Strict Enforcement of the Written Motion Requirement and the Role of Parental Denial in Abuse and Neglect Dispositions: Commentary on In re T.G., J.R., and R.G.

Strict Enforcement of the Written Motion Requirement and the Role of Parental Denial in Abuse and Neglect Dispositions: Commentary on In re T.G., J.R., and R.G.

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re T.G., J.R., and R.G., No. 24-570 (Nov. 4, 2025), affirms the termination of a stepmother’s custodial rights and a mother’s parental rights in an abuse and neglect proceeding. Although issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, the opinion is richly instructive on several recurring issues in child abuse and neglect litigation:

  • What constitutes sufficient evidence to adjudicate a parent as abusive and neglectful;
  • How a parent’s refusal to testify may be treated as affirmative evidence of culpability;
  • The necessity of a written motion to obtain a post-adjudicatory improvement period;
  • Why mere “compliance” with services is not enough if the parent refuses to accept responsibility;
  • When termination of rights may proceed without use of less restrictive alternatives.

The petitioner, C.M.-G., is the stepmother of T.G. and J.R. and the biological mother of R.G. She challenged the circuit court’s adjudication of her as an abusing and neglectful parent and the dispositional order terminating her custodial rights to her stepchildren and parental rights to her biological child. The Supreme Court affirmed, reinforcing a child-centered approach that prioritizes safety and permanency over procedural or formal “compliance” when the parent remains in denial.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. DHS Petition and Initial Allegations

On February 7, 2024, the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an abuse and neglect petition against the petitioner and the children’s father. The core allegations included:

  • Ten-year-old J.R. was hospitalized at Highland Hospital and, during a Child Advocacy Center (CAC) interview, disclosed:
    • Physical, verbal, and emotional abuse by the father;
    • That the father and petitioner did “inappropriate things” in front of her;
    • Father’s excessive drinking and driving while intoxicated;
    • Being underfed and denied food.
  • Twelve-year-old T.G., in an initial CAC interview, minimized or disputed J.R.’s claims, saying J.R. made “wild claims.”
  • Eight-year-old R.G. stated he liked living at home but noted the home had “lots of bugs and sometimes cockroaches.”
  • The petitioner tested positive for THC but professed ignorance as to why.
  • A DHS home inspection revealed:
    • A terrible smell, clutter, and an unkempt environment;
    • Visible roach feces (though no roaches at that moment);
    • Dirty kitchen and bathroom, with mold in the shower that was so filthy it appeared children bathed in the sink;
    • Trash throughout the home.
  • The petitioner had two prior involuntary terminations of parental rights in separate cases:
    • In one, a child suffered chemical burns from lye used in methamphetamine production; the petitioner failed to complete an improvement period;
    • In the other, her rights were terminated on grounds of abandonment.

On this basis, DHS alleged that the petitioner and the father:

  • Abused controlled substances;
  • Failed to provide a fit and suitable home;
  • Physically abused the children.

B. Preliminary Hearing and Emergency Removal

At the February 14, 2024 preliminary hearing, two DHS workers testified to the deplorable condition of the home. The circuit court:

  • Ratified the emergency removal of the children;
  • Found imminent danger to the children's physical and emotional wellbeing based on failure to provide a fit, apt, and suitable home.

Following additional CAC interviews after removal from the home, DHS filed an amended petition in March 2024. In the second round of interviews:

  • J.R. added disclosures of sexual abuse by the father;
  • T.G. disclosed:
    • He and J.R. were denied food;
    • Father’s alcohol abuse, including drinking and driving;
    • Father calling him offensive and derogatory names;
    • Father and petitioner having sex in front of him.
  • R.G. disclosed:
    • Father gave him alcohol;
    • T.G. had told him about not receiving food.

DHS further alleged that petitioner’s drug use negatively impacted her parenting and that she failed to protect the children from the father and failed to provide suitable housing.

C. Adjudicatory Hearings

Adjudicatory hearings occurred in April 2024. Key features:

  • The CAC forensic interviewer testified, explaining that the second interviews were prompted by new disclosures at the foster placement.
  • Recordings of the CAC interviews (both rounds) were played and admitted as evidence without objection.
  • The petitioner refused to testify.

The circuit court:

  • Treated petitioner’s refusal to testify as affirmative evidence of culpability;
  • Found that she:
    • Physically abused the children;
    • Allowed abuse to occur in the home;
    • Failed to maintain a suitable home;
    • Failed to provide appropriate food and clothing.
  • Adjudicated the petitioner as an abusing and neglecting parent.

D. Dispositional Hearing

At the August 2024 dispositional hearing, testimony focused on petitioner’s performance in services and her insight (or lack thereof):

  • Multiple witnesses testified that:
    • Petitioner participated in offered services — but
    • Persistently refused to accept responsibility, blaming J.R. for “all the problems in the home.”
  • A psychologist who evaluated the petitioner testified:
    • Petitioner “denied everything,” portraying J.R. as the problem;
    • Her prognosis for improved parenting was “extremely poor”;
    • Returning the children would risk retaliation against them by petitioner and father;
    • She did not believe petitioner was willing or able to correct the issues.
  • A service provider testified:
    • The home’s cleanliness had improved;
    • But petitioner and father continually redirected conversation from parenting to blaming J.R.;
    • They refused to allow access to their bedroom.
  • A CPS worker testified:
    • Petitioner and father padlocked the bedroom and denied access;
    • Petitioner complied with services but:
    • An improvement period would likely be futile, especially given a prior termination for failure to comply with services;
    • Petitioner said she did not want J.R. to return to her care.
  • Petitioner testified that she regretted “not getting [J.R.] the help that she needed” when asked what needed to be remedied — still deflecting responsibility.

The circuit court concluded that:

  • Petitioner had “gone through the motions” of services but did not benefit;
  • She never accepted responsibility for abuse or neglect;
  • There was no reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future;
  • No less restrictive alternative to termination could adequately protect the children’s health, safety, and welfare.

As a result, the court:

  • Terminated petitioner’s custodial rights to T.G. and J.R.;
  • Terminated her parental rights to R.G.

The father’s and the biological mother’s rights were also terminated; the permanency plan is adoption in the current placements. Petitioner appealed.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

Applying the standard set forth in syllabus point 1 of In re Cecil T., the Supreme Court:

  • Reviewed the circuit court’s factual findings for clear error; and
  • Reviewed the circuit court’s legal conclusions de novo.

The Court resolved two main issues:

  1. Adjudication of Abuse and Neglect. The Court held that DHS proved by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner abused and neglected the children. It relied on:
    • The CAC interviews (including the second set of interviews);
    • Testimony regarding the home’s unfit condition;
    • Petitioner’s refusal to testify, which the circuit court was entitled to consider as affirmative evidence of culpability under Doris S.;
    • Deference to the circuit court’s credibility determinations under Guthrie.
  2. Termination Without an Improvement Period. The Court rejected petitioner’s argument that the circuit court erred by terminating her custodial and parental rights without first granting a post-adjudicatory improvement period:
    • Petitioner did not file a written motion for an improvement period, a mandatory prerequisite under syllabus point 4 of State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson and W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2);
    • Her appellate brief failed to comply with Rule 10(c)(7) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure by not citing where and how the issue was raised below;
    • Substantively, her continued refusal to accept responsibility made an improvement period futile under In re Timber M. and supported a finding of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the September 10, 2024 dispositional order terminating petitioner’s custodial and parental rights.

IV. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. Standard of Review and Appellate Posture

The Court reaffirmed the bifurcated standard of review in abuse and neglect appeals from In re Cecil T.:

  • Findings of Fact: Reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” standard — the Court will not disturb findings supported by competent evidence unless left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made;
  • Conclusions of Law: Reviewed de novo — the appellate court exercises its own judgment on legal questions.

This standard heavily favors affirmance where the circuit court’s findings rest on credibility assessments, as in this case. The Court explicitly cited State v. Guthrie for the principle that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility — those determinations are “the exclusive function and task of the trier of fact.”

B. Adjudication of Abuse and Neglect

1. Statutory Burden: Clear and Convincing Evidence

West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(i) requires that abuse and neglect be found based on:

  • Conditions existing at the time of filing of the petition; and
  • Proof by clear and convincing evidence.

The Court reiterated, citing In re F.S. and In re Christina L., that the statute:

“does not specify any particular manner or mode of testimony or evidence by which the [DHS] is obligated to meet this burden.”

Thus, CAC interviews, forensic interview testimony, and circumstantial evidence about home conditions are all permissible evidentiary sources to satisfy the clear and convincing standard.

2. Role of the CAC Interviews and Child Disclosures

The petitioner’s appellate strategy focused on attacking J.R.’s credibility, emphasizing alleged inconsistencies with the first CAC interviews of T.G. and R.G. She argued DHS failed to properly investigate the reliability of J.R.’s statements and highlighted that T.G. initially dismissed J.R.’s claims as “wild.”

However, the Court observed:

  • The petitioner’s argument selectively focused on the first round of CAC interviews, which had been presented at the preliminary hearing;
  • After removal to foster care, all three children made additional and corroborating disclosures in the second CAC interviews:
    • J.R.’s additional disclosures of sexual abuse;
    • T.G.’s elaboration on denial of food, exposure to sexual conduct by adults, and father’s alcohol abuse;
    • R.G.’s report of being given alcohol and corroboration of T.G.’s accounts of food deprivation.

These second-round statements were played for the circuit court and admitted without objection. Importantly, the petitioner did not include the CAC recordings in the appellate appendix record. This omission is practically significant: appellate courts typically resolve ambiguities in the record against the complaining party. While the Court did not explicitly state this presumption, it noted the omission — an implicit reminder to practitioners to ensure the record includes all critical materials.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the circuit court:

  • “Clearly” weighed the children’s statements and the testimony of the forensic interviewer; and
  • Made credibility determinations that the appellate court would not disturb.

3. Home Conditions and Prior Terminations as Context

The physical condition of the home and petitioner’s history of prior terminations provided crucial background:

  • Filthy shower (to the point children likely bathed in the sink), mold, trash, cockroach feces, terrible odor;
  • Two prior involuntary terminations, one involving:
    • Chemical burns from lye used in methamphetamine production and failure to complete an improvement period;
    • Another based on abandonment.

These facts:

  • Undermined petitioner’s claims that this was a single, misunderstood situation;
  • Supported the view that petitioner had longstanding, unresolved parenting and safety problems; and
  • Bolstered the conclusion that conditions existed at the time of the petition that constituted abuse and neglect.

4. Parental Silence as Affirmative Evidence of Culpability

A significant and sometimes misunderstood feature of West Virginia abuse and neglect jurisprudence is the treatment of a parent’s refusal to testify. The circuit court “treated the petitioner’s refusal to testify at the hearing as affirmative evidence of her culpability,” and the Supreme Court expressly approved this approach, relying on syllabus point 2 of W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res. ex rel. Wright v. Doris S.:

the remedial purpose of abuse and neglect proceedings allows lower courts to “properly consider [a parent]’s silence as affirmative evidence of that [parent]’s culpability.”

In other words:

  • Because abuse and neglect proceedings are remedial and civil in nature, not criminal;
  • The trier of fact may draw adverse inferences from a parent’s silence in the face of incriminating evidence;
  • That silence can be weighed along with all other evidence in determining whether DHS proved abuse or neglect.

Here, in light of the detailed child disclosures and home conditions, petitioner’s refusal to testify was reasonably viewed as supporting — not neutralizing — the evidence against her.

5. Result: No Error in Adjudication

Taking the CAC evidence, home conditions, prior terminations, and petitioner’s silence together, the Supreme Court concluded there was no error in adjudicating petitioner as an abusive and neglectful parent. The Court refused to reweigh credibility and deferred to the circuit court’s fact-finding function under Guthrie.

C. Denial of a Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period and Termination

1. Improvement Periods Are Statutory and Conditional

A central issue on appeal was petitioner’s complaint that the circuit court terminated her rights without first granting a post-adjudicatory improvement period. She argued that her “compliance” with services demonstrated a likelihood she would complete an improvement period and remedy the conditions of abuse and neglect.

The Court responded at two levels: procedural and substantive.

2. Procedural Bar: The Mandatory Written Motion Requirement

Procedurally, the Court relied on syllabus point 4 of State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson:

“A circuit court may not grant a post-adjudicatory improvement period under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2) . . . unless the [parent] files a written motion requesting the improvement period.”

Applied here:

  • Petitioner did not point to any place in the record where she filed a written motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period;
  • Absent such a motion, the circuit court had no authority to grant one;
  • Her appellate argument therefore failed a fundamental prerequisite.

Additionally, under Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, an argument must:

contain “citations that pinpoint when and how the issues . . . were presented to the lower tribunal.”

The petitioner did not make such citations. Accordingly:

  • Her improvement-period argument was procedurally deficient;
  • The Supreme Court could have rejected it solely on this basis.

This aspect of the decision underscores a critical point of practice: Improvement periods are not automatic or self-executing. Parents (through counsel) must:

  • File a written motion requesting the improvement period;
  • Ensure the motion, arguments, and supporting evidence are clearly in the record.

3. Substantive Futility: Denial and Failure to Acknowledge Responsibility

Even setting aside the procedural defects, the Court held that the circuit court acted within its discretion in not granting an improvement period and in proceeding directly to termination. Key was petitioner’s persistent refusal to acknowledge any abuse or neglect.

The Supreme Court quoted In re Timber M.:

“[f]ailure to acknowledge the existence of the problem, i.e., the truth of the basic allegation pertaining to the alleged abuse and neglect . . . results in making the problem untreatable and in making an improvement period an exercise in futility at the child[ren]’s expense.”

Despite being adjudicated as an abusing and neglectful parent, petitioner:

  • Continued to “deny everything” according to the psychologist;
  • Blamed J.R. as the cause of all problems;
  • Testified only that she regretted not getting J.R. “the help she needed,” a statement that:
    • Shifted blame to J.R.’s supposed mental or behavioral needs;
    • Failed to acknowledge her own abusive and neglectful conduct.

Under Timber M., this lack of acknowledgment makes the underlying problem “untreatable” in the timeframe relevant to the children’s need for permanency. The Court emphasized:

  • Compliance with services (e.g., attending sessions, cleaning the house) is not enough if the parent does not truly recognize and address the abusive behavior;
  • Improvement periods are designed to facilitate real change, not box-checking.

The psychologist’s testimony about an “extremely poor” prognosis, risk of retaliation, and petitioner’s unwillingness or inability to change further supported the circuit court’s futility finding.

4. “No Reasonable Likelihood” of Correction and Welfare of the Children

Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d), “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected” means:

“the abusing adult . . . [has] demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on their own or with help.”

The circuit court found:

  • Petitioner had “gone through the motions” of services but did not benefit;
  • She refused to accept responsibility throughout the case;
  • She previously failed in services leading to a prior termination;
  • She openly expressed that she did not want J.R. back in her care.

These facts collectively demonstrate:

  • Inadequate capacity to correct the conditions;
  • Risk of renewed harm if children were returned;
  • Strong justification for the finding of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction.

The circuit court also found that termination was necessary for the children’s welfare — a finding petitioner did not challenge on appeal. That welfare finding is required by W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) for termination.

5. Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

The Court cited syllabus point 5 of In re Kristin Y., which in turn quotes syllabus point 2 of In re R.J.M.:

“Termination of parental rights . . . may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood . . . that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.”

Because:

  • The circuit court correctly found no reasonable likelihood of correction;
  • Termination was necessary for the children’s welfare;

The Supreme Court held that direct termination — without further improvement periods or lesser alternatives — was authorized and appropriate.

D. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. In re Cecil T.

Provided the standard of review:

  • Factual findings: clear error.
  • Legal conclusions: de novo.

Its influence: It constrained petitioner’s ability to re-litigate factual issues such as child credibility and weight of DHS testimony.

2. In re F.S. and In re Christina L.

These decisions clarify that W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i) does not mandate any particular “manner or mode of testimony or evidence” to meet the clear and convincing burden. This legitimizes the DHS’s reliance on:

  • CAC interviews and child statements;
  • Testimony from forensic interviewers and service providers;
  • Circumstantial and environmental evidence (home conditions).

3. State v. Guthrie

Although a criminal case, Guthrie is invoked for the fundamental appellate principle that:

“An appellate court may not decide the credibility of witnesses or weigh evidence as that is the exclusive function and task of the trier of fact.”

Influence here: It foreclosed petitioner’s attempt to have the Supreme Court second-guess the circuit court’s credibility calls regarding the children’s varying statements.

4. Doris S.

Doris S. is the cornerstone for the proposition that a parent’s silence in abuse and neglect proceedings may be treated as affirmative evidence of culpability. That doctrine:

  • Reflects the remedial, non-punitive nature of child welfare proceedings;
  • Allows judges to consider silence in context (rather than being required to treat it as neutral);
  • Was directly applied to petitioner’s refusal to testify at adjudication.

5. State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson

P.G.-1 supplies the vital procedural rule: a circuit court may not grant a post-adjudicatory improvement period under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2) absent a written motion from the parent. It effectively:

  • Transforms the “written motion” from a formality into a jurisdictional/authority requirement;
  • Enforces procedural regularity and clear record-making around improvement periods.

In this case, it undercut petitioner’s argument at the threshold.

6. In re Timber M.

Timber M. articulates the pivotal doctrine that failure to acknowledge the existence of abuse or neglect:

  • Makes the problem effectively “untreatable”; and
  • Renders an improvement period “an exercise in futility at the child[ren]’s expense.”

This case is the primary doctrinal foundation for:

  • Rejecting improvement periods where a parent remains in denial;
  • Justifying findings of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction.

7. In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M.

These cases govern termination of parental rights without resort to less restrictive alternatives when statutory criteria for “no reasonable likelihood” of correction and necessity for the child’s welfare are met. They validate:

  • Direct termination as an appropriate remedy;
  • The child-centered focus on permanency and safety.

E. Practice and Systemic Implications

1. The Importance of the Appellate Record (CAC Recordings)

The Court noted that petitioner did not include the recordings of the CAC interviews in the appendix record. Practically, this means:

  • The appellate court must assume that the missing evidence supports the circuit court’s rulings unless shown otherwise;
  • It becomes nearly impossible to challenge factual findings rooted in evidence the Supreme Court cannot review.

This is a vital practice point for appellate counsel: ensure that all critical audio/video or documentary evidence is included in the record.

2. Compliance vs. Benefit from Services

This decision underscores that “compliance” is not synonymous with “progress”:

  • Parents may attend classes, submit to evaluations, and participate in services;
  • But if they do not:
    • Internalize and acknowledge their abusive or neglectful behaviors; and
    • Demonstrate changed attitudes and behaviors;
  • The court may legitimately find that the parent has not benefited from services.

Here, the circuit court’s “gone through the motions” characterization captures this distinction. The Supreme Court endorsed that assessment as a valid basis for finding futility of further efforts and “no reasonable likelihood” of correction.

3. Stepparent “Custodial Rights” vs. Parental Rights

The order terminated petitioner’s custodial rights to her stepchildren (T.G. and J.R.) and her parental rights to her biological child (R.G.). This terminology reflects:

  • Stepparents may not have full legal “parental rights” in the same sense as biological or adoptive parents;
  • However, where a stepparent is a primary caregiver in the home, the court may address their rights as “custodial” rights subject to termination in abuse and neglect proceedings;
  • Such custodial rights can be severed to protect children from harmful caregivers, even if the stepparent is not a legal parent.

The opinion thus illustrates how West Virginia courts treat stepparents as full participants in child welfare proceedings when they function in parental roles.

4. Role of Prior Terminations

While the Court does not explicitly cite the statutory provision addressing prior terminations in this opinion, DHS’s allegations and the circuit court’s findings relied heavily on petitioner’s:

  • History of a child injured by methamphetamine-related lye exposure and failure to complete services;
  • Subsequent termination for abandonment.

That history:

  • Demonstrated a pattern of failing to protect children and benefit from intervention;
  • Supported the “no reasonable likelihood” finding;
  • Weighed strongly against any assumption that additional services would succeed this time.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Clear and convincing evidence: A high civil standard of proof. It requires that the evidence be highly and substantially more likely to be true than not, and that the fact-finder have a firm belief or conviction in its factuality. It is more demanding than “preponderance of the evidence” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • Adjudication vs. Disposition:
    • Adjudication is where the court decides whether a child has been abused or neglected and whether a parent is an abusing or neglecting parent.
    • Disposition is where the court decides what to do about it — e.g., reunification with conditions, improvement period, placement with relatives, termination of rights.
  • Post-adjudicatory improvement period: A court-supervised period after adjudication during which a parent gets services and an opportunity to correct the conditions of abuse/neglect. It is:
    • Not a constitutional right;
    • Available only if properly requested (here, via written motion) and if the court finds the parent is likely to comply and benefit.
  • “No reasonable likelihood” of correction: Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d), this means the parent has shown an “inadequate capacity” to solve the problems of abuse or neglect, even with help. Persistent denial, repeated failures in services, or a long pattern of serious parenting deficiencies can satisfy this standard.
  • Remedial vs. punitive proceedings: Abuse and neglect cases are remedial:
    • Their primary goal is to protect children and secure their welfare, not to punish parents;
    • This remedial nature is why courts may, under Doris S., draw adverse inferences from parental silence.
  • Parental rights vs. custodial rights:
    • Parental rights attach to legal parents (biological or adoptive) and include decision-making authority and responsibilities;
    • Custodial rights can exist in non-parents who have physical custody and caregiving roles (e.g., stepparents, guardians). Abuse and neglect courts may terminate either or both to ensure a child’s safety.
  • Less restrictive alternatives to termination: Options such as:
    • Temporary custody to DHS with continued parental contact;
    • Legal guardianship with a relative;
    • Supervised visitation with services.
    These must give way to termination if:
    • There is no reasonable likelihood of correction; and
    • Termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

VI. Impact and Future Significance

Though issued as a memorandum decision, In re T.G., J.R., and R.G. crystallizes and reinforces several important trends and rules in West Virginia child welfare law:

  • Procedural rigor for improvement periods: Courts and practitioners are reminded that a post-adjudicatory improvement period:
    • Requires a written motion under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2) and P.G.-1;
    • Must be properly preserved and cited under Rule 10(c)(7) to be reviewed on appeal.
  • Substance over form in services: Mere attendance or “compliance” will not shield a parent from termination if they:
    • Refuse to acknowledge wrongdoing; or
    • Fail to show genuine insight and behavioral change.
    This encourages courts to look for benefit from services, not just participation.
  • Continued force of Timber M. and Doris S.:
    • Parents who maintain blanket denials after adjudication face an uphill battle for improvement periods and reunification;
    • Silence or refusal to testify can and will be considered as evidence of culpability in the remedial context.
  • Child-centered permanency: The decision aligns with a strong emphasis on:
    • Protecting children from ongoing harm;
    • Achieving timely permanency (here, through adoption);
    • Limiting repeated cycles of services where prior interventions and terminations have already failed.
  • Guidance for stepparent caregivers: Stepparents who assume caregiving and custodial roles are subject to the same rigorous abuse and neglect standards as parents. Their “custodial rights” may be terminated where they fail to protect and care adequately for children in their home.

VII. Conclusion

In re T.G., J.R., and R.G. affirms a termination decision that rested not only on grim factual circumstances — unsanitary living conditions, child disclosures of physical and sexual abuse, denial of food, alcohol use in the home — but also on petitioner’s entrenched denial and failure to accept responsibility despite extensive services and prior terminations.

Doctrinally, the case underscores that:

  • DHS may prove abuse and neglect with a wide range of evidence, including CAC interviews and circumstantial facts;
  • Trriers of fact may treat parental silence as evidence of culpability in remedial proceedings;
  • Improvement periods are neither automatic nor available absent a written motion and a realistic prospect of change;
  • Denial of abuse or neglect can render problems untreatable for purposes of child safety and permanency;
  • Where there is no reasonable likelihood of correction and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare, courts may terminate parental (and custodial) rights without further less restrictive measures.

In the broader legal context, this decision reinforces a pragmatic, child-focused approach: when a parent’s history and present conduct demonstrate that services will not meaningfully change entrenched patterns of abuse or neglect, courts are justified — indeed, obligated — to prioritize the child’s right to safety, stability, and a permanent home over continued attempts at parental rehabilitation.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

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