Sua Sponte State Supreme Court Stays and AEDPA Finality:
A Commentary on Luis Ralphy Torres v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in Luis Ralphy Torres v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, No. 24‑11669 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), a habeas corpus case arising from the Florida state courts. Although marked “Not for Publication,” the opinion articulates an important and nuanced rule governing when a state conviction becomes “final” for purposes of the one‑year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).

At the heart of the case is a recurring and often difficult tension in federal habeas practice: a petitioner must (1) exhaust state remedies by giving state courts one complete round of review, but (2) also file his federal habeas petition within one year of the conclusion of direct review, as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). When state appellate practice becomes procedurally complex—as it did here because of a sua sponte stay entered by the Florida Supreme Court—the “finality” of the judgment, and thus the start of AEDPA’s one-year limitations period, becomes uncertain.

The principal question in Torres was:

Did Torres’s conviction become final for AEDPA purposes 90 days after the Florida First District Court of Appeal’s (“First DCA”) affirmance (as the State and the district court held), or only after the Florida Supreme Court dismissed his stayed discretionary appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari (as Torres contended)?

The Eleventh Circuit answered in favor of Torres, holding that the Florida Supreme Court’s sua sponte stay of his case—entered while that court decided a related constitutional challenge in State v. Adkins—meant that direct review had not yet concluded at the First DCA. Instead, finality occurred only after Torres pursued, and was denied, certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court from the Florida Supreme Court’s ultimate dismissal. As a result, his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, filed in November 2018, was timely.

This commentary proceeds as follows: it first summarizes the facts and procedural posture, then distills the holding, and finally offers a detailed analysis of the court’s reasoning, its use of precedent, the legal concepts involved, and the broader impact of the decision.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Conviction and Direct Appeal

In June 2010, a Florida jury convicted Luis Ralphy Torres of trafficking in oxycodone under Florida Statutes § 893.135(1)(c). He was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment with a 25‑year mandatory minimum.

Torres appealed. On December 8, 2011, the First DCA issued a per curiam affirmance (“PCA”) of his conviction, without a written opinion. That normally would have signaled the end of state appellate review, subject only to the 90‑day period for seeking certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.

However, Torres filed a motion asking the First DCA to issue a written opinion, or at least to add a citation to Flagg v. State, a First DCA decision upholding the constitutionality of Florida’s drug statute (chapter 893) that was itself in the pipeline for possible Florida Supreme Court review. Torres explicitly stated that he sought this citation so as to preserve for further review the issue of the statute’s constitutionality, already pending before the Florida Supreme Court.

The First DCA granted that request in substance: it withdrew its original PCA and reissued an opinion stating: “affirmed. See Flagg v. State, 74 So. 3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).” That citation was crucial because, under Florida’s “Jollie” doctrine (discussed below), such a “citation PCA” can provide a narrow path for Florida Supreme Court discretionary jurisdiction.

B. The Adkins Case and the Florida Supreme Court’s Sua Sponte Stay

At the same time, the Florida Supreme Court had already accepted jurisdiction in State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412 (Fla. 2012), to decide whether the same drug statute (chapter 893) was constitutional. The constitutionality of the statute was thus a live, unsettled question of statewide importance.

In March 2012, Torres filed a “Notice to Invoke Discretionary Jurisdiction” in the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the First DCA’s citation to Flagg (a case upholding the statute’s constitutionality) created a basis for discretionary review.

The Florida Supreme Court:

Formally “acknowledged” Torres’s new case and assigned a case number; and
On its own motion (sua sponte), entered an order staying proceedings in Torres’s case pending its decision in Adkins.

Thus, the state’s highest court did not immediately dismiss Torres’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Instead, it treated the case as potentially reviewable and held it in abeyance while it decided the broader constitutional question in Adkins.

In July 2012, the Florida Supreme Court decided Adkins, upholding the statute’s constitutionality. Later, in October 2012, it declined review in Flagg. In November 2012, having resolved the underlying constitutional dispute in the State’s favor, the Florida Supreme Court finally dismissed Torres’s case for lack of jurisdiction.

C. Certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court

Within 90 days of the Florida Supreme Court’s November 9, 2012 dismissal, Torres filed a consolidated petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. On April 15, 2013, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Under orthodox AEDPA analysis, that date—denial of cert—would normally mark the point at which the state judgment becomes “final” for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A).

D. State Postconviction Proceedings

In August 2013, Torres filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. That motion was denied by the state trial court in February 2018, and the First DCA affirmed the denial in September 2018. While such a properly filed postconviction motion is pending, AEDPA’s one‑year limitations period is tolled under § 2244(d)(2).

E. Federal Habeas Petition and District Court Rulings

On November 8, 2018, less than two months after the First DCA’s affirmance of the postconviction denial, Torres filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

The State moved to dismiss the petition as untimely, arguing that:

The “court of last resort” for Torres’s direct appeal was the First DCA, not the Florida Supreme Court, because the Florida Supreme Court ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Hence, Torres’s judgment became “final” on May 14, 2012—90 days after the First DCA’s February 14, 2012 decision— when the time to seek U.S. Supreme Court review of the First DCA’s decision expired without a cert petition.
Measured from that date, and disregarding the Florida Supreme Court’s stay and later actions, the AEDPA time bar had long since expired before Torres filed his § 2254 petition in 2018.

Initially, the district court accepted the State’s theory, found the petition time‑barred, and denied a certificate of appealability (“COA”).

On a prior appeal, the Eleventh Circuit remanded, directing the district court to consider specifically the “impact of the sua sponte stay on the finality of Torres’s direct appeal,” and to analyze finality under § 2244(d)(1)(A), not under the “properly filed” tolling language of § 2244(d)(2). On remand, the district court again held Torres’s petition untimely, reasoning that the Florida Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction from the outset, so its stay could not extend direct review. This time, however, the district court granted a COA on the narrow question whether the sua sponte stay affected finality under § 2244(d)(1)(A).

The Eleventh Circuit’s 2025 opinion answers that question in the affirmative and reverses.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

A. Central Holding

The Eleventh Circuit holds that:

The Florida Supreme Court, as a court of limited jurisdiction, nonetheless had authority to issue a sua sponte stay while it determined whether it had jurisdiction over Torres’s case (i.e., it had “jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction”).
That stay made Torres’s direct appeal still pending in the Florida Supreme Court, so direct review did not conclude with the First DCA.
Therefore, for AEDPA purposes, Torres’s judgment became final only after (a) the Florida Supreme Court dismissed his case in November 2012, (b) he timely sought certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, and (c) the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on April 15, 2013.
The period from the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari until Torres’s filing of his Rule 3.850 motion was less than one year; that motion then tolled the AEDPA clock until its final resolution in 2018. Only 169 non‑tolled days elapsed between April 2013 and November 2018. Accordingly, the § 2254 petition was timely.

B. Key Rationale

The court’s reasoning rests on several pillars:

Exhaustion vs. Finality: AEDPA requires petitioners to exhaust state remedies by pursuing one complete round of state appellate review, including discretionary review in the state’s highest court when that review is part of the normal appellate process. Simultaneously, AEDPA imposes a one‑year limitation period. To avoid placing petitioners in a “procedural quagmire,” the Supreme Court has interpreted AEDPA to favor protecting petitioners who reasonably pursue state remedies fully over a hyper‑technical reading of the statute of limitations.
Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction: Even if the Florida Supreme Court ultimately concluded it had no jurisdiction over Torres’s case, it indisputably had authority to decide that question, and to issue interim orders (like the stay) while doing so.
State Procedural Signals: Under Chamblee v. Florida, federal courts look to state courts’ own actions and state law to decide whether state direct review is still ongoing. Here, both the First DCA and the Florida Supreme Court behaved as if Torres’s case was potentially within the Florida Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, confirming that direct review had not yet ended at the DCA level.
Supreme Court Precedent: Decisions such as Carey v. Saffold and O’Sullivan v. Boerckel require federal courts to interpret AEDPA in ways that encourage, not penalize, the full exhaustion of state remedies, even when state appellate structures are complex or discretionary.

In short, the court refuses to penalize Torres for taking the very steps AEDPA and Supreme Court precedent encourage: seeking state supreme court review where it is reasonably and procedurally available, and then pursuing U.S. Supreme Court certiorari from that state high court’s disposition.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. AEDPA Framework: Statute of Limitations and Exhaustion

The opinion builds on two central AEDPA provisions:

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A): The one‑year filing period runs from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2): The limitations period is tolled while a “properly filed application for State post‑conviction or other collateral review” is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(c): A petition is not exhausted so long as the petitioner “has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.”

Supreme Court Rule 13.1 is also pivotal: it gives state prisoners 90 days from the entry of judgment by the “court of last resort” of the state to file a cert petition in the U.S. Supreme Court. If the prisoner actually seeks certiorari, finality is postponed until the U.S. Supreme Court denies review.

2. Supreme Court Cases on Finality, “Pending” Status, and Exhaustion

a. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009)

Jimenez addresses when a conviction becomes “final” for AEDPA purposes in light of revived or extended direct review. The Court held that direct review does not conclude until “the availability of direct appeal to the state courts and to this Court has been exhausted.” The Eleventh Circuit invokes Jimenez for the proposition that state‑ and U.S.‑supreme‑court options must be fully exhausted before finality attaches.

b. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002)

Carey concerned the meaning of “pending” in § 2244(d)(2)’s tolling provision in the context of California’s somewhat unusual, gap‑filled collateral review process. California’s position would have treated a petition as no longer “pending” during the gap between a lower court’s collateral decision and the filing of a petition in the California Supreme Court, thereby allowing the federal limitations period to run in the interim.

The Supreme Court rejected that approach as inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of “pending” and with AEDPA’s structure and purpose. It emphasized that permitting the limitations period to run while the prisoner was still in the midst of seeking state review would create a “serious statutory anomaly”:

It would force prisoners to file premature federal habeas petitions before fully exhausting state remedies, solely to avoid time bars.
It would produce cases that are “in one sense unlawful (because the claims have not been exhausted) but in another sense required by law (because they would otherwise be barred by the 1‑year statute of limitations).”

The Eleventh Circuit leans heavily on this reasoning: when state procedures create ambiguity about whether a case is still “pending” or “on direct review,” courts should interpret AEDPA to avoid this exhaustion–limitations trap.

c. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999)

O’Sullivan addressed whether a prisoner must seek discretionary review in the Illinois Supreme Court to exhaust state remedies. The Illinois Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, like Florida’s, was limited and discretionary. Yet the U.S. Supreme Court held that because the prisoner had the “right” to raise his claims by that “available procedure,” he had to give the state’s highest court an opportunity to review his claims to satisfy AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement.

The opinion in Torres invokes O’Sullivan to reinforce that:

Exhaustion requires one full round of established appellate review, which includes discretionary review in the state’s highest court when available as part of the normal process, and
A petitioner who reasonably pursues such review should not be punished for doing so by a technical reading of the limitations period.

d. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001)

Duncan held that a pending federal habeas petition does not toll AEDPA’s limitations period under § 2244(d)(2). But in doing so, the Court underscored AEDPA’s design: to “promote the exhaustion of state remedies while respecting the interest in the finality of state court judgments.” The Eleventh Circuit cites Duncan to frame AEDPA as requiring a balance between comity/exhaustion and finality/efficiency.

e. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007)

Panetti emphasizes that AEDPA must be interpreted in light of its purposes: “comity, finality, and federalism,” along with judicial efficiency. The Eleventh Circuit uses Panetti to justify construing ambiguous timing or procedural questions in ways that do not undermine those goals.

f. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947)

This case supplies the “jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction” principle. There, a district court issued a temporary restraining order even though Congress had substantially limited federal courts’ jurisdiction over labor disputes. The Supreme Court held that a court may issue such interim orders while it decides whether it has jurisdiction; those orders are not void merely because the court later concludes it lacks jurisdiction over the merits.

Torres analogizes: the Florida Supreme Court’s sua sponte stay was a valid exercise of its authority to control its docket and determine its own jurisdiction, even if it ultimately decided that its jurisdictional basis was lacking. Therefore, the stay was legally effective and cannot be dismissed as a nullity for AEDPA purposes.

3. Eleventh Circuit and Former Fifth Circuit Precedent on Exhaustion in Florida

a. Lee v. Wainwright, 468 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1972)

Lee (binding in the Eleventh Circuit by virtue of Bonner v. City of Prichard) held that a Florida prisoner generally need not seek review in the Florida Supreme Court to exhaust state remedies, unless “unusual circumstances” exist, such as a conflict among Florida’s district courts of appeal.

The Torres panel relies on this “unusual circumstances” carve‑out to explain why, despite the general rule, it was reasonable—and arguably required—for Torres to pursue discretionary review in the Florida Supreme Court: the constitutionality of the statute of conviction was then pending in that court in Adkins, and the First DCA had cited Flagg.

b. Green v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 28 F.4th 1089 (11th Cir. 2022)

Green repeated the standard proposition that in Florida “non‑capital” cases, claims are generally exhausted once decided on the merits by a district court of appeal. The Torres court acknowledges this rule but stresses that Torres’s case is exceptional because the Florida Supreme Court actively engaged with his case (acknowledging it, assigning a case number, and issuing a stay).

c. Barritt v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 968 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2020)

Barritt similarly held that Florida postconviction claims are exhausted once the DCA rules on them; Florida Supreme Court review is not ordinarily required. Torres treats this as the default rule, but again characterizes Torres’s situation as falling within the “unusual circumstances” exception recognized in Lee.

d. Chamblee v. Florida, 905 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2018)

Chamblee addressed when a state judgment is “final” where certain aspects of the sentence (fines) remained unresolved on remand. The Eleventh Circuit held that to determine whether AEDPA finality has attached, federal courts must look to “the actions taken by the state court and the relevant state law,” and are bound by the state court’s own treatment of its judgment as final.

In Torres, the Eleventh Circuit flips Chamblee into support for Torres: here, state courts themselves treated his direct appeal as potentially within the Florida Supreme Court’s jurisdiction— the First DCA re‑issued an opinion with a Jollie‑relevant citation, and the Florida Supreme Court accepted and stayed the case. Those actions show that, under Florida law, his case was still in the direct review pipeline at the Florida Supreme Court, so federal courts must treat it as such.

4. Florida Authorities on Jurisdiction and Review

a. Florida Constitution, Article V, § 3(b)

Article V, § 3(b) of the Florida Constitution sets out the Florida Supreme Court’s discretionary jurisdiction over decisions of the district courts of appeal, including cases that:

declare a state statute valid;
construe a provision of the state or federal constitution;
affect a class of constitutional officers;
“expressly and directly” conflict with decisions of other DCAs or the Supreme Court;
present questions certified to be of great public importance; or
are certified to be in direct conflict with decisions of another DCA.

The Eleventh Circuit observes that none of these categories ultimately applied to Torres’s appeal, which is why the Florida Supreme Court eventually dismissed his case. But the important point is that at the time the court entered the stay, there was at least a potential basis for “express conflict” jurisdiction rooted in the interplay between Adkins and Flagg.

b. Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981)

Jollie held that the Florida Supreme Court may exercise discretionary “express conflict” jurisdiction over a DCA per curiam affirmance that cites as controlling authority a case then pending in, or reversed by, the Florida Supreme Court. This “citation PCA” doctrine is the linchpin of Torres’s ability even to seek Florida Supreme Court review.

Once the First DCA reissued its opinion citing Flagg, if the Florida Supreme Court had later accepted jurisdiction in, and reversed, Flagg, Torres’s case could have fallen within Jollie’s ambit. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision to stay Torres’s case while deciding Adkins reflects that possibility.

c. Harrison v. Hyster Co., 515 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1987)

Hyster clarifies that a case is “pending” in the Florida Supreme Court (for Jollie purposes) only when that court has actually accepted jurisdiction, not merely when a notice to invoke jurisdiction has been filed. This matters because the potential for Jollie jurisdiction in Torres’s case turned on whether the Supreme Court accepted and later reversed or addressed the case cited by the DCA (here, Flagg).

d. Beaty v. State, 701 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1997)

Beaty held that the Florida Supreme Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a bare per curiam affirmance with no opinion and no citation. The district court had relied on Beaty to conclude that Torres’s attempt at Florida Supreme Court review could not affect finality.

The Eleventh Circuit distinguishes Beaty on a critical ground: the First DCA in Torres’s case did not leave its decision as a bare PCA; it issued a citation PCA referencing Flagg. That difference is legally significant under Jollie. Thus, unlike in Beaty, there was at least a potential path to Florida Supreme Court review when Torres invoked jurisdiction.

e. State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412 (Fla. 2012) and Flagg v. State, 74 So. 3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)

Adkins upheld the constitutionality of Florida’s drug statute (chapter 893), resolving a substantial statewide constitutional question. Flagg, the case the First DCA cited in affirming Torres’s conviction, had already upheld the statute’s constitutionality at the DCA level.

The Florida Supreme Court’s decision to stay Torres’s appeal pending its decision in Adkins, and then to deny jurisdiction in Flagg, shows that:

Before Adkins, there was real uncertainty regarding the statute’s constitutionality; and
The Florida Supreme Court itself perceived Torres’s case as potentially affected by—and potentially reviewable in light of— its coming decision in Adkins.

B. Legal Reasoning: How the Court Reached Its Result

1. The Starting Point: AEDPA’s Dual Structure

The Eleventh Circuit first lays out AEDPA’s twin structural features:

A one-year limitations period starting when the judgment becomes final “by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review” (§ 2244(d)(1)(A)).
A robust exhaustion requirement (§ 2254(c)), interpreted by the Supreme Court to require one complete round of appellate review through the state’s established channels, including discretionary review in the state high court when that is part of the normal process (O’Sullivan).

The opinion candidly acknowledges the potential clash between these features: if the limitations period is interpreted to begin running at a point when the prisoner could still, or reasonably should, pursue further state review, then AEDPA effectively traps petitioners between filing too early (and being dismissed for lack of exhaustion) or filing too late (and being time‑barred).

2. Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction and the Effect of the Sua Sponte Stay

The court next addresses the State’s argument that the Florida Supreme Court’s stay was void or without legal effect because the court ultimately concluded it lacked jurisdiction over Torres’s case.

Relying on United Mine Workers, the Eleventh Circuit rejects that argument:

Courts, including courts of limited jurisdiction, have inherent authority to determine their own jurisdiction.
Pending that determination, they may issue orders—such as temporary restraining orders or stays— to preserve the status quo and manage their docket.
Those interim orders are valid and enforceable, even if the court later concludes it lacks jurisdiction over the merits.

By analogy, when the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged Torres’s case, assigned it a case number, and sua sponte stayed it pending the outcome of Adkins, it was exercising this authority to determine its own jurisdiction. That stay therefore had real legal effect: it meant that Torres’s direct appeal was, in fact, still before the Florida Supreme Court and not yet concluded.

3. When Did Direct Review Conclude?

The crucial question under § 2244(d)(1)(A) is when the state judgment became “final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”

The Eleventh Circuit’s answer:

Direct review of Torres’s conviction did not end when the First DCA issued its citation PCA in February 2012, because the Florida Supreme Court subsequently engaged with the case, indicating that further review was possible and, indeed, under active consideration.
Direct review ended only when the Florida Supreme Court dismissed Torres’s discretionary appeal in November 2012 for lack of jurisdiction, and the time for seeking further review in the U.S. Supreme Court expired, or, as here, the U.S. Supreme Court actually denied a timely cert petition in April 2013.

In effect, the Florida Supreme Court’s actions extended and reshaped the direct review process in this case: what might have been a simple DCA‑only appeal became a two‑tiered state appellate process ending in the state’s court of last resort, followed by U.S. Supreme Court review.

4. Torres’s Conduct Was Reasonable—and Encouraged by AEDPA

The court gives substantial weight to the reasonableness of Torres’s litigation steps. Given:

The pending challenge to the drug statute’s constitutionality in Adkins;
The First DCA’s citation to Flagg in a manner that, under Jollie, could have supported Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction;
The Florida Supreme Court’s own decision to acknowledge and stay his case; and
The general rule from O’Sullivan that petitioners must use any “available procedure” to give the state high court one chance to decide constitutional issues,

the court concludes that Torres acted exactly as AEDPA and Supreme Court precedent encourage: he pursued state remedies to their fullest reasonable extent.

Indeed, the opinion notes that if Torres had instead skipped Florida Supreme Court review and gone straight to the U.S. Supreme Court or to federal habeas, he might well have been accused of failing to exhaust state remedies, especially if Adkins had come out differently (invalidating the statute, thus creating a viable Jollie path).

5. Calculating the Limitations Period

Once the court determines that finality attached on April 15, 2013 (the date of the U.S. Supreme Court’s cert denial), the calculation is straightforward:

From April 15, 2013, until early August 2013 when Torres filed his Rule 3.850 motion, approximately 112 days elapsed.
The Rule 3.850 motion was a “properly filed” state postconviction application, tolling AEDPA’s clock under § 2244(d)(2) until the First DCA denied postconviction relief in September 2018.
From mid‑September 2018 until November 8, 2018, when Torres filed his federal habeas petition, another 57 days elapsed.
In total, only 169 non‑tolled days (112 + 57) ran on AEDPA’s one‑year (365‑day) clock, leaving 196 days unused.

Therefore, the § 2254 petition was timely by a wide margin.

6. Distinguishing Beaty and Applying Chamblee

The district court had invoked Beaty to support the notion that the Florida Supreme Court categorically lacked jurisdiction over Torres’s DCA affirmance. The Eleventh Circuit rejects that inference: Beaty involved a bare PCA with no citation, whereas Torres’s case involved a citation PCA under Jollie. That distinction is outcome‑determinative in Florida jurisprudence on discretionary review.

The court then uses Chamblee to reinforce its conclusion: if federal courts must defer to a state court’s own treatment of its judgment as final or not, then here they must also defer to the Florida courts’ implicit acknowledgment that Torres’s case was potentially within the Florida Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, as evidenced by:

the First DCA’s reissuance of its opinion with a Flagg citation; and
the Florida Supreme Court’s own acceptance and stay of the case pending Adkins.

Those state‑court actions are incompatible with the notion that Torres’s direct appeal became final back at the First DCA.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Clarifying AEDPA Finality When State Supreme Courts Act Sua Sponte

The central doctrinal contribution of Torres is the clear statement that:

When a state supreme court takes affirmative steps—such as acknowledging a case, assigning a case number, and issuing a stay—while it determines whether it has jurisdiction, that action keeps direct review “pending” for AEDPA purposes, even if the court later dismisses for lack of jurisdiction.

In other words, a petitioner’s conviction does not become final, and the AEDPA clock does not start, until the state supreme court completes its own process and either:

resolves the appeal on the merits; or
formally dismisses the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

If the petitioner then seeks U.S. Supreme Court review from that state‑supreme‑court disposition, finality is postponed until the U.S. Supreme Court denies certiorari.

2. Reinforcing a Petitioner‑Protective Reading of AEDPA in Ambiguous Procedural Settings

Consistent with Carey and O’Sullivan, Torres reaffirms that when state appellate or collateral review procedures create reasonable ambiguity about whether a case is still “pending,” federal courts should avoid interpretations of AEDPA that:

punish petitioners for fully exhausting state remedies, or
drive them to file premature federal petitions that would be dismissed as unexhausted.

The opinion thus strengthens the principle that AEDPA’s statute of limitations should be applied in harmony with, not in tension with, its exhaustion requirement.

3. Specific Guidance for Florida Practitioners

For Florida criminal practitioners and habeas counsel, Torres provides several important takeaways:

If the Florida Supreme Court formally engages with a case—accepting a filing, assigning a case number, issuing an acknowledgment order, staying the case pending another decision— federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit are likely to treat direct review as ongoing until the Florida Supreme Court acts to resolve or dismiss the case.
In “unusual circumstances” such as those present in Torres—where a parallel case involving a major constitutional question is pending in the Florida Supreme Court, and a DCA issues a citation PCA that might trigger Jollie jurisdiction— prisoners may be expected (and are certainly entitled) to seek Florida Supreme Court review without risk of shortening their AEDPA time.
Counsel should carefully document any Florida Supreme Court activity—stays, orders, case acknowledgments— and incorporate that activity into AEDPA finality calculations.

4. Potential Implications Beyond Florida

Although the case is rooted in Florida’s distinctive appellate structure (with its Jollie doctrine), the broader principles may resonate in other jurisdictions:

State high courts in other states sometimes issue sua sponte stays or remand orders while considering their own jurisdiction. Under Torres, such actions should be treated as extending direct review for AEDPA purposes.
Federal habeas courts should give significant weight to how state courts themselves treat a case procedurally. If state courts act as if an appeal is still open or reviewable, federal courts should be slow to declare the case “final” at an earlier stage.

Even though Torres is unpublished (and thus not binding as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit), its reasoning is squarely anchored in Supreme Court doctrine and may be cited persuasively in future timeliness disputes involving complex state procedures.

5. Comity, Federalism, and Judicial Efficiency

Finally, the decision affirms AEDPA’s structural goals:

Comity and Federalism: By encouraging petitioners to finish a full round of state review, including discretionary state‑supreme‑court review when reasonably available, Torres respects the primacy of state courts in adjudicating federal constitutional questions arising in state criminal cases.
Judicial Efficiency: Avoiding forced, premature federal filings reduces duplicative litigation and the need for stays or piecemeal habeas litigation while state proceedings continue.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Finality” Under AEDPA

A conviction becomes “final” for AEDPA when:

The highest state court with jurisdiction has issued its final decision and the 90‑day window to seek U.S. Supreme Court review has expired without a cert petition, or
The U.S. Supreme Court has denied a timely cert petition.

Before finality, the one‑year clock has not started. After finality, the clock runs, but it pauses (is “tolled”) while a properly filed state postconviction motion is pending.

2. “Exhaustion” of State Remedies

“Exhaustion” means a prisoner has given state courts at least one full chance to correct any constitutional error. This typically requires:

Raising the claim in the trial court;
Pressing it on appeal to the intermediate appellate court; and
Where available as part of the normal process, seeking discretionary review in the state’s highest court (O’Sullivan), especially for important constitutional questions.

Once a petitioner cannot raise the claim further “by any available procedure” in state court (§ 2254(c)), the claim is exhausted and can be brought in federal habeas (subject to other AEDPA restrictions).

3. “Properly Filed” and “Pending” State Collateral Review

A state postconviction motion (e.g., a Rule 3.850 motion in Florida) is “properly filed” when it complies with the state’s procedural requirements (time limits, filing format, etc.). While such a motion is “pending”—from its initial filing through the conclusion of appellate review—AEDPA’s clock is stopped.

In Carey, the Supreme Court held that “pending” includes reasonable intervals between filings in successive state courts (e.g., from a lower court’s denial to the filing in a state supreme court), to avoid forcing prisoners to choose between exhausting and preserving timeliness.

4. Per Curiam Affirmances (PCAs) and the Jollie Doctrine

A “per curiam affirmance” is a brief, typically unsigned decision affirming the lower court without a full written opinion. In Florida:

A bare PCA, with no written explanation and no citation, is generally not reviewable by the Florida Supreme Court (Beaty).
A PCA that includes a citation to a case pending in or reversed by the Florida Supreme Court can, under Jollie, provide a hook for Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction.

Torres’s case fell into the latter category after the First DCA added a citation to Flagg. That addition created a narrow, but real, path to Florida Supreme Court review—justifying his notice to invoke jurisdiction and the Florida Supreme Court’s sua sponte stay.

5. Sua Sponte Stay

“Sua sponte” means “on its own motion”—an action the court takes without a party’s request. A “sua sponte stay” is a court‑ordered pause in proceedings initiated by the court itself.

In Torres, the Florida Supreme Court sua sponte stayed Torres’s case pending its decision in Adkins. That stay signaled that:

The court considered the case potentially within its jurisdiction;
The case remained in some sense “live” and “pending”; and
Direct review had not concluded at the First DCA level, but had moved—conditionally—into the Florida Supreme Court.

6. Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction

Even courts of limited jurisdiction (like the Florida Supreme Court) have the power to decide the scope of their own jurisdiction. While making that determination, they may issue interim orders—stays, scheduling orders, etc.—that are legally binding. Those orders are not retroactively invalidated by a later conclusion that the court lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits.

In Torres, this principle supports treating the Florida Supreme Court’s stay as valid and operative for AEDPA purposes.

VI. Conclusion

Luis Ralphy Torres v. Secretary, Department of Corrections occupies an important niche in AEDPA jurisprudence at the intersection of state appellate procedure, exhaustion, and federal habeas timeliness.

The Eleventh Circuit holds that when a state supreme court:

formally acknowledges a case;
assigns it a case number; and
sua sponte stays proceedings pending resolution of a related issue,

direct review has not yet concluded—even if the court ultimately dismisses the case for lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, AEDPA’s one‑year limitations period does not begin until:

that state‑supreme‑court process has ended; and
any timely U.S. Supreme Court certiorari process has concluded.

This approach:

ensures that petitioners who reasonably and diligently pursue all available state remedies are not penalized for doing so;
harmonizes the exhaustion requirement with the statute of limitations;
respects state courts’ own characterization of their procedures and judgments; and
advances AEDPA’s core goals of comity, finality, and efficiency.

Although unpublished, Torres offers persuasive guidance on how federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit should treat complex state procedures and state‑supreme‑court actions when computing AEDPA finality. It warns against overly rigid or formalistic timeliness rules that would force petitioners to choose between full exhaustion and timely filing, and it underscores the importance of carefully examining state‑court dockets whenever direct review and postconviction processes do not follow a straightforward path.

Sua Sponte State Supreme Court Stays and AEDPA Finality: A Commentary on Luis Ralphy Torres v. Secretary, Department of Corrections