Substantial Truth, Opinion on Intent, and the “Of-and-Concerning” Gatekeeper: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Dismissal in Pick v. Raffensperger and Defers to Local Divisional Venue Rules

Introduction

In this unpublished, per curiam decision on the non-argument calendar, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of defamation and false-light claims brought by plaintiff-appellant Jacki Pick against Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger (sued in his individual capacity), and upheld the district court’s refusal to transfer the case within the Northern District of Georgia from the Atlanta Division to the Gainesville Division. The dispute arises out of Raffensperger’s 2021 book, Integrity Counts, which critiqued narratives surrounding the 2020 election in Georgia, including a December 3, 2020 Georgia Senate subcommittee hearing where Pick presented portions of a 20-hour State Farm Arena surveillance video as part of a team challenging the election results.

Pick alleged that Integrity Counts defamed her in two ways: by characterizing the State Farm Arena video as “sliced-and-diced” and by lampooning those who called official ballot containers “suitcases.” She also brought a false-light claim and sought divisional transfer, arguing that Local Rule 3.1 mandated the case be heard in Gainesville. The district court dismissed the claims and denied transfer. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on all grounds.

The opinion is a robust restatement and application of Georgia defamation law to political commentary and post-election narratives. It sharpens three core filters that often decide such cases at the pleadings stage: (1) the “of-and-concerning” requirement for identity, (2) the substantial truth doctrine (the “gist/sting” test), and (3) the line between nonactionable opinion—including assessments of motive—and actionable fact. It also underscores deferential review of local divisional venue rules and the incorporation-by-reference doctrine at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Summary of the Opinion

Defamation—“Suitcases”: Dismissal affirmed. Integrity Counts’ criticism of people claiming “secret suitcases” of ballots was not “of and concerning” Pick. She used “suitcases” sparingly and, at least once, expressly as shorthand for ballot containers, not literal luggage. An ordinary reader would not read the book as implicitly targeting her.
Defamation—“Sliced-and-diced” video: Dismissal affirmed. The “sliced-and-diced,” “edited,” or “chopped-up” description was substantially true in gist because Pick played only selected portions of the 20-hour video to support a narrative. Any suggestion of literal editing was, at most, a minor inaccuracy that did not alter the “sting.”
Defamation—accusations of intent to deceive: Dismissal affirmed. Statements imputing that the video presentation was intended to mislead were nonactionable opinions based on disclosed, substantially true facts (i.e., only select clips were shown). They did not amount to charging a specific crime.
False light: Dismissal affirmed on the merits because the claims were neither false nor about Pick in the requisite sense; the panel did not reach the statute-of-limitations alternative ground.
Incorporation-by-reference: The court properly considered the December 3 hearing transcript and Integrity Counts at the Rule 12 stage because the complaint referenced them, they were central, and authenticity was not disputed.
Divisional venue: Denial of transfer affirmed. Interpreting N.D. Ga. Local Rule 3.1 with great deference, the Eleventh Circuit held that where activity is statewide and not local to one division, Local Rule 3.1(B)(1)(a) (residence of defendant) governs over Rule 3.1(B)(3); Atlanta Division was proper because Raffensperger resides there. The record also showed the case was initially filed in Atlanta, not Gainesville.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Georgia defamation elements: Oskouei v. Matthews, 912 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 2025) restates the four elements: false and defamatory statement “concerning” the plaintiff, unprivileged publication, fault, and special harm or per se actionability. The panel uses Oskouei as the baseline framework.
“Of-and-concerning” requirement: Smith v. Stewart, 660 S.E.2d 822 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) and Fiske v. Stockton, 320 S.E.2d 590 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) emphasize that even innuendo cannot transform a non-specific writing into one about a particular person. Holmes v. Clisby, 45 S.E. 684 (Ga. 1903) shows that explicit naming is not required if identity is otherwise ascertainable. Cox Enters., Inc. v. Bakin, 426 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) and Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2002) exemplify when identity is not sufficiently implicated. These authorities support the holding that Integrity Counts’ “suitcases” passages were not reasonably about Pick.
Substantial truth and minor inaccuracies: Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 520 S.E.2d 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) and Bryant v. Cox Enters., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) supply Georgia’s “gist/sting” rule: minor errors do not negate substantial truth. Lucas v. Cranshaw, 659 S.E.2d 612 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) shows omissions do not automatically make a statement false. These cases underpin the conclusion that “sliced-and-diced” was substantially true in context.
Opinion vs. fact; motive statements: Cottrell v. Smith, 788 S.E.2d 772 (Ga. 2016); Collins v. Cox Enters., Inc., 452 S.E.2d 226 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Austin v. PMG Acquisition, LLC, 629 S.E.2d 417 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); Jaillett, 520 S.E.2d at 726. These decisions draw the line between nonactionable opinion (including commentary about motives) and factual assertions, particularly when the opinion is grounded in disclosed true facts. The panel leans on this body of law to treat “intended to mislead” as protected opinion based on disclosed circumstances (playing select video segments).
Opinions that imply criminal facts: Equity Prime Mortg., LLC v. Greene for Cong., Inc., 908 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. Ct. App. 2024) and N. Atlanta Golf Operations, LLC v. Ward, 870 S.E.2d 814 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022) recognize that “opinions” can be actionable if they imply undisclosed, provably false facts. Swanson Towing & Recovery, LLC v. Wrecker 1, Inc., 802 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) and Rosser v. Clyatt, 821 S.E.2d 140 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) caution that accusations must charge a specific crime in language that a reasonable listener would understand as such. The panel concluded no reasonable reading of Integrity Counts charged Pick with a specific crime like O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20.
False light in Georgia: Ass’n Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 549 S.E.2d 454 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Zarach v. Atlanta Claims Ass’n, 500 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); Merz v. Prof’l Health Control of Augusta, Inc., 332 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Smith v. Stewart, 660 S.E.2d 822 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). These cases show false light requires falsity and depiction of the plaintiff, which failed for the same reasons as defamation here.
Motion-to-dismiss record and incorporation-by-reference: Baker v. City of Madison, Ala., 67 F.4th 1268 (11th Cir. 2023); Maglana v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 136 F.4th 1032 (11th Cir. 2025); Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009); Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2002). These authorities authorize considering documents referenced in the complaint, central to the claims, and undisputed in content—here, the hearing transcript and the book.
Divisional venue and deference to local rules: Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009); Clark v. Hous. Auth. of City of Alma, 971 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1992) (great deference to a district court’s interpretation of its local rules). The court also discussed 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2005), but noted plaintiff disclaimed reliance on § 1404(a); the panel thus confined itself to Local Rule interpretation.
Choice-of-law waiver: Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Imperial Premium Fin., LLC, 904 F.3d 1197, 1208 (11th Cir. 2018) (party waives non-forum law by not timely developing it). Although the district court said the claims failed under either Georgia or Texas law, the panel applied Georgia law because Pick briefed only Georgia law on appeal.

Legal Reasoning

1) The “Suitcases” Passages: Not “Of and Concerning” Pick

The court read Integrity Counts “in the sense in which the readers…would ordinarily understand it,” and in context. The “suitcases” discussion targeted those who believed ballots were stored in literal suitcases or who claimed “secret suitcases” of ballots existed outside lawful chain of custody. The book neither mentioned Pick nor reasonably pointed to her: at the hearing she used the term sparingly, and at least once she clarified she meant ballot containers. Under Georgia law, identity cannot be supplied by innuendo where the text does not point to a particular person. Because an ordinary reader would not think those passages were about Pick “by name or ascertainable implication,” the claim failed at the threshold element.

2) The “Sliced-and-Diced” Characterization: Substantially True

Integrity Counts used descriptors like “sliced-and-diced,” “edited,” and “chopped-up” to characterize how the State Farm Arena video was presented to senators. The complaint itself acknowledged that only select segments of a 20-hour video were shown, and that the presenter directed fast-forwarding and rewinding to moments supporting the argument. On these allegations, the “gist/sting” of the book’s description—that only selected parts were shown—was true.

Even if “edited” might suggest literal splicing, any such nuance was a minor inaccuracy that did not materially alter the overall effect on readers. Georgia’s substantial truth doctrine looks to whether the challenged statements would have a different effect on the mind of the reader than the pleaded truth. Here, they would not.

3) Accusations of Intent to Mislead: Protected Opinion Based on Disclosed, True Facts

The book also asserted that the edited presentation was intended to mislead. The panel held this was a nonactionable statement of opinion about motive grounded in disclosed, substantially true facts (that selective clips were shown). Under Georgia law, a subjective assessment of intent—when based on facts set out to the reader—does not assert any further undisclosed, provably false fact and cannot support a defamation claim.

The court rejected the attempt to recast these passages as a criminal accusation. Statements must plainly charge a specific offense to constitute defamation per se as an accusation of crime. The book’s rhetoric did not go that far.

4) False Light: Falls with Defamation

Georgia’s false-light tort requires false publicity depicting the plaintiff as something she is not. Because the challenged statements were either not about Pick or not false (and, for the intent statement, protected opinion), the false-light claim fell on the merits. The court did not reach the district court’s alternative statute-of-limitations analysis.

5) Incorporation-by-Reference at the Pleadings Stage

The court approved consideration of the hearing transcript and the book on a Rule 12 motion because the complaint referred to them, they were central to the claims, and their contents were undisputed. This is a practical reminder that plaintiffs who base claims on documents cannot forestall their consideration by omitting attachments; conversely, a defendant may introduce them on a motion to dismiss without converting to summary judgment if the doctrine’s elements are satisfied.

6) Divisional Venue: Deference to Local Rule Interpretation; Residence Controls When Activity Is Statewide

Interpreting N.D. Ga. Local Rule 3.1, the court deferred to the district court’s reading that Rule 3.1(B)(1)(a)—requiring suit to be brought in the division where the defendant resides for actions “not of a local nature”—governs where the activity is statewide and the complaint does not tether the case to a particular division. The “must be filed in a division…wherein the activity occurred” phrasing in Rule 3.1(B)(3) did not compel Gainesville over Atlanta in a statewide-activity case.

The court also dispelled the factual premise that the suit was first filed in Gainesville: the docket number convention (beginning with “1” for Atlanta), the absence of any transfer entries, and an early order by an Atlanta-based judge collectively showed the action originated in Atlanta.

Impact

Election-related defamation claims face robust filters: The decision fortifies two powerful defenses in commentary about public controversies: (a) substantial truth where the core “gist” is accurate even if rhetoric is sharp, and (b) protection of opinions about intent when they rest on disclosed facts. Describing an opponent’s presentation as “sliced-and-diced” will often be nonactionable if the proponent did in fact select portions of voluminous material.
“Of-and-concerning” remains a strict gatekeeper: Plaintiffs not named must plausibly allege that ordinary readers would identify them. General critiques of a narrative (“secret suitcases”) will not suffice without a clear pointer to the plaintiff.
False light tracks defamation in many applications: Where the challenged statements are either not about the plaintiff or substantially true/privileged, false light will typically fail, sometimes obviating limitations analysis.
Pleading-stage record control matters: By referencing a hearing transcript and a book, a plaintiff invites their consideration on a motion to dismiss. Assertions contrary to those documents may be disregarded.
Divisional venue strategy: In the Northern District of Georgia, when alleged “activity” spans the state and the claim is not of a local nature, the defendant’s division of residence can govern venue under Local Rule 3.1(B)(1)(a). Parties seeking a different division should frame motions under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and develop the discretionary factors rather than rely solely on Local Rule 3.1(B)(3).
Choice-of-law practice pointer: Litigants who wish to invoke non-forum law must develop it early; failure to brief it can effect waiver on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Of and concerning”: Defamation must be about the plaintiff. If an article or book does not name the person, the law asks whether a typical reader would understand it refers to that person. Vague critiques of a general viewpoint usually do not qualify.
Substantial truth (gist/sting): A statement is not “false” if it’s substantially true in its essence, even if some details are off. Courts ask whether the challenged statement would affect a reader differently than the truth would.
Opinion vs. fact: Opinions—especially about someone’s intentions—are generally not actionable. An opinion can become actionable only if it implies undisclosed, specific facts that are false. Opinions based on disclosed, true facts are protected.
Accusation of crime: To be defamatory per se on this theory, the words must plainly accuse a particular, identifiable crime. Rhetorical flourishes about “misleading” are not enough without clear, specific charging language.
False light: This privacy tort requires a false portrayal of the person to the public. If the statements are true (or opinion) or not about the person, false light fails.
Incorporation-by-reference: On a motion to dismiss, courts can consider documents referenced in the complaint, central to the claims, and undisputed in content, without converting the motion to summary judgment.
Divisional vs. district venue: Federal venue statutes govern which federal district is proper; local rules often allocate cases among divisions within the district. Courts give district judges substantial leeway in interpreting their own local rules.
Per curiam, non-argument calendar, unpublished: A short, unsigned opinion decided without oral argument. In the Eleventh Circuit, unpublished opinions are non-precedential but may be persuasive.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Pick v. Raffensperger reinforces bedrock filters in defamation and false light litigation arising from political disputes. The “of-and-concerning” requirement remains exacting; the substantial truth doctrine protects sharp characterizations where the core facts are accurate; and assessments of an opponent’s intent to mislead—when grounded in disclosed facts—are quintessential opinion. The court also reaffirmed practical procedural principles: the incorporation-by-reference pathway at Rule 12 and deferential review of local divisional venue rules favoring the defendant’s residence where asserted conduct is statewide.

For future litigants, the case offers concrete guidance: identify the plaintiff clearly in the challenged text, plead falsity at the “gist” level, be prepared that motive statements may be treated as opinion, consider § 1404(a) for divisional transfers, and brief any non-forum law early. While not precedential, the opinion is a comprehensive application of Georgia law in a charged factual context that will likely influence how similar election-related defamation suits are pled and defended.