Strict PLRA Exhaustion Through SOIGA and Rule 21 Dismissal of Unidentified Defendants: Commentary on Johnson v. Bienkowski (3d Cir. 2025)

Introduction

This commentary examines the Third Circuit’s nonprecedential opinion in Armoni Masud Johnson v. Bienkowski et al., Nos. 24-1049 & 24-1276 (3d Cir. Sept. 2, 2025), affirming the dismissal and summary-judgment disposition of a pro se prisoner’s Section 1983 action arising from events at SCI Dallas in 2016. The case is important for four reasons:

• It reinforces the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion mandate in Pennsylvania, emphasizing the need to carry grievances through the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA) under DC-ADM 804.
• It underscores the limits of the “unavailability” exceptions recognized in Ross v. Blake and the necessity of properly preserving any argument that an alternative process (e.g., misconduct/administrative custody issues) makes the 804 process inapplicable.
• It reaffirms that Pennsylvania state prisons and their employees sued in official capacities are immune from Section 1983 damages claims, and that bare assertions of supervisory liability will not suffice.
• It approves dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 of an unidentified, “Doe-like” defendant after protracted litigation and discovery, and issues a pointed warning about forfeiture through deficient appellate briefing.

The parties included appellant Armoni Johnson, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, and multiple SCI Dallas personnel: Sgt. Edmund Bienkowski, Officer David Cuba, a trade instructor (Richard Devers), a library aide referred to as “Ada, Teacher aid,” and several supervisory officials. Johnson alleged First Amendment violations, including a conspiracy to retaliate for court access, improper confiscation of legal materials and religious beads, and misuse of disciplinary and administrative procedures following the revelation that a prison trade instructor (Devers) had served on the jury that convicted Johnson in March 2016.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment in full, holding:

• Sovereign immunity and supervisory liability: Dismissal with prejudice of claims against SCI Dallas and four supervisory defendants was proper. Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity bars Section 1983 damages claims against state prisons and state officials in their official capacities (Downey v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 968 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2020)). Johnson’s pleadings did not satisfy any recognized theory of supervisory liability (Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2010)).
• Rule 21 dismissal of unidentified defendant: The claim against “Ada, Teacher aid” was properly dismissed under Rule 21, given Johnson’s failure to identify the defendant after five years and despite the opportunity for discovery.
• PLRA exhaustion: Summary judgment for defendants Devers and Bienkowski was warranted because Johnson admitted in deposition he never filed grievances against them. Summary judgment for Officer Cuba was warranted because the record (including a SOIGA affidavit) showed Johnson did not complete the grievance appeal to SOIGA as required by DC-ADM 804.
• Unavailability exceptions and forfeiture: Johnson’s arguments to excuse non-exhaustion were unpersuasive; the grievance process was “available” under Ross v. Blake. Although the court noted that DC-ADM 804 may not cover challenges to misconduct citations or administrative custody (see Prater v. Department of Corrections, 76 F.4th 184 (3d Cir. 2023)), Johnson forfeited any such argument by not properly raising it on appeal.
• Post-judgment motions: The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s post-judgment motions, whether assessed under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b).
• Appellate practice admonition: The panel reiterated a prior warning that Johnson’s appellate briefs were difficult to follow and that ill-developed arguments risk forfeiture (Barna; Geness; Mala). Future filings of similar quality may be affirmed without further reasoning.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• PLRA Exhaustion:
  • 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing Section 1983 claims concerning prison conditions.
  • Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006), mandates “proper exhaustion,” i.e., compliance with the prison’s procedural rules, including deadlines and levels of review.
  • Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016), recognizes three narrow circumstances when a remedy may be “unavailable” (dead-end system, opaque/unknowable process, or thwarting by officials). The panel applied Ross to reject Johnson’s excuses; nothing showed the process was unavailable in his case.
  • Prater v. Department of Corrections, 76 F.4th 184 (3d Cir. 2023), clarifies that some categories (e.g., misconduct hearing issues and certain custody decisions) are addressed through different procedures (like DC-ADM 801 or classification processes) and are not “grievable” under DC-ADM 804. The panel flagged this as potentially relevant to claims about misconduct citations or AC status, but deemed the point forfeited because Johnson did not develop it on appeal.
  • DC-ADM 804: Pennsylvania’s three-step grievance system requires an initial grievance, an appeal to the Facility Manager, and a final appeal to SOIGA. The court relied on a SOIGA affidavit to conclude that Johnson did not perfect a final appeal on the prayer-beads grievance against Officer Cuba.
• Sovereign Immunity and Supervisory Liability:
  • Downey v. Pennsylvania DOC, 968 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2020), confirms Eleventh Amendment immunity for the DOC and for state officials sued in their official capacities for damages.
  • Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2010), sets out pleading standards and recognized theories (personal involvement, policymaking, etc.) for supervisory liability. Johnson’s complaint lacked the requisite factual content.
• Standards of Review and Appellate Practice:
  • Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2020), describes plenary review for sua sponte dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
  • Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4th 184 (3d Cir. 2024), articulates summary judgment standards (no genuine dispute of material fact; entitlement to judgment as a matter of law).
  • Brown v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 350 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2003), and Max’s Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669 (3d Cir. 1999), govern abuse-of-discretion review for post-judgment motions (Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b)).
  • Barna v. Board of School Directors, 877 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2017); Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344 (3d Cir. 2018); and Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, 704 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2013), reinforce that pro se litigants must comply with briefing rules and that ill-developed arguments are often treated as forfeited.

Legal Reasoning Applied

The court’s reasoning proceeds along four tracks: (1) sovereign immunity; (2) failure to plead supervisory liability; (3) PLRA exhaustion; and (4) Rule 21 dismissal of an unidentified defendant, all reviewed under appropriate standards and with careful attention to the record.

• Sovereign Immunity and “Municipal” Labeling:

  Johnson styled a “municipal liability” claim against SCI Dallas. The court treated SCI Dallas as what it is—a state facility—and correctly applied Downey to hold that Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity bars Section 1983 damages claims against it and against state employees sued in their official capacities. “Monell liability” applies to municipalities; it does not convert a state prison into a municipal entity. Dismissal with prejudice was therefore proper.

• Supervisory Liability Pleading Defects:

  As to four supervisory officials (Josefowicz, Zakarauskas, Goyne, and White), the court cited Santiago to emphasize that supervisory liability demands more than a job title or conclusory assertions. Absent plausible allegations of personal involvement, policymaking causing the violation, knowledge and acquiescence, or other recognized theories, dismissal was warranted. Because Johnson had already twice amended without curing the deficiencies, dismissal with prejudice was within the court’s discretion under Section 1915(e).

• PLRA Exhaustion—Record-Driven Dispositions:
  • Devers and Bienkowski: Johnson conceded at deposition that he never filed grievances against them. Under Woodford, proper exhaustion requires using the process the prison prescribes; under Third Circuit law, exhaustion is an affirmative defense typically resolved at summary judgment. The undisputed record supported judgment for these defendants.
  • Cuba (prayer beads/free exercise): The District Court relied on an expanded record, including a sworn SOIGA affidavit, to find no final appeal was lodged. DC-ADM 804 requires an appeal to SOIGA, and Woodford requires compliance with all procedural steps. Without evidence of a perfected appeal, summary judgment was appropriate.
  • Unavailability Exceptions: Johnson invoked excuses but failed to show any Ross category. The court specifically noted that while DC-ADM 804 may not govern challenges to disciplinary outcomes or AC placement (an issue clarified in Prater), Johnson forfeited any argument premised on that distinction by not properly raising it. Moreover, he did not show he exhausted any alternative process applicable to those categories or that officials thwarted him through “machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”
• Rule 21 Dismissal of “Ada, Teacher aid”:

  After five years of litigation and the chance to conduct discovery, Johnson still could not identify “Ada.” Rule 21 permits dropping a party “on just terms” for misjoinder or nonjoinder. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment dismissing this unknown defendant, particularly because the plaintiff’s assertions that defendants “hid” the identity were vague and unsupported. This confirms that the onus remains on plaintiffs—even pro se—to use discovery tools to identify Doe defendants in a timely manner.

• Post-Judgment Motions:

  The denial of Johnson’s post-judgment motions stood under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). He identified no clear error of law, newly discovered evidence, intervening change in law, or extraordinary circumstance justifying alteration or relief from the judgment (Brown; Max’s Seafood Cafe). The abuse-of-discretion standard applied and was not met.

• Appellate Briefing and Forfeiture:

  Echoing a prior appeal involving Johnson, the panel warned that the court could affirm without extended analysis when confronted with disorganized, opaque briefing. Citing Barna, Geness, and Mala, the panel highlighted that even pro se appellants must articulate arguments cleanly and distinctly. Here, the court, despite concluding that Johnson had arguably forfeited all issues, still addressed those discernible from his submissions—a courtesy that might not be extended in future appeals.

Impact

• For Pennsylvania prisoner litigation:
  • End-to-end exhaustion is indispensable. Plaintiffs must take grievances through SOIGA and retain proof of filings and decisions at every stage. A SOIGA affidavit will be powerful summary-judgment evidence for defendants if the prisoner did not perfect a final appeal.
  • Ross exceptions remain narrow and proof-driven. Vague allegations that officials “hid” information or “blocked” filings will not suffice without concrete, corroborating evidence of thwarting, opacity, or dead-end behavior.
  • Know your procedure: In the wake of Prater, litigants must identify whether their issue is cognizable under DC-ADM 804 or instead must be pursued under the disciplinary (DC-ADM 801) or classification processes. Failure to raise the correct channel can doom the claim—or the argument that 804 was “unavailable.”
• On suing state institutions and supervisors:
  • SCI Dallas is not a municipality. Section 1983 damages claims against state prisons or state officials in official capacity remain barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs should tailor relief requests accordingly and sue proper defendants in proper capacities.
  • Supervisory liability requires facts, not labels. Complaints must plead actual personal involvement or a recognized supervisory theory with factual specificity.
• Doe defendants and Rule 21:
  • Prolonged failure to identify a defendant invites dismissal. The opinion confirms courts’ readiness to prune unidentified defendants under Rule 21 after ample time and discovery, especially absent evidence that the defense thwarted identification.
• Appellate practice for pro se litigants:
  • Clarity matters. The Third Circuit’s renewed warning suggests that chaotic or unstructured briefs risk wholesale forfeiture. Future panels may summarily affirm without extended discussion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• PLRA Exhaustion (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)): Before suing over prison conditions, inmates must complete the prison’s entire grievance process as written. In Pennsylvania, that typically means an initial grievance, an appeal to the Facility Manager, and a final appeal to SOIGA (DC-ADM 804). Skipping any step can be fatal unless the process was truly “unavailable” under Ross.
• “Unavailable” Remedies (Ross v. Blake): A remedy is unavailable only if the process is a dead end (no real relief), too confusing to navigate, or if officials actively block access through deceit or intimidation. The burden to show unavailability falls on the inmate who did not complete the process.
• DC-ADM 804 vs. other processes: Not all issues are “grievable” under 804. Misconduct hearing outcomes and some custody placement decisions may follow different procedures (e.g., DC-ADM 801). If an issue is not grievable under 804, inmates must use the correct, alternative process, or risk dismissal for non-exhaustion.
• SOIGA (Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals): The final step in the Pennsylvania grievance ladder. Final exhaustion typically requires a timely appeal to SOIGA and a final decision. Lack of a SOIGA record can be decisive evidence of non-exhaustion.
• Sovereign Immunity: States and their arms (like the DOC and SCI facilities) are generally immune from federal damages suits under the Eleventh Amendment. Suing “official capacity” is usually a suit against the state; damages claims are barred unless immunity is waived or Congress validly abrogates it.
• Supervisory Liability: Supervisors are not liable solely because they oversee others. Plaintiffs must plead facts showing personal involvement, policymaking that caused the violation, or knowledge and acquiescence, among other recognized theories. Bare conclusions are insufficient.
• Rule 21 Dismissal: Courts can drop a party at any time “on just terms” for misjoinder or nonjoinder. This tool allows dismissal of unidentified or improperly joined parties, especially when a plaintiff has had ample opportunity to identify them.
• Summary Judgment: A case can be resolved without trial if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Admissions (e.g., acknowledging no grievance was filed) and documentary proof (e.g., a SOIGA affidavit showing no final appeal) often drive the outcome.
• Rules 59(e) and 60(b): These rules allow a losing party to seek alteration or relief from a judgment, but only for narrow reasons (new evidence, clear error, intervening law, or extraordinary circumstances). They are not opportunities to reargue points or present arguments that could have been made earlier.

Conclusion

Johnson v. Bienkowski offers a clear, practice-focused reaffirmation of several bedrock principles in prisoner civil-rights litigation within the Third Circuit:

• Exhaustion under the PLRA requires strict, record-supported completion of all steps prescribed by DC-ADM 804, including a final SOIGA appeal, unless the inmate can prove true unavailability under Ross.
• Arguments that certain matters are non-grievable under DC-ADM 804 (e.g., misconduct or AC placement) must be properly preserved and supported, often by demonstrating compliance with the correct alternative process (as clarified in Prater).
• Sovereign immunity continues to bar Section 1983 damages suits against state prisons and officials in their official capacities, and supervisory liability demands non-conclusory, specific facts.
• Unidentified “Doe” defendants are vulnerable to Rule 21 dismissal after prolonged, unproductive discovery—especially absent concrete evidence of obstruction by defendants.
• Appellate courts will not rescue poorly framed or opaque arguments. Even pro se appellants must present coherent, properly developed briefs to avoid forfeiture.

While nonprecedential, the decision provides a crisp roadmap for litigants and counsel on what the Third Circuit expects in Pennsylvania prison cases: know the governing grievance architecture, create and preserve a robust exhaustion record, plead supervisory liability with specificity, promptly identify all defendants, and brief appellate issues sharply and distinctly. Failure on any of these fronts will almost certainly be outcome-determinative.