Substance Over Caption: Illegal‑Exaction Suits Against the State and the Limits of Sovereign Immunity in Arkansas

I. Introduction

In Arkansas Department of Education v. Faulkenberry, 2025 Ark. 203 (Dec. 11, 2025), the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed a procedural but highly consequential question: when a taxpayer challenges alleged unconstitutional spending of public funds under the Arkansas Constitution, can the State invoke sovereign immunity to obtain an immediate (interlocutory) appeal from the denial of its motion to dismiss?

The case arises from a broader political and legal controversy: the constitutionality of the LEARNS Act’s “Educational Freedom Account” (EFA) voucher program, which allows public funds to be used to pay for private and home-school educational expenses for “eligible students.” A group of Arkansas citizens and taxpayers—Gwen Faulkenberry, Special Renee Sanders, Anika Whitfield, and Kimberly Crutchfield—contend that this program unlawfully diverts public school funds and tax revenues from their constitutionally required purposes to private education.

The State, through the Arkansas Department of Education, the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration, and various state officials, argued that sovereign immunity barred the suit and that the circuit court’s refusal to dismiss was immediately appealable under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 2(a)(10). The Supreme Court disagreed and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The core holding is twofold:

The plaintiffs’ case is, in substance, an illegal‑exaction suit under article 16, section 13 of the Arkansas Constitution, regardless of how the complaint is styled.
Sovereign immunity does not apply to illegal‑exaction claims; therefore, there is no right to an interlocutory appeal under Rule 2(a)(10) from the denial of the State’s motion to dismiss.

This decision both reinforces and subtly extends Arkansas’s longstanding doctrine that taxpayer illegal‑exaction suits operate outside the normal sovereign-immunity barrier—even when the defendant is the State itself and the spending at issue involves statewide programs.

II. Background of the Case

A. Parties and Program at Issue

The appellants (“the State”) comprise:

The Arkansas Department of Education and its Secretary, Jacob Oliva;
The Arkansas State Board of Education and its Chair, Vice-Chair, and members (sued in their official capacities);
The Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration and its Secretary, Jim Hudson.

The appellees (“Faulkenberry”) are Arkansas citizens, taxpayers, and residents bringing a class-type taxpayer action, nominally “in behalf of [themselves] and all others interested,” to challenge the financing of the EFA program created by section 42 of the LEARNS Act.

According to paragraph 30 of the complaint, the EFA program:

Creates the “Arkansas Children’s Education Freedom Account Program,” commonly called the “Voucher Program”;
Allows “public school funds derived from public taxes assessed and collected under the laws of Arkansas for the public schools” to be deposited into a “Freedom Account” for each eligible student (a resident eligible to enroll in public school);
Uses those funds for tuition, uniforms, and other educational goods and services from private schools, home-schooling arrangements, and private service providers; and
Directs that Freedom Account funds are never paid to students or parents, but spent by the State directly to private recipients.

B. Claims in the Complaint

Faulkenberry’s 90-paragraph complaint asserts, among other things, that:

The EFA program violates article 14, sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Arkansas Constitution by unlawfully diverting public school funding (public tax revenue) from the public-school system to private schools and other private educational providers.
The EFA program violates article 16, section 11, which requires that:
“[N]o moneys arising from a tax levied for any purpose shall be used for any other purpose.”
Plaintiffs allege, in substance, that tax revenues—particularly those raised for public education—are being used for different purposes (private education).
In a separate, explicit illegal‑exaction count (Count V), the plaintiffs assert that the alleged constitutional violations result in unauthorized and unconstitutional spending of public funds, and they seek:
- A declaration that the EFA program is unconstitutional;
- An injunction stopping any further implementation or funding of the voucher program;
- An order requiring recipients of EFA expenditures to reimburse the State for amounts they received.

The complaint is expressly brought “pursuant to the Arkansas Declaratory Judgment Act,” Arkansas Code Annotated § 16‑11‑102 and article 16, section 13 (illegal‑exaction clause).

C. The State’s Motion to Dismiss and Interlocutory Appeal

The State moved to dismiss, arguing that:

The complaint failed Arkansas’s fact-pleading requirements and therefore did not sufficiently plead a cause of action; and
Because of those deficiencies, the plaintiffs could not overcome the State’s sovereign immunity under article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution (the “never be made a defendant” clause).

The Pulaski County Circuit Court disagreed, holding that:

Certain allegations—particularly paragraph 30 describing how the EFA program uses “public school funds derived from public taxes” to pay private providers—are statements of fact, not merely theories or legal conclusions; and
The express illegal‑exaction claim was “pleaded sufficiently properly to avoid dismissal for Sovereign Immunity.”

The State then sought an interlocutory appeal under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 2(a)(10), which allows appeals from:

“[a]n order denying a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on the defense of sovereign immunity or the immunity of a government official[.]”

This brought the case before the Arkansas Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction over constitutional-interpretation cases under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1‑2(b)(1).

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Holding

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Shawn Womack, dismissed the appeal. It did not decide whether the EFA program is constitutional. Instead, it held:

Although the complaint invokes the Declaratory Judgment Act, the suit is, “for all intents and purposes,” an illegal‑exaction action under article 16, section 13, because its core allegation is that public funds derived from taxes are being unconstitutionally spent.
Under established Arkansas law, sovereign immunity does not apply to such illegal‑exaction suits; the State cannot use article 5, section 20 as a shield against them.
Because sovereign immunity is inapplicable, the circuit court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss is not an order “based on the defense of sovereign immunity” within the meaning of Rule 2(a)(10). The Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal at this stage.

Result: the appeal is dismissed, and the case returns to the circuit court for further proceedings on the merits of the constitutional challenge to the EFA program.

B. The Dissent

Chief Justice Karen R. Baker dissented. Reiterating her views from earlier decisions—especially Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, 535 S.W.3d 616—she argued:

Article 5, section 20 (“The State of Arkansas shall never be made a defendant in any of her courts”) must be applied literally, without implied exceptions, including for illegal‑exaction suits;
Under Andrews, any suit that seeks to control or review State conduct is barred, and the majority’s approach (again) conflicts with this broad reading; and
Accordingly, she would reverse the circuit court and dismiss the case on sovereign-immunity grounds.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Doctrinal Context: Sovereign Immunity and Illegal‑Exaction in Arkansas

Arkansas constitutional law grapples with two powerful and, at times, competing clauses:

Article 5, section 20 – Sovereign Immunity:
“The State of Arkansas shall never be made a defendant in any of her courts.”
On its face, this provision appears absolute and has been read robustly in cases like Andrews.
Article 16, section 13 – Illegal‑Exaction:
Commonly paraphrased as giving any taxpayer the right to bring suit “to protect the inhabitants against the enforcement of any illegal exactions whatever.” The provision is self-executing and historically has been interpreted broadly.

The tension is clear: if the State can “never be made a defendant,” how can taxpayers sue the State itself when public funds are misused? Arkansas jurisprudence has resolved much of this tension by recognizing illegal‑exaction actions as a distinct, constitutionally authorized category of suits that cannot be barred by sovereign immunity.

This case reaffirms that resolution and extends it by clarifying that even when a complaint is partially styled as a declaratory-judgment action, if the substance is an illegal‑exaction challenge to the misapplication of tax-derived funds, the entire action should be treated as such and is outside the sovereign-immunity bar.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Opinion

1. Brizendine v. Department of Human Services – Standard of Review

The Court cites Brizendine v. Dep’t of Human Services, 2025 Ark. 34, 708 S.W.3d 351, for the standard of review on a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity:

The Court treats factual allegations in the complaint as true, but not the plaintiff’s theories, speculation, or statutory interpretation.
The Court looks only to the complaint itself, not to outside materials.
Whether sovereign immunity applies is a question of law, reviewed de novo.

This frame matters because the State’s initial argument was that Faulkenberry’s complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations to surmount sovereign immunity. The circuit court and the Supreme Court both recognized key factual assertions—such as paragraph 30 describing how public school tax funds flow into EFA accounts and then to private providers—as more than mere legal conclusions.

2. Rutledge v. Remmel, 2022 Ark. 86 – Illegal‑Exaction and Sovereign Immunity

Rutledge v. Remmel, 2022 Ark. 86, 643 S.W.3d 5, is central. There, the Court reaffirmed that sovereign immunity does not apply to illegal‑exaction actions. The Faulkenberry majority relies on Remmel to:

Confirm that article 16, section 13 actions proceed notwithstanding article 5, section 20; and
Support the procedural conclusion that Rule 2(a)(10) interlocutory appeals are available only where sovereign immunity “applies or could apply.”

Because Faulkenberry’s complaint is categorized as an illegal‑exaction suit, the logic of Remmel means sovereign immunity is off the table and Rule 2(a)(10) does not confer jurisdiction.

3. Gates v. Walther, 2023 Ark. 74 (Womack, J., concurring) – Substance Over Style

A notable feature of this opinion is its reliance on Justice Womack’s own earlier concurrence in Gates v. Walther, 2023 Ark. 74, 665 S.W.3d 217. In that concurrence, he argued:

When a plaintiff alleges that public funds derived from taxes are being misapplied or illegally spent, the claim is, in essence, an illegal‑exaction claim, regardless of its caption or form;
Courts should not allow the labeling of a claim (e.g., as a declaratory-judgment action) to defeat the substantive right conferred by article 16, section 13.

In Faulkenberry, the majority expressly quotes and relies on that principle:

“[C]laims that are essentially illegal-exaction claims should be treated as illegal-exaction claims, even when they are styled as something else.”

What had been a concurring view in Gates is effectively elevated here to controlling doctrine: courts must look through the caption to the substance when classifying taxpayer suits concerning public funds.

4. Nelson v. Berry Petroleum Co., 242 Ark. 273 (1967) – Breadth of “Illegal Exaction”

The Court quotes an oft-cited line from Nelson v. Berry Petroleum Co., 242 Ark. 273, 413 S.W.2d 46 (1967):

“Illegal Exaction means far more than the mere collection of unlawfully levied taxes. With little limitation, almost any misuse or mishandling of public funds may be challenged by a taxpayer action.”

This language is crucial in characterizing Faulkenberry’s claim. She does not primarily argue that a specific tax is unlawful; rather, she contends that lawfully collected tax revenues—designated for public schools or specific purposes—are being spent in an unconstitutional manner (on private education through EFA accounts). Under Nelson, that is squarely within the scope of an illegal‑exaction claim.

5. Samples v. Grady, 207 Ark. 724 (1944) – Self-Executing Nature of Article 16, Section 13

In Samples v. Grady, 207 Ark. 724, 182 S.W.2d 875 (1944), the Court held that article 16, section 13 is:

Self-executing; and
Imposes “no terms or conditions upon the right of the citizens to bring the action.”

The Faulkenberry majority invokes Samples to argue that courts must avoid “putting form over substance” by denying taxpayers their constitutional right to challenge illegal exactions merely because of how they style their complaint. If the gravamen of the case is misuse of public funds, article 16, section 13 controls.

6. Parsons v. Preferred Family Healthcare, Inc., 2023 Ark. 56 – Remedies in Illegal‑Exaction Suits

Parsons v. Preferred Family Healthcare, Inc., 2023 Ark. 56, 662 S.W.3d 654, is cited to illustrate the scope of relief available in illegal‑exaction cases, including:

Obtaining refunds or restitution from private entities who improperly received public funds; and
Restoring those funds to the State’s coffers.

Faulkenberry’s request that “recipients of [EFA] expenditures reimburse the State of Arkansas” mirrors the remedy upheld in Parsons. This reinforces that both the injunctive relief (stopping funding) and the restitutionary relief (return of funds) she seeks fall comfortably within the illegal‑exaction framework.

7. Farrell v. Oliver, 146 Ark. 599 (1921) – Scope of Defendants in Illegal‑Exaction Actions

The State made a more structural argument: article 16, section 13 refers to “[a]ny citizen of any county, city or town,” and, it claimed, that phrase limits illegal‑exaction suits to exactions by local governments (counties, cities, towns), not the State itself.

The Court rejected this argument based on Farrell v. Oliver, 146 Ark. 599, 226 S.W. 529 (1921). In Farrell, the Court held that:

The county/city/town language describes who may sue (any citizen residing in such a locality);
It does not limit the defendant or the subject of the exaction; and
The constitutional text is “broad enough to afford a remedy against state-wide exactions which are illegal.”

Thus, illegal‑exaction suits can target statewide financial measures and state entities as well as local ones. This precedent directly undercuts the State’s attempt to confine article 16, section 13 to local fiscal disputes.

8. Andrews, Prince, Carpenter Farms, and Hurd – The Dissent’s Sovereign-Immunity Line

Chief Justice Baker’s dissent relies heavily on a different line of cases:

Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, 535 S.W.3d 616.
The majority in Andrews read article 5, section 20 literally: “We interpret ... precisely as it reads.” Baker’s dissent here reiterates her earlier view that Andrews created an almost absolute bar, with no implicit exceptions.
Prince v. Arkansas State Highway Commission, 2019 Ark. 199, 576 S.W.3d 1.
The majority in Prince held that Andrews “has no bearing on a citizen’s right to bring an illegal-exaction claim.” Baker’s concurrence in Prince objected, arguing this carve-out is inconsistent with Andrews.
Ark. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin. v. Carpenter Farms Med. Grp., LLC, 2020 Ark. 213, 601 S.W.3d 111.
Baker’s separate opinion there emphasized that when a suit seeks to “control or review State action,” Andrews should bar it.
Arkansas Oil & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, 2018 Ark. 397, 564 S.W.3d 248.
Her dissent in Hurd reiterated that Andrews did not recognize exceptions; “the State may never be sued.”

These cases undergird Baker’s contention that recognizing an illegal‑exaction exception to sovereign immunity—as the majority does here—is doctrinally inconsistent with the broad reading of article 5, section 20 in Andrews and its progeny, at least as she understands them.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Characterizing the Action as an Illegal‑Exaction Suit

The central analytic move is the Court’s decision to treat the entire Faulkenberry case as an illegal‑exaction action, notwithstanding that parts are styled under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

Key steps:

Faulkenberry explicitly pleaded an illegal‑exaction cause of action under article 16, section 13 (Count V).
Her other claims—seeking a declaration that the EFA funding violates article 14 and article 16, section 11, plus an injunction stopping that funding—are all premised on the allegation that public tax funds are being unconstitutionally spent.
Under Nelson, Samples, and now Gates (as adopted here), such allegations of misapplication of taxpayer dollars are essentially illegal‑exaction claims.

Thus, the Court holds:

“For all intents and purposes, the entirety of Faulkenberry’s lawsuit is an illegal-exaction claim because she alleges that the State is unconstitutionally spending taxpayer dollars to fund the EFA program.”

And specifically:

“[C]laims that are essentially illegal-exaction claims should be treated as illegal-exaction claims, even when they are styled as something else.”

This adopts a substance-over-caption approach: if the heart of the complaint is misuse of tax-derived public funds, article 16, section 13 governs, regardless of whether the plaintiff also invokes the Declaratory Judgment Act or other statutes.

2. Why Sovereign Immunity Does Not Apply

Once the case is classified as an illegal‑exaction suit, the next question is whether sovereign immunity can still bar it. The answer, under Arkansas precedent, is no.

The Court reasons:

Article 16, section 13 is self-executing and imposes no conditions on taxpayers’ right to challenge “any illegal exactions whatever.” (Samples.)
Historically, Arkansas courts have allowed taxpayers to sue not only local governments but also the State (and even private entities receiving public money) to enjoin or recover illegal exactions. (Farrell, Parsons.)
Remmel and related cases clearly hold that sovereign immunity is no defense to illegal‑exaction suits.

Therefore:

“[T]he underlying lawsuit is treated, in its entirety, as an illegal-exaction claim, and sovereign immunity does not bar Faulkenberry’s lawsuit against the State.”

3. Interpreting “Any Illegal Exactions Whatever” and the Statewide Reach of Article 16, Section 13

The State argued that the phrase “any citizen of any county, city or town” in article 16, section 13 restricts illegal‑exaction suits to challenges against local governmental entities and their exactions. The Court rejected that interpretation for two reasons:

The phrase describes who may bring suit (a citizen of a county, city, or town), not what governmental body or level may be sued.
The subsequent phrase—taxpayers may sue to protect themselves “against the enforcement of any illegal exactions whatever”—is deliberately broad, and longstanding precedent (Farrell) has interpreted it to encompass statewide exactions and the State itself.

In the Court’s words:

“As we have explained for more than 80 years, the county, city, and town language qualifies who may file an illegal-exaction claim; it does not limit what public entity (or private entity taking misspent public monies) can be sued.”

Consequently, illegal‑exaction suits directly against the State of Arkansas fall within the scope of article 16, section 13.

4. Procedural Consequence: No Interlocutory Appeal Under Rule 2(a)(10)

Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 2(a)(10) permits an interlocutory appeal of:

“[a]n order denying a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on the defense of sovereign immunity or the immunity of a government official[.]”

The Court clarifies that:

This rule is available only when sovereign immunity applies or could apply to the claims in question;
If a category of claim (such as illegal‑exaction) is one to which sovereign immunity simply does not apply, then the denial of a motion to dismiss on other grounds is not appealable under Rule 2(a)(10).

Because the Court holds that sovereign immunity is categorically inapplicable to illegal‑exaction suits, the State cannot use Rule 2(a)(10) to obtain immediate review. Instead, it must wait for a final judgment to appeal any adverse rulings.

Therefore, the Court dismisses the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, leaving the underlying case to continue in the circuit court.

D. The Dissent and the Continuing Sovereign-Immunity Debate

Chief Justice Baker’s dissent underscores a deep and ongoing tension in Arkansas jurisprudence:

On one hand, Andrews adopted a robust textualist reading of article 5, section 20, emphasizing that the State “shall never be made a defendant in any of her courts.”
On the other hand, the Court has continued to recognize a variety of actions—illegal‑exaction suits among them—where the State can be sued, often on the rationale that other constitutional provisions (like article 16, section 13) must also be given full effect.

Baker argues that the majority’s ongoing reinforcement of the illegal‑exaction exception (and its insulation from Andrews) is doctrinally inconsistent. In her view:

Any suit that seeks to control or review State action is barred by article 5, section 20;
Andrews did not carve out exceptions for illegal‑exaction actions or other types of constitutional claims; and
By continuing to recognize such suits, the Court undermines the textual commitment it professed in Andrews.

Her position suggests that, if Andrews were applied in full force as she understands it, taxpayer suits challenging the State’s spending of funds—not just its collection of taxes—would also be barred, even under article 16, section 13.

The majority does not directly engage with this critique. Instead, it proceeds on the established understanding that illegal‑exaction claims occupy a special, constitutionally protected category that sovereign immunity cannot block.

V. Impact and Implications

A. Immediate Impact on the LEARNS Act / EFA Litigation

This decision does not decide the constitutionality of the EFA program or the LEARNS Act. Those questions remain for the circuit court on remand. Nevertheless, the decision has important immediate consequences:

The plaintiffs’ case survives the State’s attempt to end it at the pleadings stage based on sovereign immunity.
The litigation over whether the EFA program violates article 14 (public education funding obligations) and article 16, section 11 (use of tax revenues for their stated purposes) will proceed into discovery, motions, and potentially trial.
The State must now defend the EFA program on the merits rather than blocking the suit altogether through an immunity defense.

The case will likely become a key vehicle for defining the constitutional limits—if any—on using public-school and tax revenues to finance private educational choices in Arkansas.

B. Broader Effects on Taxpayer Suits and Public-Finance Litigation

More broadly, Faulkenberry sends a clear signal to litigants and lower courts:

Taxpayer suits alleging misapplication of public funds should be understood as illegal‑exaction actions.
This holds even if the suit is also framed as a declaratory-judgment action or includes other constitutional claims. Plaintiffs challenging state spending decisions can expect their cases to be treated as illegal‑exaction suits where the gravamen is misuse of tax-derived funds.
The State cannot invoke sovereign immunity to defeat such suits at the threshold.
The decision reaffirms that article 5, section 20’s sovereign immunity is subordinated, in this category of cases, to article 16, section 13’s explicit guarantee of a taxpayer remedy against “any illegal exactions whatever.”
State and local officials, as well as private recipients of public funds, remain subject to restitutionary remedies.
Relying on Parsons, the Court reaffirms that illegal‑exaction plaintiffs can seek to recover public funds from private entities that received them unlawfully. This may have a deterrent effect on public-private arrangements involving controversial uses of taxpayer money.

C. Procedural Strategy: Interlocutory Appeals and Litigation Posture

A key practical effect concerns litigation strategy and timing:

State defendants can no longer reliably use Rule 2(a)(10) to obtain early appellate review of denials of motions to dismiss in taxpayer suits alleging misuse of public funds, because those claims are now clearly recognized as non-immunity cases.
Instead, defendants must litigate such suits through to final judgment before appealing, potentially incurring greater litigation costs and facing broader discovery.
For plaintiffs, structuring their complaints as illegal‑exaction actions—supported by factual allegations regarding tax revenue and spending—offers a relatively secure pathway around sovereign immunity and toward merits review.

D. Doctrinal Significance in the Sovereign-Immunity Debate

Doctrinally, Faulkenberry continues a trend in which the Arkansas Supreme Court:

Maintains a strong textual commitment to sovereign immunity in many contexts (following Andrews); but
Also continues to carve out and reaffirm exceptions where other constitutional provisions—like article 16, section 13 (illegal‑exaction), separation-of-powers doctrines, or specific text—require that suits against the State remain possible.

The dissent shows that the Court remains divided on how to reconcile article 5, section 20 with competing constitutional guarantees. For now, however, the majority’s approach preserves the longstanding Arkansas tradition of robust taxpayer enforcement of constitutional limitations on public finance.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity is the principle that the State cannot be sued without its consent. In Arkansas, it appears in article 5, section 20:

“The State of Arkansas shall never be made a defendant in any of her courts.”

This means that, as a default rule, you generally cannot sue the State or its agencies for damages or to control their actions—unless another constitutional provision or statute clearly authorizes such a suit.

2. Illegal‑Exaction

An illegal‑exaction is a broad term under Arkansas law for:

Either: the unlawful collection of taxes (for example, a tax not properly authorized by law); or
The unlawful spending or misuse of lawfully collected public funds (for example, tax revenues raised for schools being spent on purposes the constitution forbids).

Article 16, section 13 of the Arkansas Constitution gives any taxpayer the right to sue to stop and remedy such illegal exactions. These suits:

Can be brought against local governments and the State;
Can challenge both the raising and spending of public money; and
Often seek injunctions, declarations, and restitution of misused funds.

3. Self-Executing Constitutional Provisions

When a constitutional provision is described as self-executing, it means:

It is effective on its own, without the need for the legislature to pass implementing statutes; and
Citizens may enforce it directly in court.

Article 16, section 13 is self-executing, so taxpayers can bring illegal‑exaction suits without needing additional statutory authorization.

4. Interlocutory Appeal

An interlocutory appeal is an appeal taken before the trial court has entered a final judgment resolving all claims. Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 2(a)(10) allows interlocutory appeals when a trial court denies a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity.

However, if sovereign immunity does not apply to a particular category of claim (as with illegal‑exaction suits), then such a denial is not “based on sovereign immunity,” and Rule 2(a)(10) does not apply. The parties must wait until the end of the case to appeal.

VII. Conclusion

Arkansas Department of Education v. Faulkenberry, 2025 Ark. 203, is procedurally a dismissal of an interlocutory appeal, but substantively it is a significant reaffirmation and refinement of Arkansas’s illegal‑exaction doctrine.

Key takeaways:

Substance governs over caption. When a taxpayer suit alleges that public tax revenues are being unconstitutionally or unlawfully spent—and seeks to halt that spending and recover funds—the suit is an illegal‑exaction action, even if also styled as a declaratory-judgment case.
Sovereign immunity does not bar illegal‑exaction suits. Article 5, section 20 cannot be used to block taxpayer challenges brought under article 16, section 13, whether the target is a local government, a state agency, or private entities receiving public funds.
No interlocutory appeals in this context. Because sovereign immunity is inapplicable, Rule 2(a)(10) does not permit interlocutory appeals from denials of motions to dismiss in illegal‑exaction cases. The State must litigate these cases to final judgment before seeking appellate review.
Taxpayer oversight of public finance remains robust. Despite ongoing debates about the reach of sovereign immunity, Arkansas continues to recognize broad taxpayer standing and remedies to police “any illegal exactions whatever,” preserving an important mechanism of constitutional accountability.

Going forward, Faulkenberry will guide both plaintiffs and defendants in structuring, defending, and understanding litigation concerning the use of public funds in Arkansas—particularly in contentious areas like education funding, voucher programs, and public-private financial arrangements. The case leaves unresolved the substantive constitutional fate of the EFA program, but it decisively sets the procedural stage: taxpayers may have their day in court when they allege unconstitutional spending of tax dollars.

Substance Over Caption: Illegal‑Exaction Suits Against the State and the Limits of Sovereign Immunity in Arkansas – Commentary on Arkansas Dep’t of Education v. Faulkenberry, 2025 Ark. 203