Strict Enforcement of Rule-16(b) Deadlines and Redressability of Declaratory Relief after Settlement:
A Commentary on CBV Inc. v. ChanBond LLC (3d Cir. 2025)

Introduction

The Third Circuit’s unpublished opinion in CBV Inc. v. ChanBond LLC, No. 24-1780 (3d Cir. July 21, 2025) tackles two recurring procedural flash-points in federal civil litigation: (1) when a party may amend (or, more precisely, supplement) its pleadings after the deadline imposed by a Rule 16(b) scheduling order, and (2) when a request for declaratory relief becomes moot after the underlying dispute has been resolved and funds disbursed.

CBV, the original patent owner, sought additional compensation after discovering that ChanBond—its patent-purchaser—had paid millions from a $125 million infringement settlement to its consulting affiliate, IPNAV. When the district court refused to let CBV add a late unjust-enrichment claim against IPNAV and later dismissed CBV’s request for a declaratory judgment interpreting a “prior approval” clause, CBV appealed. The Third Circuit affirmed, crystallising two important points:

1. Good cause to modify a Rule 16(b) deadline is demanding, especially where the proposed claim could be litigated in a separate action and trial is imminent; and
2. A declaratory-judgment request loses Article III redressability—and therefore becomes moot—once the challenged funds are paid, the parties have settled, and no remaining claim can be anchored to the declaration.

Summary of the Judgment

• Denial of Leave to Supplement. Four months after the scheduling-order deadline and mere weeks before trial, CBV moved to add an unjust-enrichment claim against IPNAV. The court of appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave because (a) Rule 16(b)(4) requires a showing of “good cause,” (b) the new claim arose after the litigation commenced and could be filed in a new suit, and (c) allowing the claim would disrupt the imminent trial schedule.
• Mootness of Declaratory Relief. By the time summary judgment was argued, ChanBond had already paid IPNAV the arbitral award and CBV had settled its damages claims with ChanBond. Without a live controversy or any remaining relief that a declaration could deliver, the court found CBV’s declaratory-judgment request non-redressable and therefore moot. No mootness exception (voluntary cessation, capable-of-repetition, etc.) applied.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Eastern Minerals & Chemicals Co. v. Mahan, 225 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2000) – Provides abuse-of-discretion standard for denying late amendments. The panel relied on Mahan to underscore district-court autonomy over its docket.
• Morgan v. Covington Township, 648 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2011) – Clarifies that res judicata does not bar claims arising after the original pleading. The court used Morgan to explain why CBV could still pursue unjust enrichment in a new action, reducing the need to disturb the scheduling order.
• Lutter v. JNESO, 86 F.4th 111 (3d Cir. 2023) – Distinguishes amendment from supplementation; cited to characterise CBV’s motion as a supplement based on post-complaint events and to compare the “more lenient” standard for amendments with the stricter approach to supplementation.
• Gulden v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 119 F.4th 299 (3d Cir. 2024) – Reiterates that loss of any standing element during litigation can moot a claim. Anchored the mootness analysis.
• FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234 (2024) and Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) – Contrasted as examples of mootness exceptions (voluntary cessation and capable-of-repetition), neither of which applied here.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Rule 16(b) “Good Cause.”

Rule 16(b)(4) permits modification of a scheduling order “only for good cause.” Good cause, the panel reiterated, pivots on the diligence of the moving party and the prejudice to the orderly progression of the case. The opinion stresses three factors:

1. Timing – The motion arrived four months late and two months before trial.
2. Availability of Alternative Forum – Because the unjust-enrichment events post-dated the complaint, CBV could pursue a stand-alone action, so the equities of judicial economy were weak.
3. Disruption – Adding new parties/claims would have required new discovery, undermining the purpose of the scheduling order.

These points collectively justified denying leave without abusing discretion.

b. Mootness & Declaratory Relief.

Article III requires an “actual, ongoing case or controversy.” A declaratory judgment must offer conclusive resolution that affects the parties’ present or future conduct. Three intervening events stripped redressability:

1. ChanBond paid IPNAV the contested $30 million, leaving no pot of money to redirect.
2. CBV settled with ChanBond, promising to hold ChanBond harmless and seeking no further monetary relief.
3. The court had denied CBV’s attempt to add an unjust-enrichment claim, the only live claim that could have been advanced by a declaration.

With no practical effect left, the declaration would be an advisory opinion—constitutionally impermissible.

3. Likely Impact of the Decision

• Stricter Adherence to Scheduling Orders. Litigants in the Third Circuit can expect even less tolerance for late-added claims when (i) the new claim is supplemental, not merely amended, and (ii) it can be pursued in a fresh suit.
• Declaratory Relief after Settlement. Parties seeking declarations to influence allocation of funds should obtain them before the money is disbursed or claims settled. Once the economic stakes are gone, so is standing.
• Patent-monetisation Deals. Although the merits of the “prior-approval” clause were never reached on appeal, the litigation signals to patent buyers and sellers that affiliate-consulting agreements must be vetted ex ante or risk later strife.
• Strategic Considerations for Unjust-Enrichment Claims. Plaintiffs cannot rely on a parent lawsuit as a perpetual vessel for newly accruing enrichment claims; vigilant monitoring and prompt motion practice are essential.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order: A court-issued timetable fixing deadlines (for amendments, discovery, motions, etc.). Altering it after entry requires “good cause,” meaning the party could not have reasonably met the deadline despite diligence.
• Amendment vs. Supplementation: • Amendment changes allegations based on pre-existing events.
  • Supplementation adds allegations or claims based on post-filing events. Courts scrutinise supplementation more closely when trial is near.
• Mootness: If intervening events eliminate the concrete stake parties once had, a claim becomes “moot” and federal courts lose jurisdiction—unless an exception applies (e.g., voluntary cessation or capable-of-repetition).
• Redressability: Part of constitutional standing; the court’s decision must be capable of providing meaningful relief to the plaintiff. If money is already gone and no injunction is sought, a declaration alone may not suffice.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision in CBV Inc. v. ChanBond LLC re-emphasises two procedural guardrails: (1) litigants must strictly observe Rule 16(b) deadlines or show compelling, case-specific “good cause” to deviate, and (2) declaratory judgments require a live controversy with genuine prospective consequences—once the economic or legal stake evaporates, so too does federal jurisdiction.

Beyond its immediate parties, the opinion serves as a cautionary tale for patent-monetisation ventures and civil litigators alike: address affiliate transactions upfront, seek declaratory relief early, and move quickly if new causes of action arise. Failing that, courts will not hesitate to bar late claims and dismiss moot requests, preserving efficient case management and Article III limits.