Strict Particular Social Group Standards and Harmless Timeliness Errors in Motions to Reopen: Commentary on Amiryan v. Bondi (10th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Tenth Circuit’s unpublished order and judgment in Amiryan v. Bondi, No. 25‑9540 (10th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025), where the court denied a pro se petitioner’s challenge to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of a motion to reopen. Although designated as non‑precedential, the decision offers useful, persuasive guidance on:

How the court treats a BIA timeliness error in a motion to reopen when the BIA also denies reopening on an alternative ground;
The stringent requirements for recognizing a “particular social group” (PSG), especially for informants and whistleblowers who have testified against powerful actors abroad;
The demanding evidentiary standard for showing a nexus to political opinion; and
The high bar for satisfying the “more likely than not” and “government acquiescence” requirements for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

The case sits at the intersection of criminal immigration history, repeated illegal reentries, cooperation with U.S. authorities, and feared retaliation in Armenia by political and criminal actors. It clarifies, in a concrete factual setting, just how difficult it is to reopen removal proceedings on the basis of new threats against family members and alleged exposure of one’s cooperation with law enforcement.

II. Background of the Case

A. Factual Chronology

Petitioner Andranik Amiryan is a native and citizen of Armenia. His immigration history is long and complicated:

He entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1997.
After a series of criminal convictions, his lawful permanent resident status was revoked, and he was removed to Armenia in early 2008.
He unlawfully reentered in late 2009, was arrested and convicted for illegal reentry, served a 14‑month sentence, and was again removed in early 2011.
By his own admission, he illegally reentered the United States again in May 2012.
In 2021, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349.

Following his 2021 conviction, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reinstated his prior order of removal. In response, he applied for withholding of removal and CAT protection. At a merits hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ), he submitted testimony and evidence describing:

Demands for money and intimidation by a high‑ranking member of a paramilitary group in Armenia in 2011;
His daughter’s account that, during a visit to Armenia, unknown individuals approached her and her brother, called her father a “rat,” asked about his removal case, and then assaulted them;
His brother’s account of a threat from an unknown caller with a Russian number, who said he would “cut [Amiryan’s] throat”; and
His fear of retaliation from a paramilitary figure and the “Russian Mafia,” coupled with distrust of Armenian police protection.

The IJ denied withholding and CAT relief, and the BIA affirmed. The Tenth Circuit then denied his first petition for review in an earlier case, Amiryan v. Bondi, No. 24‑9564, 2025 WL 2181466 (10th Cir. Aug. 1, 2025) (unpublished).

B. The Motion to Reopen

While that first petition was pending, Amiryan filed a motion to reopen with the BIA based on alleged changed country conditions in Armenia. He submitted new evidence, principally that:

His brother‑in‑law in Armenia had been physically attacked and verbally threatened in person and via text message; and
He believed his reasonable fear interview (containing details of his cooperation with U.S. authorities and testimony) had been stolen by an Armenian individual, “Arman,” who was allegedly associated with his 2020 arrest, and that this information might have reached his persecutors.

In March 2025, the BIA denied the motion to reopen on two grounds:

It deemed the motion untimely; and
It held that the new threats and attacks were a continuation of previously considered circumstances and did not constitute a material change in country conditions, and that, in any event, he had not made a prima facie showing of eligibility for withholding of removal or CAT relief.

Amiryan, proceeding pro se, sought review of that denial in the Tenth Circuit. Meanwhile, he was removed from the United States. The court, citing Addo v. Barr, 982 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2020), held that his removal did not moot the petition because, if he prevailed, ICE could facilitate his return.

III. Summary of the Tenth Circuit’s Opinion

The Tenth Circuit (Judges Tymkovich, Baldock, and Phillips) denied the petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening. The key elements of the ruling are:

Standard of review: The decision on a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The BIA abuses its discretion only if its decision lacks a rational explanation, departs from established policies, is devoid of reasoning, or consists of bare conclusions.
Timeliness issue treated as non‑dispositive: The court noted that the BIA misapprehended the filing date of the motion and incorrectly labeled it untimely. However, because the BIA also denied the motion on the alternative ground that Amiryan failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief, the court affirmed on that alternative basis and declined to decide the timeliness and changed‑country‑conditions questions.
Withholding of removal: The court upheld the BIA’s finding that the proposed PSG (“Armenians whose sworn testimony against oligarchs becomes public”) was not shown to be a cognizable group under BIA jurisprudence requiring immutability, particularity, and social distinction. It also agreed that Amiryan had failed to establish a nexus between feared harm and a protected political opinion, actual or imputed.
CAT protection: The court held that the new evidence—including the attack on his brother‑in‑law and an ominous text message—did not meet the “more likely than not” standard for future torture with government acquiescence. Generalized evidence of corruption and poor policing in Armenia was held insufficient to demonstrate that public officials would have actual knowledge of, or be willfully blind to, torture against him.

Accordingly, the court concluded that the BIA did not act arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law in denying reopening, and it denied the petition for review.

IV. Legal Framework

A. Motions to Reopen and Their Disfavored Status

Motions to reopen are statutory and regulatory mechanisms permitting a respondent in removal proceedings to ask the BIA (or IJ) to consider new facts that were not available at the original hearing.

Key points from the governing framework (as referenced in the opinion):

Statutory basis: 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).
New facts and evidence: A motion to reopen must “state the new facts that will be proven” and be supported by evidentiary materials. § 1229a(c)(7)(B).
Time limit: Ordinarily, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
Changed country conditions exception: For motions seeking asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief based on changed country conditions, the time and number limits do not apply if the evidence is material and previously unavailable. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
Disfavored remedy: The Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit stress that motions to reopen are “disfavored,” and the petitioner bears a “heavy burden” to show the BIA abused its discretion. See Maatougui v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2013).

Under INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104–05 (1988), the BIA may deny a motion to reopen on at least three independent grounds:

The petitioner fails to establish a prima facie case for the substantive relief sought;
The petitioner fails to present previously unavailable, material evidence; or
Where relief is discretionary, the petitioner does not merit a favorable exercise of discretion.

B. Withholding of Removal

Withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) prohibits removal to a country where an individual’s “life or freedom would be threatened” on account of:

Race;
Religion;
Nationality;
Membership in a particular social group; or
Political opinion.

The standard is more demanding than for asylum: the applicant must show that it is more likely than not that his life or freedom would be threatened on account of a protected ground.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not define “particular social group.” The BIA has interpreted it—approach endorsed in Tenth Circuit precedent—to require:

Immutability: Group members share a characteristic “beyond the power of an individual to change.”
Particularity: The group is clearly defined and not overly amorphous or subjective.
Social distinction: The group is perceived by the relevant society as a distinct social group.

These elements are described in decisions such as Rodas‑Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 2015).

C. CAT Protection

Relief under the Convention Against Torture is codified in regulations implementing the U.N. Convention. It is not conditioned on a protected ground (unlike asylum or withholding), but the standard is high. An applicant must show that:

It is “more likely than not” that he would be subjected to torture if removed; and
Such torture would be inflicted by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).

“Torture” is a severe form of harm; it is not established by all forms of ill‑treatment or criminal violence. Public official “acquiescence” requires:

Prior awareness of the activity constituting torture, and
Failure to intervene.

“Awareness” may be shown by actual knowledge or willful blindness. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). The Tenth Circuit has stressed both the personalized risk requirement and the insufficiency of general country violence to meet the CAT standard. See Escobar‑Hernandez v. Barr, 940 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2019); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005).

V. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Standard of Review and Deference to the BIA

The court reiterates the deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard from Maatougui:

“The BIA abuses its discretion when its decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements.”

Furthermore, even when a petitioner presents “new evidence, or a prima facie case for relief,” the BIA retains discretion to deny reopening, as long as its rationale is clear and legally correct. See Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th Cir. 2004). This is a crucial backdrop: the court is not re‑deciding the merits de novo; it is policing for irrational or legally mistaken decisions.

B. Timeliness Error and Affirmance on Alternative Grounds

One of the more practically significant aspects of Amiryan is the court’s handling of the BIA’s timeliness ruling. The BIA stated that the motion to reopen, “filed on February 18, 2025,” was untimely under the 90‑day rule. The Tenth Circuit, examining the record, noted that the BIA had “misapprehended when Amiryan filed his motion to reopen.”

Ordinarily, such a miscalculation might be a substantial error. However, the panel did not grant the petition for that reason. Instead, it emphasized that the BIA had also:

Addressed the merits of the motion; and
Concluded that, even assuming reopening, Amiryan had not established prima facie eligibility for withholding or CAT protection.

Invoking Abudu, the court affirmed the BIA’s decision on this alternative ground:

“Even so, the BIA also denied the motion to reopen on the alternative grounds that Amiryan failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for either withholding of removal or CAT protection. It is on these grounds we affirm the BIA and deny the petition for review.”

The court therefore declined to resolve whether:

The motion was actually timely; or
Amiryan demonstrated “changed country conditions” sufficient to excuse untimeliness.

This approach effectively treats the BIA’s timeliness error as harmless, because even a timely motion would have been denied for failure to state a prima facie claim. The opinion does not use the term “harmless error,” but functionally it applies that concept: where the agency’s alternative, independent ground is legally sound and dispositive, a misstep on timeliness does not require remand.

For practitioners, this underscores the importance of developing robust substantive arguments for reopening; even a successful challenge to procedural errors (like a miscalculated deadline) may be immaterial if the BIA also makes a valid, independent determination that the new evidence would not change the result.

C. Prima Facie Eligibility for Withholding of Removal

1. The Proposed Particular Social Group

Amiryan sought withholding of removal based on alleged persecution as a member of the group:

“Armenians whose sworn testimony against oligarchs becomes public.”

He argued that such individuals are effectively whistleblowers or informants against “political elites” and that Armenian society, or at least powerful segments of it, punishes dissenters and informants severely.

The BIA rejected this proposed PSG, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, referencing the tri‑part test articulated in Rodas‑Orellana and related BIA precedents:

Immutability – a shared, inherent characteristic beyond an individual’s control;
Particularity – a clear, definable group, not indeterminate or overly subjective; and
Social distinction – recognition by Armenian society that such people form a distinct group.

While the court did not delve deeply into each prong, it focused on the third—social distinction. The opinion emphasizes that a petitioner must “provide evidence of shared characteristics that define the particular social group such that Armenian society would perceive it as a group.”

The Tenth Circuit’s key conclusion:

“Although Amiryan submits evidence that he has been threatened, and his family members were attacked and threatened, in response to his testimony in immigration court and past cooperation with United States authorities, he does not provide evidence of shared characteristics that define the particular social group such that Armenian society would perceive it as a group. … Thus, he fails to show the BIA’s conclusion was arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”

Legally, this reaffirms several important points:

PSGs based on one’s conduct as an informant, witness, or whistleblower can be viable only if country‑specific evidence shows that such individuals are recognized as a distinct class in that society.
Evidence of individual threats or attacks, by itself, is insufficient to show that society sees such persons as a group.
The applicant bears the burden to provide sociological, legal, or other country‑conditions evidence demonstrating that the proposed group exists in the eyes of the society—not just in the eyes of the persecutors or the applicant.

2. Political Opinion and Nexus

Amiryan also argued that he faced persecution on account of political opinion, contending that his testimony and cooperation against “oligarchs” and corrupt elites amounted to a political stance—exposing corruption and abuse of power in a country where dissent is punished.

The BIA, and the Tenth Circuit, found that he:

Did not clearly identify a specific political opinion (actual or imputed); and
Failed to show that those who threatened or harmed him (or his relatives) did so because of that political opinion.

The Tenth Circuit cited INS v. Elias‑Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992), which holds that the statute “makes motive critical” and that the applicant must provide evidence of the persecutors’ motive:

“Amiryan … does not explain, or provide evidence of, how the individuals he fears are motivated to harm him because of his actual or imputed political opinion. Motive is critical to establish the nexus between the harm and protected ground. … Again, Amiryan fails to show the BIA's conclusion was arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”

In practical terms, this reinforces:

The need for evidence—such as statements by persecutors, patterns of targeting similar individuals, or documentary reports—showing that retaliation is linked to the victim’s actual or perceived political stance;
The inadequacy of purely circumstantial or speculative claims that opposition to “oligarchs” or involvement in legal processes necessarily equates to a protected political opinion for asylum/withholding purposes.

D. Prima Facie Eligibility for CAT Protection

For CAT relief, the legal test differs from withholding of removal: no protected ground is required, but the applicant must show that it is “more likely than not” that he would be subjected to “torture,” with the involvement or acquiescence of public officials.

The BIA found, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that:

Evidence of Armenian prison conditions and police violence was too general to show a personal, “high probability” risk of torture;
Past harm, even if severe, does not create a presumption of future torture under CAT (citing Niang); and
The attack on the brother‑in‑law and the menacing text message, while troubling, did not meet the threshold of showing that Amiryan, personally, is more likely than not to face torture with state acquiescence.

The panel again underscored that “generalized evidence of government corruption and unsuccessful policing” is insufficient to show that officials would have “actual knowledge or willful blindness” as required by the CAT regulations and interpreted in Escobar‑Hernandez.

The court’s reasoning underscores several doctrinal points:

Particularized risk: CAT does not protect against background violence or systemic failures alone. There must be a concrete, individualized showing of a likely future torture event.
State involvement: The fact that law enforcement did not adequately respond to an attack on a family member does not automatically prove “acquiescence.” Applicants must show that the authorities had awareness (actual or through willful blindness) of anticipated torture and nonetheless failed to intervene.
Weight of family harm: Harm to family members abroad can support an inference of risk, but it must be convincingly tied to the applicant and to likely future torture, not merely serious criminal violence.

E. Pro Se Status and Limits of Liberal Construction

The court briefly notes that Amiryan proceeded pro se and therefore his filings were “liberally construed,” citing Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005):

“[W]e liberally construe his filings, but we cannot take on the responsibility of serving as his attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.”

This is a reminder that, even in the high‑stakes context of removal and CAT claims, courts cannot fill in missing arguments or evidence for unrepresented litigants. Pro se petitioners receive leniency in how their pleadings are read, but not in the substantive law or evidentiary requirements.

VI. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2005)

Used to articulate the standard for treating pro se litigants: courts read their submissions liberally but will not act as their counsel. Here, it justified the court’s willingness to parse his arguments while still holding him to the burden of establishing abuse of discretion and meeting substantive standards.

B. Addo v. Barr, 982 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2020)

Cited in a footnote to explain that removal during a pending petition for review does not necessarily moot the case. If the petitioner ultimately prevails, ICE can facilitate his return under its “Facilitation of Return Policy.” This ensures that appellate review remains meaningful even after physical removal.

C. Maatougui v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2013)

Provides the general abuse‑of‑discretion framework for reviewing motions to reopen and emphasizes that such motions are “disfavored” and petitioners bear a “heavy burden” to prove abuse. The court uses Maatougui to set a high bar before it will overturn the BIA’s denial.

D. Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359 (10th Cir. 2004)

Reinforces the BIA’s broad discretion to deny motions to reopen even when the petitioner arguably presents new evidence or a prima facie case, as long as its reasoning is “clear” and legally correct. This supports the Tenth Circuit’s acceptance of the BIA’s succinct but reasoned discussion of withholding and CAT.

E. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988)

The foundational Supreme Court case on motions to reopen. It authorizes the BIA to deny reopening on multiple independent grounds and clarifies that the BIA is not required to open proceedings every time a prima facie case is alleged. In Amiryan, Abudu is central to the court’s decision to affirm the BIA on the alternative ground of lack of prima facie eligibility, despite the apparent error in timeliness analysis.

F. Rodas‑Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 2015)

Provides the Tenth Circuit’s adoption and clarification of the BIA’s three‑part PSG test (immutability, particularity, social distinction). The Amiryan court uses Rodas‑Orellana to emphasize that Armenian society must recognize “Armenians whose sworn testimony against oligarchs becomes public” as a distinct group; Merely labeling the group is not enough.

G. INS v. Elias‑Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992)

A cornerstone case on political‑opinion nexus. It holds that the applicant must show that the persecutors were motivated by the victim’s political opinion, not simply that harm resulted from generalized violence or other motives. In Amiryan, this doctrine underlies the rejection of his political‑opinion theory: he offered no concrete evidence that those threatening or attacking his family did so because of an actual or imputed political opinion.

H. Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005)

Clarifies that, under CAT, there is no presumption of future torture based on past torture. An applicant must separately show a current, more‑likely‑than‑not risk of future torture. The Tenth Circuit uses this to support the BIA’s conclusion that even serious past harm would not, by itself, entitle Amiryan to CAT protection.

I. Escobar‑Hernandez v. Barr, 940 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2019)

Emphasizes that generalized violence in a country does not suffice for CAT relief; there must be a particularized risk of torture with state involvement or acquiescence. The court in Amiryan relies on Escobar‑Hernandez to reject arguments that widely documented corruption and weak law enforcement in Armenia, without more, could establish that the government would be aware of and fail to prevent his torture.

VII. Impact and Future Implications

A. Motions to Reopen: Timeliness vs. Substantive Merit

Amiryan underscores that even when the BIA errs on the procedural aspects of a motion to reopen (such as timeliness), the Tenth Circuit will not automatically remand if:

The BIA also addresses the merits; and
Its merits‑based denial is legally sound and adequately reasoned.

This effectively incentivizes the BIA to provide alternative merits rulings and warns petitioners that they must attack those rulings head‑on; purely procedural challenges may not suffice.

B. Particular Social Groups for Whistleblowers, Informants, and Witnesses

The decision is likely to be cited persuasively in future Tenth Circuit cases involving informant or whistleblower PSGs. It illustrates:

That the label of a group, even if intuitively plausible (e.g., “witnesses who testified against oligarchs”), is not enough;
That detailed, country‑specific evidence is needed to show that such individuals are recognized as a distinct social group in that society; and
That harms inflicted because of cooperation with law enforcement may be perceived by the court as personal retaliation or criminal reprisal rather than persecution on account of a protected ground unless the PSG and nexus elements are carefully established.

C. Political Opinion Claims Based on Anti‑Corruption or Anti‑Oligarch Stances

The opinion also illustrates the continued force of Elias‑Zacarias in the modern context of anti‑corruption claims. Simply opposing corrupt elites or cooperating with law enforcement does not, without more, establish that the persecutors are motivated by the victim’s political opinions. Applicants must provide:

Evidence that persecutors view anti‑corruption actions as political opposition; and
Statements, threats, or patterns of targeting that link harm to that perceived political belief.

D. CAT Claims in Contexts of Corruption and Impunity

For CAT practitioners, Amiryan confirms:

General failures of policing, systemic corruption, or sporadic non‑responsiveness do not automatically translate into “acquiescence” for CAT purposes;
Applicants must bridge the gap between general conditions and their own situation, showing that in their specific case officials would likely be aware of the anticipated torture and fail to intervene; and
Family members’ attacks, though relevant, must be contextualized to demonstrate a concrete, individualized likelihood that the applicant himself will be tortured.

E. Strategy for Counsel and Pro Se Litigants

The case underscores key strategic lessons:

For motions to reopen: Invest heavily in the “prima facie” showing; do not rely solely on timeliness exceptions or procedural points.
For PSG development: Compile country reports, expert affidavits, and legal materials showing that similarly situated individuals are recognized as a distinct social cohort, not just targets of private revenge.
For CAT claims: Obtain specific evidence linking past incidents to official awareness, patterns of non‑intervention in similar cases, or evidence that the applicant’s particular notoriety renders state protection illusory.
For pro se litigants: Recognize that courts will not “fill in” missing nexus, PSG, or CAT arguments; concrete, evidence‑based legal theories are still required.

VIII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Motion to Reopen (in Plain Terms)

A motion to reopen is like asking the immigration court for a “do‑over” because new facts have emerged that were not available at the time of the original hearing. To succeed, the person must show:

The new facts are important (material);
The evidence could not have been presented earlier; and
If considered, the new evidence would likely change the outcome.

B. Particular Social Group (PSG)

Think of a PSG as a specific “type” of person in a society that:

Shares something important and unchangeable (like race, family ties, or past experience);
Is clearly defined (not vague, like “people who are against crime”); and
Is recognized by the society as a distinct group (for example, a tribal clan or a known occupational group).

In Amiryan, the court said: “You haven’t shown that Armenian society recognizes ‘people whose testimony against oligarchs becomes public’ as a distinct group in this sense.”

C. Political Opinion and Nexus

A political opinion case is not just about what the applicant believes; it is about why the persecutors are attacking. To win, the person must show:

He has a political opinion (for example, opposing a regime or supporting an opposition party), or the persecutors think he does; and
The persecutors are harming him because of that opinion.

If the harm is due to personal revenge, money, or other non‑political motives, the claim will usually fail.

D. CAT, Torture, and Government Acquiescence

Under CAT:

The harm must be very severe—far more serious than ordinary crime or harassment;
It must be intentional; and
Government officials must either carry it out, order it, or know it is going to happen (or be willfully blind to it) and fail to stop it.

General corruption or poor policing is not enough; the applicant must show that, in his own case, officials would effectively allow torture to occur.

E. Prima Facie Case in a Motion to Reopen

A “prima facie case” is a threshold showing: based on the new evidence, if everything the applicant says is true and is believed, would he likely win the underlying claim (withholding or CAT)? If the answer is “no,” the BIA can deny reopening without holding a new full hearing.

IX. Conclusion

Amiryan v. Bondi is a non‑precedential decision, but it encapsulates several critical principles in immigration law:

A procedural error by the BIA regarding timeliness may not warrant remand if there is a valid, independent merits‑based ground to deny reopening;
Particular social group claims, especially those based on cooperation with law enforcement or testimony against powerful actors, require strong evidence that society at large—not just persecutors—recognizes such individuals as a distinct group;
Political opinion and CAT claims remain tightly confined by Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, with motive, individualized risk, and government involvement or acquiescence serving as decisive hurdles;
Pro se litigants, while given procedural leeway, must still satisfy demanding substantive requirements.

In the broader legal context, Amiryan reflects a consistent Tenth Circuit approach: strong deference to the BIA in motions to reopen, strict application of PSG and nexus doctrines, and a high threshold for CAT relief in environments of generalized corruption and violence. For practitioners, it serves as a cautionary illustration of the evidentiary and doctrinal rigor required to successfully reopen immigration proceedings on the basis of new threats and alleged exposure of cooperation with U.S. authorities.