Strict Enforcement of Issue Preservation and Counsel Competence in Immigration Appeals: Commentary on Salazar‑Gutierrez v. Bondi (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2025)

Strict Enforcement of Issue Preservation and Counsel Competence in Immigration Appeals: Commentary on Salazar‑Gutierrez v. Bondi (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Second Circuit’s summary order in Salazar‑Gutierrez v. Bondi, No. 23‑7789 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2025) (summary order), a petition for review arising from removal proceedings against three Ecuadorian nationals: Luis Bernadino Salazar‑Gutierrez, Gabriela Margarita Tipantasig‑Chango, and their minor child.

Although designated a “summary order” without precedential effect under the Second Circuit’s rules, the decision is notable in several respects:

  • It reinforces the strict consequences of failing to preserve and properly brief issues at both the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and court of appeals levels.
  • It underscores the importance of addressing all dispositive elements of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) claims—particularly the likelihood of persecution or torture.
  • It applies and clarifies existing precedent regarding:
    • Waiver before the BIA and abandonment of issues on petition for review;
    • The “one central reason” nexus standard in withholding of removal;
    • The two‑step CAT analysis (likelihood of torture plus state action); and
    • The connection between failing to meet the asylum standard and failure on withholding and CAT.
  • It sharply criticizes petitioners’ counsel’s briefing and forwards the order to the Court’s Grievance Panel, while simultaneously sketching a roadmap for a potential motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

The decision therefore provides a pointed reminder to immigration practitioners about appellate briefing standards, issue preservation, and the procedures and standards governing ineffective assistance claims in immigration proceedings.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit (Judges Nardini, Robinson, and Nathan) denied the petition for review of a BIA decision that had affirmed an Immigration Judge’s denial of:

  • Asylum;
  • Withholding of removal; and
  • Protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

Because the BIA had modified the IJ’s reasoning, the court reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified and supplemented by the BIA, excluding issues the BIA expressly did not reach.

With respect to:

  • Asylum and withholding of removal:
    • The BIA held that Salazar‑Gutierrez waived key challenges on appeal, specifically:
      • Whether his past harm rose to the level of “persecution,” and
      • Whether he had an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.
    • On petition for review, Salazar‑Gutierrez did not challenge the BIA’s waiver finding.
    • The Second Circuit treated that failure as abandonment of the dispositive issues and declined to reach the merits.
  • CAT protection:
    • The agency had found:
      • No showing that torture was “more likely than not,” and
      • No showing that any such torture would be inflicted by or with the acquiescence of a public official.
    • Salazar‑Gutierrez’s brief to the court addressed only the “state action/acquiescence” element, not the likelihood of torture.
    • The court again treated the unbriefed, dispositive element—likelihood of torture—as abandoned and denied CAT relief.

In a pointed section, the court criticized petitioners’ counsel, Michael Borja, for:

  • Failing to address dispositive issues;
  • Providing inadequate citations;
  • Misstating legal standards (particularly for CAT); and
  • Misrepresenting the evidentiary record.

Because of these deficiencies, the panel directed that a copy of the order be forwarded to the Second Circuit’s Grievance Panel. At the same time, in a detailed footnote, the court explained that petitioners may seek to file a motion to reopen with the BIA based on ineffective assistance of counsel, outlined the statutory time limit for such motions, and summarized the standards for equitable tolling and the procedural requirements under Matter of Lozada.

All pending motions and applications were denied, and any stays of removal were vacated.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Posture and Scope of Review

The case proceeded through the standard immigration adjudication pipeline:

  1. Immigration Judge (IJ) – Denied asylum, withholding, and CAT relief in an October 5, 2022 decision.
  2. BIA – On October 19, 2023, affirmed the IJ’s decision but on limited grounds, and expressly declined to reach certain alternative bases relied on by the IJ.
  3. Second Circuit – Reviewed the BIA’s decision and the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA.

The Second Circuit cites:

  • Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); and
  • Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005),

for the well‑established proposition that when the BIA adopts parts of an IJ decision and rejects or modifies others, the court reviews:

  • The IJ’s opinion as modified by the BIA (i.e., ignoring grounds the BIA declined to reach), and
  • The BIA’s own additional reasoning.

The court’s standards of review are likewise standard:

  • Factual findings (e.g., the severity of harm, the risk of future harm, government acquiescence):
    • Reviewed under the substantial evidence standard (citing Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018)); and
    • Deemed “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
  • Questions of law and application of law to fact:
    • Reviewed de novo (again citing Hong Fei Gao).

This framework becomes critical when the court later explains both:

  • Why it cannot reach issues that have been waived or abandoned; and
  • Why it will not reweigh conflicting evidence when the agency’s conclusions are supported by record evidence (citing Quintanilla‑Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 592 (2d Cir. 2021)).

B. Asylum and Withholding of Removal

1. Substantive Legal Standards

To obtain asylum, an applicant must show that he is a “refugee” within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The order cites (with a likely typographical error in the title) 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) and § 1231(b)(3)(A), together with the implementing regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b) (asylum) and 1208.16(b) (withholding of removal).

Key requirements distilled by the court:

  • Past persecution or well‑founded fear of future persecution:
    • “Persecution” is an “extreme concept” and must be more than “mere harassment.”
      • Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006);
      • Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011).
    • Absent past persecution, the applicant must demonstrate a fear of future persecution that is objectively reasonable (citing Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004)).
  • Nexus to a protected ground:
    • The harm must be “on account of” race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
    • For asylum, the protected ground must be “one central reason” for the harm, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
    • In footnote 2, the court underscores that this “one central reason” standard also applies to withholding of removal, citing Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 109–14 (2d Cir. 2022).

The IJ apparently made findings on multiple elements, including:

  • Whether the harm rose to the level of “persecution,” and
  • Whether there was an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.

However, the BIA chose to resolve the appeal at the administrative level solely on the grounds of waiver of those issues.

2. Waiver Before the BIA and Abandonment in the Court of Appeals

The BIA determined that Salazar‑Gutierrez had waived his challenge to the IJ’s dispositive findings that:

  • Past harm did not rise to the level of persecution; and
  • He did not establish an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.

In other words, on administrative appeal he did not meaningfully contest the IJ’s findings on those elements. Under BIA practice, an appellant’s failure to brief an issue constitutes waiver at the agency level.

On petition for review, the Second Circuit emphasizes that Salazar‑Gutierrez:

  • Did not challenge the BIA’s waiver finding; and therefore
  • Abandoned any argument that the IJ erred on the core elements of persecution and well‑founded fear.

The court cites Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023), for the rule that:

“We consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an appellant’s brief, and an appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment.”

The court accordingly refuses to reach the underlying merits, noting that courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues unnecessary to the result, citing INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976).

By contrast, petitioners’ appellate brief focused heavily on:

  • Nexus arguments (e.g., whether persecution was “on account of” a protected ground), and
  • An incorrect contention that the “one central reason” standard does not apply to withholding of removal—an error foreclosed by Quituizaca.

Because the BIA did not rely on the nexus findings to resolve the case, the Second Circuit notes that these arguments are “misplaced.” Under Xue Hong Yang and Yan Chen, the court reviews only those grounds actually relied upon by the BIA.

Practical significance: The order powerfully illustrates a two‑level failure:

  1. Before the BIA – Failure to brief key issues led to waiver at the administrative level.
  2. Before the Second Circuit – Failure to challenge that waiver ruling or to brief the dispositive elements led to abandonment and denial of the petition.

The court’s reliance on Debique reflects a continuing trend: petitions for review will be denied where briefing does not squarely engage the BIA’s actual rationale, even if potentially meritorious arguments could have been made.

C. CAT Protection

1. Legal Framework and the Two‑Step Inquiry

To obtain relief under the Convention Against Torture, an applicant must show that:

  • It is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed; and
  • The torture would be inflicted by or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.

The order relies on the governing regulations:

  • 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2): “more likely than not” burden;
  • 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1): definition of torture requiring state action (instigation, consent, or acquiescence); and
  • 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7): definition of “acquiescence” as requiring prior awareness of the activity and subsequent breach of a legal duty to intervene.

The Second Circuit describes a CAT claim as involving a two‑step inquiry, citing Garcia‑Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 758–59 (2d Cir. 2022):

  1. Whether torture is “more likely than not” to occur; and
  2. Whether there is “sufficient state action” (i.e., government involvement or acquiescence) in that torture.

Both elements must be proven; failure on either is dispositive.

2. Petitioners’ Briefing Defect and Resulting Abandonment

The agency found both that:

  • Salazar‑Gutierrez did not show that torture was more likely than not; and
  • He did not show government acquiescence.

In the Second Circuit, however, petitioners’ counsel:

  • Challenged only the state‑action component, and
  • Failed to brief the likelihood‑of‑torture element.

The court holds that this failure to address the likelihood element abandons the CAT claim. It cites:

  • Debique again for abandonment by inadequate briefing; and
  • Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010), for the proposition that:
    An applicant who fails to meet the lower burden for asylum “necessarily fails to demonstrate the clear probability of future persecution required for withholding of removal, and the more likely than not to be tortured standard required for CAT relief.”

Lecaj is particularly important. It means that:

  • If the applicant cannot establish a “well‑founded fear” of persecution for asylum (a lower probability threshold),
  • He generally cannot meet the “clear probability” or “more likely than not” burdens applicable to withholding and CAT, absent some materially different theory or evidence specific to those claims.

Here, since Salazar‑Gutierrez did not successfully challenge the BIA’s resolution of the asylum claim, it follows a fortiori that he cannot meet the higher CAT standard. And because he did not brief the likelihood‑of‑torture element at all, the court treats that omission as independently dispositive.

The order further notes that counsel incorrectly argued that the agency erred by requiring government acquiescence for CAT relief—an argument directly contradicted by the regulation defining torture itself, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). The court also notes that, contrary to counsel’s assertions, the agency’s rejection of the “acquiescence” element was supported by record evidence of Ecuadorian government efforts to combat corruption and gang violence. Under Quintanilla‑Mejia, the existence of conflicting evidence favoring the applicant is not sufficient to overturn the agency’s finding if the record also supports the agency’s conclusion.

D. Appellate Briefing Standards and Counsel’s Performance

1. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)

The court invokes Fed. R. App. P. 28(a), which sets out the contents and structure of an appellant’s brief, including:

  • A statement of issues presented for review;
  • A concise statement of the case and relevant facts, with citations to the record;
  • Argument with citations to authorities and the record; and
  • A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.

The panel finds multiple violations of these requirements in petitioners’ brief:

  • Failure to address dispositive issues (persecution threshold, likelihood of torture);
  • Insufficient citation to legal authority and record evidence; and
  • Misstatements of both law and fact.

2. Court’s Criticism and Referral to the Grievance Panel

The court takes the unusual step of explicitly criticizing counsel, identifying specific problems, and ordering that the opinion be forwarded to the Court’s Grievance Panel for further consideration of possible attorney discipline.

The order lists several concrete examples of deficient performance:

  • Misstatement of CAT law:
    • Counsel argued that the agency erred by requiring government acquiescence, despite the plain text of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1), which defines torture as harm inflicted “by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official.”
  • Failure to engage with the agency’s actual reasoning:
    • Counsel claimed there was “sufficient evidence of state action,” but the BIA had found otherwise and had relied on country‑conditions evidence indicating efforts to combat gang violence and corruption.
    • The brief did not meaningfully grapple with that evidence or explain why any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach a different conclusion, as required under the substantial evidence standard.
  • Misrepresentation of the record:
    • The brief asserted, without citation, that petitioners were “continuously attacked and threatened with death,” even though “there is no such evidence in the record.”
  • Misunderstanding of nexus law:
    • As noted in footnote 2, counsel argued that the “one central reason” nexus standard did not apply to withholding of removal, contrary to Quituizaca.

By forwarding the opinion to the Grievance Panel, the court signals that such deficiencies may not only disadvantage the client but also raise serious professional responsibility concerns. At the same time, as discussed below, the panel explicitly acknowledges that petitioners may have recourse through a motion to reopen premised on ineffective assistance of counsel.

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Motion to Reopen

1. Statutory and Doctrinal Background

In its final footnote, the court emphasizes that:

“Petitioners may seek to file with the BIA a motion to reopen removal proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel before the IJ or the BIA.”

A motion to reopen is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), which generally:

  • Limits a noncitizen to one motion to reopen; and
  • Requires that the motion be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).

However, the court points out that:

  • Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2008), recognizes that ineffective assistance of counsel can justify equitable tolling of both:
    • The 90‑day filing deadline; and
    • The numerical bar on motions to reopen.

Under Rashid, a party seeking equitable tolling must show:

  1. That counsel’s performance was so ineffective that it impinged upon the fundamental fairness of the hearing; and
  2. That the noncitizen has exercised due diligence in pursuing the claim.

The panel expressly declines to express any opinion on:

  • Whether petitioners have potentially meritorious claims for asylum, withholding, or CAT if proceedings are reopened; or
  • Whether equitable tolling would be appropriate here.

Instead, the court offers what is effectively procedural guidance for a possible future motion.

2. Matter of Lozada Compliance

The court also notes that any individual claiming ineffective assistance in removal proceedings must “substantially comply” with Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), citing Twum v. INS, 411 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2005).

Under Lozada, and as summarized by the court, the motion to reopen must include:

  1. Affidavit from the noncitizen:
    • Setting forth in detail the agreement with former counsel concerning what action would be taken; and
    • Explaining what counsel did or did not represent in this regard.
  2. Notice to former counsel:
    • Proof that the noncitizen notified former counsel of the allegations of ineffective assistance; and
    • Evidence that counsel was given an opportunity to respond.
  3. Disciplinary complaint or explanation:
    • If a violation of ethical or legal duties is alleged, a statement indicating:
      • Whether a complaint has been filed with an appropriate disciplinary authority; and
      • If not, an explanation for the failure to file such a complaint.

The court’s inclusion of this detail is unusual for a summary order and underscores its concern that:

  • Petitioners were potentially prejudiced by their representation; but
  • Any remedy must be sought in the proper procedural posture (i.e., via a motion to reopen before the BIA, not in the first instance on petition for review).

3. Court’s Non‑Committal but Instructive Guidance

The panel is careful not to prejudge the outcome of a potential motion to reopen or any related disciplinary proceedings. Nonetheless, by:

  • Outlining the path to reopening;
  • Describing the standards for equitable tolling; and
  • Providing a concise roadmap to Lozada compliance,

the court sends a clear signal to both petitioners and the bar:

  • Clients harmed by seriously deficient representation may have recourse; but
  • They must act diligently and follow specific procedural rules.

IV. Clarification of Key Legal Concepts

The order touches on several doctrinal points that can be opaque to non‑specialists. The following simplified explanations may assist in understanding the case’s significance.

1. Persecution vs. “Mere Harassment”

  • Persecution is a severe level of harm, such as:
    • Serious physical violence;
    • Detention or torture;
    • Serious threats combined with other forms of harm; or
    • Grave economic or social harm targeted on a protected ground.
  • “Mere harassment” (e.g., isolated insults, minor threats, or sporadic discrimination) is not enough to satisfy the legal test for asylum.
  • The distinction is fact‑intensive and depends on:
    • Frequency and severity of incidents;
    • Cumulative effect;
    • Context, including country conditions and vulnerability of the applicant.

2. Probability Standards: Asylum vs. Withholding vs. CAT

  • Asylum – The “well‑founded fear” standard can be met with a probability significantly less than 50% that persecution will occur; courts have suggested even a 10% chance may suffice if the consequences are severe.
  • Withholding of removal – Requires a “clear probability” that persecution will occur, often treated as roughly “more likely than not” (>50%).
  • CAT protection – Also uses a “more likely than not” (>50%) standard, but focused specifically on torture with state involvement.
  • Because these standards escalate in stringency, Lecaj explains that failing to meet the asylum standard ordinarily means the applicant will also fail on withholding and CAT, unless a distinct theory or new evidence is presented.

3. Nexus and the “One Central Reason” Standard

  • For asylum and withholding, the applicant must show that persecution is “on account of” a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or particular social group).
  • The REAL ID Act codified a “one central reason” standard for asylum, meaning the protected characteristic must be one of the central reasons for the harm, not an incidental or tangential factor.
  • Quituizaca v. Garland extended this “one central reason” test to withholding of removal in the Second Circuit.

4. Waiver vs. Abandonment of Issues

  • Waiver before the BIA:
    • Occurs when an appellant does not raise or brief a particular issue in the administrative appeal;
    • The BIA can treat such issues as waived and refuse to consider them.
  • Abandonment in the court of appeals:
    • Occurs when a petitioner fails to raise or adequately brief an issue in the petition for review; and
    • The court will then decline to address that issue, even if it was preserved below.
    • Debique is the key authority cited for this doctrine.

5. CAT “State Action” and Government Acquiescence

  • CAT relief is not available for purely private violence unless there is a sufficient link to the state.
  • “Acquiescence” means that:
    • A public official is aware (before the fact) of the torture, and
    • Fails to take steps to prevent it, in breach of a legal duty.
  • Evidence that a government is attempting to combat gangs or corruption can undermine a claim of systemic acquiescence, though corruption or local complicity may still suffice in some cases if sufficiently supported by evidence.

6. Substantial Evidence Review

  • The court may not simply reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
  • If there is any reasonable view of the evidence that supports the agency’s decision, the court must uphold it, even if another view might also be reasonable.
  • Only if the record would “compel” a contrary conclusion can the petitioner prevail.

7. Equitable Tolling and Lozada in Ineffective Assistance Claims

  • Equitable tolling allows a motion to reopen to be filed beyond the 90‑day deadline if:
    • Counsel’s performance was so deficient it undermined the fundamental fairness of the proceedings; and
    • The noncitizen acted diligently in discovering and pursuing the claim.
    • Matter of Lozada compliance:
      • Affidavit describing the representation and alleged failures;
      • Notice to prior counsel and opportunity to respond;
      • Statement regarding disciplinary complaint (filed or explained why not).

    V. Impact and Practical Implications

    Although formally nonprecedential, the Salazar‑Gutierrez order is significant for practitioners and adjudicators in several ways.

    1. Reinforcing Strict Issue Preservation

    • The decision confirms that:
      • Arguments not raised before the BIA are waived at the administrative level; and
      • Arguments not properly briefed before the Second Circuit are abandoned on judicial review.
    • Immigration practitioners must ensure that:
      • The IJ’s key adverse findings (e.g., no persecution, no well‑founded fear, no likelihood of torture, no acquiescence) are challenged in detail before the BIA; and
      • The petition for review squarely attacks the BIA’s actual rationale, with specific legal and factual arguments.

    2. The Necessity of Addressing All Elements of Relief

    • The case shows the risk of focusing on one aspect of a claim (e.g., nexus, state action) while neglecting threshold elements like:
      • Severity of harm (persecution vs. harassment);
      • Objective reasonableness of fear; or
      • Likelihood that torture will occur.
    • Courts will not rescue a petitioner from such omissions, even where underlying facts might be sympathetic; the burden of proper briefing lies on counsel.

    3. Professional Responsibility and Quality of Advocacy

    • The explicit referral to the Grievance Panel is a strong message to immigration counsel in the Second Circuit:
      • Misstating the law (e.g., CAT without state involvement) or the record (e.g., describing “continuous attacks” that never occurred) is beyond mere zealous advocacy and can trigger professional discipline.
      • Immigration appeals demand specialized knowledge and careful attention to both legal standards and evidentiary support.
    • The decision thus may encourage:
      • Higher quality briefing; and
      • Closer court scrutiny of repeated or egregious deficiencies in representation.

    4. Guidance on Ineffective Assistance and Reopening

    • By spelling out the contours of equitable tolling and Lozada compliance, the order:
      • Provides a practical template for future motions to reopen based on ineffective assistance; and
      • Signals the court’s openness, in appropriate cases, to the idea that poor representation can warrant additional time and a fresh adjudication.
    • At the same time, the panel’s neutrality on the merits preserves the BIA’s primary role in evaluating such motions in the first instance.

    5. Continuity with Existing Precedent

    The decision does not create a new rule of law but consolidates and applies existing Second Circuit and Supreme Court precedents:

    • Yang and Yan Chen on the scope of review;
    • Hong Fei Gao and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) on the substantial evidence standard;
    • Ivanishvili and Mei Fun Wong on the definition of persecution;
    • Ramsameachire on objective reasonableness of future fear;
    • Bagamasbad on declining to decide unnecessary issues;
    • Quituizaca on the “one central reason” standard for withholding;
    • Debique and Fed. R. App. P. 28(a) on abandonment via inadequate briefing;
    • Garcia‑Aranda on the two‑step CAT inquiry;
    • Lecaj on the interplay between asylum, withholding, and CAT burdens;
    • Quintanilla‑Mejia on substantial evidence review and conflicting evidence; and
    • Rashid, Lozada, and Twum on ineffective assistance and reopening.

    In this sense, Salazar‑Gutierrez is best understood as a cautionary application of settled law to a case where the primary problem was not the doctrinal complexity of asylum or CAT, but the failure of advocacy at both administrative and judicial levels.

    VI. Conclusion

    Salazar‑Gutierrez v. Bondi is a nonprecedential summary order, but it carries significant practical and professional lessons. It reaffirms that:

    • Immigration relief is denied not only when claims lack substantive merit, but also when counsel fails to properly preserve and argue them;
    • Courts will rigorously enforce waiver and abandonment doctrines, particularly in the face of deficient briefing that ignores dispositive issues;
    • Accuracy in describing both the law and the record is a core professional duty, and violations can trigger disciplinary review; and
    • Noncitizens harmed by ineffective representation may, in limited circumstances, obtain a second chance through a motion to reopen—but only if they act diligently and comply with detailed procedural requirements, including those set forth in Matter of Lozada.

    For practitioners, the decision is a stark reminder that effective advocacy in immigration appeals requires:

    • Mastery of the governing legal standards;
    • Comprehensive and accurate briefing of all dispositive elements; and
    • Meticulous attention to the evidentiary record and procedural preservation of issues.

    For noncitizens and adjudicators, Salazar‑Gutierrez highlights both the vulnerabilities created by inadequate counsel and the structured, albeit demanding, mechanisms the law provides to address such failures through motions to reopen and equitable tolling.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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