Strict Enforcement of Final‑Judgment and Notice‑of‑Appeal Rules for Pro Se Litigants: Commentary on Martin v. City of Las Vegas (5th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Fifth Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in Martin v. City of Las Vegas, No. 25‑50216 (5th Cir. Nov. 26, 2025), is not designated for publication under 5th Cir. R. 47.5 and therefore does not create binding precedent in the ordinary sense. Nonetheless, it provides a clear and instructive application of several core appellate doctrines:

The final‑judgment rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 in multi‑party litigation.
The requirement under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B) that a notice of appeal must designate the judgment or appealable order being challenged.
The circumstances under which a denial of in forma pauperis (IFP) status on appeal is proper because the appeal is frivolous or jurisdictionally defective.

The case arises from a pro se federal lawsuit filed in the Western District of Texas by Stacey Bernard Martin concerning his alleged deprivation of access to his son. Martin sued numerous Nevada‑based actors—judges, attorneys, a legal aid organization, child advocacy personnel—as well as the City of Las Vegas and others. Several motions to dismiss were granted (on grounds including lack of personal jurisdiction and immunity), and other defendants were subject to a magistrate judge’s recommendation for dismissal based on lack of proper service.

Before the district court entered a final judgment disposing of all claims against all parties, Martin filed two documents styled as “Motion for Interlocutory Appeal Section 1” and “Motion for Interlocutory Appeal Section 2.” The district court and the Fifth Circuit construed these documents as notices of appeal.

The Fifth Circuit’s opinion does not reach the merits of Martin’s constitutional allegations, the underlying family‑law context, or the propriety of the district court’s personal‑jurisdiction and immunity rulings. Instead, it addresses only whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction to consider Martin’s attempted appeal and whether the district court properly denied his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. The court ultimately dismisses the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This commentary examines the decision in depth, focusing on:

The procedural background and posture.
The court’s application of well‑established appellate principles.
The precedents cited and how they shape the outcome.
The implications for future litigants—particularly pro se parties—in multi‑defendant federal cases.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Background

Martin filed an amended complaint in the Western District of Texas against:

The City of Las Vegas (“The City”).
Several Nevada state judges (Judges Linda Marquis, Christine Vasquez Hortick, and Rosie Alvarado).
Attorneys and law firms (including Cameron Brown, Christopher P. Ford, Tony T. Smith, and Ford Friedman Law Firm).
Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, Inc. (LACSN) and Marina Dalia‑Hunt.
Child‑advocacy and private individuals (e.g., Kassandra Levay Child Advocacy, the Ochonmas, etc.).

He alleged that, in connection with disputes over access to his son, these defendants engaged in illegal and unconstitutional conduct.

Key procedural steps in the district court included:

Motions to dismiss by Nevada‑based defendants:
- Dalia‑Hunt and LACSN moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
- Judge Marquis moved to dismiss, also citing lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) among other grounds.
- Judges Hortick and Alvarado moved to dismiss, invoking Eleventh Amendment immunity and judicial immunity.
District court’s rulings:
- The district court granted the personal‑jurisdiction motions and the immunity‑based motion, dismissing:
  - Dalia‑Hunt
  - LACSN
  - Judge Marquis
  - Judge Hortick
  - Judge Alvarado
- A magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation that the remaining defendants (including The City, Brown, Ford, Smith, House, KLCA, and the Ochonmas) be dismissed for lack of or improper service.

Crucially, the district court had not yet entered a final judgment disposing of all claims against all defendants when Martin filed his putative notices of appeal:

“Motion for Interlocutory Appeal Section 1” (challenging, among other things, dismissal of The City, Judge Marquis, and Dalia‑Hunt and various rulings about Nevada defendants and attorneys).
“Motion for Interlocutory Appeal Section 2” (challenging the dismissal of Judges Hortick and Alvarado and broadly “all his motions”).

Upon direction from the Fifth Circuit, Martin filed an opening brief describing nine “constitutional questions” and an alleged criminal conspiracy involving all defendants, focusing mainly on events in state courts.

B. Holding

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, relying on two principal grounds:

No final, appealable judgment at the time of the notices of appeal.
- The dismissals of certain defendants were partial; claims against other defendants remained pending.
- These partial dismissals were not certified as final under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
- The district court had not yet acted on the magistrate judge’s recommendation regarding the remaining defendants.
- The final judgment came approximately three months after Martin filed his notices of appeal.
- Therefore, the notices of appeal were premature, and the court lacked jurisdiction to review those dismissals.
Martin’s notices of appeal failed to “designate the judgment—or the appealable order—from which the appeal is taken” as required by Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B).
- His “Section 1” and “Section 2” notices did not clearly identify any specific orders.
- His brief and notices focused primarily on alleged wrongdoing in state courts and did not provide a clear indication of which federal district‑court orders he sought to challenge.
- Even under the rule of liberal construction for pro se filings, this failure to designate could not be cured, as the filings did not give sufficient notice to the court or other parties.

Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit examined the record to identify which district‑court orders were likely encompassed in Martin’s references to “all his motions,” and held:

Orders denying:
- a motion to dismiss a motion to dismiss (treated as a response to a motion to dismiss),
- a motion for default judgment, and
- a motion for a criminal investigation referral,
were not final, appealable orders at the time of the notices of appeal and, in any event, not subject to immediate appeal.
The order denying Martin’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal was proper because the appeal was frivolous:
- The IFP motion only supplied financial information; it did not identify any nonfrivolous appellate issue, rendering it frivolous under United States v. Dunlap, 389 F. App’x 359 (5th Cir. 2010).
- Moreover, even if it had identified the dismissal orders as issues, the appeal would still be frivolous because the Fifth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review those orders (they were not yet final).

On that basis, the court concluded:

“Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED.”

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Duty to Examine Appellate Jurisdiction Sua Sponte

The Fifth Circuit begins by reiterating a foundational principle: appellate courts must ensure they have jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits, even if no party raises the issue.

It cites:

Lewis v. Sheriff’s Dep’t Bossier Par., 478 F. App’x 809, 813 (5th Cir. 2012), quoting In re Cortez, 457 F.3d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 2006): “[W]e are obligated to examine the basis for our jurisdiction, sua sponte, if necessary.”

This principle is rooted in the constitutional and statutory limits on federal courts’ power. Without statutory authorization—primarily 28 U.S.C. § 1291’s grant of jurisdiction over “final decisions” of district courts (and a handful of specific interlocutory appeal provisions)—an appellate court must dismiss.

2. Final‑Judgment Rule and Partial Dispositions in Multi‑Party Cases

The court then turns to the central jurisdictional issue: whether the orders dismissing some, but not all, defendants were immediately appealable.

Citing:

Butler v. Denka Performance Elastomer LLC, 806 F. App’x 271, 273 (5th Cir. 2020), quoting Elizondo v. Green, 671 F.3d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 2012):
“[I]n a multi‑party lawsuit, ‘a dismissal of claims against some, but not all, defendants is not a final appealable judgment unless, pursuant to Rule 54(b) . . . the district court concludes there is no justification for delaying an appeal and specifically directs entry of judgment.’”

This reflects a straightforward application of:

28 U.S.C. § 1291: limiting appellate jurisdiction to “final decisions” of the district courts, and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b): which allows a district court, in a case involving multiple claims or parties, to enter a partial final judgment as to fewer than all claims or parties, but only by making an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and expressly directing entry of judgment.

Where, as here, the district court dismissed some defendants (for lack of personal jurisdiction and immunity) but not others—and did not issue a Rule 54(b) certification—there was no “final decision” within the meaning of § 1291. The unresolved defendants (e.g., The City and others still pending with a magistrate recommendation outstanding) meant the litigation was ongoing.

The court also notes:

Star Ins. Co. v. Livestock Producers Inc., 34 F. App’x 151, 2002 WL 496371, at *2 (5th Cir. 2002): When a notice of appeal is premature, “the court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal.”

This applies the general rule that an appeal filed before a final judgment (and outside the limited exceptions, such as certain Rule 4(a)(2) scenarios) is ineffective to confer jurisdiction.

3. Specificity Requirement in Notices of Appeal – Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)

Even apart from the lack of finality, the court finds a second, independent jurisdictional defect: Martin’s notices of appeal failed to comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c).

Rule 3(c)(1) requires that a notice of appeal:

Specify the party or parties taking the appeal.
Designate the judgment—or the appealable order—from which the appeal is taken.
Name the court to which the appeal is taken.

The court quotes Rule 3(c)(1)(B) directly:

“[T]he notice of appeal must ‘designate the judgment—or the appealable order—from which the appeal is taken.’”

Two key precedents frame the discussion:

Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992):
- Held that a document intended as an appellate brief can serve as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal if it gives the required notice under Rule 3.
- However, the Supreme Court stressed that liberal construction does not excuse failure to meet the core requirements of Rule 3.
Wilson v. Navika Capital Group, L.L.C., 663 F. App’x 341, 344 (5th Cir. 2016), quoting Smith:
“Although courts should ‘liberally construe’ the requirements of Rule 3, ‘[t]his principle of liberal construction does not . . . excuse noncompliance with the Rule.’”
Kinsley v. Lakeview Reg’l Med. Ctr., 570 F.3d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 2009), quoting Smith:
“[T]he purpose of [Rule 3] is to ensure that the filing provides sufficient notice to other parties and the courts.”

Martin’s filings failed this test. The Fifth Circuit observes:

His notices did not designate any specific order or judgment.
The extensive “Section 1” (18 pages) and “Section 2” (10 pages) filings, as well as his 20‑page brief, provided almost no discussion of the district court’s orders—they focused instead on state‑court events and alleged conspiracies.
As a result, neither the court nor the appellees had sufficiently clear notice of what federal rulings Martin actually sought to appeal.

The court acknowledges that a failure to designate can sometimes be cured:

Turnbull v. United States, 929 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1991), quoting United States v. Rochester, 898 F.2d 971, 976 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990):
“[F]ailure to properly designate the order appealed from . . . may be cured by an indication of intent in the briefs or otherwise.”

But here, there was no such clarifying indication. Again, the filings “hardly mention the district court, let alone the district court orders.” Thus, the liberal‑construction rule could not rescue the notices; Rule 3’s core function—notice to court and parties—was not fulfilled.

4. Non‑Appealability of Certain Interlocutory Orders

The Fifth Circuit then takes the extra step of determining which district‑court orders were actually denied when Martin’s notices referred vaguely to “all his motions.” Those included:

a motion to dismiss a motion to dismiss (treated as a response to a defendant’s motion to dismiss),
a motion for default judgment,
a motion for a criminal investigation referral, and
a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

The court holds that the first three were not appealable final orders:

Adult Film Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Thetford, 776 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam):
“We find that the district court’s order denying a [motion for] default judgment . . . is not an appealable final order.”

By analogy, denials of a motion to dismiss another motion and of a motion to refer a matter for criminal investigation are interlocutory rulings in an ongoing case. They do not resolve the merits or terminate the litigation and are not independently appealable under § 1291 or any recognized exception.

5. Denial of In Forma Pauperis Status and “Good Faith” Standard

Finally, the court addresses Martin’s IFP motion. The governing standards come from:

Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219–20 (5th Cir. 1983):
- A federal court may refuse to certify an appeal for IFP status if the appeal is not taken in good faith.
- “Good faith” is shown when an appellant seeks review of any issue that is not frivolous.
United States v. Dunlap, 389 F. App’x 359, 360 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam):
A motion is frivolous where it “only provides his financial information [without] address[ing] whether his appeal will present a nonfrivolous issue.”
Johnson v. Cain, 471 F. App’x 301, 302 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam):
- If the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over the would‑be appeal, then by definition the appeal is frivolous, and the district court does not err by denying IFP.

The Fifth Circuit holds:

Martin’s IFP motion—filed on the court’s short form—only contained financial information and did not identify any jurisdictionally sound or nonfrivolous appellate issue.
Therefore, under Dunlap, the motion was frivolous.
Even if the motion had specified that he sought to appeal the dismissals of Dalia‑Hunt and Judges Marquis, Alvarado, and Hortick, the appeal would remain frivolous because the court lacked jurisdiction over those interlocutory dismissals (as shown earlier).

As a result, the district court properly refused to certify the appeal as taken in good faith and correctly denied IFP status.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning Step‑by‑Step

1. Jurisdictional Review Comes First

The Fifth Circuit adheres to the basic rule that subject‑matter jurisdiction must be confirmed at the outset. Before addressing Martin’s asserted “nine constitutional questions” or his allegations of criminal conspiracy, the court determines whether it has the power under § 1291 and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to hear the case at all. Finding no jurisdiction, it never reaches those constitutional questions.

2. Final‑Judgment Rule in a Multi‑Defendant Context

The court first looks at whether there was a “final decision” of the district court when Martin filed his notices of appeal.

Certain defendants (Dalia‑Hunt, LACSN, Judge Marquis, Judges Hortick and Alvarado) had been dismissed.
But other defendants—most notably The City and several individuals—remained in the case, pending the district court’s action on a magistrate judge’s recommendation.
The district court had not yet entered a final judgment disposing of the case. Indeed, final judgment came about three months later.
There was no Rule 54(b) certification making the partial dismissals immediately appealable.

On these facts, the court applies Butler and Elizondo to hold that the orders dismissing some defendants were not final judgments and thus not yet appealable. Martin’s attempt to appeal them early—via his “interlocutory appeal” motions—was premature and did not confer jurisdiction.

3. Rule 3(c) Defect: Lack of Designation of the Orders Appealed From

Even assuming arguendo that some appealable order existed, the court finds an independent problem: Martin did not tell the court or the appellees clearly what he was appealing.

Rule 3(c)(1)(B) requires that a notice of appeal “designate the judgment—or the appealable order—from which the appeal is taken.” This is more than a technicality; it is the mechanism by which:

The parties know which rulings to brief and defend.
The appellate court can define the scope of its review.

Martin’s notices, and even his later brief, failed to:

Identify specific docket numbers or dates of the orders being challenged.
Describe the nature of those orders (e.g., “the order granting Judge Marquis’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction”).
Connect his constitutional arguments to particular district‑court rulings.

Because his filings were almost entirely focused on alleged criminal misconduct and constitutional violations in Nevada state‑court proceedings—and barely mentioned the federal district‑court process—the court held that the Rule 3(c) designation requirement was not met. Liberal construction under Smith v. Barry cannot salvage a filing that fails to perform the essential notice function.

4. Alternative Analysis: Even if Designation Were Adequate, the Underlying Orders Were Not Appealable or the Appeal Was Frivolous

As an alternative ground, the Fifth Circuit addresses what would happen if Martin’s vague references to “all his motions” were generously construed as appealing the orders denying:

his motion to dismiss a motion to dismiss,
his motion for default judgment,
his motion for criminal investigation referral, and
his motion to proceed IFP on appeal.

The court concludes:

Denials of the first three motions are interlocutory, nonfinal, and nonappealable at that stage.
The denial of default judgment, in particular, is explicitly held nonappealable under Adult Film Ass’n v. Thetford.
The IFP denial was proper because:
- The IFP motion did not articulate any nonfrivolous issue, violating the “good faith” requirement (Howard, Dunlap).
- The only arguably intended issues (the partial dismissals) were themselves non‑appealable at that time, making the appeal frivolous from a jurisdictional standpoint (Johnson).

Thus, even if Rule 3’s designation demand were satisfied (it was not), the appeal would still have to be dismissed either for lack of jurisdiction over nonfinal orders or as frivolous for purposes of IFP.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Reinforcement of Strict Compliance with Final‑Judgment Principles

The decision reinforces that the final‑judgment rule is not a mere formality. In multi‑defendant federal litigation:

Dismissals of some defendants do not open the door to an immediate appeal unless:
- All claims against all defendants are resolved (creating a final judgment under § 1291), or
- The district court enters a Rule 54(b) certification expressly directing entry of judgment and finding no just reason for delay.
If a litigant files an appeal during this “in‑between” stage, the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss.

This is particularly important in complex pro se litigation, where plaintiffs often attempt to appeal step‑by‑step rulings as they are issued. Martin makes clear that such piecemeal appeals are generally improper and ineffective.

2. Notice of Appeal as a Jurisdictional Gateway Document

The decision underscores that the notice of appeal is jurisdictional in function. If the notice does not adequately specify what is being appealed, the appellate court may lack jurisdiction to consider anything.

For practitioners and pro se litigants alike, this means:

The notice of appeal should at minimum:
- Identify the specific order(s) and/or the final judgment by date, and ideally by docket entry number.
- Use clear language (e.g., “I appeal from the final judgment entered on [date] and the order granting [Defendant X]’s motion to dismiss on [date].”).
Vague allusions to “all adverse rulings” or, as here, focusing entirely on extra‑record grievances, may be insufficient and fatal to appellate jurisdiction.

The case thus serves as a cautionary example: substance—not just the heading “notice of appeal”—determines whether jurisdiction is properly invoked.

3. Pro Se Litigants and the Limits of Liberal Construction

While courts often grant latitude to pro se filings, Martin illustrates that there are limits:

Pro se status does not excuse noncompliance with core rules like Rule 3(c).
Liberal construction permits the court to interpret what the litigant clearly intended, but it does not allow the court to guess which orders are being appealed, especially when the filings scarcely mention the federal court proceedings at all.

The opinion thus balances fairness to pro se litigants with the need for procedural clarity and predictability in appellate practice.

4. IFP Appeals and the “Good Faith” Requirement

The court’s treatment of the IFP motion reinforces critical points about appeals taken in forma pauperis:

To proceed IFP on appeal, an appellant must show both:
- inability to pay, and
- a nonfrivolous (good‑faith) basis for the appeal.
A motion that states only financial information, without articulating a legal or factual basis suggesting any reversible error or jurisdictionally valid issue, can be deemed frivolous.
If the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over the orders being challenged, the appeal is necessarily frivolous from an IFP perspective.

For future litigants, especially those proceeding without counsel, Martin signals the importance of:

Using the IFP application to identify at least one specific nonfrivolous legal issue (e.g., “The district court erred by [specific act] on [date].”).
Ensuring the underlying order is, in fact, appealable (e.g., final judgment or certified under Rule 54(b)).

5. Limited but Practical Precedential Impact

Because the opinion is unpublished and explicitly stated to be “not designated for publication” under 5th Cir. R. 47.5, it generally does not serve as binding precedent. Nevertheless, such unpublished opinions:

May be cited in limited contexts (e.g., for res judicata, law of the case, or persuasive authority where allowed by local rules).
Offer practical guidance to district courts and litigants on how the Fifth Circuit is likely to apply settled jurisdictional rules and procedural requirements.

In that sense, Martin contributes to a body of persuasive authority clarifying how strictly the Fifth Circuit enforces:

The final‑judgment rule in multi‑party cases.
Rule 3(c)’s designation requirement.
The “good faith” standard for IFP appeals.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Final‑Judgment Rule (28 U.S.C. § 1291)

Under § 1291, courts of appeals generally can review only “final decisions” of the district courts. A decision is “final” when it:

Ends the litigation on the merits, and
Leaves nothing for the district court to do but execute the judgment.

In a case with multiple defendants, if the court dismisses some defendants but others remain, the litigation is usually not over. Therefore, there is no final decision—unless:

The district court issues a Rule 54(b) order declaring no just reason for delay and directing entry of judgment as to the dismissed parties.

In Martin, that did not happen. So, when Martin attempted to appeal the partial dismissals, his appeal was premature.

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)

Rule 54(b) allows a district court to:

Enter a final judgment on fewer than all claims or parties,
But only if it expressly determines that there is no just reason to delay the appeal and expressly directs entry of judgment.

This rule is an exception to the general rule against piecemeal appeals. Absent a Rule 54(b) certification, partial resolutions are not immediately appealable.

C. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B)

Rule 3(c)(1)(B) requires that a notice of appeal:

“designate the judgment—or the appealable order—from which the appeal is taken.”

In practical terms, this means the notice should:

Reference the specific order or judgment (ideally by date and description).
Make clear what exactly is being appealed.

The rule exists to give fair notice to:

The court of appeals, so it knows what to review; and
The opposing parties, so they know what to defend against.

A notice that simply complains in general terms about wrongdoing or that focuses on matters outside the federal case, without tying those complaints to a particular federal order, fails to satisfy this requirement.

D. In Forma Pauperis (IFP) Appeals and “Good Faith”

Proceeding in forma pauperis allows a litigant who cannot afford filing fees to pursue an appeal without payment. But to be granted IFP status on appeal, a litigant must show:

Financial need, and
That the appeal is taken in “good faith,” meaning it raises at least one issue that is not frivolous.

An appeal is frivolous if:

It lacks any arguable basis in law or fact, or
The appellate court clearly lacks jurisdiction to hear it (e.g., because there is no final judgment to appeal from).

A bare‑bones IFP application that only lists financial information, without explaining what nonfrivolous issue is being appealed, can be denied as frivolous under cases like Dunlap.

E. Personal Jurisdiction, Eleventh Amendment Immunity, and Judicial Immunity (Context Only)

Although the Fifth Circuit did not reach the merits of these doctrines in Martin, the underlying district‑court dismissals involved:

Personal Jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(2)):
- A federal court sitting in Texas generally cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants who have no meaningful contacts with Texas.
- Dalia‑Hunt, LACSN, and Judge Marquis—all Nevada‑based actors—were dismissed for lack of such contacts.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity:
- Bars many suits against states and state officials (in their official capacities) in federal court, absent consent or a valid congressional abrogation.
- Judges Hortick and Alvarado raised this defense.
Judicial Immunity:
- Provides absolute immunity to judges from civil suits for damages based on judicial acts performed within their jurisdiction.
- Also invoked by Judges Hortick and Alvarado.

Because the appeal was dismissed on jurisdictional and procedural grounds, the Fifth Circuit left those questions undisturbed.

V. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

Martin v. City of Las Vegas is a procedural decision, but it carries significant lessons for federal appellate practice, especially for pro se litigants:

Final‑Judgment Rule Is Strictly Enforced. In a case involving multiple defendants, an appeal cannot ordinarily be taken from the dismissal of some defendants while others remain unless:
- There is a final judgment resolving all claims against all parties, or
- The district court enters a Rule 54(b) certification making the partial judgment final and immediately appealable.
A Notice of Appeal Must Clearly Identify What Is Being Appealed. Rule 3(c)(1)(B) requires designation of the judgment or order under review. Generalized complaints, especially those focused on events outside the federal case, do not suffice and may deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction.
Pro Se Status Does Not Override Fundamental Procedural Requirements. Courts will construe pro se filings liberally, but they will not guess at which orders are being appealed or overlook jurisdictional defects.
Not All District‑Court Orders Are Immediately Appealable. Interlocutory orders—such as denials of motions for default judgment, motions to dismiss motions, or requests for criminal investigation referrals—are usually not appealable until final judgment, if at all.
IFP Appeals Require Both Indigence and a Nonfrivolous Issue. A motion that only lists financial information, without identifying any arguably meritorious appellate issue, can properly be denied as frivolous. If the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over the would‑be appeal (e.g., because there is no final judgment), IFP denial is essentially compelled.

Although unpublished and nonprecedential, Martin concretely illustrates how the Fifth Circuit applies longstanding rules governing appellate jurisdiction, notices of appeal, and IFP motions. For litigants—especially those proceeding without counsel—it underscores the importance of:

Waiting until a final judgment (or proper Rule 54(b) certification) before appealing.
Clearly designating in the notice of appeal the specific orders or judgment being challenged.
Ensuring that an IFP application identifies at least one nonfrivolous issue for review.

These procedural prerequisites are not mere technicalities; they define the court of appeals’ power to hear a case at all. In Martin, failure to satisfy them led inexorably to dismissal of the appeal, leaving the district court’s dismissals intact and Martin’s substantive complaints unreviewed at the appellate level.