Substantial Compliance, Summary Notice, and Frivolous Constitutional Claims in Municipal Zoning: Commentary on Frank Griswold v. City of Homer (Alaska 2025)

Substantial Compliance, Summary Notice, and Frivolous Constitutional Claims in Municipal Zoning: Commentary on Frank Griswold v. City of Homer (Alaska 2025)

Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, Opinion No. 7798 (November 28, 2025)
Case: Frank Griswold v. City of Homer, Supreme Court No. S-18939
Lower Court: Superior Court No. 3HO-22-00278 CI (Judge Lance Joanis)

I. Introduction

This Alaska Supreme Court opinion arises from a citizen challenge to a citywide zoning reform in Homer, Alaska. The City adopted Ordinance 22‑68(A), which reclassified numerous uses from “conditional uses” requiring a discretionary permit to “permitted uses” in various zoning districts. Longtime litigant and Homer resident Frank Griswold, appearing pro se, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the ordinance.

Griswold’s lawsuit advanced three main strands of attack:

  • Procedural defects under the Homer City Code’s legislative procedures (HCC 21.95) and Alaska’s municipal notice statute.
  • Substantive invalidity on due process grounds (no legitimate public purpose; inconsistency with the comprehensive plan; alleged vagueness/unenforceability).
  • Attorney’s fees challenges, including prevailing-party status, the “constitutional litigant” shield in AS 09.60.010(c)(2), discretionary reduction under Civil Rule 82(b)(3), and the sufficiency of redacted billing records.

The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on all claims and awarded the City 20% of its actual attorneys’ fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed across the board.

Although the decision largely applies existing doctrine, it is doctrinally important in three interconnected ways:

  1. It confirms that Homer’s procedural rules for zoning code amendments (HCC 21.95) are directory, requiring only substantial compliance, not strict compliance.
  2. It reaffirms and applies a relatively permissive standard for what qualifies as a sufficient “summary” in public notice of ordinances under AS 29.25.020(b)(3).
  3. It tightens the application of the constitutional litigant attorney-fee shield by labeling zoning-related due process claims “frivolous” when they rest on conclusory allegations and policy grievances rather than evidence.

Together, these holdings strengthen municipal discretion in zoning legislation, raise the bar for procedural and substantive due process challenges, and underscore the potential fee exposure of unsuccessful citizen challengers.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Background Facts

Homer’s zoning code divides the city into 14 districts and distinguishes between:

  • Permitted (outright) uses that require only ministerial approval, and
  • Conditional uses that require a discretionary conditional use permit (CUP) from the Planning Commission, after public hearing and application of specific criteria (HCC 21.71.020–.050).

In 2022, the city planner initiated an amendment to reduce reliance on CUPs. After reviewing a decade of CUP approvals, the Planning Department concluded that many CUPs were routinely granted without added conditions. To increase efficiency, reduce costs, and encourage development consistent with the comprehensive plan, staff proposed shifting many such uses to permitted status.

The Planning Commission held a work session and four meetings, received successive staff reports, revised the proposal, and then voted to hold a public hearing and forward a draft ordinance to the City Council. Public notice described the measure as amending the Homer City Code “regarding conditional uses in each district” and listed the affected districts.

Following the Commission’s recommendation, the City Council held its own noticed hearing, at which the city manager characterized the ordinance as a “streamlining measure.” Some members of the public opposed the change. The Council made two amendments and passed Ordinance 22‑68(A) by a 4–1 vote.

B. Griswold’s Lawsuit

Griswold sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that:

  • The Planning Department did not properly evaluate the proposed amendment under the four criteria in HCC 21.95.040 (comprehensive plan consistency; enforceability; public health/safety/welfare; consistency with the rest of the zoning code).
  • The Planning Department did not submit proper “comments, recommendations, and proposed findings” to the Planning Commission (HCC 21.95.060(b)).
  • The Planning Commission did not submit proper written recommendations to the City Council (HCC 21.95.060(d)).
  • The City’s public notices were inadequate or misleading under AS 29.25.020(b)(3) and corresponding Homer provisions.
  • The ordinance violated substantive due process because it was allegedly arbitrary, inconsistent with the comprehensive plan, and driven by an improper motive to insulate CUP approvals from appeal.
  • The ordinance was “unenforceable” and void for vagueness.

He also contested the later attorney’s fee award on multiple grounds.

C. Lower Court Rulings

The superior court:

  • Held that the Homer City Code’s internal legislative procedures were nonjusticiable “legislative procedure” but alternatively concluded that the City had at least substantially complied.
  • Found the public notice adequate under state law and local code.
  • Rejected the substantive due process and unenforceability arguments, finding that the ordinance served legitimate public purposes (efficiency, cost savings, and development) and was not vague.
  • Awarded the City 20% of its actual fees under Civil Rule 82, denying Griswold constitutional litigant status because his constitutional claims were objectively unreasonable (frivolous), and finding no compelling reason to vary from the presumptive award.
  • Accepted the City’s redacted billing records as sufficient to support the fee request and denied in camera review as moot.

D. The Alaska Supreme Court’s Decision

The Alaska Supreme Court:

  • Affirmed summary judgment for the City on all procedural and substantive challenges.
  • Affirmed the attorney’s fee award in full, including:
    • Prevailing-party designation for the City,
    • Rejection of constitutional litigant protection due to frivolity of Griswold’s constitutional claims,
    • Refusal to vary the Rule 82 default percentage, and
    • Use of redacted billing records.

III. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Procedural Issues: Substantial Compliance with HCC 21.95

1. Directory vs. Mandatory Procedural Requirements

The first major doctrinal question was whether the procedural provisions of HCC 21.95 governing how zoning amendments are proposed, evaluated, and adopted require strict compliance or merely substantial compliance.

This builds on the Court’s prior decision in Griswold v. City of Homer, 556 P.3d 252 (Alaska 2024), where it held that another part of the Homer code (dealing with permit applications) was directory rather than mandatory. There, as here, the Court applied the three-factor test from South Anchorage Concerned Coalition, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage Board of Adjustment, 172 P.3d 768 (Alaska 2007):

A rule is directory — and thus requires only substantial compliance — if:
  1. its wording is affirmative rather than prohibitive;
  2. the legislative intent was to create guidelines for the orderly conduct of public business; and
  3. serious, practical consequences would result if it were considered mandatory.

Applying that test, the Court held that HCC 21.95 is directory:

  • Affirmative wording. The code repeatedly uses “shall” in an affirmative way, without specifying a penalty for noncompliance. Citing Schnell and South Anchorage Concerned Coalition, the Court noted that in the absence of a penalty and of prejudice, “shall” can denote futurity/guidance rather than a rigid command.
  • Guidance function. The provisions “appear to have been framed to guide the City in deciding what sorts of information to consider” in zoning amendments and leave broad legislative discretion to adopt, amend, or reject proposals (HCC 21.95.070).
  • Practical consequences. Treating every procedural misstep as fatal would mean that “any small procedural deviation from the code would…require a proposed ordinance to be completely tossed” — an impractical and disruptive result.

Doctrinally, this extends the 2024 Griswold “substantial compliance” approach — previously applied to permit review procedures — to legislative zoning amendments. It signals sustained judicial reluctance to invalidate municipal legislation for technical deviations from internal procedural codes unless the deviations are substantial and harmful.

2. Presumption of Regularity and Burden of Proof

Once HCC 21.95 was held directory, the Court applied another entrenched principle: a strong presumption of regularity in municipal proceedings. Citing City of St. Mary’s v. St. Mary’s Native Corp., 9 P.3d 1002 (Alaska 2000), and McCormick v. City of Dillingham, 16 P.3d 735 (Alaska 2001), the Court emphasized:

  • Challengers bear the burden of producing affirmative evidence of illegality;
  • Pointing out “anomalies” or speculating about possible defects is not enough; and
  • In the summary judgment context, opponents must offer evidence that is not “too conclusory, too speculative, or too incredible to be believed” and that directly contradicts the movant’s showing (Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Service, Inc., 335 P.3d 514 (Alaska 2014)).

Griswold, however, frequently argued there was no evidence of compliance and invited the Court to infer noncompliance. The Court rejected that move: in the face of a presumption of regularity and an affidavit from the city planner, mere absence of affirmative documentary detail is not enough to defeat summary judgment.

3. Evaluation by the Planning Department (HCC 21.95.040)

Under HCC 21.95.040, the Planning Department must “evaluate each amendment” and may only recommend approval if it finds the proposal:

  1. Consistent with and furthering the comprehensive plan;
  2. Reasonable to implement and enforce;
  3. Promoting public health, safety, and welfare; and
  4. Consistent with the intent and wording of the rest of Title 21.

The city planner submitted an affidavit stating that prior to forwarding the amendment, the department examined it under all four factors and found it consistent with each objective. Griswold attacked the lack of written evaluation findings and pointed to:

  • Absence of a separate written evaluation document;
  • Later partial rescission by the Council (arguing this proved initial noncompliance); and
  • Minor textual inconsistencies within the code.

The Court held:

  • HCC 21.95.040 requires an evaluation, not written findings. The absence of a written evaluation document does not show that no evaluation occurred.
  • Subsequent legislative change does not retroactively prove that the initial evaluation was defective; the Council retains broad discretion to revisit zoning.
  • Pointing to “anomalies” or minor inconsistencies is insufficient to rebut the presumption of regularity (McCormick); it does not establish failure to evaluate under the four factors.

Thus, the Planning Department was found to have substantially complied with its evaluative obligations.

4. Staff Report and “Proposed Findings” to the Planning Commission (HCC 21.95.060(b))

HCC 21.95.060(b) requires the Planning Department, within 30 days of determining an amendment application is complete, to present it to the Planning Commission with:

  • Its “comments and recommendations,” and
  • “Proposed findings consistent with those comments and recommendations.”

Griswold argued that “proposed findings” meant a formal set of findings expressly addressing each of the four criteria from HCC 21.95.040.

The Court rejected that interpretation as overly formalistic and inconsistent with the structure of the code:

  • HCC 21.95.040 and 21.95.060(b) are separate subsections; only the former mentions the four evaluation criteria.
  • The latter requires “comments, recommendations, and proposed findings” consistent with those comments, not a second written set of criterion-specific findings.
  • The staff report actually did contain guidance-type statements — e.g., that the changes would increase efficiency and encourage development consistent with the comprehensive plan, and that each district’s changes were matched with its “intent and primary use.” The Court treated these narrative sections as functional proposed findings.

The key doctrinal point here is flexible: “proposed findings” are not a talismanic label. Substantive narrative in staff reports can satisfy the requirement even if not formally labeled “Findings.”

5. Planning Commission’s Written Recommendations to the Council (HCC 21.95.060(d))

HCC 21.95.060(d) obliges the Planning Commission to “submit to the City Council its written recommendations” on the amendment, along with staff materials.

The city planner transmitted a memorandum to the Council stating that the Commission:

  • Had worked with staff on the ordinance,
  • Believed CUPs should be reserved for uses likely to need special conditions, and
  • Recommended that the Council adopt the draft ordinance.

Griswold argued that because the Commission did not sign or directly transmit anything itself, the code was violated.

The Court disagreed:

  • The memo conveyed the Commission’s position and referenced staff reports that had been adopted by the Commission.
  • Substance mattered more than form: the Commission’s “written recommendations” were effectively embodied in the memo and the adopted staff reports forwarded to the Council.

Again, substantial compliance prevailed over a literalistic reading of “submit” or questions of who physically sent the documents.

B. Notice Requirements: What Counts as a “Summary” of an Ordinance?

Under AS 29.25.020(b)(3), when adopting an ordinance a municipality must publish “a summary of the ordinance” and notice of the time and place of the hearing at least five days beforehand. Homer’s code similarly requires a summary of the ordinance and its amendments.

The notices in this case:

  • Announced a hearing on an ordinance “amending [the] Homer City Code…regarding conditional uses in each district,”
  • Listed each affected zoning district, and
  • Provided contact information and directions to the website and physical locations where the full ordinance could be reviewed.

Griswold contended the notices were misleadingly vague because they:

  • Did not specify that CUPs were being converted into permitted uses, and
  • Did not enumerate each specific change to each district’s list of uses.

Relying on Fairbanks North Star Borough v. College Utilities Corp., 689 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1984), and Kotzebue Lions Club v. City of Kotzebue, 955 P.2d 921 (Alaska 1998), the Court reaffirmed that:

  • Notices need only “describe clearly, if generally, what the proposed ordinance would accomplish.”
  • The Legislature deliberately chose to require publication of a summary, not the full text.
  • Even notices that are “incomplete” or “not perfect” may satisfy the statute if they are accurate and sufficiently informative.

The Court concluded:

  • The description that the ordinance amended the code “regarding conditional uses” — combined with listing the affected districts — was an accurate general description of what the ordinance would do.
  • The City was not required to specify the direction of every change (e.g., “converting conditional uses to permitted uses”) or to list all individual use reclassifications.
  • Providing links and locations for review of the full ordinance strengthened the sufficiency of notice when compared to prior cases upholding even sparser summaries.

The notice discussion essentially confirms a lenient, pragmatic reading of AS 29.25.020(b)(3): a reasonably informative, general description with pointers to the full ordinance is enough, even in the context of complex zoning code amendments.

C. Substantive Issues: Due Process, Comprehensive Plans, and Vagueness

1. Substantive Due Process and Zoning: The Rational Basis Standard

Griswold argued that Ordinance 22‑68(A) was:

  • “A product of arbitrary decision-making and improper motives,” and
  • Unrelated to any legitimate governmental purpose.

Substantive due process claims attacking zoning decisions are evaluated under a highly deferential rational basis standard. Citing Concerned Citizens of the South Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1974), and Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1996), the Court reiterated:

A zoning decision violates substantive due process only if it has no reasonable relationship to a legitimate government purpose. The challenger bears the “heavy burden” of demonstrating that no rational basis exists.

Further, as Concerned Citizens emphasizes:

  • If any plausible legitimate purpose is apparent (or offered by the government), opponents must disprove the factual basis for that justification.
  • The “existence of facts known to the court” that provide a rational basis suffices unless the challenger actually disputes those facts.

The record here showed that the City’s stated purposes were:

  • Increasing administrative efficiency,
  • Reducing costs for both the City and applicants, and
  • Encouraging development consistent with the comprehensive plan by easing permitting in certain districts.

These are classic legitimate governmental objectives in the land-use context — similar to the “convenience to the public” and “guid[ance of] growth and development” that the Court has previously accepted as valid (Griswold 925 P.2d at 1023).

On summary judgment, the City’s evidence of those purposes (affidavits, staff reports, meeting minutes) was unrebutted. Griswold instead:

  • Asserted that the ordinance was really intended to “prohibit [him] and other citizens” from appealing CUP approvals, and
  • Relied heavily on a remark by the mayor (who could only break Council ties and did not vote on the ordinance) that CUPs were “the root of almost all city litigation in court.”

The Court held that:

  • Allegations of “improper motive” must be supported by evidence; a single statement about reducing litigation did not show that the Council’s 4–1 vote rested on an unconstitutional purpose.
  • Griswold produced no evidence contradicting the City’s asserted goals of efficiency and development; his allegations remained conclusory and speculative.

Thus, there was at least one rational basis, undisputed in the record; the due process challenge therefore failed as a matter of law.

2. Role of the Comprehensive Plan

Griswold also claimed the ordinance conflicted with the comprehensive plan, arguing that such inconsistency demonstrated a lack of legitimate purpose.

The Court responded in two steps:

  1. It concluded that the ordinance was, in fact, reasonably consistent with the plan’s objectives, such as “guid[ing] Homer’s growth with a focus on increasing the supply and diversity of housing” and “support[ing] development of a variety of well-defined commercial/business districts.” Easing permitting to encourage desired development aligned with these goals.
  2. It reiterated the principle from Griswold 925 P.2d that “nonconformance with a comprehensive plan does not necessarily render a zoning action illegal.” The comprehensive plan is advisory/informative, not binding in the same way as the zoning code.

The comprehensive plan may inform a court’s assessment of legitimacy, but the core due process question remains: is there some rational, legitimate public purpose? Here, there plainly was.

3. Enforceability and the Void-for-Vagueness Challenge

Griswold further asserted that the ordinance was “unenforceable” and void for vagueness.

His primary legal hook in the superior court was AS 29.26.110(a)(4), which requires that municipal ballot initiatives must be “enforceable as a matter of law” to be certified. The Supreme Court dismissed this statutory argument as categorically inapplicable: AS 29.26.110 governs citizen initiatives and referenda, not ordinances adopted by a legislative body.

Regarding vagueness, the Court applied the usual standard: an enactment can be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give persons “adequate notice” of what is required or prohibited (Haggblom v. City of Dillingham, 191 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2008); Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252 (Alaska 2004)). But:

  • Courts presume municipal ordinances are constitutional and must, where possible, construe them to avoid unconstitutionality.
  • The ordinance at issue simply reclassified lists of uses from CUP to permitted in specified districts; it was easily understandable in the context of the existing zoning scheme.
  • Griswold’s “vagueness” arguments were largely policy disagreements or quibbles over consistency, not honest claims of lack of clarity.

Accordingly, the vagueness and “unenforceability” claims failed.

D. Attorney’s Fees: Prevailing Party, Constitutional Litigant Status, and Redacted Bills

1. Prevailing Party Under Civil Rule 82

Under Alaska Civil Rule 82(b)(2), in cases resolved without trial and without a money judgment, the court must award the prevailing party 20% of its actual attorneys’ fees (subject to discretionary adjustment under Rule 82(b)(3)).

Because:

  • The City prevailed on all claims by summary judgment, and
  • No money judgment was involved,

the City was plainly the prevailing party. Griswold argued that he should be treated as prevailing because the City later rescinded some “cornerstone” provisions of the ordinance legislatively. The Court, citing cases such as Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., 31 P.3d 77 (Alaska 2001), and Olivit v. City & Borough of Juneau, 171 P.3d 1137 (Alaska 2007), rejected this:

The prevailing party is “the one who is successful on the main issue of the action and in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and the judgment entered.”

Here, judgment was entered entirely in the City’s favor.

2. Constitutional Litigant Protection (AS 09.60.010(c)(2))

AS 09.60.010(c)(2) generally prohibits fee awards against losing parties who bring nonfrivolous constitutional claims without sufficient economic incentive. To determine whether this protection applies, the Court:

  1. Identifies which claims “clearly concern protection of constitutional rights” (Manning v. State, 355 P.3d 530 (Alaska 2015)), then
  2. Evaluates whether each such constitutional claim is frivolous (Pruitt v. State, 526 P.3d 136 (Alaska 2023); Griswold 556 P.3d at 275–76).

In this case:

  • Only two of Griswold’s claims — those invoking due process — were genuinely constitutional; his procedural-code claims and “unenforceability” claim were not inherently constitutional.
  • Those due process claims were, in the Court’s view, frivolous: “far-fetched” and “completely without merit,” in the language of the 2024 Griswold case.

The Court focused on:

  • The highly deferential rational basis standard;
  • The City’s unrebutted evidence of legitimate purposes; and
  • Griswold’s lack of any specific factual showing that could negate those purposes.

Given this profound evidentiary gap, the Court held that his due process claims were so weak as to be frivolous, disqualifying him from the statutory fee shield.

This aspect of the opinion sends a clear signal: constitutional labels alone do not entitle a litigant to fee protection; the underlying legal and factual basis must be substantial and non-speculative.

3. Discretion to Vary the Fee Award Under Rule 82(b)(3)

Civil Rule 82(b)(3) permits a court to vary the default fee percentage based on several factors, including:

  • Complexity of the litigation,
  • Reasonableness of the hours and fees claimed,
  • Deterrent effect of the award on similarly situated litigants, and
  • Other equitable considerations.

Griswold argued that:

  • The case was not factually or legally complex;
  • The City’s fees were exorbitant and designed to deter citizen challenges;
  • The fee award would chill other zoning litigants.

The Court, however:

  • Emphasized that application of Rule 82(b)(3) is discretionary, not mandatory (Greene v. Tinker, 332 P.3d 21 (Alaska 2014));
  • Noted that fee awards are “presumptively correct” and may be set aside only for “compelling reasons” (Dickson v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources, 433 P.3d 1075 (Alaska 2018));
  • Observed that the superior court had expressly considered the relevant factors and found no reason to vary from the default 20%.

The record showed:

  • Numerous and lengthy filings by Griswold, undercutting the claim that the case was simple;
  • No evidence that the City used litigation as a strategic deterrent against future zoning challenges, as in the unusual circumstance of Dickson;
  • A total 20% fee (~$8,748) comparable to those upheld in other cases as not “so onerous” as to deter meritorious claims (cf. Borer v. Eyak Corp., 507 P.3d 49 (Alaska 2022)).

The Supreme Court thus found no abuse of discretion in leaving the award at the default level.

4. Redacted Billing Records and the Sufficiency Standard

Finally, Griswold argued that the City’s redacted billing records were inadequate to support a fee award and that the superior court should have conducted in camera review of unredacted bills.

Under Hayes v. Xerox Corp., 718 P.2d 929 (Alaska 1986), prevailing parties requesting attorney’s fees must submit “accurate records of the hours expended and a brief description of the services reflected by those hours.” At the same time, Gonzales v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 882 P.2d 389 (Alaska 1994), holds that redaction is permissible so long as it does not “materially interfere with an understanding of the services performed.”

The City submitted 28 pages of billing records with some subject-matter redactions, asserting attorney–client privilege and work-product protections. The Court agreed with the superior court that:

  • The bills itemized the date, hours, and billing attorney for each task;
  • Every entry contained at least a brief description of the work performed; and
  • The redactions did not materially prevent the court from assessing the types of work done or the reasonableness of the time spent.

Accordingly, the redacted records were adequate under Gonzales, and in camera review was unnecessary and properly denied as moot.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Strict Compliance” vs. “Substantial Compliance”

  • Strict compliance means the government must follow every procedural step exactly as written; any deviation, however minor, may invalidate its action.
  • Substantial compliance means the government must meet the essential requirements and purposes of the procedure; minor or technical deviations that cause no real harm do not invalidate the action.

In this case, the Court held Homer’s zoning-amendment procedures require only substantial compliance, making it harder for challengers to overturn ordinances based on technical missteps.

2. “Directory” vs. “Mandatory” Procedural Rules

  • Mandatory rules must be obeyed to the letter; noncompliance invalidates the resulting action.
  • Directory rules are intended as guidance for orderly procedure; they should be followed, but failing to do so does not automatically invalidate the action.

Whether a statute or code is directory or mandatory depends on its wording, the intent behind it, and the practical consequences of rigid enforcement. The Court found HCC 21.95 directory.

3. Presumption of Regularity

When a city council or planning commission follows its public procedures, courts presume it acted lawfully and in good faith. Challengers must bring actual evidence of legal violations; they cannot simply speculate that something “must” have gone wrong behind the scenes.

4. Substantive Due Process in Zoning (Rational Basis Review)

Most zoning challenges are evaluated under the “rational basis” test:

  • The ordinance is valid if there is any conceivable legitimate government purpose it reasonably serves (e.g., public safety, efficiency, economic development, neighborhood character).
  • The challenger must prove there is no rational relation between the ordinance and any legitimate purpose. This is a very tough burden.

Because efficiency and economic development are plainly legitimate purposes, and because Griswold did not rebut those purposes with facts, his due process challenge failed.

5. Relationship Between Comprehensive Plans and Zoning Codes

A comprehensive plan is a general, long-range policy document describing a city’s goals for land use, housing, transportation, etc. A zoning code is the legally binding set of regulations that implement those goals.

  • The comprehensive plan guides zoning decisions but usually is not itself legally binding in the same way as the zoning code.
  • Even if a zoning decision arguably departs from the comprehensive plan, it is not automatically unlawful; courts still ask whether it serves some legitimate purpose.

6. Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine

A law is unconstitutionally vague if:

  • Ordinary people cannot reasonably understand what it requires or prohibits, or
  • It is so undefined that officials can enforce it arbitrarily.

Land-use ordinances that clearly list permitted and conditional uses by district are rarely vague. The ordinance here simply shifted uses between existing categories; it was not ambiguous in the relevant sense.

7. Constitutional Litigant Fee Protection (AS 09.60.010(c)(2))

Alaska law protects some losing parties from paying the government’s attorney’s fees when they bring constitutional claims:

  • The claim must actually concern protection of a constitutional right (not merely cite the Constitution in passing), and
  • The claim must be nonfrivolous (not obviously baseless or far-fetched), and
  • The litigant must lack a sufficient economic incentive to bring the case aside from the constitutional issue.

If a litigant’s constitutional claim is deemed frivolous, the protection does not apply and standard fee rules (Civil Rule 82) govern.

8. Civil Rule 82 and the “Prevailing Party”

In Alaska, unlike many states, the losing party usually pays part of the winning party’s attorney’s fees. Under Civil Rule 82:

  • The “prevailing party” is the one who wins on the main issues and obtains judgment in its favor.
  • In non-monetary, no-trial cases, the prevailing party presumptively receives 20% of its actual reasonable attorney’s fees.
  • The court can raise or lower that percentage for equitable reasons, but only in its discretion.

9. Redacted Bills, Privilege, and Fee Awards

Attorney billing records often contain privileged or work-product information. Alaska law allows redaction if:

  • The records still show hours, dates, and the general nature of the work; and
  • The court can still evaluate the reasonableness of the time and charges.

Complete disclosure of strategy or client communications is not required to support a fee award.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

A. For Municipalities and Planning Bodies

This decision is favorable to municipalities in several respects:

  • Procedural resilience. By holding that HCC 21.95 is directory and requires only substantial compliance, the Court makes it harder for challengers to overturn zoning ordinances based on non-prejudicial procedural imperfections.
  • Flexible documentation requirements. Staff reports and memoranda that clearly articulate the rationale for amendments can satisfy “proposed findings” and recommendation requirements, even if not formalized in separate findings documents.
  • Lenient notice standards. Municipalities can publish concise summaries of complex ordinances, focusing on a clear general description and directing the public to full text, without listing every detailed change.
  • Deference to policy choices. The Court affirms that efficiency, cost savings, and development are legitimate bases for reworking zoning codes to reduce use of conditional permits.

Municipal lawyers and planners can treat this case as confirmation that courts will generally:

  • Presume proper performance of internal procedural steps absent concrete contrary evidence, and
  • Decline to invalidate ordinances over hyper-technical objections where the core purposes of the process were met.

B. For Citizen Litigants and Land-Use Challengers

The opinion also carries important cautionary lessons for citizen challengers:

  • Evidence, not inference. Courts will not infer noncompliance from silence or absence of a particular written form when there is a presumption of regularity and some affirmative evidence from the municipality.
  • High bar for due process claims. Zoning due process challenges require substantial, specific evidence that no rational government purpose exists; courts will not entertain purely policy-based disagreements as constitutional violations.
  • Fee exposure risk. Reframing policy arguments as constitutional claims does not automatically invoke the constitutional litigant fee shield; if those constitutional arguments are too weak, they may be deemed frivolous, leading to fee liability.
  • Limited role of comprehensive plans. Alleged inconsistencies with comprehensive plans may not carry the legal weight some opponents assume; they are aids to interpretation, not absolute constraints.

Particularly for self-represented litigants, the case underscores the importance of:

  • Developing a factual record showing concrete procedural violations or irrational effects;
  • Avoiding overreliance on speculative motives or isolated statements by individual officials;
  • Recognizing the strong deference courts give to legislative judgments in land-use policy.

C. For the Law of Attorney’s Fees in Public-Law Litigation

The decision reinforces several strands in Alaska’s distinctive fee-shifting regime:

  • Constitutional claims must be substantial. The Court continues the line of cases (including the 2024 Griswold decision) that treat flagrantly weak constitutional claims as frivolous, thereby denying AS 09.60.010(c)(2) protection.
  • 20% as a strong default. The Court reiterates that the 20% award under Rule 82(b)(2) is presumptively correct, and adjustments under Rule 82(b)(3) require compelling reasons.
  • Redactions are tolerated. The decision confirms that meaningful redaction of fee records is compatible with fee awards, so long as the court can still discern the general nature and reasonableness of the work.

Together, these holdings contribute to a stable, predictable framework governing fee awards in municipal and constitutional litigation in Alaska.

VI. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

  • HCC 21.95 is directory, not mandatory. Homer’s zoning amendment procedures require only substantial, not strict, compliance. Minor procedural deviations that do not defeat the purposes of the process will not invalidate a zoning ordinance.
  • Public notice “summaries” may be general but must be accurate. A notice that states an ordinance will amend “conditional uses” in specified districts and points to full text for details satisfies AS 29.25.020(b)(3); exhaustive itemization of each change is unnecessary.
  • Substantive due process challenges to zoning face a steep uphill battle. Valid municipal purposes such as efficiency, cost savings, and development readily satisfy rational basis review, absent strong evidence of arbitrariness.
  • Comprehensive plans are influential but not binding. Even if a zoning ordinance arguably departs from a comprehensive plan, it is not necessarily illegal; courts focus on legitimate purposes and rationality.
  • Vagueness claims require genuine ambiguity. Reclassification of uses within an established zoning framework is unlikely to be void for vagueness when the categories and districts are clear.
  • Constitutional litigant fee protection is narrow. Only clearly constitutional and nonfrivolous claims qualify for AS 09.60.010(c)(2) protection. Weak or speculative due process arguments may be labeled frivolous, exposing litigants to Rule 82 fees.
  • Redacted billing records can support fee awards. So long as redactions do not materially obscure the nature and scope of work, courts may rely on redacted invoices to calculate prevailing-party fees.

In the broader legal landscape, Frank Griswold v. City of Homer consolidates a deferential and pragmatic approach to municipal zoning legislation in Alaska. It protects cities from technical attacks on internal procedures, confirms flexible standards for public notice, and signals that constitutional challenges to zoning must rest on more than policy disagreements and conjecture. At the same time, it clarifies the limits of fee protection for constitutional litigants and the evidentiary expectations facing citizens who seek to overturn local land-use decisions in court.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court Of The State Of Alaska

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