Strict Liability Persists for § 841(b)(1)(C) “Death Results” After Ruan; No Need to Identify the Specific Fatal Bag When All Sources Trace to Defendants

United States v. Jeremy Edward Johnson; United States v. Susan Melissa Nickas, Nos. 22-2512 & 23-1316 (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 2025) (not precedential)

Note: This disposition is designated “Not Precedential” under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7 and does not constitute binding precedent. It nonetheless offers practical guidance on several recurring issues in drug-overdose prosecutions.

Introduction

The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions of Jeremy Johnson and Susan Nickas for conspiracy to distribute, and distribution of, heroin/fentanyl resulting in death under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846. The case arose from the December 11, 2020 overdose death of Joshua Kiernan following his consumption of heroin/fentanyl in both stamped (“Rite-Aid”) and unstamped baggies.

The appeal presented multiple issues: (1) whether Johnson’s statements after he requested counsel during interrogation should have been suppressed under Miranda; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to link Nickas to both the stamped and unstamped drugs and to causally connect those drugs to Kiernan’s death; (3) whether the “death results” element requires proximate cause and/or a mens rea in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruan v. United States; (4) whether the government improperly vouched for a key witness; (5) whether prosecutorial remarks in summation denied due process; and (6) whether cumulative error warranted a new trial.

The panel rejected all challenges, emphasizing robust circumstantial proof tying both sets of baggies to the defendants, reaffirming (on plain-error review) that § 841(b)(1)(C)’s “death results” element remains a strict-liability sentencing enhancer requiring but-for causation—not proximate cause or additional mens rea—and clarifying that the prosecution need not prove which specific bag caused the fatal overdose when all plausible fatal sources are attributable to the defendants.

Summary of the Opinion

Miranda/Harmless Error: Without deciding whether a Miranda violation occurred when Johnson requested counsel mid-interrogation, the court held any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given overwhelming independent evidence establishing the distribution chain. (Citing United States v. Brownlee and United States v. Shabazz.)
Sufficiency as to Nickas: The panel found ample circumstantial evidence that (i) the unstamped bags Johnson sold on the morning of December 10 derived from Nickas’s December 6 supply, and (ii) the stamped bags Johnson delivered that night were sourced from Nickas’s December 10 run. Either way, the fatal dose came from defendants. The verdict easily satisfied the “bare rationality” standard. (Citing Caraballo-Rodriguez and Jacobs.)
“Death Results” Element—Proximate Cause and Mens Rea: The court reaffirmed its precedent that proximate cause is not required (United States v. Robinson; Jacobs), and, post-Ruan, it is not plain error to omit a separate mens rea instruction for the “death results” enhancement. The element remains a strict-liability increase triggered by but-for causation as clarified by Burrage v. United States.
Vouching: No improper vouching occurred; the detective’s testimony about a witness’s earlier lies and later truth-telling was rooted in record-based investigative detail and, in material part, elicited in response to defense questioning. (Citing Weatherly, Berrios, and Vitillo.)
Prosecutorial Misconduct: Even assuming certain remarks were imperfect, no statement or cumulative set of statements “so infected” the trial as to deny due process, particularly in light of curative instructions and the strength of the evidence. (Citing Repak, Donnelly, Fulton, Rivas, and Lee.)
Cumulative Error: No prejudice to cumulate; convictions affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Shabazz, 564 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Jackson, 120 F.4th 1210 (3d Cir. 2024)
- Brownlee provides the harmless-error framework for admitted statements obtained in violation of Miranda: reversal is required unless the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
- Shabazz illustrates harmlessness where other evidence is overwhelming.
- Jackson and Kramer (75 F.4th 339 (3d Cir. 2023)) govern standards of review: factual findings for clear error, legal conclusions de novo, and viewing facts in the government’s favor when a suppression motion is denied.
United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc); United States v. Jacobs, 21 F.4th 106 (3d Cir. 2021); United States v. Zayas, 32 F.4th 211 (3d Cir. 2022)
- These cases articulate the highly deferential sufficiency standard: the verdict must be upheld if supported by any reasonable inference and does not fall below “bare rationality.”
United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Jacobs, 21 F.4th 106 (3d Cir. 2021); Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450 (2022); Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014)
- Robinson and Jacobs establish that § 841(b)(1)(C)’s “death results” element does not require proof of proximate cause in the Third Circuit.
- Burrage requires but-for causation for the “death results” enhancement. It did not impose a proximate cause requirement.
- Ruan held that § 841(a)(1) requires the government to prove knowing or intentional unauthorized distribution for doctor-defendants, but did not address the “death results” enhancement. The panel here concludes it is not plain error to omit a mens rea instruction for the enhancement post-Ruan.
United States v. Weatherly, 525 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Lora v. United States, 599 U.S. 453 (2023); United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2007)
- These decisions define improper vouching as a prosecutor’s assurance of credibility based on personal knowledge or information outside the record. They also explain that vouching can occur during witness examination, not just summation, but hinges on those two criteria.
United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230 (3d Cir. 2017); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974); United States v. Fulton, 837 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2016); United States v. Rivas, 493 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Greenspan, 923 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2019)
- These cases supply the due process framework for prosecutorial misconduct claims, the “so infected the trial” standard, and the permissibility of hard-hitting but fair comment during summation. Fulton and Greenspan address plain-error and cumulative-error review.

Legal Reasoning

1) Miranda claim resolved by harmless error

Johnson said “I want a lawyer” about 25 minutes into interrogation, conversations continued briefly without counsel, and then he agreed to proceed. Rather than adjudicate whether this sequence violated Miranda and Edwards, the panel assumed arguendo a violation and held any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Independent, non-statement evidence—hundreds of messages, cell location data, and witness testimony—reconstructed the December 10 supply chain from Johnson (sourced by Nickas) to Watson to Kiernan (morning unstamped bags) and directly to Kiernan (evening stamped bags). Given this robust proof, the challenged statements did not contribute to the verdict.

2) Sufficiency of the evidence against Nickas: circumstantial proof of two sources tied to her

Nickas argued the government tied her only to the stamped bags from December 10, not to the unstamped bags sold by Johnson on the morning of December 10, and that the government failed to prove causation from the stamped bags. The panel rejected both propositions, underscoring:

On December 6, Johnson purchased $300 of heroin/fentanyl from Nickas. The record supported the inference he retained some of that supply through December 10, as he told Watson early that morning he had drugs “right now” before contacting other suppliers, and then delivered unstamped bags to her around 11 a.m.
Later on December 10, Johnson obtained stamped (“Rite-Aid”) bags via a planned New Jersey run with Nickas and delivered them to Kiernan that evening.
At the overdose scene on December 11, two empty bags—one stamped and one unstamped—tested positive for heroin/fentanyl; other bags in Kiernan’s kit also contained the same mixture. The court accepted that these empty bags represented the drugs used in the fatal overdose.

On this record, a reasonable juror could find that both the unstamped and stamped bags originated with Nickas (via the Dec. 6 and Dec. 10 supplies, respectively). The court emphasized that Johnson’s attempts to re-up in the interim days did not compel the conclusion that he had exhausted the Dec. 6 supply, and appellate review cannot displace a reasonable inference simply because another is equally plausible.

3) The “death results” element: no proximate cause or mens rea instruction required on plain-error review

Defendants asked the court to instruct that the “death results” element of §§ 841/846 requires proximate causation and a knowing or intentional mens rea. The panel, applying plain-error review, found:

Proximate cause: Foreclosed by Third Circuit precedent (Robinson; Jacobs), which the panel continues to follow.
Mens rea: Not plain error to omit a separate mens rea for the “death results” enhancement. Ruan (requiring knowledge/intent with respect to unauthorized distribution for § 841(a)(1)) did not speak to § 841(b)(1)(C)’s penalty enhancement. As Burrage explains, “death results” increases the penalty if a user’s death is caused by the drug distributed—this is a causation fact that does not distinguish wrongful from innocent conduct in the way “authorization” does under § 841(a)(1).

Critically, the panel endorsed the prosecutor’s trial position that the government did not need to prove which specific bag caused death where all plausible fatal sources (the stamped and unstamped bags) were tied to the defendants and each contained the same heroin/fentanyl mixture. That approach fits Burrage: if every causation alternative is a bag attributable to the defendants, then the but-for requirement is satisfied without selecting a single bag.

4) No improper vouching

The detective testified that witness Kaleigh Watson lied initially but later told the truth in an April 2021 interview. Vouching requires assurances of credibility based on the prosecutor’s personal knowledge or extra-record information. Here:

No personal knowledge by the prosecutor was involved.
The detective’s basis was thoroughly explored on the record (the investigation she described); Watson herself admitted her initial lies and later truthfulness when confronted with messages.
Several challenged answers were responsive to defense counsel’s lines of questioning about investigative techniques and witness interviews.

In context, the testimony did not cross the vouching line.

5) Prosecutorial misconduct in summation rejected

Reviewing eight challenged remarks for plain error, the panel concluded none, either individually or cumulatively, denied due process:

Comments accusing the defense of distraction fell within permissible attacks on opposing arguments, particularly under instructions that argument is not evidence.
References to “junkie” language were supported by the record showing Nickas used such terms for customers, even if not directed at the decedent.
Arguments that random sampling supported an inference about the entire set of baggies were permissible inferences.
The assertion that the government did not have to prove which bag caused death was a fair reflection of the theory that all plausible fatal bags traced to defendants.
Statements that coworkers did not disturb the scene did not contradict the testimony (which reported movement of the body to render aid).
A numeric misstatement (“five bundles, 250 bags” instead of 50 bags) was isolated, not repeated, and cured by instructions that arguments are not evidence.
Remarks noting the absence of evidence supporting alternative suppliers permissibly highlighted holes in the defense theory and did not shift the burden.
A “fair guess” phrasing was promptly corrected on rebuttal, and the jury was reminded not to guess and to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

6) Cumulative error

With no preserved or prejudicial errors, there was nothing to cumulate; the cumulative error claim failed.

Impact

“Death results” remains strict liability (Third Circuit): This opinion—though nonprecedential—confirms the court’s settled approach: § 841(b)(1)(C)’s “death results” enhancement requires but-for causation under Burrage and does not require proximate cause or a separate mens rea. Post-Ruan challenges will not succeed on plain-error review and face an uphill battle generally.
No need to pinpoint the exact fatal bag when all paths lead to defendants: Prosecutors need not prove which specific bag caused the overdose where all plausible fatal sources are attributable to the defendants and contain the causative drug mixture. This is particularly important in cases involving multiple doses consumed close in time.
Use of digital and circumstantial evidence in overdose prosecutions: The court’s sufficiency analysis underscores that messages, cell-site data, and timing can robustly reconstruct supply chains even in the absence of complete physical testing of every bag.
Miranda litigation pragmatics: Even serious questions about interrogation after invocation may be resolved as harmless where the non-statement case is overwhelming. Defense counsel should develop a record on prejudice, not just violation.
Trial practice guardrails:
- For the government: avoid “guess” language and ensure numerical accuracy; where missteps occur, prompt corrections and clear jury instructions can mitigate prejudice.
- For the defense: preserve objections specifically (vouching, burdenshifting, mens rea/proximate cause instructions) to avoid plain-error barriers and to position issues for potential en banc or Supreme Court review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Miranda/Edwards and harmless error: If a suspect asks for a lawyer, interrogation must stop until a lawyer is present unless the suspect validly reinitiates. Even if the police err, a conviction remains intact if the remaining evidence is so strong that the improperly obtained statements made no difference to the verdict.
“Death results” element vs. the underlying offense: Section 841(a)(1) defines the crime of distribution and requires wrongful/unauthorized conduct (after Ruan, knowing or intentional). Section 841(b)(1)(C)’s “death results” is a penalty enhancement triggered if the distributed drug was a but-for cause of a user’s death. It is not a separate crime and does not add a mental-state requirement beyond causation.
But-for vs. proximate cause: But-for causation asks whether the death would have occurred without the drug the defendant distributed. Proximate cause adds a foreseeability or directness filter. The Third Circuit does not require proximate cause for § 841(b)(1)(C)—only but-for causation per Burrage.
Plain error review: When a party does not object at trial, the appellate court will correct only “plain” errors—those that are clear under existing law, affect substantial rights, and seriously affect the proceedings’ fairness. This is a demanding standard.
Improper vouching: It is improper for a prosecutor to assure jurors a witness is truthful based on the prosecutor’s own knowledge or information outside the evidence. It is not vouching to draw credibility inferences from evidence the jury heard or to elicit an investigator’s testimony grounded in the record.
Random sampling of drug evidence: Law enforcement may test a subset of seized baggies; if all tested samples contain the same substance, jurors may reasonably infer the untested bags from the same stash are the same, especially where corroborated by context (packaging, stamps, contemporaneous use).

Conclusion

The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions of Johnson and Nickas in a comprehensive opinion that, while nonprecedential, meaningfully clarifies several doctrines for overdose prosecutions:

Miranda errors are subject to strict harmless-error review, and overwhelming independent proof can render any violation harmless.
Jurors may rely on strong circumstantial evidence—texts, timing, travel, packaging—to link multiple doses to a single supplier, even where baggies bear different stamps or are partially tested.
The “death results” enhancement under § 841(b)(1)(C) continues to require but-for causation, not proximate cause or a separate mens rea, and courts need not force the government to choose a single bag as the fatal dose where all plausible fatal sources are tied to the defendants.
Claims of vouching and summation misconduct will be assessed contextually; absent clear reliance on extra-record assurances or pervasive prejudice, convictions will stand—especially under plain-error review.

In the broader legal landscape, the decision signals the Third Circuit’s continued adherence to pre-Ruan “death results” doctrine and offers practical guidance on proof structures that satisfy Burrage’s but-for causation requirement in multi-dose overdose cases. Defense counsel seeking to expand Ruan into the sentencing-enhancement context will need to preserve the issue, confront adverse circuit precedent, and likely seek higher-court intervention.