

The dissent makes explicit what Bucklew’s and Baze’s logic already implies: courts must evaluate method-specific mental anguish, not merely physical pain. Nitrogen hypoxia’s distinctive cruelty lies in compelling the prisoner to endure an irresistible, “primal urge to breathe” while simultaneously understanding that breathing will cause death. This is not ordinary anticipatory distress; it is the mechanics of the method itself, predictably inflicting minutes of conscious psychological torture before unconsciousness.

The District Court’s framing—folding this minutes-long terror into the “unavoidable” distress of any execution—was, in the dissent’s words, a “false equivalence.” It flattens a unique, extended, and avoidable period of suffering into the baseline anxiety of facing death. Bucklew requires more: a court must identify whether the method “superadds” terror, pain, or disgrace beyond constitutional baselines.

3) Comparative assessment under Bucklew: firing squad versus nitrogen hypoxia

The analysis then turns comparative. The District Court found that a firing squad would render a person unconscious in three to six seconds, albeit with some associated physical pain. Against nitrogen hypoxia’s two-to-seven minutes of conscious torment prior to unconsciousness, the duration differential is stark—what the dissent characterizes as “up to 140-fold.”

Under Bucklew and Glossip, the question is whether the proposed alternative “significantly reduces” a “substantial risk of severe pain.” On the District Court’s own assumptions:

• Nitrogen hypoxia produces minutes of severe psychological pain (with possible physical discomfort) until unconsciousness.
• A firing squad produces seconds of pain/terror before unconsciousness.

The dissent concludes that the numerical disparity paired with the qualitatively different nature of the suffering compels a finding that the firing squad is a constitutionally significant risk-reducing alternative.

4) The “cooperation” factor cannot sanitize the method

Alabama previously suggested that Kenneth Smith’s prolonged consciousness and violent movements owed to his own actions (e.g., breath-holding). The dissent rejects the premise that the method is constitutionally adequate if the condemned “cooperates.” The record shows predictable, repeated patterns of gasping and convulsions across executions; more importantly, any breath-holding or short gasps are likely involuntary physiological responses to hypoxia. A method that functionally relies on overriding the body’s survival reflex necessarily entails minutes of conscious terror as part of its normal operation. That is the very definition of a “superadd[ed]” cruelty.

5) Stay standards and procedural posture

Although the dissent focuses principally on likelihood of success on the merits (the central stay factor in capital method cases), the irreparability of the harm is self-evident: once the execution proceeds, no court can remedy the constitutional injury. The dissent would have granted a stay and certiorari to correct the Eleventh Circuit’s deference to the District Court’s error in conflating ordinary anticipatory anguish with method-specific psychological torture.

Likely Impact on Future Cases and the Law

The Court’s denial of a stay and certiorari sets no binding national precedent. However, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent is likely to have substantial persuasive force in lower courts adjudicating nitrogen hypoxia challenges and, more broadly, in method-of-execution litigation:

• Blueprint for evidentiary showings: The dissent identifies the pivotal metrics: time to loss of consciousness, the nature and intensity of pre-unconscious suffering, and the comparative duration under a proposed alternative. Litigants will foreground these data points, including witness observations and expert consensus that psychological pain persists until unconsciousness.
• Psychological pain as equal in constitutional stature to physical pain: By synthesizing Bucklew, Baze, and Watts, the dissent fortifies the argument that mental anguish is not a second-class harm under the Eighth Amendment. Expect courts to analyze method-specific mental torment with greater care.
• Firing squad as a practical comparator: The District Court’s finding that a firing squad induces unconsciousness in mere seconds, and is “feasible” and “readily implemented,” places firing squad executions on firmer doctrinal footing as a Glossip/Bucklew alternative—at least in jurisdictions where feasibility can be shown on the record. States may increasingly face arguments that firing squads significantly reduce severe suffering relative to nitrogen hypoxia.
• Scrutiny of “cooperation” defenses: The dissent flags the dubiousness of attributing prolonged torment to inmates’ supposed noncooperation. Courts may treat such arguments skeptically where the record shows that involuntary physiological responses are the predictable product of the method itself.
• Pressure on experimental protocols: The dissent’s “experimental method” critique, coupled with actual execution data, may prompt stricter judicial insistence on transparency and testing before implementation, or at least on stays where the State’s assurances are contradicted by empirical evidence.
• Signals for future Supreme Court review: Although no majority endorsed the dissent today, its synthesis of doctrine and data positions the Court to revisit the question should a circuit split emerge or a fuller record sharpen the penological justifications (or lack thereof) for nitrogen hypoxia vis-à-vis feasible alternatives.

Practically, the denial of relief permits Alabama to proceed with nitrogen hypoxia as its operative method. But as more executions supply data points, the dissent’s framework equips lower courts to undertake the comparative analysis Bucklew demands—and to enjoin nitrogen hypoxia where the record mirrors the patterns described here.