Substance Over Caption: Liberal Construction of Pro Se Filings as Complaints in Malvezzi v. State of Florida

I. Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision, though marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and issued on the non-argument calendar, delivers a clear and practically important message for district courts handling pro se litigation: when a self-represented litigant’s initial filing is substantively a complaint that satisfies the basic pleading rules, it must be treated as a complaint, regardless of how it is titled or partially mis-framed.

The case arises from an attempt by a Florida criminal defendant, James Malvezzi, to bring federal civil rights claims against a variety of state and county actors—while simultaneously purporting to “remove” his state criminal prosecution to federal court. The district court treated the filing exclusively as a defective notice of removal and dismissed the action outright, expressly stating that no complaint had been filed. The Eleventh Circuit vacated that dismissal, holding that the filing—liberally construed in light of Malvezzi’s pro se status—functioned as a civil complaint and had to be treated as such.

At the same time, the court reaffirmed the very narrow circumstances under which state criminal proceedings may be removed to federal court, concluding that any attempted removal here was improper. The decision thus sits at the intersection of:

Federal pleading rules (Rules 3, 8, and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure),
The liberal construction required for pro se filings, and
The stringent statutory limits on removal of state criminal cases under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1442a, and 1443.

This commentary analyzes the opinion’s reasoning, its use of precedent, and its likely impact on future civil rights and removal practice in the Eleventh Circuit.

II. Background of the Case

A. Parties and Allegations

Plaintiff–Appellant: James Malvezzi, a Florida citizen proceeding pro se.

Defendants–Appellees included:

The State of Florida (Martin County);
The Clerk of Court of Martin County, in both official and individual capacities;
The Clerk of Court of the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida, in official and individual capacities;
The Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida, in official and individual capacities;
Four officers of the Martin County Sheriff’s Office, in official and individual capacities;
A Florida state court judge, in his individual capacity;
Two assistant state attorneys, in their official and individual capacities.

According to the filing, in November 2023:

The defendants allegedly assaulted Malvezzi with physical force and falsely accused him of a crime.
As a result, he was charged in a criminal case in Florida state court in Martin County.
In the state court case, defendants allegedly prevented him from submitting evidence, including a video of the attack.
He further asserted that the defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights.

On the basis of these allegations, he purported to bring claims under:

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil action for deprivation of rights under color of state law), and
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights).

He alleged federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights jurisdiction) and sought $10 million in damages.

B. The Initial Filing in Federal Court

Malvezzi initiated the federal action by filing a document titled:

“Notice of Removal and Constitutional Complaint of the Terminated State Criminal Prosecution and New Matters to Federal Court.”

The filing had a proper federal case caption, set out parties, invoked federal jurisdiction, set forth factual allegations and legal claims, and demanded relief—features typical of a civil complaint. At the same time, the title and some aspects of the text attempted to “remove” his state criminal prosecution into federal court.

C. District Court Proceedings

The district court, on its own motion (sua sponte), dismissed the action shortly after filing. It:

Construed the filing as a notice of removal of the pending state criminal case;
Concluded that removal of those criminal proceedings was improper under the applicable removal statutes; and
Directed the clerk to close the case, expressly stating that Malvezzi “has not filed a complaint in this action.”

After the dismissal, but while his first appeal was pending, Malvezzi filed:

An application for clerk’s entry of default, and
A motion for reconsideration.

The district court ruled that, because a notice of appeal had already been filed, it lacked jurisdiction to entertain those post-dismissal filings. Malvezzi then filed a second notice of appeal. Both appeals (docketed as Nos. 24-12600 and 24-13051) were consolidated and resolved in this opinion.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit (Judges Jordan, Jill Pryor, and Luck, per curiam) held:

The district court erred in concluding that no complaint had been filed.
Liberally construed, the initial filing was a complaint starting a civil action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3. It satisfied Rule 8(a)’s requirements (jurisdictional basis, statement of entitlement to relief, and demand for relief) and had a proper caption as required by Rule 10(a).
The case must be vacated and remanded.
The dismissal order was vacated, and the case was remanded with instructions that the district court treat the initial filing as a complaint and proceed accordingly.
Any attempted removal of the state criminal proceedings was improper.
To the extent the filing sought to remove state criminal proceedings, removal did not meet the narrow statutory conditions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1442a, or 1443. The court affirmed the district court’s conclusion on that limited point.
No ruling on the merits or potential bars to the claims.
The court explicitly declined to decide:
- Whether the complaint sufficiently states a claim,
- Whether any claims are barred (e.g., by sovereign immunity), or
- Whether abstention (e.g., because of the ongoing state criminal case) would be appropriate.
Those issues remain open for the district court on remand.
Post-dismissal motions and jurisdictional issues are mooted by the remand.
Because the dismissal was vacated, the Eleventh Circuit did not reach the separate question whether the district court correctly refused to entertain the application for default and motion for reconsideration on the ground that an appeal was pending.
Motion for release from state prison denied.
The court denied a motion by Malvezzi seeking release from state prison, signaling the limited procedural scope of this appeal (focused on the characterization of the initial filing, not habeas relief).

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rules 3, 8, and 10

The core of the decision rests on the relationship between three basic procedural rules:

Rule 3 – Commencement of Action
“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”
The Eleventh Circuit’s central question: was the initial filing a “complaint” in the sense required by Rule 3?
Rule 8(a) – General Rules of Pleading
A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
1. a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction;
2. a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
3. a demand for the relief sought.
The court explicitly noted that Malvezzi’s filing included all three.
Rule 10(a) – Caption; Names of Parties
Requires a caption with the court’s name, title of the action, file number, and names of parties. The court emphasized that the filing’s caption met these requirements and even used the word “complaint” in the title.

By cross-referencing Rules 3, 8, and 10, the Eleventh Circuit grounded its conclusion in the textual requirements for what constitutes a complaint and thus for what commences a civil action.

2. Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014)

The decision cites Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd. for a familiar but powerful proposition: pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. In Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that courts should not employ overly technical or formalistic rules when reading filings made by self-represented litigants. Instead, courts should look to the substance and intent of the filing.

Here, that principle is operationalized in a pointed way: even if a pro se filing is confusing, multi-purpose, or partly mislabeled (e.g., “Notice of Removal and Constitutional Complaint”), the court must separate its distinct functional components and recognize a viable complaint when the content satisfies the pleading rules.

3. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 – Civil Rights Jurisdiction

The court notes that Malvezzi invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which provides district courts with original jurisdiction over civil actions brought:

“To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law … of any right … secured by the Constitution of the United States.”

By highlighting this, the opinion underlines that the filing explicitly invoked a proper jurisdictional basis for federal civil rights claims, reinforcing its character as a complaint rather than a mere notice of removal.

4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985

Although the Eleventh Circuit did not analyze these statutes in depth, it noted that:

§ 1983 authorizes suits against persons acting under color of state law for deprivation of federal rights;
§ 1985 addresses conspiracies to interfere with civil rights.

The invocation of these statutes further confirms that Malvezzi’s filing was not merely procedural (removal) but also substantive (a civil damages action), again supporting its construction as a complaint.

5. Criminal Removal Statutes: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1442a, and 1443

In a footnote, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that to the extent the filing sought to remove the pending state criminal action, such removal was improper. The court referenced:

28 U.S.C. § 1442 – Federal Officer Removal
Allows removal of state actions against federal officers (and those acting under them) for acts under color of office. The court cited:
State v. Meadows, 88 F.4th 1331 (11th Cir. 2023), which elaborates on when federal officer removal is available, including in criminal contexts.
28 U.S.C. § 1442a – Armed Forces Members
Allows removal of certain criminal prosecutions against members of the armed forces under limited conditions. The court cited:
Florida v. Simanonok, 850 F.2d 1429 (11th Cir. 1988), which discusses the circumstances under which such removal is appropriate.
28 U.S.C. § 1443 – Civil Rights Removal
Permits removal when a defendant is denied or cannot enforce in state court a right under any law providing for equal civil rights. The court cited:
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966), the leading Supreme Court case defining the narrow scope of § 1443(1) civil-rights-based removal.

Citing these authorities, the Eleventh Circuit underscored that removal of state criminal prosecutions is strictly limited. The fact that Malvezzi’s filing did not meet these statutory requirements confirms that, while part of his document was an invalid attempt at removal, the rest was nonetheless a valid civil pleading.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Framing the Central Question: What Is a Complaint?

The court posed a precise, narrow question:

“Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ‘[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 3. The question before us in this appeal is whether Malvezzi’s initial filing in this case was a complaint.”

This framing is important: the Eleventh Circuit did not address the sufficiency of the claims, the merits, or the procedural posture beyond the initial filing. It focused exclusively on whether the district court mischaracterized that filing.

2. Liberal Construction of Pro Se Pleadings

Relying on Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., the court reiterated that:

“Because Malvezzi was proceeding pro se, the district court was required to liberally construe his pleadings.”

“Liberal construction” means that courts:

Look to the substance of the filing rather than its precise form or label;
Consider what the litigant appears to be trying to accomplish, especially when that litigant is not trained in the law;
Avoid dismissing potentially valid claims based solely on technical missteps in wording, labeling, or formatting.

The Eleventh Circuit applied this principle by examining:

The structure and caption of the filing;
The substantive content (allegations, references to statutes, demands for relief); and
The invoked jurisdictional basis.

3. Why the Filing Was a Complaint

The court identified several features demonstrating that the filing met Rule 8 and Rule 10:

Caption form: It “had a caption that set forth all the required information, including the court’s name, a file number, and the names of all parties,” in compliance with Rule 10(a). Importantly, “the caption also included a title identifying the filing as a complaint.”
Jurisdictional statement: It set forth the basis for invoking federal jurisdiction—28 U.S.C. § 1343 for civil rights violations under color of state law.
Substantive allegations: It provided “a statement showing why Malvezzi believed he was entitled to relief,” including:
- Alleged physical assault by officers,
- False accusation of a crime,
- Interference with his ability to present evidence in state court, and
- Alleged conspiracy among officials to violate his constitutional rights.
Demand for relief: It contained “a demand for relief,” specifically $10 million in damages.

On this basis, the court concluded:

“Given the filing’s content, we conclude that the district court erred in failing to construe it as a complaint.”

In other words, when viewed through the required pro se lens, the document objectively satisfied all the necessary elements of a complaint under Rule 8 and Rule 10, and thus commenced a civil action under Rule 3.

4. Separating the Civil Complaint from the Defective Removal Attempt

The opinion then carefully disentangled two conceptually distinct aspects of the filing:

The civil rights complaint portion – which adequately invoked § 1983, § 1985, § 1343 jurisdiction, articulated wrongs, and sought damages.
The attempted removal of state criminal proceedings – which, as the court emphasized, was improper.

On removal, the court stated:

“We agree with the district court that to the extent that Malvezzi’s filing sought to remove his pending state criminal proceedings to federal court, removal was improper. Federal law permits the removal of a state criminal action to federal court in narrow circumstances only. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442; 1442a; 1443. Malvezzi’s filing did not establish that removal was appropriate under any of these statutes.”

The key analytical move here is that the court:

Affirmed the district court’s substantive conclusion about removal, but
Rejected the district court’s procedural characterization of the entire filing as “only” a notice of removal.

Thus, a single document can:

Be a valid complaint initiating a civil action, and
Contain an invalid attempt to remove a state case, which may be disregarded or rejected on its own terms.

The district court’s error lay in failing to separate these two components and in throwing out the entire action on the basis of the defective part.

5. Scope of the Appellate Holding and Issues Left Open

The Eleventh Circuit expressly limited its holding. It cautioned:

No ruling on sufficiency of the claims:
“We caution that we make no decision today about whether the allegations in Malvezzi’s complaint are sufficient to state a claim for relief.”
No ruling on sovereign immunity or abstention:
“We also do not decide whether his claims are barred for any other reason, such as sovereign immunity, or whether the district court should abstain from reviewing the claims in the complaint while Malvezzi’s state court criminal case is pending.”

The court underscored that nothing in its decision prevents the district court, on remand, from:

Scrutinizing the complaint under the usual pleading standards (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) failure to state a claim);
Determining whether some or all defendants are immune (for instance, under Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity or other immunities);
Applying abstention doctrines (such as Younger abstention) in light of ongoing state criminal proceedings; or
Addressing any other procedural bars, apart from the specific issue decided in this opinion.

The only binding directive is that, on remand, the district court must treat the initial filing as a complaint and may not dismiss it on the theory that no complaint was filed.

C. Impact on Future Cases and Legal Practice

1. Reinforcing the Duty to Liberally Construe Pro Se Filings

The decision strengthens, in a concrete setting, the principle that federal courts must give substantive effect to pro se filings that meet the basic pleading standards, regardless of how inartfully they are drawn or labeled.

For district courts, especially within the Eleventh Circuit:

If a pro se litigant files a document that looks like a complaint, contains a caption, names defendants, states a jurisdictional basis, sets forth factual allegations, and demands relief, the court must treat it as a complaint—even if parts of the same document pursue some improper or unavailable procedural mechanism (such as invalid removal).
Courts must avoid collapsing the analysis of one part of a filing (e.g., defective removal jurisdiction) into a wholesale conclusion that no civil action exists.

In short, form cannot defeat substance where a pro se litigant has in fact commenced a civil action in compliance with the basic federal rules.

2. Practical Consequences for Prisoner and Pro Se Civil Rights Litigation

Because many civil rights suits in federal court are brought by prisoners or other pro se litigants, the ruling has several practical effects:

Access to screening and adjudication:
Instead of being summarily closed as a misdirected “notice of removal,” Malvezzi’s case will now enter the normal federal civil process. The district court may:
- Require an amended complaint,
- Screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) or 1915A (if applicable),
- Address motions to dismiss, or
- Proceed to discovery or summary judgment if claims survive.
Clarifying expectations:
Pro se litigants often misuse terminology like “removal,” but if the underlying document otherwise states a cognizable claim, it should not be discarded solely for mislabeling. This decision protects the litigant’s opportunity to have his civil claims considered on their own merits.

3. Affirming the Narrow Scope of Criminal Removal

The opinion reinforces another important doctrinal point: removal of state criminal prosecutions to federal court is exceedingly rare and tightly circumscribed. The court’s quick dismissal of the removal attempt, and its citations to Meadows, Simanonok, and Georgia v. Rachel, serve as a reminder that:

Criminal removal under §§ 1442, 1442a, and 1443 is limited largely to:
- Federal officers and persons acting under them for acts done under color of office (§ 1442),
- Members of the armed forces in specific circumstances (§ 1442a), and
- Cases where a defendant is unable to enforce equal civil rights in state court under particular federal civil rights laws (§ 1443, as narrowly interpreted in Rachel).
Disagreements with state criminal procedures, or general allegations of unfairness, typically do not suffice.

Thus, while the decision opens a path for civil damages litigation by clarifying how to treat the complaint, it simultaneously forecloses any suggestion that criminal defendants can routinely “remove” pending state prosecutions to federal court on broad civil-rights-based theories.

4. Anticipated Issues on Remand

On remand, the district court will likely confront several issues:

Failure to state a claim:
Are the factual allegations sufficiently specific and plausible under modern pleading standards (e.g., Twombly/Iqbal) to support § 1983 or § 1985 claims?
Sovereign and official immunities:
The court flagged “sovereign immunity” as a possible bar. This likely refers to:
- Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims against the State of Florida itself, and
- Potential immunity for certain officials in their official capacities for damages claims.
Judicial and prosecutorial immunity:
Though not mentioned by name, the presence of a state judge and two assistant state attorneys as defendants suggests the likely applicability of:
- Absolute judicial immunity for actions taken in a judicial capacity, and
- Absolute prosecutorial immunity for actions intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.
Abstention (likely Younger):
The Eleventh Circuit hints that the district court may consider abstaining from adjudicating some or all claims while the state criminal case remains pending. Under Younger v. Harris, federal courts often decline to interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings except in narrow circumstances.
Procedural housekeeping:
The district court will also need to address service of process, any in forma pauperis status, and how to handle the earlier post-dismissal filings (default, reconsideration) in light of the fact that the case is no longer closed.

Although the opinion does not pre-ordain the outcome on any of these questions, it ensures that they will be analyzed through the proper procedural lens—namely, a live civil complaint rather than a dismissed non-action.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. “Pro Se” and Liberal Construction

A pro se litigant is someone who represents himself or herself without a lawyer. Courts are instructed to interpret pro se filings “liberally,” meaning:

They do not require perfect legal language;
They focus on the substance rather than strict technical form; and
They try to discern what legal claim the person is actually trying to bring, even if the person uses imprecise labels or mixed terminology.

2. Complaint and Commencement of a Civil Action

A complaint is the document that starts a civil lawsuit in federal court. Under the rules:

It must say why the court has power over the case (jurisdiction);
It must set out, in short and plain terms, what happened and why the plaintiff believes he is entitled to relief;
It must specify what kind of relief is being requested (e.g., money damages); and
It must have a proper caption, identifying court, parties, and case number.

Once such a complaint is filed, a “civil action” is considered formally commenced.

3. Removal of a State Criminal Case

Removal is a procedure that allows certain cases filed in state court to be moved to federal court. While civil cases can often be removed (for example, based on federal question or diversity jurisdiction), removing a state criminal case is very rare and only allowed in specific situations written into federal statutes, such as:

When the defendant is a federal officer acting in official capacity;
When the defendant is a member of the armed forces in certain listed scenarios; or
When a defendant cannot enforce an equal civil right in state court as specified by federal civil rights laws (under a narrow reading).

Simply claiming that a state trial is unfair or that rights are being violated is usually not enough to remove a state criminal case to federal court.

4. Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity generally means that a state (like the State of Florida) cannot be sued for money damages in federal court unless:

The state clearly consents to be sued; or
Congress validly abrogates that immunity under certain constitutional powers.

This doctrine often prevents plaintiffs from recovering money damages against a state or state agencies, even when they allege constitutional violations. The Eleventh Circuit flagged this as a possible bar that the district court must consider on remand, but did not decide it.

5. Abstention (Ongoing State Proceedings)

Abstention refers to situations where a federal court decides that, even though it might technically have jurisdiction, it should decline to exercise that jurisdiction because of ongoing state proceedings. Under Younger v. Harris, federal courts usually do not interfere with ongoing state criminal cases, especially by granting injunctions or relief that would disrupt those prosecutions, except in very unusual circumstances (such as bad faith prosecutions or flagrant lack of an adequate state forum).

The Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court may consider such abstention principles in addressing the complaint on remand.

6. “Vacated and Remanded”

When a court of appeals says an order is “vacated and remanded”, it:

Vacates (nullifies) the lower court’s decision, as if that dismissal had not occurred; and
Remands (sends back) the case to the lower court with instructions on what to do next.

In this case, the instruction is that the district court must treat the initial filing as a complaint and then proceed to evaluate it under normal civil procedures.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of Malvezzi v. State of Florida

This unpublished Eleventh Circuit opinion does not break new doctrinal ground in the traditional sense, but it crystallizes and applies several important principles in a setting that frequently arises in practice:

Substance over caption for pro se litigants.
A document that is functionally a complaint—containing a jurisdictional statement, factual allegations, and a demand for relief—must be treated as such, even if it also attempts to perform another function (like removing a state criminal case) and even if that other function is legally impermissible.
Limited scope of criminal removal.
The federal removal statutes for criminal cases, particularly §§ 1442, 1442a, and 1443, are narrow. Efforts by state criminal defendants to use these provisions broadly will generally fail unless strict statutory conditions are met, as reinforced by cases like Meadows, Simanonok, and Georgia v. Rachel.
Preservation of access to federal civil rights forums.
By requiring district courts to recognize and process complaints embedded within multi-purpose pro se filings, the ruling helps ensure that federal civil rights claims—even if they are ultimately unsuccessful on the merits—receive their proper day in court rather than being dismissed on a misunderstanding of the nature of the filing.
Clear delimitation of the appellate decision’s scope.
The Eleventh Circuit carefully avoids pre-judging the outcome on issues such as sovereign immunity, the sufficiency of the allegations, and abstention. Those remain for the district court to decide, but now will be decided with the procedural posture correctly defined.

In sum, Malvezzi v. State of Florida stands as a pointed reminder to federal district courts, within the Eleventh Circuit and beyond, that when dealing with pro se litigants the court must:

Look beyond the caption or title of a filing,
Identify and give effect to any portion that satisfies the minimal requirements of a civil complaint, and
Confine dismissals to proper legal grounds, not to mischaracterization of what a pro se litigant has actually filed.

The precedent thus refines and reinforces the principle that access to federal civil adjudication should not be lost through mislabeling, especially when the underlying pleading satisfies the Federal Rules.