Introduction

In McRaney v. North American Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, Inc., No. 23-60494 (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2025), the Fifth Circuit (Judge Andrew S. Oldham, joined by Chief Judge Richman; Judge Ramirez dissenting) issued a sweeping articulation of the First Amendment’s church autonomy doctrine. The court affirmed summary judgment for the North American Mission Board (NAMB) against tort claims brought by Pastor Will McRaney arising from his termination by the Baptist Convention of Maryland/Delaware (BCMD) and subsequent alleged reputational and economic harms. The court simultaneously vacated the district court’s statement that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, clarifying that church autonomy is a merits immunity from suit rather than a Rule 12(b)(1) bar.

The case sits at the intersection of ecclesiology and civil adjudication. BCMD and NAMB entered a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) to pursue evangelism and church planting grounded in the Baptist Faith & Message. As disagreements developed over ministry strategy and implementation, NAMB gave notice to terminate the SPA, and BCMD’s board later voted unanimously to terminate McRaney as Executive Director. McRaney then sued NAMB (not his employer BCMD) for tortious interference, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging NAMB’s role in his termination and later “blacklisting.”

After removal and an initial round of appellate proceedings in which a prior Fifth Circuit panel deemed dismissal “premature” at the pleadings stage (with a close denial of rehearing en banc), discovery ensued. On a renewed summary-judgment motion, the district court granted judgment to NAMB, characterizing the dispute as unadjudicable under church autonomy but, confusingly, also stating it lacked jurisdiction. On the present appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirms the result on church autonomy grounds, clarifies the procedural posture of the doctrine, and rejects the dissent’s argument that non-hierarchical Baptists fall outside ecclesiastical abstention.

Summary of the Opinion

• The court holds that the First Amendment’s church autonomy doctrine bars adjudication of McRaney’s tort claims because resolving them would require civil courts to decide matters of faith and doctrine and intrude upon internal religious governance, including ministerial staffing and discipline.
• The ministerial exception—described as a component of church autonomy—applies even though NAMB was not McRaney’s employer. It bars tort claims that would litigate or penalize religious entities’ decisions about who will minister to the faithful, including claims against third-party religious partners whose actions influence employment outcomes.
• The doctrine protects non-hierarchical denominations and ministries. It is triggered by the subject matter (faith, doctrine, governance), not by the presence of a hierarchical ecclesiastical tribunal. Denominational neutrality forbids privileging hierarchical churches over congregational ones.
• The court clarifies that church autonomy operates as a structural constitutional immunity from suit that must be resolved at the threshold, permits immediate appellate review if denied, and results in a merits judgment with prejudice. It is not a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the Rule 12(b)(1) sense. The court therefore vacates the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal and affirms the entry of summary judgment on the merits.
• Application: McRaney’s pre-termination interference, defamation, and IIED claims would require courts to decide whether he met religious objectives under the SPA, whether he exhibited “Christ-like” leadership, and whether NAMB’s reasons were ecclesiastically justified—questions courts cannot adjudicate. Post-termination claims based on alleged “blacklisting,” speaking disinvitations, and a “no-entry” photo similarly intrude on protected internal communications, discipline, and ministerial selection by other ministries.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Watson v. Jones (1871): The court revisits Watson’s foundational principle that civil courts must abstain from “strictly and purely ecclesiastical” questions involving faith, doctrine, and church discipline. Although Watson pre-dates incorporation and was not a First Amendment case, its “spirit of freedom” for religious organizations, later constitutionalized in Kedroff and Milivojevich, undergirds the court’s approach. The opinion also emphasizes that Watson’s reference to “ordinary principles” of voluntary associations was confined to property disputes and cannot justify civil adjudication of doctrinal or governance questions.
• Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral (1952) and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976): These decisions constitutionalized Watson’s logic, requiring deference to ecclesiastical decisions on governance and discipline, and forbidding review of canon-law procedures. The Fifth Circuit uses Milivojevich to underscore that secular courts cannot second-guess church tribunals or restructure church polity.
• Presbyterian Church v. Blue Hull (1969) and Jones v. Wolf (1979): Blue Hull reiterates that civil litigation cannot turn on religious doctrine; Wolf allows “neutral principles” in some church property cases, warning courts to avoid doctrinal inquiry. The Fifth Circuit distinguishes this narrow property-law context from the ministerial and doctrinal issues present here.
• Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC (2012) and Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (2020): The Supreme Court’s modern articulation of church autonomy and the ministerial exception. The Fifth Circuit relies heavily on these cases to define the ministerial exception broadly (beyond titled “ministers”), to bar both statutory and tort claims that would intrude on ministerial selection, and to frame church autonomy as protecting internal governance essential to religious mission.
• NLRB v. Catholic Bishop (1979): Cited for the principle that the “very process of inquiry” into internal church affairs impinges on First Amendment rights—a theme the court uses to condemn the burdensome discovery that occurred here.
• Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith (5th Cir. 2018): The court’s prior decision quashing intrusive discovery of a Catholic bishops’ conference informs the protection for internal religious communications and the chilling effect of compelled disclosure to ideological opponents.
• Bryce v. Episcopal Church (10th Cir. 2002) and Pfeil v. St. Matthew’s Lutheran (Minn. 2016): Both recognize protection for internal ecclesiastical communications and disciplinary processes, support the court’s conclusion that McRaney’s post-termination claims about internal security and exclusion cannot be adjudicated.
• Starkey v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis (7th Cir. 2022) and Bell v. Presbyterian Church (4th Cir. 1997): These cases are key on the ministerial exception’s application to third-party religious entities (not the employer) when claims would “litigate the employment relationship” or penalize religious actors for ministry staffing decisions. The Fifth Circuit leans on Starkey and Bell to bar McRaney’s tortious interference and defamation claims against NAMB.
• Lee v. Sixth Mount Zion (3d Cir. 2018), Combs v. Central Texas Conference (5th Cir. 1999), Rayburn v. Seventh-Day Adventists (4th Cir. 1985): These cases reinforce that civil investigation of minister-church disputes intrudes upon protected governance and discipline—even apart from final adjudication on the merits.
• Recent authorities on the doctrine’s procedural character: The court cites Billard (4th Cir. 2024), Garrick (7th Cir. 2024), Belya (2d Cir. 2023), Tucker (10th Cir. 2022), and O’Connell v. USCCB (D.C. Cir. 2025) to navigate whether church autonomy is “jurisdictional.” Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote indicates the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense; the Fifth Circuit synthesizes these threads to a unitary conception: structural immunity from suit resolved on the merits and amenable to immediate appeal if denied.

Legal Reasoning

A. The doctrine and its strands

The court surveys church autonomy’s “ancient roots,” then organizes modern doctrine into four strands that repeatedly block civil adjudication:

• Ministerial exception: Courts must abstain from employment disputes involving those who lead, teach, or otherwise minister, regardless of titles and regardless of whether claims sound in statute or tort.
• Religious questions: Civil courts cannot decide the truth or falsity of religious doctrines, scriptural interpretations, or moral standards for spiritual leadership; this bars defamation and fiduciary-duty claims when truth turns on doctrinal propositions.
• Church governance: Membership, discipline, clerical status, and identification of the “true church” are internal matters; Milivojevich forecloses review of ecclesiastical procedure.
• Internal communications: Compelled disclosure or litigation over internal ecclesiastical deliberations chills religious self-governance; Whole Woman’s Health and Bryce illustrate the protective scope.

B. Subject matter, not denominational structure

Rejecting the dissent’s premise, the court announces a consequential rule: the church autonomy doctrine is triggered by the subject matter—faith, doctrine, and governance—not by whether the religious body is hierarchical or congregational. To limit autonomy to hierarchical churches would violate denominational neutrality and exclude many non-hierarchical traditions (including many Protestant denominations and non-Christian faiths). Nothing in Watson or its progeny licenses civil courts to scrutinize religious disputes merely because the faith lacks higher tribunals.

C. Application to McRaney’s pre-termination claims

McRaney’s tortious interference, defamation, and IIED claims would require a court to:

• Adjudicate whether NAMB had “right or justifiable cause” to act under an SPA steeped in doctrinal commitments to the Great Commission, “Biblical Authority,” and evangelism.
• Decide the “truth” of statements about McRaney’s compliance with religiously framed ministry benchmarks (e.g., “penetrating lostness,” “church planting”) and leadership qualities (e.g., “Christ-like” character).
• Determine proximate cause by probing BCMD’s religious decision-making in dismissing its Executive Director, a ministerial leader tasked with implementing evangelistic strategy.

Each inquiry is forbidden under the religious-questions and governance strands. The ministerial exception “gilds the lily”: even though NAMB was not McRaney’s employer, his claims “litigate the employment relationship” and would penalize religious partners for ministry staffing decisions. Under Starkey and Bell, that is impermissible.

D. Application to post-termination claims

The same logic bars claims premised on missed ministry opportunities, disinvitations from conferences, and internal security measures (the “no-entry” photograph). To adjudicate these claims, courts would need to determine why other religious ministries chose not to hire or host McRaney and to pass on NAMB’s internal communications and discipline. Those choices fall within the core of church autonomy: who embodies, teaches, and speaks the faith; how ministries coordinate their witness; and whom they admit to their facilities. The court notes that, even if viewed as a security decision, the exclusion grew out of a doctrinal split and internal governance.

E. Procedural posture: immunity from suit, not Rule 12(b)(1)

The court resolves a persistent procedural confusion:

• Church autonomy is a structural constitutional immunity from suit that must be decided at the earliest stage and permits immediate appeal if denied (like qualified or sovereign immunity), precisely because the process itself inflicts irreparable injury on religious autonomy.
• But it is not “jurisdictional” in the Rule 12(b)(1) sense. Treating it as such would encourage repetitive state litigation and deny res judicata effect. Consistent with Hosanna-Tabor’s framing of the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense, the appropriate vehicle is a merits disposition (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) or summary judgment) with prejudice.
• The court accordingly vacates the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal and affirms the with-prejudice judgment.

F. Engagement with the dissent

Judge Ramirez characterizes the claims as “familiar state law tort claims” resolvable by neutral principles and argues that, absent a hierarchical “Baptist Church,” there is no “church government” to trigger ecclesiastical abstention. She would also confine the ministerial exception to employee–employer disputes.

The majority responds that:

• Denominational neutrality forbids conditioning autonomy on hierarchy. Subject-matter triggers the doctrine; Baptists do not lose protection by virtue of congregational polity.
• Even “neutral” tort elements (falsity, causation, justification) require doctrinal determinations here, given the SPA’s religious content and the ministerial nature of McRaney’s role.
• The ministerial exception extends to third-party religious entities where adjudication would penalize or pry into ministry staffing decisions (Starkey, Bell).
• The discovery that already occurred illustrates the precise harm church autonomy aims to avoid.

Impact

• Non-hierarchical religious bodies: The decision expressly protects congregational and networked ministries. Courts may not deny autonomy because a faith lacks a supreme judicatory; subject matter is dispositive.
• Third-party liability and the ministerial exception: Plaintiffs cannot evade the ministerial exception by suing a religious partner (funder, diocese, national ministry) instead of the employer. Tortious interference, defamation, and IIED claims that “litigate the employment relationship” are barred.
• Early resolution and litigation strategy: Church autonomy is a threshold protection. Religious defendants should raise it early; if denied, immediate appellate review may be available. Courts should decide on the merits, not under Rule 12(b)(1), to confer res judicata effect and prevent duplicative state proceedings.
• Discovery constraints: The opinion underscores that the discovery process itself can violate church autonomy. Trial courts should be cautious about permitting discovery into internal religious communications, deliberations, and discipline.
• Scope of “neutral principles”: This decision cabins neutral-principles analysis to secular issues that can be resolved without doctrinal inquiry (often in property/trust contexts). Attempts to repackage ministerial or doctrinal questions as “neutral” torts will fail if truth, justification, or causation requires ecclesiastical judgments.
• Speaking engagements and platform decisions: Claims based on disinvitation from religious venues or conferences, or internal “no-entry” determinations, are generally non-justiciable where they stem from ecclesiastical judgment, discipline, or safety measures bound up with doctrinal division.
• State-federal comity: By clarifying that autonomy leads to merits judgments (rather than jurisdictional dismissals), the court promotes finality across forums and shields religious defendants from being re-haled into state courts to re-litigate ecclesiastical matters.
• Potential for circuit dialogue: The opinion harmonizes with Starkey and Bell on third-party ministerial claims and with recent discussions (Billard, Belya, Garrick, O’Connell) on the procedural character of the doctrine, offering a robust framework that other circuits may adopt or refine.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Church autonomy doctrine: A First Amendment principle protecting religious institutions’ independence in matters of faith, doctrine, and internal governance. Courts must abstain from deciding religious questions or intruding on leadership, discipline, and internal communications.
• Ministerial exception: A component of church autonomy that bars courts from adjudicating employment disputes involving ministers or those who perform key religious functions (leaders, worship conductors, teachers of faith). It applies to both statutory and tort claims and can reach third-party religious actors if adjudication would penalize or pry into ministerial decisions.
• Neutral principles: Legal rules (e.g., contract or property doctrines) that courts may apply so long as doing so does not require resolving religious doctrine. Often viable in church property disputes; not a license to examine faith, doctrine, or ministerial judgments.
• Denominational neutrality: The government may not favor one denomination’s structure over another’s. Legal protections cannot hinge on whether a faith is hierarchical or congregational.
• Structural immunity from suit: Like qualified or sovereign immunity, church autonomy protects against being sued and subjected to discovery on ecclesiastical matters, not merely against liability. Denials may be immediately appealable because the process is the harm.
• Jurisdiction vs. merits: A Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal means the court lacks power to hear the case at all (and typically allows refiling elsewhere). The Fifth Circuit explains that church autonomy usually calls for a merits disposition (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) or summary judgment), producing preclusive effect and preventing duplicative litigation.
• Collateral order doctrine: A narrow path to immediate appellate review of certain interlocutory orders (including denials of immunities from suit) because waiting for final judgment would irreparably harm the rights asserted.
• Res judicata (claim preclusion): A final judgment on the merits bars re-litigation of the same claims between the same parties in later suits, promoting finality and preventing harassment through repetitive litigation.
• Congregational vs. hierarchical polity: Congregational bodies (e.g., many Baptist churches) are autonomous local congregations; hierarchical bodies (e.g., many Episcopal or Orthodox churches) have higher tribunals. Under this decision, both are equally protected when disputes center on faith, doctrine, or governance.

Conclusion

McRaney v. NAMB marks a significant doctrinal consolidation in the Fifth Circuit. First, it clarifies that church autonomy is a structural First Amendment immunity from suit resolved on the merits and available for immediate interlocutory review if denied—dispelling confusion over Rule 12(b)(1) “jurisdiction.” Second, it decisively rejects any hierarchy-based limit: the protection turns on the subject matter (faith, doctrine, governance), not denominational structure. Third, it extends the ministerial exception’s protective ambit to third-party religious partners where claims would “litigate the employment relationship” and penalize ministry staffing decisions. Finally, it warns that discovery itself can violate religious autonomy.

The practical upshot is robust: civil courts within the Fifth Circuit must refrain from adjudicating tort and employment-adjacent claims that would require deciding whether religious objectives were met, whether leaders were “Christ-like,” why a ministry selected or declined a particular messenger, or how a religious body coordinates its evangelistic strategy. By vacating the district court’s jurisdictional rationale while affirming summary judgment, the court both vindicates institutional religious freedom and ensures finality that prevents relitigation in other forums.

In the broader legal landscape, McRaney fortifies a consistent national trend: when disputes pivot on who speaks the faith, how ministries organize their message, and the standards they apply to spiritual leadership, civil courts must stand down.