Substance Over Label in Pro Se Civil Rights Filings: Commentary on James Malvezzi v. State of Florida (11th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in James Malvezzi v. State of Florida (Nos. 24‑12600 & 24‑13051, Dec. 22, 2025) clarifies an important procedural point at the intersection of:

Pro se litigants’ access to federal courts, and
The strict limitations on removing state criminal prosecutions to federal court.

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” (and therefore not binding precedent under the Eleventh Circuit’s rules), the opinion gives concrete content to the duty of federal district courts to liberally construe pro se filings. Specifically, it holds that when a pro se litigant files a document that:

Is formatted like a civil complaint,
Contains all the elements required by Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
Expressly asserts federal civil rights claims and demands damages,

the district court must treat that filing as a complaint commencing a civil action, even if the document is also styled as a “Notice of Removal” of a state criminal case.

At the same time, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirms that removal of state criminal prosecutions to federal court is permissible only in very narrow, statutorily defined circumstances and that the plaintiff’s attempt to remove his pending state criminal case was improper.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Parties and Allegations

Plaintiff–appellant James Malvezzi, a Florida citizen proceeding pro se (without a lawyer), initiated an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. His initial filing was titled:

“Notice of Removal and Constitutional Complaint of the Terminated State Criminal Prosecution and New Matters to Federal Court.”

Within that filing, he named a broad set of defendants:

State of Florida, Martin County
Clerk of Court of Martin County (official and individual capacities)
Clerk of Court of the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida (official and individual capacities)
Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida (official and individual capacities)
Four officers of the Martin County Sheriff’s Office (official and individual capacities)
A Florida state court judge (individual capacity)
Two assistant state attorneys (official and individual capacities)

Substantively, Malvezzi alleged that:

In November 2023, the defendants assaulted him with physical force and falsely accused him of a crime.
He was thereafter charged as a criminal defendant in a Florida state court in Martin County.
In that criminal case, defendants allegedly prevented him from submitting exculpatory evidence, including a video recording of the attack.
Defendants allegedly conspired to violate his constitutional rights.

The filing invoked:

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights),
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights), and
28 U.S.C. § 1343 as the jurisdictional basis for the federal court to hear the case.

He demanded $10 million in damages.

B. District Court’s Sua Sponte Dismissal

Shortly after the filing, the district court, on its own motion (sua sponte), dismissed the case. It:

Concluded that the filing was a notice of removal by which Malvezzi was attempting to remove his ongoing state criminal prosecution to federal court.
Held that such removal was improper under the federal criminal removal statutes.
Explicitly stated that Malvezzi “has not filed a complaint in this action.”
Directed the clerk to close the case.

Thus, the district court treated the filing solely as an attempted removal, not as an original civil action for damages.

C. Post‑Dismissal Motions and Dual Appeals

After the dismissal:

Malvezzi filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal order.
He then filed, in the district court:
- An application for clerk’s entry of default against the defendants, and
- A motion for reconsideration of the dismissal.
The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider these filings because the case was already on appeal.
Malvezzi then filed a second notice of appeal, bringing that jurisdictional ruling before the Eleventh Circuit as well.

On appeal, both case numbers (24‑12600 and 24‑13051) were consolidated before a panel of Circuit Judges Jordan, Jill Pryor, and Luck, and decided on the Non‑Argument Calendar (without oral argument).

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit’s core holdings and conclusions can be summarized as follows:

The initial filing should have been treated as a complaint.
Applying the rule that pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, the court held that:
- Malvezzi’s document was formatted like a complaint, with a proper caption.
- It identified itself as a “complaint.”
- It stated the basis for federal jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1343).
- It alleged facts and stated why he believed he was entitled to relief (claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985).
- It included a demand for relief (damages of $10 million).
Therefore, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 3, 8(a), and 10(a), it was sufficient to constitute a complaint commencing a civil action.
The district court erred in concluding “no complaint” had been filed and in dismissing the entire case solely as an improper removal.
The attempted removal of the state criminal prosecution was indeed improper.
The court agreed with the district court that:
- Federal statutes allow removal of a state criminal prosecution only in “narrow circumstances,” under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1442a, and 1443.
- Malvezzi’s filing did not show that his case fit any of these provisions.
Hence, to the extent the filing sought criminal removal, it was defective.
No decision on the merits of the civil rights claims or on possible defenses.
The Eleventh Circuit expressly did not decide:
- Whether the allegations were sufficient to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
- Whether sovereign immunity or other immunities bar the claims.
- Whether abstention (most clearly, Younger abstention) should apply while the state criminal case is pending.
Remand for further proceedings as a civil case.
The dismissal order was vacated, and the case was remanded with instructions that the district court treat the initial filing as a complaint and then address any appropriate procedural or substantive issues in the first instance.
Other issues not reached.
Because the court vacated and remanded:
- It did not decide whether the district court was correct that it lacked jurisdiction to address Malvezzi’s post‑appeal motions (default, reconsideration).
- The Eleventh Circuit also denied Malvezzi’s motion demanding release from state prison.

IV. Analysis

A. Liberal Construction of Pro Se Pleadings and the Definition of a “Complaint”

1. Governing Rules: FRCP 3, 8, and 10

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

Rule 3: A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.
Rule 8(a): A complaint must contain:
1. A short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,
2. A short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and
3. A demand for the relief sought.
Rule 10(a): The complaint must have a caption with:
- the court’s name,
- the title of the action,
- the file number, and
- the names of all parties.

The Eleventh Circuit carefully examined the content and format of Malvezzi’s filing and concluded that it met all of these requirements. It emphasized that the filing:

Contained a proper caption with the correct court, case number, and named parties.
Explicitly styled itself, in part, as a “Constitutional Complaint.”
Invoked a federal jurisdictional statute (28 U.S.C. § 1343).
Set out factual allegations explaining why Malvezzi believed his constitutional rights had been violated.
Set forth a clear demand for monetary relief.

Thus, even though the document was non‑standard in title and form (“Notice of Removal and Constitutional Complaint”), its substantive content satisfied the definition of a complaint.

2. Pro Se Litigants and Liberal Construction: Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.

The court applied the long‑standing rule that pleadings filed by pro se litigants must be liberally construed. It cited:

Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014).

In Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that courts should not hold pro se litigants to the same stringent drafting standards as trained attorneys and should interpret their filings to reasonably raise the strongest arguments they suggest. This principle stems from the recognition that:

Pro se litigants often lack legal expertise and familiarity with formal pleading requirements.
Dismissing cases purely because of technical or labeling defects would unduly restrict access to the courts.

In Malvezzi’s case, this principle required the district court to look beyond the heading “Notice of Removal” and to recognize that the filing, in substance, was also a civil rights complaint.

3. “Substance Over Label” in Hybrid Filings

The case effectively establishes (at least as persuasive authority) a practical rule for the Eleventh Circuit:

When a pro se filing is a hybrid document that both purports to remove a state case and asserts independent civil rights claims with all the attributes of a complaint, the district court must treat the filing as commencing a civil action, regardless of its label.

This “substance over label” approach is not novel in federal practice, but this opinion applies it in a focused way to a recurring scenario: pro se defendants in state criminal proceedings attempting to combine:

A challenge to their state prosecution (often via “removal”), and
Separate allegations of civil rights violations by state actors (akin to § 1983 damages actions).

The key point is that the improper nature of the removal attempt does not justify dismissing the separate civil action that is embedded in the same document.

B. Removal of State Criminal Prosecutions: Narrow Statutory Gateways

1. Statutory Framework

The Eleventh Circuit expressly agreed with the district court that Malvezzi could not properly remove his pending state criminal case to federal court. It referenced the limited statutes under which such removal is allowed:

28 U.S.C. § 1442 – Federal officer removal:
- Allows removal of state civil or criminal actions against federal officers (and those acting under them) for acts done under color of such office.
28 U.S.C. § 1442a – Members of the armed forces:
- Permits removal of certain criminal prosecutions against U.S. armed forces members arising from acts done under color of office or status.
28 U.S.C. § 1443 – Civil rights removal:
- Allows removal of criminal prosecutions where a defendant is denied, or cannot enforce in state court, a right under a law providing for equal civil rights.

The court concluded that Malvezzi did not allege facts bringing him within any of these categories. He was neither:

a federal officer, nor
a member of the armed forces acting under color of such status, nor
able to satisfy the stringent requirements for civil rights removal under § 1443.

2. Precedents Cited

To support its conclusion that removal was improper, the Eleventh Circuit cited three key authorities.

a. State v. Meadows, 88 F.4th 1331 (11th Cir. 2023)

In State v. Meadows, the Eleventh Circuit considered the scope of federal officer removal under § 1442, clarifying:

The statutory requirements for a federal officer (or one acting under him) to remove a state proceeding to federal court.
The need for a causal nexus between the officer’s asserted official duties and the conduct underlying the prosecution.

By citing Meadows, the court highlights that:

Federal officer removal is not a general safety valve for unhappy state criminal defendants.
It is a narrow protection for federal officers facing state prosecution for actions tied to federal duties.

Because Malvezzi was a Florida citizen and not a federal officer or agent, Meadows directly supports rejecting his attempt at removal under § 1442.

b. Florida v. Simanonok, 850 F.2d 1429 (11th Cir. 1988)

In Simanonok, the Eleventh Circuit addressed removal under § 1442a by a member of the armed forces. The case underscores:

The limited scope of § 1442a to service members prosecuted for acts done under color of military office or status.

Again, Malvezzi did not allege that he was a member of the armed forces acting in such capacity. Simanonok thus confirms that § 1442a was inapplicable.

c. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966)

Georgia v. Rachel is a leading Supreme Court case interpreting § 1443. The Court held that:

§ 1443(1) applies only where the removal petitioner is denied or cannot enforce specific federal rights “providing for equal civil rights”, typically involving racial equality.
General constitutional rights (e.g., due process) are not ordinarily enough; there must be a law explicitly protecting equal civil rights.

By invoking Rachel, the Eleventh Circuit signaled that:

Civil rights–based removal is narrow and focused on specific equality‑based rights.
A general complaint that a state criminal prosecution violates one’s constitutional rights does not by itself justify removal under § 1443.

Malvezzi’s allegations—about an assault, false accusation, and inability to present evidence—do not, as pleaded, clearly invoke the type of federal “equal civil rights” statute required by § 1443.

3. Coexistence of Improper Removal and a Valid Civil Action

Crucially, the Eleventh Circuit separated two distinct issues:

Whether the state criminal prosecution can be removed (answer: no), and
Whether the same filing also commences a civil rights damages action (answer: yes, when liberally construed).

The district court had effectively collapsed these into a single question, treating the entire filing as an improper removal notice and dismissing it wholesale. The Eleventh Circuit corrects this by:

Affirming the dismissal in part as to the attempted removal (i.e., the criminal case remains in state court), but
Reversing as to the civil component and instructing that it be treated as a federal complaint.

C. Jurisdictional Basis: 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and Civil Rights Statutes

The opinion notes that Malvezzi invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1343 as the basis for jurisdiction. Section 1343 gives district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions “to redress the deprivation, under color of any State law” of rights secured by the Constitution and federal statutes providing for civil rights.

The substantive claims were brought under:

42 U.S.C. § 1983 – the general vehicle for suing state and local officials for violations of federal constitutional rights under color of state law.
42 U.S.C. § 1985 – targeting conspiracies to interfere with civil rights.

Thus, on its face, the complaint invoked a classic federal civil rights jurisdictional framework:

§ 1983 / § 1985 as the causes of action, and
§ 1343 as the jurisdictional grant allowing federal courts to hear such cases.

D. Issues Expressly Left Open for the District Court on Remand

The Eleventh Circuit explicitly disclaimed any view on several potentially dispositive issues. The district court is free to reach these on remand:

1. Sufficiency of the Allegations (Rule 12(b)(6))

The court emphasized that it was not deciding whether the allegations state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On remand, the district court may:

Screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (if in forma pauperis), or
Address Rule 12(b)(6) motions from defendants, applying modern pleading standards (e.g., Twombly/Iqbal).

Issues likely to arise include:

Whether specific defendants are personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivations.
Whether the bare allegations of “conspiracy” under § 1985 meet the requirement of showing an agreement and, typically, a class‑based discriminatory animus.

2. Sovereign Immunity and Other Immunities

The court also noted that it took no view on whether sovereign immunity would bar any claims. On remand, the district court may confront:

Eleventh Amendment (state sovereign) immunity as to:
- The State of Florida.
- State courts and their clerks when sued in their official capacities (as arms of the state).
- State prosecutors in their official capacities for damages.
Judicial immunity for the state judge, at least as to actions taken in a judicial capacity.
Prosecutorial immunity for assistant state attorneys, at least for actions intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.
Qualified immunity for law enforcement officers sued in their individual capacities.

The Eleventh Circuit’s silence on these questions flags that the opinion should not be read as validating the viability of the claims; it addresses only the threshold characterization of the filing as a complaint.

3. Abstention While State Criminal Proceedings Are Pending

The court also highlighted, without deciding, whether the district court should abstain from reviewing the claims while the state criminal case against Malvezzi is ongoing.

This alludes to the Younger abstention doctrine (from Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)), which:

Generally prevents federal courts from interfering with ongoing state criminal prosecutions,
Absent exceptional circumstances such as bad faith prosecutions, harassment, or flagrantly unconstitutional statutes.

On remand, the district court may determine that:

Certain forms of relief (especially those that would directly interfere with the state prosecution) are barred by Younger abstention, while
Other aspects (such as damages for past misconduct) might proceed, depending on timing and the degree of interference with the ongoing case.

4. Interaction with Habeas Corpus and Requests for Release

The Eleventh Circuit denied Malvezzi’s motion demanding release from state prison. Although the court did not elaborate, this aligns with the well‑established principle (e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez) that:

Challenges to the fact or duration of confinement must generally be brought in habeas corpus proceedings (e.g., under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for state prisoners),
While § 1983 actions are principally vehicles for damages or injunctive relief short of immediate release.

Thus, even if his § 1983 claims survive screening, a request for immediate release would not be properly granted within a § 1983 damages suit and is procedurally distinct.

5. Post‑Appeal Filings and Jurisdiction

Because the Eleventh Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded, it declined to reach whether the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider:

the application for entry of default, and
the motion for reconsideration

filed after the first notice of appeal.

This relates to the general rule that the filing of a notice of appeal:

Divests the district court of jurisdiction over “those aspects of the case involved in the appeal,” but
Leaves jurisdiction in the district court for collateral matters (e.g., certain sanctions, fees, or clerical issues).

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision to avoid this question leaves the jurisdictional boundaries for such post‑appeal motions to be worked out in future cases.

V. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

To make the opinion more accessible, it is helpful to unpack several core legal terms and doctrines referenced or implicated in the decision.

1. Pro Se Litigant

A pro se litigant is someone who represents themselves in court without an attorney. Courts:

Read pro se filings more generously than lawyer‑drafted documents.
Try to interpret them to raise, where possible, the legal issues they appear to intend, even if the litigant uses incorrect terminology or formats.

2. Complaint vs. Notice of Removal

Complaint: The document that starts a civil lawsuit. It sets out:
- Why the case is in that court (jurisdiction),
- What happened (facts and claims), and
- What the plaintiff wants (relief).
Notice of removal: A document by which a defendant in a state‑court case transfers that existing case to federal court under specific statutory authority.

In this case, Malvezzi’s document did both at once. The appellate court held that, for a pro se litigant, the presence of complaint‑like features meant it had to be treated as a complaint, even though the attempt at criminal removal was invalid.

3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985

§ 1983:
- Allows individuals to sue state and local officials who, acting “under color of state law,” violate their federal constitutional or statutory rights.
- Common in cases alleging police misconduct, due process violations, or unconstitutional state actions.
§ 1985:
- Targets conspiracies to deprive people of “equal protection of the laws” or equal privileges and immunities.
- Typically requires proof of an agreement among two or more people and, for many claims, a class‑based discriminatory animus (often racial).

4. 28 U.S.C. § 1343

Section 1343 gives federal district courts jurisdiction over civil actions to redress the deprivation of constitutional and certain civil rights under color of state law. It is the standard jurisdictional statute paired with § 1983.

5. Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity generally protects states and “arms of the state” (such as many state agencies and courts) from being sued in federal court for money damages unless:

The state clearly consents (waives immunity), or
Congress validly abrogates that immunity in a particular statute.

Because Malvezzi sued the State of Florida and various state officials and court clerks, the district court on remand may have to dismiss some claims on sovereign immunity grounds, at least as to official‑capacity claims seeking damages.

6. Abstention (Younger Doctrine)

The Younger abstention doctrine generally prohibits federal courts from interfering with ongoing state criminal prosecutions. The idea is to:

Respect the role of state courts in enforcing state criminal law, and
Avoid conflicting federal and state rulings on the same prosecution.

While Younger typically bars injunctions or declaratory judgments that would halt or undermine the state prosecution, its application to damages claims is more nuanced and fact‑dependent. The Eleventh Circuit left this to the district court to sort out.

7. Removal of State Criminal Cases

Ordinary criminal defendants in state court cannot simply “remove” their prosecutions to federal court because they believe their constitutional rights are being violated. Removal is strictly limited to:

Federal officers or those acting under them (§ 1442),
Armed forces members in certain circumstances (§ 1442a), and
Defendants who meet stringent criteria under the civil rights removal statute (§ 1443), typically tied to racial equality statutes or similarly specific equal‑rights laws.

Malvezzi did not satisfy any of these categories. Thus his state criminal case remains in state court, even as his civil rights damages suit proceeds separately in federal court.

VI. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. For Pro Se Litigants and Access to Federal Courts

The decision reinforces that:

Pro se litigants will not be penalized merely for mislabeling or awkwardly formatting their pleadings.
Courts must look to the content of a pro se filing to determine whether it states a civil claim, even if it is combined with procedurally improper requests (like an invalid removal).

Practically, this means:

A state criminal defendant who submits a hybrid “notice of removal / complaint” in federal court will not automatically lose the ability to pursue a civil rights damages claim merely because the removal piece fails.
District courts are reminded to separate the valid portions of such filings (the complaint) from invalid ones (the removal) rather than dismiss everything wholesale.

B. For District Courts in the Eleventh Circuit

While the opinion is unpublished and not binding precedent, it is a clear signal that:

District judges should carefully review pro se filings that seem irregular in title or structure.
When a filing objectively satisfies Rule 8 and Rule 10, it should be treated as a complaint—even if mislabeled or combined with other requests.
Improper removal of criminal cases should be dealt with by rejecting the removal, not by closing the file on an otherwise viable civil rights action embedded in the same document.

C. Clarifying the Boundary Between Civil Rights Actions and Criminal Removal

The case draws a sharper line between:

Challenging the validity or conduct of a state criminal prosecution itself (which is generally reserved to:
- the state courts, and
- federal habeas corpus after exhaustion of state remedies), and
Seeking damages or other civil relief for alleged constitutional violations by state actors before or during that prosecution.

The Eleventh Circuit’s approach:

Prevents litigants from using removal statutes as an end‑run around state criminal jurisdiction, but
Preserves their ability to pursue independent civil rights damages actions in federal court, subject to immunities and abstention doctrines.

D. Limited Precedential Weight but Significant Persuasive Value

Because the opinion is “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” it is:

Not binding precedent under Eleventh Circuit rules, but
Available as persuasive authority on how to handle similar hybrid pro se filings.

It is particularly instructive for:

Magistrate judges and district judges performing initial screening of pro se complaints.
Clerk’s offices that must categorize new filings as complaints, notices of removal, or both.

VII. Conclusion

James Malvezzi v. State of Florida underscores a central procedural principle in federal civil rights litigation: for pro se litigants, substance controls over form. Even when a filing bears the confusing title of “Notice of Removal and Constitutional Complaint,” if it:

Contains the elements required of a complaint under Rules 8 and 10, and
Clearly seeks redress for alleged constitutional violations under § 1983 and related statutes,

the district court must treat it as commencing a civil action under Rule 3.

At the same time, the opinion reaffirms that:

Removal of state criminal prosecutions is a narrowly controlled exception governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1442a, and 1443.
Ordinary criminal defendants cannot remove their prosecutions to federal court simply because they allege constitutional violations.

On remand, the district court may well conclude that some or all of Malvezzi’s claims are barred by:

Failure to state a claim,
Various immunities, or
Abstention doctrines while the criminal case is ongoing.

But the Eleventh Circuit’s intervention ensures that those questions will be answered on the proper footing—treating his filing as what, in substance, it is: a civil complaint alleging constitutional violations, not merely an invalid notice of removal. In this way, the decision reinforces both the procedural protections for pro se litigants and the structural limits on federal interference with state criminal prosecutions.