Strict Local Rule 56.1 Compliance and “Similarly Situated” Comparator Proof in Federal-Sector Title VII/ADEA Suspension Cases

Introduction

In David Jackson v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) on an employee’s claims of race and age discrimination under the federal-sector provisions of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and on a Title VII retaliation claim.

The plaintiff, David E. Jackson, an FAA Airway Transportation System Specialist at the Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center, received a two-week suspension after failing to complete mandated on-the-job training by a supervisor-imposed deadline and then asserting he had completed it when the instructor reported he had not attended instructional sessions. Jackson alleged the stated reason was a pretext for discrimination (race and age) and retaliation (based on a prior internal grievance).

The central issues on appeal were (1) whether Jackson produced admissible evidence creating a genuine dispute that his suspension was tainted by race or age discrimination, and (2) whether his earlier internal grievance qualified as statutorily protected activity supporting a Title VII retaliation claim.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that no reasonable jury could find discrimination or retaliation played any role in the suspension. The court emphasized two practical summary-judgment lessons:

Local Rule 56.1 compliance is outcome-determinative: because Jackson’s response failed to provide specific record citations and relied on “unidentifiable documents,” the district court properly deemed the employer’s facts admitted.
Comparator evidence must match in “all material respects”: Jackson’s proposed comparators did not engage in the same basic misconduct (missing a deadline and then being untruthful during follow-up), so the comparison could not support an inference of discriminatory intent.

On retaliation, the court concluded Jackson’s internal grievance did not allege unlawful discrimination and therefore did not constitute protected activity under Title VII.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Record-citation and Local Rule enforcement at summary judgment

The court relied heavily on Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2008), for the proposition that compliance with local summary-judgment rules is “the only permissible way” for a nonmovant to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Under Reese v. Herbert, when the nonmovant fails to cite evidence with specificity, the court may deem the movant’s factual assertions admitted.

Here, Jackson’s citations to “unidentifiable documents” (hundreds of unlabeled, disordered pages) were treated as noncompliance. The panel’s application of Reese v. Herbert effectively narrowed the dispute to the employer’s version of events, placing Jackson in a substantially weaker posture for proving intent.

2) Summary judgment standard

The court framed the standard of review and the Rule 56 inquiry through McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024), reiterating that summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine dispute of material fact exists and no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.

3) Federal-sector Title VII and ADEA: “free from any discrimination” / “taint” standard

For the governing substantive standard, the court cited Babb v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Aﬀs., 992 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2021), explaining that the federal-sector provisions of Title VII and the ADEA are “essentially identical” and require personnel actions to be made “free from any discrimination.” Under Babb v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Aﬀs., a plaintiff must show that a discriminatory reason played some part in the decision-making process—i.e., the action was not “untainted” by discrimination.

The panel also cited Buckley v. Sec'y of Army, 97 F.4th 784 (11th Cir. 2024), reinforcing that the “taint” inquiry applies to federal-sector claims and that a plaintiff must connect the protected characteristic to the personnel action at least as a motivating factor in the process.

4) Circumstantial proof and the “convincing mosaic” concept

The court cited Tynes v. Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939 (11th Cir. 2023), to recognize that plaintiffs may defeat summary judgment through a wide variety of circumstantial evidence, so long as it would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.

It also cited Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011), and Jimenez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 146 F.4th 972 (11th Cir. 2025), for the important caution that comparator evidence is not strictly required; the absence of a comparator does not necessarily doom a case if other circumstantial evidence supports an inference of discriminatory intent.

However, because Jackson relied almost entirely on purported comparators and did not supply other indicia such as suspicious timing or ambiguous statements (as referenced in Tynes v. Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just.), the comparator analysis became dispositive.

5) Comparator standard: “similarly situated in all material respects”

The controlling comparator framework came from Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc), which requires that comparators be “similarly situated in all material respects,” including being subject to the same policy and having engaged in the same basic conduct.

Applying Lewis v. City of Union City, the court concluded that Jackson’s proposed comparators were materially different because Jackson did not show they missed a supervisor-imposed training deadline or were untruthful during the ensuing inquiry. The court further cited Anthony v. Georgia, 69 F.4th 796 (11th Cir. 2023), to support the principle that absent materially similar misconduct, different treatment does not reasonably imply discrimination.

6) Title VII retaliation: protected activity requires a reasonable belief of unlawful practice

For retaliation, the court relied on Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2016), which requires the plaintiff to show a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in an unlawful employment practice.

It also invoked Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 47 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 1995), for the proposition that unfair treatment alone—absent discrimination based on a protected characteristic—is not unlawful under Title VII. Because Jackson’s 2014 grievance did not complain of racial discrimination and instead concerned accountability/work assignment issues, it was not statutorily protected activity, foreclosing retaliation as a matter of law.

Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural posture and the power of deemed admissions

The panel’s reasoning begins with procedure: by enforcing Local Rule 56.1 through Reese v. Herbert, the court accepted the employer’s factual narrative as effectively undisputed. This is not a mere technicality; it determines what facts the court treats as “genuine disputes” versus “admissions.” Once the FAA’s narrative was deemed admitted, Jackson’s ability to argue pretext and discriminatory inference necessarily depended on whether his remaining admissible evidence could still create a triable issue.

2) Discrimination claims: no inference of “taint” without valid comparators (or other circumstantial evidence)

Under Babb v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Aﬀs. and Buckley v. Sec'y of Army, Jackson needed evidence that race or age played some role in the decision-making process—i.e., that the suspension process was not “untainted.”

Jackson attempted to show taint through allegedly favorable treatment of two coworkers. The court treated that as classic comparator proof and evaluated it under Lewis v. City of Union City. Because the comparators were not shown to have missed training deadlines or to have been untruthful during follow-up, the comparison did not “match” the relevant misconduct. Without a valid comparator, and without other circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent (as contemplated in Tynes v. Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just.), the court held the record could not support a reasonable inference of discriminatory animus.

Notably, the opinion does not require that Jackson disprove the employer’s reason in the abstract; rather, it requires some evidence connecting the adverse action to a protected trait. The admitted facts instead support a non-discriminatory explanation: missed deadline plus perceived dishonesty during follow-up.

3) Retaliation: the grievance did not oppose unlawful discrimination

The panel’s retaliation analysis is straightforward and doctrinally orthodox within Eleventh Circuit law. Under Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, protected activity requires a reasonable belief of unlawful discrimination; Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs clarifies that complaints about unfairness not tied to protected status do not qualify.

Because Jackson’s grievance concerned changing expectations and being held accountable for others’ work—without alleging race discrimination—no reasonable jury could find he engaged in protected activity. That finding alone defeats causation and pretext questions because the prima facie element is missing.

Impact

Reinforces strict summary-judgment practice norms: The decision underscores that litigants who fail to comply with Local Rule 56.1 risk having the opposing party’s facts deemed admitted, which can be dispositive in intent-based cases where factual nuance matters.
Clarifies comparator rigor in discipline cases: By focusing on the “same basic conduct” (missed deadline plus alleged untruthfulness), the opinion signals that comparator proof in disciplinary settings must align with the employer’s articulated misconduct rationale, not merely share job titles or supervisors.
Limits retaliation claims based on generalized workplace complaints: Employees’ internal complaints about management style, workload, or unfairness will not support Title VII retaliation unless they reasonably communicate opposition to discrimination prohibited by Title VII.
Operationalizes the federal-sector “untainted” standard: While Babb v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Aﬀs. sets a plaintiff-friendly “any taint” formulation, this case illustrates that the standard still requires evidence linking the personnel action to protected status—procedural defaults and weak comparators will prevent a case from reaching a jury.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling where the court decides the case because, even viewing the evidence in the nonmovant’s favor, no reasonable jury could find for that party on the record presented.
Local Rule 56.1 statements: Many federal courts require parties to respond to numbered facts with specific citations to the record. If you do not, the court may treat the other side’s facts as admitted.
Comparator evidence: Proof that similarly situated coworkers outside the plaintiff’s protected class committed the same misconduct but were treated better. Under Lewis v. City of Union City, comparators must be similar in the ways that matter to the discipline decision (policy, supervisor context, and “same basic conduct”).
Federal-sector “untainted” standard: Under Babb v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Aﬀs., a federal employee can establish liability if discrimination played any part in the process. But the employee still must produce evidence that discrimination actually entered the decision-making chain.
Protected activity (retaliation): Complaining about unlawful discrimination (or reasonably believing you are) is protected; complaining about unfair treatment not tied to protected status generally is not, per Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs.

Conclusion

David Jackson v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation is a practical, procedure-sensitive decision: strict enforcement of Local Rule 56.1 can effectively determine the factual record at summary judgment, and discrimination claims built primarily on comparators will fail unless the proposed comparators are “similarly situated in all material respects” under Lewis v. City of Union City. On retaliation, the case reiterates that Title VII protects opposition to unlawful discrimination—not generalized workplace grievances—under Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC and Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs. Even under the federal-sector “untainted” framework of Babb v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Aﬀs., a plaintiff must still present admissible evidence connecting the adverse action to protected status or protected activity; absent that link, summary judgment will be affirmed.