Substantive Immunity Shields Municipalities from Negligence Claims Over Inoperable Interstate Streetlights

Introduction

In Ex parte City of Birmingham (In re: Smith v. City of Birmingham), decided on September 19, 2025, the Supreme Court of Alabama granted the City of Birmingham’s petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter summary judgment for the City. The Court held that under the doctrine of substantive immunity, a municipality that voluntarily undertakes the maintenance of streetlights on an interstate highway owes no legal duty to individual motorists arising from inoperable streetlights. Consequently, negligence claims predicated on alleged failures to maintain those lights are barred.

The decision clarifies and extends Alabama’s substantive-immunity jurisprudence beyond the traditional “inspection” cases to a core public-safety service—roadway lighting—when provided on interstate highways. It emphasizes that the provision and upkeep of interstate streetlighting is a service undertaken for the public at large, not for specific individuals, and that imposing tort liability would materially thwart municipalities’ efforts to provide that service.

Background and Procedural History

The underlying events stem from a nighttime, multi-vehicle collision on June 23, 2019, on I-59 southbound in Birmingham. After an initial sideswipe caused driver John Daniels to strike the concrete median, subsequent vehicles collided with the wreck scene “back to back to back.” Two motorcyclists, Nicholas Raynard Smith, Jr. and his friend, approached at highway speed; Smith collided with Daniels’s vehicle and suffered severe injuries. When first responders arrived, streetlights marked W066 and W067 in the median were not operational. There was conflicting evidence about whether those lights were operational at the precise time the initial accident occurred.

The City had performed a lighting upgrade along that corridor in April 2019, converting fixtures to LED and addressing a breaker/fuse issue that briefly caused some outages (including in the W061–W070 sequence). City personnel testified that those issues were resolved by April 29, 2019, and that the City had received no outage notice thereafter.

Smith sued the City in 2021 asserting negligence, wantonness/recklessness, and negligent/wanton hiring, training, supervision, and retention. The trial court dismissed the wantonness/recklessness claims. The City then moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims, invoking municipal immunity under § 11-47-190 and substantive immunity. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the prior fuse issues could show notice of a problem and that fact disputes existed for a jury.

The City petitioned for mandamus. In his response, Smith conceded that his negligent hiring/training/supervision/retention claim should be dismissed, leaving only negligence for review. The Supreme Court reviewed the denial of immunity via mandamus and addressed the City’s substantive-immunity defense, finding it dispositive.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court held:

Substantive immunity applies to a municipality’s voluntary maintenance of streetlights on an interstate highway; that service is provided for the public’s safety, health, and welfare, and any duty runs to the public at large, not to particular individuals.
Because substantive immunity is a “no-duty” doctrine in narrow areas of essential public services, the City owed no legal duty to Smith regarding the operability of the interstate streetlights. Without a duty, a negligence claim cannot stand.
The Court therefore directed entry of summary judgment for the City on negligence, without reaching the City’s alternative municipal-immunity argument under § 11-47-190.
Smith conceded dismissal of his negligent hiring/training/supervision/retention claim; the Court confirmed that disposition.

The petition was granted and the writ issued. Eight Justices agreed with the result (six fully concurred and two concurred in the result).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s analysis is anchored in Alabama’s substantive-immunity line of cases and contextualized with out-of-state authority regarding the public character of streetlighting.

Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So. 2d 385 (Ala. 1982): The foundational case adopting substantive immunity in Alabama. Rich established that courts may “prevent the imposition of a legal duty” in “narrow areas of governmental activities essential to the well-being of the governed” where tort liability would “materially thwart” the provision of public services. Although Rich involved sewer-line inspections, it expressly contemplated broader application to essential public services. The Court relied on Rich’s public-policy rationale.
Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So. 2d 889 (Ala. 1991): Applied substantive immunity to city electrical inspections that the city was not legally required to perform. Hilliard underscored that imposing tort liability in areas where municipalities voluntarily provide essential safety services could destroy their motivation or financial ability to continue providing them. The Court quoted Hilliard to show why attaching liability for streetlight outages would discourage cities from maintaining interstate lighting.
Nichols v. Town of Mount Vernon, 504 So. 2d 732 (Ala. 1987): Confirmed that voluntarily assumed public-safety functions can still be within substantive-immunity protection, rebutting the argument that a voluntary undertaking automatically creates a duty enforceable in tort.
Ex parte City of Muscle Shoals, 384 So. 3d 37 (Ala. 2023): Clarified that substantive immunity is not limited to inspection contexts and is rooted in the “public interest outweighs individual duty” idea. The Court cited and quoted Muscle Shoals to reaffirm that immunity applies to services provided “for the public’s safety, health, and general welfare.”
Ex parte City of Orange Beach, [Ms. SC-2024-0526, Apr. 4, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2025): Recently emphasized that imposing liability in essential public-service domains would “materially thwart” municipal efforts and may induce municipalities to cease non-mandated services (“will likely simply stop performing” them). The Court used Orange Beach to reinforce the policy logic against individual-duty recognition for interstate lighting.
Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 295 So. 3d 625 (Ala. 2019) (plurality): Applied substantive immunity to smoke-detector inspections, again illustrating the doctrine’s reach across essential safety functions.
Calogrides v. City of Mobile, 475 So. 2d 560 (Ala. 1985): Recognized immunity for municipal determinations concerning the level of police protection at a public event, another example of the public-at-large nature of the service.
City of Prichard v. Kelley, 386 So. 2d 403 (Ala. 1980) (plurality): Pre-Rich case stating that voluntarily erecting a stop sign creates a duty to maintain it, based on voluntary-undertaking principles. The Court here carefully notes Prichard pre-dates Rich and thus does not control in the face of the later substantive-immunity framework.
Section 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975 (municipal immunity): The Court acknowledged the statute’s general municipal-liability regime, including the “defect in the streets” clause, but emphasized two things: (1) negligence requires a legal duty as a matter of law, and (2) an inoperable streetlight is not a “defect in the street” for purposes of that clause, consistent with City of Prichard’s recognition that a defective traffic light or missing stop sign is not a physical street defect.
Hale v. City of Tuscaloosa, 449 So. 2d 1243 (Ala. 1984), and City of Birmingham v. Cox, 230 Ala. 99, 159 So. 818 (1935): These cases recognize a municipal duty to warn of dangerous conditions in or near a roadway. The Court distinguishes those cases because the danger here was not a physical defect or hazard in I-59; darkness alone is not a roadway “defect.”

Out-of-state authorities reinforced the public, non-individual nature of streetlighting:

Cimato v. City of Lackawanna, 158 A.D.2d 1000, 551 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1990): Voluntary municipal street illumination on a state highway does not create a duty to individuals; it is provided for the public at large.
Georgantonis v. Reading, 156 N.E.3d 1037 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020): Immunity applied to claims about city street-lighting because it promotes public health and safety for the community.
Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 Wash. 2d 540, 78 P.3d 1279 (2003); Wicks v. Salt Lake City, 208 P. 538 (Utah 1922); City of Little Rock v. Holland, 42 S.W.2d 383 (Ark. 1931); Miller v. Town of Milford, 276 N.W. 826 (Iowa 1937): All treat streetlighting as a governmental function provided for the public’s safety and convenience.
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998), and Mixon v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 207 Cal. App. 4th 124 (2012): Establish that municipalities have no common-law duty to light streets and that darkness alone is not a dangerous roadway condition.
White v. Southern California Edison Co., 25 Cal. App. 4th 442, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (1994): Emphasized the impracticality of imposing a maintenance duty for numerous streetlights that will inevitably fail periodically.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps: (1) defining duty as a pure question of law, (2) situating streetlight maintenance within the substantive-immunity doctrine, and (3) applying the doctrine’s public-policy rationale.

Duty is a legal question: A negligence claim requires a legal duty owed to the plaintiff. The Court reiterates that whether a duty exists is for the courts to decide, not juries. Therefore, even if there are fact disputes about whether lights were out and whether that contributed to the crash, those disputes are immaterial if no duty exists.
Substantive immunity as a no-duty doctrine: Rich and its progeny allow courts to withhold the recognition of a duty in “narrow areas” of essential governmental activity where tort liability would materially thwart the provision of the service. The Court holds that maintaining streetlights on an interstate highway falls squarely within this category. The service is quintessentially one “for the public’s safety, health, and general welfare,” provided to countless users—citizens and non-residents alike—and thus “so laden with the public interest as to outweigh the incidental duty to individual citizens.”
Policy: If municipalities could be liable for streetlight outages, they would likely withdraw from maintaining interstate lighting at all—particularly because no law requires them to undertake that function—and/or be forced into “perpetual inspections” of hundreds of fixtures to avoid liability. Either course would undermine a valuable public-safety service. This is the precise harm substantive immunity seeks to avert.

The Court also addresses and rejects two counterarguments:

Voluntary undertaking: Although the City had agreed (likely via a state-municipal maintenance agreement) to maintain interstate lighting, voluntarily assuming a public-safety service does not, by itself, create a tort duty to individuals when the service falls within substantive-immunity’s protection. Nichols and Hilliard make clear that the doctrine can trump general voluntary-undertaking principles in this context.
“Defect in the streets”: The statutory “defect” route under § 11-47-190 is inapposite. The Court notes that defective traffic controls are not “physical defects” in the street and further emphasizes that darkness alone is not a dangerous roadway condition. The case does not involve a separate hazardous condition in or near the roadway triggering a municipal duty to warn.

Because substantive immunity negates any otherwise cognizable duty, the Court did not reach the City’s independent statutory immunity arguments and ordered summary judgment for the City on the negligence claim. Smith’s negligent hiring/training/supervision/retention claim was dismissed by his concession.

Impact and Implications

Ex parte City of Birmingham is a significant extension and clarification of Alabama’s substantive-immunity doctrine:

Streetlight-maintenance claims on interstates: Plaintiffs cannot pursue negligence claims against municipalities based solely on allegations that interstate streetlights were inoperable. The City owes no individual duty in that context.
Broader reach beyond inspections: The decision expands the doctrine’s application beyond inspection and code enforcement (Rich, Hilliard, Muscle Shoals, Orange Beach) to the provision and maintenance of an essential public-safety infrastructure—lighting—at least on interstate highways.
Incentive compatibility: The ruling expressly seeks to prevent perverse incentives that would cause municipalities to abandon non-mandated, beneficial services for fear of tort exposure.
Litigation focus shifts: Plaintiffs may pivot to alternative theories or defendants:
- Dangerous-condition claims: If a distinct dangerous physical condition exists in or adjacent to the roadway (e.g., an open excavation, unguarded drop-off) and the City has notice, the duty to warn remains potentially viable (Hale; Cox). Darkness alone will not suffice.
- Defective roadway claims: Claims predicated on physical defects in the street itself may proceed under § 11-47-190’s “defect in the streets” clause with the statute’s notice requirements, though traffic-control and lighting malfunctions are not “defects” under this line.
- Non-municipal defendants: Contractors responsible for installation/maintenance or other tortfeasors (e.g., motorists who cause crashes) remain potential targets; the opinion does not confer substantive immunity on private entities.
Contractual undertakings: The decision indicates that municipal agreements with the State to maintain interstate lighting do not, standing alone, transform a public-at-large service into an individual-duty relationship sounding in tort.
Possible future questions: While the holding is framed around “streetlights on an interstate highway,” the reasoning—public-at-large service essential to safety—may influence cases involving lighting on other high-volume public ways or similar public-safety infrastructure. Courts will continue to assess, on a service-by-service basis, whether recognizing an individual duty would “materially thwart” essential public services.
Procedural posture: Immunity-based defenses remain amenable to mandamus when trial courts deny summary judgment; parties should promptly seek extraordinary review to avoid the burdens of litigation inconsistent with immunity’s purposes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Writ of mandamus: An extraordinary remedy used to correct certain legal errors mid-case, including the erroneous denial of immunity. The petitioner must show a clear legal right, an imperative duty and refusal by the lower court, no adequate alternative remedy, and proper jurisdiction.
Substantive immunity: A “no-duty” doctrine. In narrow, essential areas of public service, courts decline to recognize a legal duty to individual plaintiffs because imposing such a duty would deter or impair the provision of important public services.
Municipal immunity (§ 11-47-190): Alabama’s statute governing municipal liability and immunities. It permits negligence claims against municipalities for acts of employees in the line and scope of duty, and for certain street “defects” after notice—but does not itself create a duty; duty remains a separate legal question.
Duty to warn of dangerous conditions: Separate from lighting, municipalities may have a duty—upon notice—to warn motorists of physical hazards in or near the roadway (e.g., barriers, railings, lights as warnings), especially at night. Darkness alone is not such a hazard.
Voluntary-undertaking doctrine: Generally, one who undertakes to act must exercise reasonable care. In the municipal context, this doctrine is limited where substantive immunity applies to essential public-safety services; a voluntary undertaking does not override substantive immunity’s no-duty rule.
Summary judgment despite fact disputes: If the law imposes no duty, negligence fails as a matter of law. Courts need not reach factual disputes like whether lights were out or caused the accident.

Conclusion

Ex parte City of Birmingham confirms that Alabama’s substantive-immunity doctrine reaches municipal maintenance of interstate streetlighting. Because lighting on an interstate is an essential public-safety service undertaken for the benefit of the public at large, a municipality owes no individual driver a tort duty to ensure lights are operational. The Court’s holding forecloses negligence claims premised solely on inoperable interstate streetlights and underscores the doctrine’s policy foundation: avoiding liability rules that would discourage municipalities from providing vital public services they are not legally required to perform.

The decision leaves room for traditional claims involving actual defects in the roadway or separate dangerous conditions that require warning, as well as claims against non-municipal actors. But it decisively aligns Alabama with jurisdictions that treat streetlighting as a governmental function insulated from individual-duty claims, thereby providing clear guidance to courts, municipalities, and litigants on the contours of tort liability in this domain.