Strict Enforcement of Appellate Deadlines in Recall Appeals: Washington Supreme Court Affirms Inherent Power to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute

Introduction

In In re Recall of Ruelas, the Washington Supreme Court reinforced the constitutional and statutory imperative that recall proceedings be handled “without delay.” The case arose from a recall effort against Rachel Ruelas, the Mayor of Mabton, predicated on allegations that she failed to timely perform budget duties and used city resources to promote her private business. After the Yakima County Superior Court deemed two charges legally and factually sufficient for the ballot, Mayor Ruelas appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

The appeal, however, was marred by repeated procedural defaults: missed deadlines for designating the record and arranging transcripts, failure to respond to the clerk’s question about duplicative filings, and an untimely merits brief followed by a tardy extension request. The recall proponents moved to dismiss the appeal for failure to prosecute. The Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, emphasizing the neutrality and necessity of appellate deadlines in the recall context. A dissent would have reached the merits to perform the judiciary’s recall “gatekeeping” role and, on that basis, would have found both charges insufficient.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the Court, Justice González held that the judiciary’s constitutional and statutory duty to expedite recall matters requires strict adherence to appellate deadlines. Reaffirming that courts possess inherent authority to dismiss for want of prosecution, the Court concluded that Mayor Ruelas’s repeated failures to meet deadlines in an accelerated recall appeal prevented timely disposition, thereby warranting dismissal. The Court granted the recall proponents’ motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, dismissed the appeal, and remanded.

The majority underscored that briefing deadlines are neutral in operation and integral to orderly and timely appellate review, especially in recall cases. It did not reach the merits of the recall charges.

In dissent, Justice Gordon McCloud would have denied the dismissal, invoked RAP 1.2(a)’s preference for decisions on the merits, and concluded the charges were legally and factually insufficient. The dissent argued that no prejudice was shown to support laches and that the Court, as a gatekeeper against frivolous recalls, should decide sufficiency rather than dismiss based on several weeks’ delay.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Constitutional and statutory acceleration of recall: The majority grounded its urgency in the Washington Constitution, article I, sections 33-34, which enshrine recall and direct the legislature to facilitate the process “without delay,” and in RCW 29A.56.110, .140, .270, which accelerate judicial handling. The Court cited In re Recall of West, 156 Wn.2d 244, 251 n.2, 126 P.3d 798 (2006), to characterize recall matters as “urgent and deserving of accelerated procedure.”
• Inherent power to dismiss for want of prosecution: The key authority is Snohomish County v. Thorp Meats, 110 Wn.2d 163, 166–67, 750 P.2d 1251 (1988) (quoting State ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court, 16 Wn.2d 300, 304, 133 P.2d 285 (1943)), which the majority invoked to affirm the judiciary’s inherent power to dismiss a case when a party’s inaction impedes timely resolution. This precedent underpins the Court’s holding that dismissal—independent of any laches analysis—is appropriate where deadlines in an accelerated appeal are repeatedly ignored.
• Dissent’s gatekeeping jurisprudence: The dissent canvassed a line of recall sufficiency cases:
  • In re Recall of Inslee, 200 Wn.2d 809, 522 P.3d 972 (2023); In re Recall of Riddle, 189 Wn.2d 565, 403 P.3d 849 (2017); In re Recall of West, 155 Wn.2d 659, 121 P.3d 1190 (2005): reiterating that courts must screen out “frivolous or unsubstantiated charges.”
  • Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wn.2d 268, 693 P.2d 71 (1984): legislative intent to allow recall for cause while protecting officials from harassment via baseless charges.
  • In re Recall of Sawant, 197 Wn.2d 420, 483 P.3d 752 (2021); In re Recall of Boldt, 187 Wn.2d 542, 386 P.3d 1104 (2017); Teaford v. Howard, 104 Wn.2d 580, 707 P.2d 1327 (1985): setting the de novo standard and limiting appellate review to facial legal and factual sufficiency; allegations are assumed true for this screening function.
  • In re Recall of Wasson, 149 Wn.2d 787, 72 P.3d 170 (2003); In re Recall of Anderson, 131 Wn.2d 92, 929 P.2d 410 (1997); In re Recall of Ackerson, 143 Wn.2d 366, 20 P.3d 930 (2001); In re Recall of Zufelt, 112 Wn.2d 906, 774 P.2d 1223 (1989); In re Recall of Wade, 115 Wn.2d 544, 799 P.2d 1179 (1990): defining legal and factual sufficiency and the need to identify a violated standard, law, or rule.
  • In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wn.2d 255, 961 P.2d 343 (1998): when illegality is alleged, petitioners must show intent to commit the act and intent to act unlawfully.
  • In re Recall of Burnham, 194 Wn.2d 68, 448 P.3d 747 (2019); Hubbard v. Spokane County, 146 Wn.2d 699, 50 P.3d 602 (2002), overruled in part on other grounds: delineating “special privilege” under RCW 42.23.070(1) and when conduct confers such a privilege.
  • In re Recall of Feetham, 149 Wn.2d 860, 72 P.3d 741 (2003): applied RCW 42.23.070(1) in the recall setting.
  These authorities informed the dissent’s conclusion that both charges against Mayor Ruelas were insufficient and should not reach voters.

Legal Reasoning

Majority

The majority’s reasoning is concise and categorical:

• Constitutional and statutory mandate to expedite: Article I, section 34 commands the legislature to pass laws facilitating recall “without delay.” The legislature did so via RCW 29A.56.110, .140, and .270, which collectively accelerate superior court review, ballot synopsis issuance, and appellate proceedings in recall cases.
• Deadlines as neutral and necessary: The Court emphasized that “[c]ourt rules prescribing deadlines for the filing of briefs are neutral—they do not favor either party.” Deadlines ensure that the appellate process proceeds “without unnecessary delay,” a concern magnified in recall matters due to the constitutional imperative.
• Inherent power to dismiss for failure to prosecute: Citing Thorp Meats and Dawson, the Court reaffirmed its inherent authority to dismiss when a party’s noncompliance frustrates timely adjudication. The Court grounded dismissal not in equitable laches but in its supervisory power over the docket and the orderly administration of justice.
• Application to the facts: The record showed repeated noncompliance: missed initial and revised deadlines for record designation and arrangements, nonresponse to a clerk’s inquiry about duplicative filings, failure to timely file a merits brief, and a belated extension request weeks after the due date. These lapses “prevented [the Court] from timely disposing of this case.” On that basis, the Court granted the motion to dismiss and remanded.

Notably, the majority neither analyzed nor required a showing of prejudice (as would be expected under laches), signaling that in accelerated recall appeals, repeated missed deadlines can justify dismissal under inherent authority alone.

Dissent

The dissent framed the Court’s role in recall litigation as dual and sometimes competing: to resolve recall cases quickly and to protect the electorate and officeholders by screening out unsubstantiated charges. It argued that where the Court possesses full briefing—even after delay—RAP 1.2(a) counsels in favor of deciding on the merits absent prejudice.

On the merits, the dissent would have held the two surviving charges insufficient:

• Budget charge (RCW 35A.33.075): The statute cited by the petitioners (and used in the ballot synopsis) imposes the duty to adopt the final budget on the legislative body—the city council—not on the mayor. The mayor’s role is set forth in RCW 35A.33.052 (preparing the preliminary budget). Because the charge relied on a statute that does not impose a duty on the mayor, it failed to “identify a standard, law, or rule” making the mayor’s alleged conduct unlawful, rendering it legally insufficient.
• Special privileges charge (RCW 42.23.070(1)): The dissent reasoned that a “special privilege” typically involves either the official’s violation of a law to confer a benefit that would otherwise be unavailable (Hubbard) or conferring a benefit on unequal terms (Burnham). A screenshot displaying a City “Home of the Month” photograph that includes the name of the mayor’s private business as a co-sponsor does not, without more, show the securing of a special privilege for the mayor or the exclusion of others. Furthermore, because the charge alleged illegality, petitioners needed to show the mayor’s intent to act unlawfully (Pearsall-Stipek), and to provide dates and particulars (RCW 29A.56.110). The petition, in the dissent’s view, fell short factually and legally.

Balancing expedition against gatekeeping, the dissent concluded that the delay—while inexcusable—did not prejudice the proponents, and thus the Court should decide the sufficiency questions rather than dismiss.

Impact

The Court’s holding carries several practical and doctrinal implications:

• Heightened procedural discipline in recall appeals: Parties—especially appellants challenging sufficiency rulings—should expect strict enforcement of appellate deadlines. Belated briefing may not cure missed deadlines in an accelerated recall appeal. Counsel must proactively seek extensions before deadlines and respond promptly to clerk directives.
• No prejudice requirement for dismissal under inherent power: By resting on inherent authority rather than laches, the Court signaled that repeated noncompliance in an accelerated recall appeal may warrant dismissal without a separate demonstration of prejudice to the opposing party.
• Systemic commitment to recall expedition: The decision aligns with Washington’s constitutional and statutory design to expedite recall proceedings, preventing procedural stalling from undermining the electorate’s timely access to the recall process.
• Tension with merits-first adjudication policies: The dissent highlights a countervailing interest: courts’ gatekeeping duty to prevent frivolous recalls and RAP 1.2(a)’s preference for decisions on the merits. Future litigants may invoke this tension when seeking relief from minor or brief defaults. But Ruelas indicates that, at least where missed deadlines are repeated and unexcused, the balance tips toward dismissal.
• Practical effect on this case: With the appeal dismissed, the superior court’s sufficiency determinations remain intact on remand, and the recall process may proceed according to the superior court’s order and statutory timelines.
• Guidance (though not binding) on drafting recall charges: While not part of the holding, the dissent’s merits analysis offers a caution to future recall proponents:
  • Identify the correct statute imposing the duty on the officer charged (e.g., RCW 35A.33.052 for a mayor’s budget preparation, not RCW 35A.33.075 for council adoption).
  • For RCW 42.23.070(1), be prepared to show how the benefit was unlawful or not equally available, and allege intent when charging illegality.
  • Include approximate dates, locations, and the nature of each act as required by RCW 29A.56.110.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Recall petition “sufficiency”: Before a recall reaches voters, a court checks whether the charges, assumed true, (1) allege conduct that would amount to misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of the oath of office (legal sufficiency) and (2) are backed by detailed, specific factual allegations within the petitioners’ knowledge (factual sufficiency). The court does not decide truth at this stage.
• Misfeasance, malfeasance, violation of oath (RCW 29A.56.110):
  • Misfeasance: wrongful conduct affecting official duty; also performing a duty improperly.
  • Malfeasance: the commission of an unlawful act.
  • Violation of oath: neglect or knowing failure to faithfully perform a legal duty.
• Ballot synopsis (RCW 29A.56.130-.140): A concise statement of each charge that appears on the ballot; the superior court may amend it and, once set, its content is not reviewable on appeal.
• Failure to prosecute vs. laches:
  • Failure to prosecute: A court’s inherent authority to dismiss when a party fails to move the case forward (e.g., by repeatedly missing deadlines). It safeguards the court’s docket and the timely administration of justice.
  • Laches: An equitable defense requiring inexcusable delay and prejudice to the opposing party. The majority did not rely on laches here; the dissent discussed it to argue for reaching the merits.
• Accelerated recall appeal: Recall matters are fast-tracked by statute to ensure voters can act promptly. This “rocket docket” magnifies the importance of meeting every filing deadline.
• Designation of clerk’s papers and statement of arrangements:
  • Designation of clerk’s papers identifies the documents from the trial court file that the appellate court will review.
  • Statement of arrangements initiates preparation of the verbatim report of proceedings (transcript) and related logistics.
  • In accelerated cases, tardiness in these foundational steps can stall the entire appeal.
• Budget statutes (RCW 35A.33):
  • RCW 35A.33.052: the mayor’s duty to prepare and file the preliminary budget with the city clerk.
  • RCW 35A.33.075: the council’s duty to adopt the final budget by ordinance and transmit it to the state auditor and the Association of Washington Cities.
• Special privileges (RCW 42.23.070(1)): A “special privilege” often entails conferring a benefit unavailable without violating law (Hubbard) or on unequal terms (Burnham). Alleging illegality also requires pleading (and ultimately proving) intent.

Conclusion

In re Recall of Ruelas crystallizes a clear procedural principle for Washington recall litigation: appellate deadlines in accelerated recall appeals are to be strictly enforced, and repeated noncompliance may result in dismissal for failure to prosecute under the Court’s inherent powers—without a separate showing of prejudice under laches. The decision underscores the judiciary’s constitutional and statutory obligation to advance recall proceedings “without delay,” even at the cost of foregoing merits review where an appellant’s conduct impedes timely adjudication.

The dissent’s comprehensive merits analysis simultaneously reminds practitioners of the enduring gatekeeping function: recall petitions must be tightly drafted, cite the correct statutory duties, specify dates and particulars, and, where illegality is alleged, plead intent. While that guidance is not the holding, it is a roadmap for future petitions and challenges.

The key takeaway is dual: for parties in recall appeals, procedural rigor is nonnegotiable; for petition drafters, substantive rigor remains essential. Together, these norms serve the constitutional design—ensuring that the powerful remedy of recall proceeds swiftly, but ultimately, only on adequate grounds.